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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the colonial ruling class developed its first White 
Australia policy in 1888, creating most of the precedents for the federal 
legislation of 1901. White Australia was central to the making of the Australian 
working class, to the shaping of Australian nationalism, and the development 
of federal political institutions. It has long been understood as a product of 
labour movement mobilising, but this thesis rejects that approach, arguing that 
the labour movement lacked the power to impose such a fundamental national 
policy, and that the key decisions which led to White Australia were 
demonstrably not products of labour movement action. 
It finds three great ruling class agendas behind the decisions to exclude Chinese 
immigrants, and severely limit the use of indentured “coloured labour”. 
Chinese people were seen as a strategic threat to Anglo-Australian control of 
the continent, and this fear was sharpened in the mid-1880s when China was 
seen as a rising military power, and a necessary ally for Britain in its global 
rivalry with Russia.  The second ruling class agenda was the building of a 
modern industrial economy, which might be threatened by industries resting 
on indentured labour in the north. The third agenda was the desire to construct 
an homogenous people, which was seen as necessary for containing social 
discontent and allowing “free institutions”, such as parliamentary democracy. 
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These agendas, and the ruling class interests behind them, challenged other 
major ruling class interests and ideologies. The result was a series of dilemmas 
and conflicts within the ruling class, and the resolution of these moved the 
colonial governments towards the White Australia policy of 1901. The thesis 
therefore describes the conflict over the use of Pacific Islanders by pastoralists 
in Queensland, the campaign for indentured Indian labour by sugar planters 
and the radical strategy of submerging this into a campaign for North 
Queensland separation, and the strike and anti-Chinese campaign in opposition 
to the use of Chinese workers by the Australasian Steam Navigation Company 
in 1878. The first White Australia policy of 1888 was the outcome of three 
separate struggles by the majority of the Anglo-Australian ruling class—to 
narrowly restrict the use of indentured labour in Queensland, to assert the right 
of the colonies to decide their collective immigration policies independently of 
Britain, and to force South Australia to accept the end of Chinese immigration 
into its Northern Territory. The dominant elements in the ruling class had 
already agreed that any serious move towards federation was to be conditional 
on the building of a white, predominantly British, population across the whole 
continent, and in 1888 they imposed that policy on their own societies and the 
British government. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
THIS THESIS explains the development of the White Australia policy in a new 
way, not as the result of working-class racism or working-class mobilisation, 
but as a ruling-class attempt to secure three major objectives—Anglo-Australian 
colonisation of the continent, a modern rather than indentured labour economy, 
across the whole continent, and an “homogeneous” population. These strategies 
were fought for by the dominant elements within the ruling class in a series of 
conflicts from 1876 onwards, with the first White Australia policy being 
established by 1888 through legislation that effectively prevented Chinese 
immigration and severely constrained the employment of indentured non-
European labour in Queensland. The laws adopted in 1901, shortly after 
federation, represented a broadening and consolidation of the principles 
established in 1888. 
White Australia was one of the defining elements of Australian nationalism and 
a central feature of Australian politics for two-thirds of the twentieth century. 
Frank Castles and Paul Kelly have argued that in the period around federation, 
Australia’s first national politicians developed an “Australian settlement”, a set 
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of broad policies agreed to by all major parties, policies above the fray of 
partisan conflict, which guided the year-by-year business of legislating and 
governing. They see White Australia as a crucial part of this “Australian 
settlement”.1 Nevertheless it was dismantled in a long process beginning in the 
late 1950s and ending in 1975 with the passing of the Racial Discrimination Act. 
The ideology of “White Australia” and the prevention of non-European 
immigration were always affronts to the peoples of Asia, and with 
decolonisation after the Second World War, the affronts were felt by the 
political leaders and business people who were now running Australia’s 
neighbours. With racism more generally discredited after the Holocaust, the 
White Australia policy had become a strategic, ideological and economic 
liability.2
Yet even years after its official demise, White Australia and its attendant racism 
have continued to haunt Australian politics. During 1984-85, Geoffrey Blainey 
won a national audience for his campaign against the supposed “surrendering” 
of Australia to Asia through immigration. In August 1988, Liberal opposition 
                                                 
1 Francis Castles, Australian public policy and economic vulnerability: A comparative and historical 
perspective, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988, especially pp. 91-109. Paul Kelly outlined his theory 
of the Australian Settlement in The end of certainty: Power politics & business in Australia, revised 
edition, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards (NSW), 1994, pp. 1-13. His account has been controversial, 
and inter alia, the subject of a major discussion in The Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 
39, no. 1, March 2004, with contributions by Geoffrey Stokes, Marian Sawer, Stuart Macintyre, 
Judith Brett, Paul Smyth and Kelly in reply. Significantly, all of the contributors agree that there 
was some kind of agreed national political strategy in place for most of the twentieth century 
and all who mention the White Australia policy see it at the centre of this hegemony. 
2 This is the argument of The Immigration Reform Group, Immigration: Control or Colour Bar? 
The background to ‘White Australia’ and a proposal for change, revised edition, Melbourne 
University Press, Parkville (Vic), 1962, pp. 88, 92-103. See also Sean Brawley The white peril: 
foreign relations and Asian immigration to Australasia and North America 1919-78, UNSW Press, 
Sydney, 1995, pp. 297-320; Gwenda Tavan “The dismantling of the White Australia Policy: Elite 
conspiracy or will of the Australian people?” in Australian Journal of Political Science vol. 39, no. 
1, March 2004, pp. 109-25. 
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leader, John Howard, called for reduced Asian immigration in a vain attempt to 
win votes. Pauline Hanson’s election to federal parliament in 1996 unleashed 
racist campaigns against both Indigenous people and non-European 
immigrants that were openly tolerated, if not encouraged, by Howard as Prime 
Minister. Since 1999, John Howard has used the issues of refugees and terrorism 
to promote fear of Arab and Muslim people3 Many writers see contemporary 
Australian politics as a legacy of White Australia, including Ghassan Hage, and 
the distinguished contributors to Legacies of White Australia published in 2003.4 
Ien Ang argued that the rise of Hanson was “a sharp reminder that the 
structures of feeling of White Australia have not disappeared”.5 From the right 
there is a renewed willingness to defend the White Australia policy as “a 
rational, and in a number of ways progressive, product of its times.”6 For those 
of us who wish to permanently rid society of racism, it is imperative that we 
have a clear understanding of its origins and underpinnings. This thesis will 
argue that the currently hegemonic explanation of White Australia is 
fundamentally flawed, and of limited assistance in understanding racism in 
Australia, either in the past, or today. 
                                                 
3 Scott Poynting, Greg Noble, Paul Tabar and Jock Collins, Bin Laden in the suburbs: Criminalising 
the Arab other, Sydney Institute of Criminology, Sydney, 2004. 
4 Ghassan Hage, White nation: Fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural society, Pluto Press, 
Annandale (NSW), 1998; and Against paranoid nationalism: Searching for hope in a shrinking society, 
Pluto Press, Annandale (NSW), 2003. See also Laksiri Jayasuriya, David Walker and Jan 
Gothard (eds), Legacies of White Australia: Race, culture and nation, UWA Press, Crawley (WA), 
2003. 
5 Ien Ang, “From White Australia to fortress Australia: The anxious nation in the new century” 
in Jayasuriya, Walker and Gothard (eds), Legacies of White Australia, p. 51. 
6 Keith Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, Macleay Press, Sydney, 2004, p. 9. 
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A review of the literature 
For all its importance, the White Australia policy has been relatively little 
studied; and the dynamics leading to its adoption have been least studied of all. 
Until 1974, there was only one substantial history of the campaign to exclude 
non-white immigrants: Myra Willard’s The history of the White Australia Policy to 
1920, first published in 1923.7 The early 1970s saw a transformation in the 
approach of historians, most of whom for the first time saw White Australia as a 
question of racism, and began investigating the nature and history of that 
racism.8 For the first time, too, the experiences of Chinese and other non-
European people in Australia, and their contact with Anglo-Australian people, 
                                                 
7 Myra Willard, The history of the White Australia Policy to 1920, Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton (Vic), 1967 (first pub 1923). RJ Lewis makes a similar comment regarding Victoria for 
the years 1880-1907, “the period which saw the greatest involvement in Victoria’s history of 
Governments in passing or attempting to pass measures which were specifically designed to 
restrict non-Europeans. And yet it had been little studied.” From “‘Strangers within the gates’: 
Victorian governments and non-Europeans”, 1880-1908, MA Thesis, University of Melbourne, 
1982, p. ii. I am aware of nothing since which fills the gap identified by Lewis. 
8 Humphrey McQueen, A new Britannia: An argument concerning the social origins of Australian 
radicalism and nationalism, Penguin, Ringwood (Vic), 1970; FS Stevens (ed), Racism: The Australian 
experience: A study of race prejudice in Australia: Volume 1, Prejudice and xenophobia, Australia and 
New Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1971; Volume 2, Black versus white, Australia and New 
Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1971; Volume 3, Colonialism, Australia and New Zealand Book 
Company, Sydney, 1972; Ann Curthoys, “Race and ethnicity: A study of the response of British 
colonists to Aborigines, Chinese and non-British Europeans in New South Wales, 1856-1881“, 
PhD thesis, Macquarie University, 1973; Raymond Evans, Kay Saunders, Kathryn Cronin, Race 
relations in colonial Queensland: A history of exclusion, exploitation and extermination, University of 
Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1988 (First published 1975); Andrew Markus, Fear and hatred: 
Purifying Australia and California 1850-1901, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1979; Kathryn Cronin, 
Colonial casualties: Chinese in early Victoria, Melbourne University Press, Carlton (Vic), 1982; Ann 
Curthoys and Andrew Markus (eds), Who are our enemies? Racism and the Australian working 
class, Hale and Iremonger in association with the Australian Society for the Study of Labour 
History, Neutral Bay (NSW), 1978; Robert A Huttenback, Racism and empire: White settlers and 
colored immigrants in the British self-governing colonies 1830-1910, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
and London, 1976. 
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began to be studied, and that has continued to develop.9 However, after a burst 
of interest in the 1970s, research into the reasons for anti-Asian racism stalled, in 
sharp contrast to the intense focus on contact between Aboriginal people and 
European settlers that has developed over the past two decades into a major 
discipline in its own right. Indeed, in 1982, Eric Andrews wrote that, “Further 
work on the general picture [of White Australia] is not needed”.10
A major reason for this complacency was the dominance of a mythology of 
White Australia, in which large scale Chinese immigration during the gold 
rushes had alerted working class people to see Chinese people as a danger; and 
even if the riotous methods they used were unfortunate, all classes became 
more and more agreed that the white working class had to be protected from 
Asian immigration. In the labourist version of this myth, White Australia was 
seen as the product of a class struggle between pastoralists and sugar planters, 
who wanted to exploit “cheap coloured labour”, and the working people who 
fought to stop them. Thus it is the working class (however defined) that 
imposed the policy against exploitative employers. This mythology still 
dominates popular views of the White Australia policy, as can be seen in the 
Sydney Daily Mirror, which in 1994 headlined an historical feature on the 
                                                 
9 Among the more notable are Paul Macgregor (ed), Histories of the Chinese in Australasia and the 
South Pacific: Proceedings of an international public conference held at the Museum of Chinese 
Australian History, Melbourne, 8-10 October 1993, Museum of Chinese Australian History, 
Melbourne, 1995; Cathie R May, Topsawyers: The Chinese in Cairns, 1870-1920, Studies in North 
Queensland history, Department of History and Politics, James Cook University, (Townsville), 
1984; Diana Giese, Beyond Chinatown: Changing perspectives on the Top End Chinese experience, 
National Library of Australia, Canberra, 1995; Regina Ganter (Guest editor), Asians in Australian 
history , Special issue of Queensland Review, vol. 6, no. 2, November 1999; Clive Moore, Kanaka: A 
history of Melanesian Mackay, Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies and University of Papua 
New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 1985; M De Lepervanche, Indians in a white Australia, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 1984. 
10 EM Andrews, Australia and China: The ambiguous relationship, Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton (Vic), 1985, p. 248, emphasis in the original. 
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Clunes riot of 1873: “White Australia Policy sprang from workers’ uprising”.11 
In the lead-up to the 1996 federal election, Opposition leader, John Howard, 
told one audience that, “it was the Coalition which finally put an end to Labor’s 
White Australia policy.”12 Fuelling this myth was the insistence of the Labor 
Party over decades that it was the only reliable custodian of the White Australia 
policy; in the words of Labor leader, James Scullin, “Labour is solid for a White 
Australia, and no amount of political propaganda will shake the people’s faith 
in our party on that big national question.”13
The four major works which have attempted to explain White Australia were 
written by Myra Willard (1923), Charles Price (1974), Robert A Huttenback 
(1976) and Andrew Markus (1979). Willard’s was the pioneering history, 
regarded as sufficiently authoritative that there was no new book-length 
account for over half a century. She proposed two dynamics which led to the 
adoption of White Australia: the resistance of the working class to competition 
with non-European labour; and the desire to preserve “a British-Australian 
                                                 
11 Daily Mirror (Sydney), 30 September 1994. 
12 ‘Politics and patriotism: A reflection on the national identity debate’, speech given by Hon 
John Howard, Melbourne, 13 December 1995, [online] 
http://www.ozpolitics.info/election2004/1995-ident.htm [accessed 1 December 2006]. He was, 
of course, wrong on both counts. The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 was a central plank in 
the 1901 election campaign of the quasi-Protectionist government of Edmund Barton as well as 
the Labor campaigns in various states, and the legislation was written and introduced by the 
Liberal, Alfred Deakin. The principle was overwhelmingly supported by the Free Trade party 
led by George Reid, as well as by Labor, with the parliamentary debate revolving around the 
form which exclusion would take, rather than the principle of exclusion itself. Similarly, while 
coalition governments began the formal unravelling of the policy, it was only completed under 
the Whitlam government from 1973-75. On this see Gwenda Tavan, The long, slow death of White 
Australia, Scribe, Melbourne, 2005. 
13 Carlotta Ellis, “Why does the A.L.P. support the ‘White Australia’ Policy? (1855-1940)“, MA 
thesis, Melbourne University, c1950, p. 1. See also Jack Lang, I remember, Invincible Press, 
Sydney, 1956, chapter 6, “White Australia saved Australia”. 
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nationality” throughout the continent.14 These two themes have dominated the 
historiography of White Australia, with this qualification—that since the 1970s, 
the second has been reconceptualised as “racism”, and occasionally 
imperialism. Where there has been debate, it has been, for instance, over 
whether or not the motives of the colonial working class were “economic” or 
“racial”.15
In the hands of some writers, the central myth was qualified to acknowledge 
the role played by middle class elements. Ray Markey described the various 
anti-Chinese campaigns from the gold rushes through to the end of the 
nineteenth century as attracting “a populist alliance of diggers, city artisans, 
small businessmen and bourgeois liberals”.16 Ann Curthoys too embraced the 
idea that, “What emerged during the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s, then, was an 
alliance among the political organisations of the working class, the self-
employed, and the small employers.”17 But in even the most subtle accounts, it 
was the motives of the working class, and the labour movement’s role in the 
campaigns, that were described, analysed and highlighted, while those 
politicians who led the campaigns were generally described in terms of the 
demography of their electorates (mostly working class), rather than their own 
class positions or interests.18 The mythology is also sustained by partial truths 
                                                 
14 Willard, p. 189. 
15 See Verity Burgmann, “Capital and labour” in Curthoys and Markus (eds), Who are our 
enemies? pp. 20-34, for the outlines of this debate. 
16 Ray Markey, “Populist politics” in Curthoys and Markus (eds), Who are our enemies? p. 67. 
17 Ann Curthoys, “Racism and class in the nineteenth-century immigration debate” in Andrew 
Markus and MC Ricklefs (eds), Surrender Australia? Essays in the study and uses of history: Geoffrey 
Blainey and Asian immigration, George Allen & Unwin, North Sydney (NSW), 1985, p. 97. 
18 For example, Curthoys, Race and ethnicity, p. 443, where she describes seven NSW MPs 
involved in the anti-Chinese campaign of 1878 as “a group of M.L.A.’s, usually representing 
working class electorates”. Of the seven, John Davies was a former Cabinet minister and the 
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that are deceptive in the impression they create. For instance, in his discussion 
of refugee policy in Australia, Don McMaster wrote, “Trade unions were major 
supporters of the White Australia policy, perceiving immigrant labour, and 
especially Chinese labour, as a threat to working conditions.”19 He neglected to 
say that most politicians, squatters, religious leaders, newspapers, 
schoolteachers and businesspeople large and small, were also major supporters 
of the White Australia policy. 
The problem is that the historical consensus is unconvincing to anyone who 
cares to look critically at the explanations on offer. The writer most hostile to 
the established mythology, Verity Burgmann, argued that, “It attributes to the 
working class a degree of power and influence that is quite unrealistic.”20 
Legislation to restrict Chinese immigration was passed by the Queensland 
parliament in 1877 when there was little ongoing labour movement in that 
colony. While individual strikes could be won, and governments pressed to 
give relief to the unemployed at times, no labour movement in any colony had 
the capacity to exert sustained class pressure before the 1890s, and certainly not 
pressure on the scale needed to impose a long-term immigration policy on the 
state. The most powerful working class mobilisation in Australia before 1890 
was the seamen’s strike of 1878-79, centred in New South Wales, which saw 
                                                                                                                                               
President of the Protestant Political Association, perhaps the most powerful, ruling-class 
political machine in NSW; Macintosh was a businessman and ally of Davies’; McElhone was a 
rich merchant, exporter and Sydney City Councillor; Hungerford was a major pastoralist who 
in 1883 had 3 million acres in the Gulf country and 1 million acres in South Australia near the 
Queensland border; and O’Connor was another major businessman and Sydney City 
Councillor. The remaining two were skilled artisans with business links and support (Melville, 
and Cameron). 
19 Don McMaster, Asylum seekers: Australia’s response to refugees, Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton South (Vic), 2001, p. 136.  
20 Burgmann, Capital and labour, p. 33. 
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thousands of workers take prolonged industrial action to prevent the 
Australasian Steam Navigation Company from replacing European seafarers 
with Chinese. This industrial action was supported by a vast cross-class popular 
movement that defeated and ultimately ruined the largest business in Sydney. 
Yet this movement could not force the New South Wales parliament to pass a 
law to restrict Chinese immigration, similar to Queensland’s.21
One of the very few other writers to have subjected the existing explanations to 
sustained scrutiny is Robert J Lewis, in his MA thesis, “‘Strangers within the 
gates’: Victorian governments and non-Europeans, 1880-1908”.22 Lewis was 
frustrated by the Australia-wide approach taken by Willard, arguing that “in 
covering the situation of all the colonies, Willard may end up not sufficiently 
explaining them individually.” After listing the factors which Willard believed 
led to anti-Chinese legislation in New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia in 1881, Lewis asked: 
Were Victorians more affected by competition, the Queensland situation, 
or the introduction of diseases? Were all colonies equally concerned with 
all factors? Willard does not say, relying on such expressions as: “the 
now fairly general desire for the restriction of Chinese immigration 
found united expression”…23
He found that Victoria rarely featured in Willard’s account, and so its anti-
Chinese legislation was essentially unexplained. He found Charles Price’s 1974 
account similarly frustrating; the closest it came to explaining the 1888 anti-
                                                 
21 The attempt by Premier Sir Henry Parkes to pass a Chinese immigration bill was defeated less 
than four months after the end of the strike, SMH 23 April 1879, p. 2, col. 6 and p. 3, col. 1. 
22 University of Melbourne, 1982. 
23 Lewis, Strangers, p. iii. 
Page 10   Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chinese laws in Victoria was in arguing the strength of public opinion. Lewis 
commented: 
It may well be that this explanation is correct, but it would need to be 
explored and justified much more. Did “public opinion” simply reflect 
politicians’ attitudes, or did it influence them? Did it result in politicians 
being forced into introducing laws they really did not want? Or did it 
just influence the timing of the measures? Is there any correlation 
between popular demands and actual legislative details? Were 
politicians succumbing to electoral pressure to safeguard their seats?24
Neither did Lewis find any satisfaction in the work of Andrew Markus or 
Geoffrey Oddie,25 observing that neither offered any explanation for the 1881 
legislation; and that they argued that the 1888 legislation could have been the 
result of union campaigning. But there was a gap: the mobilisation of 1887-8 
ended around May 1888, but “the legislation itself was not passed until six 
months later”, a problem which Markus recognised but did not resolve.26
One reason for this lack of any convincing explanation lies in the methodology 
of Willard, Price, Huttenback and Markus, who painted a picture of society-
wide antagonism to Chinese (or other non-European immigration), and then 
charted the legislative debates and consequences. What were missing were 
causal linkages. Myra Willard’s method was to focus on situations of conflict, 
when Anglo-Europeans campaigned or rioted against the Chinese. This seemed 
to Willard to prove that the presence of Chinese people was a problem, that 
                                                 
24 Lewis, Strangers, pp. iv-v. 
25 Geoffrey Oddie, “The Chinese in Victoria, 1870-1890”, MA thesis, University of Melbourne, 
1959. 
26 Lewis, Strangers, pp. vi-viii. 
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Europeans and Chinese could never mix, and that the Chinese threatened the 
standard of living of the working class. These campaigns supposedly aroused 
the antipathy of the vast majority, and colonial governments supposedly 
succumbed, eventually, to popular pressure and passed more and more 
restrictive legislation against the Chinese. But why should they succumb, unless 
they agreed with restriction? And if they agreed with restriction, why? 
In Willard, the working class had immediate, economic interests and expressed 
them in opposition to the Chinese, while the squatters and sugar planters (and 
the directors of the Australasian Steam Navigation Company in 1878) sought 
cheap, indentured labour. But the leading politicians and most of “the people” 
were above all this sectionalism, thinking only of what was best for the nation 
and all classes. 
Though the leaders of the people admitted the cogency of the industrial 
reason for the exclusion of Asiatics of the coolie classes, one and all, 
including the leaders of this [Labor] party, believed that the higher social 
and political grounds for their policy were more conclusive than those of 
labour.27
What we have here is the development of a nationalist mythology, not an 
explanation of White Australia. The possibility that these “statesmen” might 
have been pursuing class agendas of their own is not even considered. 
By the early 1950s, this self-congratulatory history no longer fitted, at least for 
some historians. The White Australia policy was being challenged from within 
                                                 
27 Willard, p. 203. 
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the policymaking establishment on liberal and foreign policy grounds. 
Diplomats, businesspeople and travellers found it was insulting to the newly 
independent nations of Asia who were our neighbours and that some of its 
rhetoric sounded uncomfortably close to that of the recently defeated Nazis. 
The racism of the policy had to be dealt with, and thus began a fitful debate 
over whether the working class was racist in mobilizing against Chinese people, 
or simply pursuing economic protection.28
The early 1970s represented a turning point in the historiography of the White 
Australia policy. For the first time, substantial historical works were published 
that saw racism as the policy’s defining feature, and set out to document, 
analyse, explain and historicise that racism. The first, and most cathartic work 
was Humphrey McQueen’s A new Britannia. McQueen’s project was much 
broader than racism; he was inquiring into the nature and social roots of 
radicalism and nationalism, with the aim of debunking the Old Left’s historical 
                                                 
28 This debate began in the mid-1950s, when Australian Quarterly magazine sponsored a debate 
consisting of four short articles by academic historians about the origins of White Australia. 
Bruce Mansfield was primarily concerned to argue that the White Australia policy was racist—a 
radically new position for an academic to take—and not a cover for some other political project, 
such as defending working class conditions. This led him to explicitly endorse Willard’s 
conclusion that the main impetus for White Australia was the desire to preserve a British-
Australian nationality; “The origins of ‘White Australia’”, Australian Quarterly, December 1954, 
pp. 61-68. Mansfield’s analysis was contested by KM Dallas, who stridently argued that behind 
White Australia lay “opposition in shearing shed, mine and sawmill to the infiltration of scab 
labour in any form. The commonest form then, except in the canefields, was that of Chinese 
labour”; “The origins of  ‘White Australia’”, Australian Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1, March 1955, pp. 
43-52 (quote p. 43). Racism was thus largely irrelevant. Bede Nairn’s contribution echoed that of 
Dallas; while conceding that a “parasitical racialism” adhered to the policy, “The economic 
factor was of infinitely greater importance in the development of the White Australia Policy 
than either the racial or political.” However a rising sense of nationalism was also crucial; “A 
survey of the history of the White Australia Policy in the 19th century”, Australian Quarterly, 
Sept 1956, pp. 16-31 (quotes, pp. 26, 28). Thus the lines of debate, between an explanation of 
White Australia as a product of racism, versus a product of economic self-interest and working 
class self defence, were outlined. 
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mythology of radical labourism in general, and Russel Ward’s eulogy of the 
independent, radical bush worker in particular. McQueen’s book was important 
because it exposed the virulence of anti-Asian racism in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the racism inherent in Australian nationalism, the 
degree to which racism was central to much early Labor politics, and the way 
that anti-Asian racism translated into pro-Empire militarism after the turn of 
the century. McQueen thus located Australian racism in “the chauvinism of 
British imperialism,” seeing it as “inherent in Australia’s economic and 
geographic position as the advance guard of European conquest” and 
“intensified by its geographic proximity to Asia.”29
But having made the essential conceptual leap to imperialism and colonialism, 
McQueen turned back to relocate his case within a century of left nationalist 
mythologising. Despite the centrality of British imperialism for McQueen, the 
“tribunes of racism in Australia” were not its  local representatives—the 
Governors, naval and military officers, trading and pastoral capitalists, cabinet 
ministers, imperial visitors, official priests, Orange Lodge officials, or 
newspaper editors—but “the leaders of the Labor Party”.30
McQueen was followed in 1971 by FS Stevens, who edited a three volume 
collection of articles on aspects of Australian racism.31 For some pioneer 
                                                 
29 McQueen, A new Britannia, pp. 21, 42. 
30 McQueen, A new Britannia, esp. pp. 21, 50. 
31 FS Stevens (ed), Racism: The Australian experience: A study of race prejudice in Australia: Volume 1, 
Prejudice and xenophobia, Australia and New Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1971; Volume 2, 
Black versus white, Australia and New Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1971; Volume 3, 
Colonialism, Australia and New Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1972. 
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researchers into Australian racism, Stevens’ collection was pathbreaking,32 but 
only a handful of articles in the three volumes addressed the history of the 
White Australia policy and its attendant anti-Asian racism, and there were few 
original insights on this issue.  
Kathryn Cronin produced two state-based accounts of anti-Chinese racism that 
were rich in descriptive content. She first contributed a long section on hostility 
to the Chinese in Queensland to Race Relations in Colonial Queensland, which she 
co-wrote in 1975 with Raymond Evans and Kay Saunders.33 This used extensive 
archival sources and local newspapers to describe the racism faced by Chinese 
labourers and gold miners outside the context of major campaigns and crises. It 
included a brief but illuminating account of Chinese rural labour; from its 
introduction by planters in 1850s to the extensive Chinese agriculture in the 
north in the 1880s and 1890s, which was eventually wiped out by government 
action. Cronin pointed to the use of fear of disease, especially leprosy, to whip 
up fear of Chinese people, and the way wildly inaccurate and terrifying 
information about the disease was deliberately promoted. Her account of the 
                                                 
32 In the Preface to the 1988 edition of Race Relations in Colonial Queensland, Ray Evans and Kay 
Saunders wrote of their reaction to the publication of Stevens’ three volumes. They had felt 
dissatisfied with the existing histories of white-black and Anglo-Asian contact: “There was little 
in any of these works directly confronting the historical problem of white racism in Australia. 
That is why, as researchers working upon white interactions with Aborigines, Melanesians and 
Chinese in Queensland, we were greatly stimulated by the seemingly iconoclastic appearance, 
in 1972, of a three volume set of studies, boldly titled Racism: The Australian Experience, edited 
by economic historian, Frank Stevens. These books seemed to herald a long overdue penetration 
of the Anglo-Australian psyche, in search of the hidden roots of ‘race prejudice’. As a reading 
experience, Racism was thus cathartic in terms of what it frankly raised for public disclosure 
rather than what it ultimately deciphered. It fired a scatter-gun of disturbing articles into a 
formerly quiet public place and, to our ears, it carried the report of a starter’s pistol.” pp. xi-xii 
33 Kathryn Cronin, “‘The yellow agony’: Racial attitudes and responses towards the Chinese in 
colonial Queensland” in Evans, Saunders, Cronin, Race relations in colonial Queensland: A history 
of exclusion, exploitation and extermination, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1988, pp. 
235-340. Race Relations was first published in 1975 as Exclusion, exploitation, and extermination. 
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Queensland gold rush is fascinating, and she uses a few “case studies” to really 
good effect; for example describing the development of the race issue in 
Cooktown, where local opinion was initially divided, but then shifted as the 
number of Chinese rose rapidly and racist agitators created fear. 
The most significant weakness in Cronin’s account was her tendency to quote 
indiscriminately and juxtaposes comments made at very different times from 
the 1860s through to the late 1890s and beyond, without hinting that there 
might have been some shift in social or political conditions or underlying 
assumptions over that period.34 Equally, there was too often a lack of 
consideration about who was making a statement—the mere existence of a 
racist comment was enough to have it recorded.35 The result was that when 
dealing with the urban movement, she saw similarities in the racism of the 
pastoralists, the agitators, the workers and the middle class, but did not even 
discuss the possibility that there might be differences in their approach to 
people of different origins. 
                                                 
34 For example;, her discussion of racial attitudes towards the Chinese jumps from comments 
made in 1876, to comments made in 1855, then 1881, 1877-78, 1881, 1899, and 1866, all within a 
page, pp. 242-3. The material used for subsequent pages is just as chronologically jumbled. 
35 For example, Cronin reports that “European labourers continued to argue against the 
morality of the capitalist who wanted to hire aliens…”, Yellow agony, p. 262, but the source for 
this is a letter by the Senior Sargeant at Stanthorpe to the Commissioner of Police. As sources 
for her discussion of the attitudes of miners towards Chinese people, on p. 259, she has used G 
Carrington, Colonial Adventures and Experiences, London, 1871, p. 181; Cooktown Courier, 20 June 
1874; G.R. Fitz-Roy Cole, “John Chinaman Abroad”, Fraser’s Magazine, 98, 1878, p. 450; QPD., 
XXIII, 13 June 1877, p. 235; CA Feilberg, “Can the Chinaman be Made a Good Colonist?”, 
Victorian Review, I, p. 367; see Yellow agony, Footnotes 229-233, pp. 325-6. All these are ruling 
class figures; with the parliamentarian quoted being Francis Ivory, one of Queensland’s richest 
squatters, who voted in the minority against anti-Chinese legislation. Only the editors of the 
Cooktown Courier would have had some relationship with North Queensland miners. Two pages 
later, p. 260, Cronin makes the same assertion: “The whites derived many of their attitudes 
concerning the Chinese from actual contact with them, for they were often camped cheek by 
jowl on the goldfields.” Her source for this is Mr. Kelsey, Proceedings of the Royal Colonial 
Institute, IX, 1877-78, 63. 
Page 16   Chapter 1: Introduction 
Cronin attempted to fit much of the racism she found into an analysis that, “The 
contact experiences of these years were to influence greatly the kind of 
stereotypes popularly applied to the Chinese and the northern Aborigines by 
European miners.”36 The argument that racism is a product of contact was also 
central to the writing of Andrew Markus, and Verity Burgmann has condemned 
this approach as blaming the victims of racism for the racism they suffered.37 
This argument is also one of the dominant approaches within the sociology of 
racism, and is discussed theoretically in Chapter 2. The important point here is 
that Cronin was unable to substantiate her contact thesis, leaving an enormous 
explanatory gap in her work. One of the major themes in her chapters was the 
central role played by racist theories emanating from Britain and Europe and 
fears, whipped up by the press, that Chinese immigration was “part of a 
military design to conquer the North”, and that a struggle for survival was 
imminent. She then declared it “more accurate to assume that these notions of 
racial conflict were derived more from the whites’ immediate experiences in the 
frontier situation of the North”.38 There was no way that fear of a “Chinese 
invasion” was simply the product of someone’s experience, least of all that of 
the editors of Brisbane newspapers such as The Queenslander, nearly 2000km 
away from the “experience” of Chinese immigration into the north.39 Cronin 
failed to ask the obvious question: when British miners met Chinese people, 
were their responses and attitudes to people they had not met before in any 
way shaped by the pervasive and militant newspaper racism of the time? And 
did this media racism in any way shape the way they experienced and 
                                                 
36 Cronin, Yellow agony, p. 258 
37 Verity Burgmann, “Writing racism out of history”, Arena [first series], no. 67, 1984, p. 84. 
38 Cronin, Yellow agony, pp. 256-7 
39 In a footnote she reports the Melbourne Argus claiming that the outcry against the Chinese 
was “far greater” in Brisbane than the north; note 285 on p. 327. 
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theorised that contact? Within half a page of describing some invasion 
propaganda, Cronin described “occasions when Chinese and Europeans 
travelled or worked together, for mutual protection against native raids”,40 and 
elsewhere noted European miners and storekeepers defending Chinese people 
oppressed by police or mining wardens,41 and white miners facing scurvy when 
Chinese gardeners were driven out of their towns.42 The result was an analytical 
mess. 
Cronin also wrote a major account of the Chinese in early Victoria,43 which 
focused on the gold rushes, and the earlier period during which many Chinese 
were brought in to do agricultural labour. She dealt with the violence and 
racism they faced in detail, documented it as widespread, and showed that the 
pastoralists were just as racist as the anti-Chinese campaigners. She went on to 
look at racial ideology, official responses, church missionary activity, and 
briefly at what happened after this period. For her, the legacy of the frontier (ie 
gold) experience was long lasting and profound. Colonial Casualties drew on a 
wide range of archival sources to show that hostility and violence towards 
Chinese people on the gold fields was sustained, and effectively rewarded by 
the government. Cronin provided a far richer and more credible account than 
earlier writers, and debunked a series of myths. However, she also asserted that 
the campaign against the Chinese continued into the 1860s and 70s, the period 
during which most discriminatory legislation was repealed, without any 
recognition that such a campaign might have been less violent and more 
                                                 
40 Cronin, Yellow agony, p. 257 
41 Cronin, Yellow agony, pp. 274-5 
42 Cronin, Yellow agony, p. 287. 
43 Kathryn Cronin, Colonial casualties: Chinese in early Victoria, Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton (Vic), 1982. 
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intermittent. Her weakness once again was that she seemed content to describe 
responses to Chinese immigration, and to describe the racism directed towards 
them, rather than explain it or investigate its dynamic and possible class or 
political agendas behind it. As with her long discussion of the Chinese in 
Queensland, she indiscriminately mixed quotes from 1850s and 1880s with no 
sense that things might have changed. In particular, she made no attempt to 
analyse the role of the press or politicians in the anti-Chinese agitation, 
although she quoted liberally from them. Ruling class racism is frequently 
described in her two accounts, but neither identified as such, nor theorised. 
Like Cronin, Robert A Huttenback set out to locate the racial exclusionism of 
the settlement colonies of the British empire in “the xenophobia and race hatred 
of the Anglo-Saxon”, along with “the workingman’s fear of losing his job to 
‘cheap’ labour from Africa and Asia.”44 Written primarily from Colonial Office 
records, Huttenback’s book was both a description of the racist beliefs and 
arguments of British colonists, and a narrative of discriminatory and 
exclusionary legislation. While useful at this level, it offered little by way of 
analysis. Huttenback saw two principles on a collision course in the empire—
the principle of “the natural equality of mankind at large”, and the 
determination of British settlers that their colonies would be a “White Man’s 
Country.”45 At no point do we find out why one principle triumphed over the 
other; racist exclusion triumphs as a result of the triumph of racism. Neither is 
there any serious justification for his argument that, “Race hatred was the 
driving force behind legislation”. What does become clear is that for all its 
                                                 
44 Huttenback, Racism and empire; see pp. 58, 323, for succinct statements of his thesis. 
45 Huttenback, Racism and empire, p. 21. 
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professed attachment to equality, the Colonial Office was so weak in insisting 
on this principle that Huttenback concluded that its officials shared the racism 
of their colonial subjects. 
In a recent article on the historiography of White Australia, Matthew Jordan has 
challenged historians who essentialise Australian racism, such as Raymond 
Evans, for whom “the idea of a white Australia was born…in the protracted 
process of Aboriginal dispossession, degradation and demise.” Jordan argues 
that this approach 
runs the risk of imposing a set of ideas which only came to dominate in 
the late nineteenth century on a period when notions of race and blood 
had to compete with, and were for the most part subordinate to, notions 
of civil liberalism.46
He points to ambivalence towards race through the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century, and the argument from Henry Reynolds and Andrew 
Markus that “colonial attitudes to race underwent a fundamental shift 
sometime during the 1870s and 1880s.”47 Ann Curthoys, too, has pointed out 
that both the advocates of the super-exploitation of unfree labour, and those for 
the exclusion of “coloured” labourers, were racist.48 Racism cannot explain the 
outcome of a struggle in which two of the major protagonists were racist. 
                                                 
46 Matthew Jordan, “Rewriting Australia’s racist past: How historians (mis)interpret the “White 
Australia” Policy”, History Compass, no. 3, 2005, p. 7. 
47 Jordan, p. 11. 
48 Ann Curthoys, “Racism and class in the nineteenth-century immigration debate” in Andrew 
Markus and MC Ricklefs (eds), Surrender Australia? Essays in the study and uses of history: Geoffrey 
Blainey and Asian immigration, George Allen & Unwin, North Sydney (NSW), 1985, p. 99; see also 
her “An uneasy conversation: The multicultural and the indigenous” in John Docker  and 
Gerhard Fischer (eds), Race, colour and identity in Australia and New Zealand, UNSW Press, 
Sydney, 2000, p. 23. 
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Andrew Markus and Charles Price attempted to use comparative history to 
understand White Australia, by looking at anti-Asian attitudes in Australasia 
and the Americas, and attempting to draw comparisons. Like Price and Willard, 
Andrew Markus’ Fear and Hatred: Purifying Australia & California 1850-1901, 
published in 1979, is an account of the most successful campaigns and crisis 
points in the campaign for a white Australia. Markus argued that the “near 
consensus” for racial exclusion, achieved by the end of the nineteenth century, 
was a product of “the experience of Chinese immigration”.49 In other words, it 
was contact between different peoples that gave rise to hatred and a desire for 
exclusion. Nowhere did he make a plausible case to support this theory; his 
“proof” was constructed from suggestion and implication. Despite his 
methodological emphasis on “direct experience”, he described very few 
experiences of contact between Chinese and European people—indeed, at one 
point he argued that, “After the gold rushes, agitation in urban areas arose not 
from the experience of a competitive system but from fear that one would come 
into being.”50 Why should ordinary people fear a system of competition unless 
the dominant discourses of the time—shaped overwhelmingly by 
newspapers—attempted to convince them that this was a future danger? Those 
experiences of contact Markus did discuss were experiences of conflict, and his 
sources for these were overwhelmingly newspapers, and the reports of mining 
wardens on gold fields. 
                                                 
49 Markus, Fear and hatred, pp. xx-xxi. It should be noted that he does not mean the Chinese 
experience of immigration, nor the experience of the receiving population (which of course 
included people from many backgrounds, including some Chinese), but his imputation of the 
experience of British-Australians. 
50 Markus, Fear and hatred, p. 249. 
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In fact, Markus’s own evidence tended to undermine his implicit argument. The 
anti-Chinese movement he described was occasionally massive and explosive, 
such as during the seamen’s strike of 1878-79; but most often it was small, 
isolated, sometimes dominated by trade unions with limited organisation and 
resources, unable to raise more than token amounts of money, with little real 
influence over politicians. Such a discrepancy ought to have led him to question 
his own emphasis, to look beyond the trade union campaigns to explain anti-
Chinese legislation. While Markus discussed “experiences” which generated 
conflict, he ignored a range of other, relevant experiences, such as the 
experience of reading newspapers, day after day, permeated by the racism of 
the British empire, with episodic dishonest “exposés” of Chinese communities; 
the experience of being harangued by anti-Chinese ideologues; and the 
experience of economic insecurity. His discussion of “experience” was always 
focused on the experience of miners competing to find gold, or working class 
competition for jobs, a limitation which corrupted the validity of his argument. 
Nowhere did he discuss the middle-class experience of competition, as felt by 
the shopkeepers and publicans who were often the leaders of anti-Chinese 
agitation on mining fields.51 Nor did he discuss the ruling class experience of 
grappling with the problems of ruling their colonies, and attempting to 
understand rival strategic doctrines. 
Markus was entirely unreflective about his sources; never considering, for 
instance, the vast silence about most Chinese-British contact and the possibility 
that a newspaper’s failure to report such contact might reflect peaceful and 
tolerant cohabitation which was therefore hardly “news”. Nor did Markus 
                                                 
51 Curthoys notes the importance of storekeepers at Lambing Flat, Race and ethnicity, p. 327. 
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consider that newspaper reports of European grievances against Chinese 
people might have been sensationalised, dishonest or slanted to suit the 
political agenda or financial interests of the editor or owner.  
By contrast, Jerome Small’s pathbreaking thesis on the Clunes riot of 1873 found 
Chinese communities that were integrated into a wider, British-dominated 
community, and also Chinese communities that had been isolated and 
ostracised. Significantly, the warning that the Clunes Mining Company had 
recruited Chinese miners to scab on the strike came from Chinese miners who 
had a good relationship with their British-Australian neighbours, while the 
Chinese recruited to break the 1873 miners’ strike came from an isolated 
community. A struggle between employer and employees was then reported as 
an anti-Chinese crusade after the event and at the behest of the middle class 
leadership of the town, including its newspaper. This was how the rest of 
Australia “experienced” the Clunes struggle; as articles in newspapers which 
described a supposed racial struggle for survival.52 Like Small’s thesis, the 
literature which has emerged over the past decade on Chinese-European 
contact in the nineteenth century paints a far more differentiated picture than 
Markus’s focus on conflict. 
Charles Price’s exercise in comparative history, The Great White Walls are Built, 
was published in 1974 as a quasi-defence of White Australia. Price compared 
the movement for exclusion in Australia during the period 1836-1888 with those 
in New Zealand, British Columbia and California. In his Preface, he argued that 
the reason for taking this comparative approach was to show that “countries 
                                                 
52 Jerome Small, “Reconsidering White Australia: Class and anti-Chinese racism in the 1873 
Clunes riot“, BA (Hons) thesis, La Trobe University, 1997. 
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with consistently severe restrictions on immigration, such as Australia, have 
fewer race problems than countries with long periods of free migration”.53 Like 
Willard, Price focused on periods of crisis, and on the campaigns to secure 
exclusionary legislation. He rejected the traditional labourist view that racial 
exclusion was nothing more than a product of the working class fighting for its 
economic interests, and posited instead a series of reasons for the adoption of 
the White Australia policy. These were: economic interest; humanitarian and 
religious fears at a new kind of slavery and slave trade; fears of being swamped 
politically and socially by vast numbers of Chinese settlers; the struggle of a 
new young country to find some identity and social homogeneity; antipathy to 
strangers of such conspicuously different customs and culture; worries about 
maintaining law and order; and explicitly racist fears about mixing with 
peoples of a “lower” civilisation or of “inferior” biological stock.54 This thesis 
will show that Price’s list of concerns came a lot closer to describing the key 
agendas that led to White Australia than most other histories, and provided a 
significant number of analytical leads. In part, this is because Price’s research 
was focused on parliamentary debates over exclusionary legislation.  
While there are many problems with such a limited approach, Price was 
unapologetic, arguing that it was the laws and their implementation that most 
affected non-European immigrants, and “parliamentary proceedings give a 
reasonable coverage of the issues, opinions and policies involved”.55 The virtues 
of this approach are that it focused on the decisions made by the colonial ruling 
                                                 
53 Price, Great white walls, p. x. 
54 Price, Great white walls, pp. 117-8. Also pp. 48-50 where he sees these elements present in the 
pre-gold rush agitation. 
55 Price, Great white walls, p. 20. 
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class as a whole, and that some of the major arguments against exclusion are 
described and discussed, aspects missing from both Willard and Markus. 
However the speeches of the politicians were not measured against any external 
reality except numbers of Chinese and social “disturbances”, and only weakly 
linked to any wider structure of mainstream political or social thought. Entirely 
left out was the possibility that racism became a respectable lightning rod for 
other social discontent. It is a book of description rather than analysis. Price 
seemed unable to conceive of a ruling class with distinct interests from the mass 
of the population. Thus speeches and arguments were taken at face value. 
The one, significant exception to this historiography of White Australia was the 
work of Adrian Graves on the Queensland sugar industry. Graves produced a 
materialist analysis of the Queensland sugar industry to link the exclusion of 
Pacific Islanders—one of the key elements in the Commonwealth’s White 
Australia legislation of 1901—with a period of crisis and restructuring.56 While 
the abolition of the labour trade was a political act, campaigned for by the 
Queensland Labor Party and legislated as part of the White Australia legislation 
of 1901, Graves argued that it was facilitated by the withering of plantation 
production as a system and the development of a generalised white labour 
market throughout coastal Queensland.57 Graves has provided an explanation 
for an important component of the decision to implement the formal White 
Australia policy in 1901, but offered little explanation for the political campaign 
against indentured Islander labour waged by liberals and plebeian activists 
from the early 1870s, nor for the decision of the Queensland Liberal government 
                                                 
56 Adrian Graves, Cane and labour: The political economy of the Queensland sugar industry, 1862-
1906, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1993. 
57 Graves, Cane and labour, esp. pp. 62-69. 
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in 1885 to outlaw Islander recruitment from the end of 1890. I deal in more 
detail with Graves and the issues raised by him in Chapter 7. 
In the early 1980s, Verity Burgmann sharply attacked the historiography of 
White Australia, accusing historians of covering up and justifying the racist 
past, blaming the victims of racism for the racism they suffered, and then, 
where racism was admitted, shifting the blame for it onto the working class. She 
was critical of those radical historians, such as Humphrey McQueen and 
Andrew Markus in the 1970s, who, while insisting that the White Australia 
policy was racist, also reinforced the mythology that it was the labour 
movement that led the fight for exclusion. In these new accounts, the working 
class was now imbued with a racist ideology, rather than mere “economic” 
motives for their hostility to “coloured labour”. Racism, she argued, was a 
ruling class ideology, and racism amongst the working class reflected the 
ideological domination of the ruling class.58 Burgmann made three substantive 
criticisms of the dominant historical explanation. First, the unreal degree of 
power it accorded the labour movement; secondly that, “It is not logical that the 
middle class, let alone the capitalist class, would espouse the White Australia 
ideal out of any concern for working class wage levels”; and finally that middle-
class racism “barely exists” for most historians. Burgmann offered suggestions 
towards an alternative explanation, including an argument that the real 
motivation for the policy of racial exclusion lay in ruling class distaste for the 
competition provided by Chinese (and other Asian) businesspeople able to 
employ Chinese (and other non-European) labour, but did not develop these 
                                                 
58 Verity Burgmann, Writing racism, esp. pp. 84-92; Burgmann, Capital and labour, pp. 21-22. 
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herself.59 Methodologically, she was calling on historians to examine the 
motives and interests of the ruling class, arguing that these would provide the 
key to understanding White Australia.60
It is a powerful argument. Almost all historians acknowledge that all classes 
overwhelmingly supported the adoption of the White Australia policy in 1901; 
yet apart from Burgmann’s brief suggestions, not one historian has ever 
examined the class motives that led the vast majority of the Anglo-Australian 
ruling class to take this stand.  It seems that the working class has economic and 
class motives and interests, but not the capitalists, nor the middle class.61 This 
chasm in historical explanation struck Peter Corris most forcefully in 1973: 
If racialism was…an ingredient in the thinking and behaviour of all 
Australians, regardless of class, right through the political spectrum, the 
present emphasis in discussion on working-class and radical racialism 
will be misleading to any attempt to understand racialism as a whole. 
What about the bosses?62
The problem was still present for Ann Curthoys in 1985: 
The crucial historical question is why the large urban employers and 
pastoralists joined the exclusionary forces, which they did in the early 
1860s and again more wholeheartedly during the 1880s.63
                                                 
59 Burgmann, Capital and labour, pp. 31-33. 
60 Burgmann, Capital and labour, p. 33; Writing racism, p. 85. 
61 With this exception, that pastoralists supposedly craved Chinese labourers for their supposed 
cheapness and docility; JB Hirst, The Strange Birth of Colonial Democracy: New South Wales 1848-
1884, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988, p. 160. This argument will be dealt with later. 
62 Peter Corris, “Racialism: The Australian experience”, Historical Studies, Australia and New 
Zealand, vol. 15, no. 61, October 1973, p. 754. 
63 Curthoys, Racism and class, p. 98, emphasis in original. 
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However crucial it was, the question has remained unanswered, and largely 
ignored. 
A ruling class policy? 
In more general terms, the argument for focusing on possible ruling class 
agendas for the White Australia policy rests first and foremost on the fact that 
all the anti-Chinese laws passed in colonial Australia were passed by ruling 
class parliaments; not just in the ordinary sense that it is the priorities of the 
largest capitalist enterprises and industries which impose themselves most 
forcefully on lawmakers (as they do today), but in the narrow sense that to be a 
member of one of the colonial parliaments required a man to be rich or to have 
wealthy backers. Election campaigns were expensive, members of parliament 
were unpaid (except in Victoria), and only the rich could afford to take the time 
required for parliamentary duties. Moreover, an individual required broad, 
ruling-class and middle-class support to win a seat in parliament, and this was 
reflected in the tradition of “requisitioning” candidates, whereby a citizen was 
petitioned to offer himself for election by “leading men” in the electorate. In all 
the colonial parliaments, from 1876 to 1888, there was only a handful of 
members of parliament with links to the organised labour movement, and even 
fewer for whom those links were their predominant base of support. 
In other words, ruling class legislators could largely get what they wanted 
without public meetings, petitions, protests and riots. For the ruling class more 
generally, MPs were available to be lobbied privately. The mass media 
examined all proposed legislation in the light of whatever version of ruling 
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class interests guided the paper’s editors. They had the social power to explain 
and justify proposals they agreed with; and they almost unanimously 
supported restrictive legislation against Chinese immigration, even though 
some disagreed with the detail of proposed laws. Most of the great public 
debates in the decades before 1890 reflected divisions within the ruling class, 
such as the debates over indentured labour in the Queensland sugar industry, 
over government aid to church schools and the role of religion in education, 
over taxes and the spending of government money on public works, over land 
legislation, over Ireland and British foreign and colonial policy, and 
increasingly over free trade or protectionist tariffs. It was precisely divisions in 
the ruling class that opened a variety of issues up for public debate, and 
allowed for agitation to occasionally develop amongst the plebeian classes. 
Such a view rejects the orthodoxy that colonial Australia was ultra-democratic, 
a “working-man’s paradise” in which “the people ruled”. Some historians have 
argued that the views of politicians reflected those of their electors because they 
had to get themselves elected by the broad population.64 Such a view leaves out 
the ability of the elite to marginalise genuine radicals as “dangerous” and 
“ignorant” of the needs of politics. In fact colonial democracy was far closer to 
the model advocated by Joseph Schumpeter, in which ordinary voters merely 
got to choose between competing groups of rulers.65 Robert Michels gave us a 
                                                 
64 This is especially argued for members of parliament representing “working class electorates”; 
some writers see this as the reason they campaigned against Chinese immigration; Curthoys, 
Race and ethnicity, p. 443;. One of Markus’ strategies is to give details of the background and 
electorates of anti-Chinese politicians representing “working class” electorates; Markus, Fear 
and hatred, p. 78 for Cameron; p. 135 for Melville. 
65 See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 1976, 
p. 269.  
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realistic way of understanding the rhetoric of democracy in colonial politics 
when he observed: 
A conservative candidate who should present himself to his electors by 
declaring to them that he did not regard them as capable of playing an 
active part in influencing the destinies of the country, and should tell 
them that for this reason they ought to be deprived of the suffrage would 
be a man of incomparable sincerity but politically insane.66
Some of the techniques necessary for capitalists and their managers, lawyers 
and priests to retain political control within a system of universal suffrage were 
also spelled out by one of its most trenchant opponents, the Italian elitist, 
Gaetano Mosca: 
All those who, by wealth, education, intelligence, or guile, have an 
aptitude for leading a community of men, and a chance of doing so—in 
other words, all the cliques in the ruling class—have to bow to universal 
suffrage…and also, if occasion requires, cajole and fool it.67
According to Girvetz, “Thus, ironically, the democratic myth is one that an 
elitist society, which despises democracy, must perpetuate and preserve.”68 
Apart from the myth-making process they highlight, his comments remind us 
that historians must be especially careful not to take any political rhetoric at 
face value, least of all in colonial Australia. 
                                                 
66 Quoted in HK Girvetz, Democracy and elitism: Two essays with selected readings, Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1967, p. 33. 
67 Quoted in Girvetz, Democracy and elitism, p. 34. 
68 Girvetz, Democracy and elitism, p. 33. 
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Nowhere is the importance of examining ruling class agendas clearer than in 
Queensland, which led all other colonies in the passage of more restrictive anti-
Chinese legislation between 1876 and 1884. The upper house of the parliament 
which passed the 1876 and 1877 laws was dominated by squatters who were, in 
the mythology, the champions of “cheap coloured labour”.69 The Conservative 
party in Queensland, based as it was on pastoralists, sugar planters and mining 
capital,70 was in its majority strongly anti-Chinese from 1877 onwards. In 1878 it 
was Conservative Queensland politicians and newspapers that mobilised most 
strongly in support of the intercolonial seamen’s strike against their 
replacement by Chinese workers. Moreover, before 1890, Queensland’s trade 
union movement was the weakest of the four eastern mainland colonies. JB 
Dalton has argued that, “Unionism in Queensland really began in 1883”, with 
no Queensland unions represented at the first two intercolonial trade union 
congresses, in 1879 (Sydney) and 1884 (Melbourne). The Brisbane Trades and 
                                                 
69 This labourist mythology is summed up in William Lane, The workingman’s paradise: An 
Australian labour novel, with an introduction by Michael Wilding, Sydney University Press, 
Sydney, 1980; also Banjo Paterson’s “A bushman’s song”: 
I asked a cove for shearin’ once along the Marthaguy: 
”We shear non-union here,” says he. “I call it scab,” says I. 
I looked along the shearin’ floor before I turned to go— 
There were eight or ten dashed Chinamen a-shearin’ in a row. 
Originally published in The Bulletin, 24 December 1892 [online] 
http://www.bushpoetry.com.au/masterpoets/MasterPoetsHome/PatersonAndrewBartonBanj
o/tabid/704/Default.aspx?PageContentMode=1#1250 [accessed 1 December 2006] According 
to Ann Curthoys, “In the 1870s the number of Chinese immigrants gradually rose again; again 
the pastoralists and large employers supported Chinese immigration”, see “An uneasy 
conversation: The multicultural and the indigenous” in John Docker and Gerhard Fischer (eds), 
Race, colour and identity in Australia and New Zealand, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2000, p. 23. Ray 
Markey, Populist politics, p. 67, argues that the Chinese Immigration Bill of 1879, “had been 
heavily defeated in the upper house, where pastoralists and others who may have been 
interested in cheap coloured labour, predominated.” 
70 Duncan Waterson, Personality, profit and politics: Thomas McIlwraith in Queensland, 1866-1894, 
The John Murtagh Macrossan Lecture, 1978, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 
1984. 
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Labour Council was only formed in late 1885, but even then, unionism 
“remained relatively weak in the face of heavy immigration and limited 
settlement on the land which combined to create a large labour market on 
which employers could draw.”71  
The passage of anti-Chinese laws in Queensland reflects neither anti-Chinese 
agitation, nor anti-Chinese violence on the goldfields or elsewhere. There was 
agitation against Chinese miners on Queensland goldfields from 1867 to 1872, 
and a series of brutal attacks,72 but no move towards restriction. An 
examination of the conservative Brisbane Courier newspaper for the years 1876 
and 1877, the first years in which anti-Chinese legislation was passed in the 
Queensland parliament, showed just one report of a violent protest against the 
substantial Chinese immigration into the Palmer River goldfields. A crowd of 
whites had on two separate days prevented Chinese people from landing at 
Trinity Bay (Cairns). The government sent extra police to the area and the 
tensions subsided.73 Significantly, this incident occurred after the passing of the 
first anti-Chinese laws in parliament, and a few days after the Governor, Cairns, 
reserved them for the consideration of the Colonial Office.74
                                                 
71 JB Dalton, “An interpretative survey: The Queensland labour movement”, in DJ Murphy, RB 
Joyce, Colin A Hughes (eds), Prelude to Power: The Rise of the Labour Party in Queensland 1885-
1915, The Jacaranda Press, Milton (Qld), 1970, p. 4. 
72 Cronin, Yellow agony, pp. 279-81. 
73 This was first raised in parliament, QPD, vol. XX, p. 1018 (LA Adjournment debate, 18 
October 1876), and then QPD, vol. XX, p. 1046 (LA Question without notice, 19 October 1876). 
74 This was the Gold Fields Amendment Bill, reserved on 11 October. The actions at Trinity Bay 
were on the 15th and 17th October. The Governor was then sent a substantial petition against 
Chinese immigration from Cairns (the place), 18 October, letter 76/2870 in QSA, Col Sec 
inwards corresp., SRS5253-1-229. 
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This thesis examines the development of ruling class thought and action on the 
issue of Chinese and other “coloured” immigration, in relation to the strategic 
environment in which the Anglo-Australian ruling class found itself, its 
strategies for economic and political development, its tactics for containing class 
tensions, and the tensions within the ruling class on these (and other) issues. At 
the time, the attempt to formulate effective strategies was done within the 
parameters of existing British imperial thought. Virtually all previous historians 
of White Australia have treated this context too superficially, as they have 
necessarily neglected the occasional, but important, apostasies initiated in 
Australia as the local ruling class ditched significant imperial “principles” in 
their own, local class interest. 
One advantage of this methodology is that the White Australia policy is seen as 
both durable and historically contingent. The durability of the decision reached 
in 1888 to effectively end Chinese immigration, and the ease with which it was 
extended to all non-Europeans in the years 1896-1902, suggest that some 
profound, general and ongoing interest was involved, one necessarily congenial 
to the ruling class and the politicians in every colony who made the laws and to 
the administrators who organised their implementation.  
The White Australia policy shaped, and impinged on, three of the great general 
ruling class agendas: who will do the work? how shall the state be constructed? 
and what form shall their ideological hegemony take? White Australia was both 
a population policy, and a definition of nationality and nationalism. It also 
imposed certain costs on sections of the ruling class. It limited the labour force, 
eliminated the possibility of different state structures in different parts of the 
continent, and locked the developed south-eastern centres into taking 
responsibility for a vast area of the earth’s surface in which there was minimal 
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capitalist development. White Australia worked against any strategy of 
economic integration into Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, at a time when Asian capitalism was starting to grow spectacularly, 
most notably in Japan, and Australian exports to the region were also growing 
rapidly.75 Finally, the ruling class was also locked into promoting a certain 
ideology of Australian nationalism, one which emphasised protection of white 
living standards from competition from poorer countries, and this in turn 
limited its own freedom of action. Given these significant consequences, it is 
remarkable that for the most part, the dominant capitalists, politicians and 
ideological institutions of the Australian bourgeoisie worked assiduously to 
sustain White Australia from 1901 to the late 1950s. While it is true that great 
national policies and structures also influence the structure of the ruling class, 
this strong support for White Australia over a long period suggests that the 
policy strongly reflected ruling class needs. Had it not, broad groups among the 
rich and powerful would have begun organising against it long before it was 
abandoned. 
y argument also suggests reasons for th gradual abandonment of the White 
Australia policy in the 1960s and 1970s, as many of the conditions which gave 
rise to it changed, confronting the ruling class with new challenges and the 
need to develop new strategies. This methodology posits working-class, ruling-
class and middle-class people as active participants in the making of, and 
                                                 
75 Sandra M Tweedie, “Between depressions: Australian dilemmas in the quest for Asian 
markets, 1893/1933“, MComm (Hons) thesis, University of New South Wales, 1982. John 
Fitzgerald has also looked at some of the perverse consequences of the Anglo-Australian 
decision to create a continental nation in hostile antagonism to Asia, “European settler 
colonialism and national security ideologies in Australian history” in R Leaver and D Cox (eds), 
Middling, meddling, muddling, Issues in Australian foreign policy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards 
(NSW), 1997, pp. 91-119. 
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resistance to, the White Australia policy. Conventional historiography has 
either ignored the ruling class, or built its analysis around a small fraction of 
capitalists—squatters, sugar planters and others supportive of racially 
oppressed “cheap” labour. It has painted the rich and powerful as either 
ultimately recognising the validity of working class concerns, or as helpless in 
the face of working class mobilisation. These approaches are unsustainable 
given the nature of colonial society. 
None of this is meant to imply that the ruling class was always united over 
“white Australia” strategies. Marx called the bourgeoisie “hostile brothers”,76 
and the literature already discussed is replete with examples of ruling class 
conflict, including the supplanting of one ruling class element by another in the 
struggle for domination. Indeed, the 1888 decision to effectively shut Chinese 
immigration out of the Australian continent was reached despite a measure of 
ruling class opposition, and at considerable economic cost to some South 
Australian and Queensland capitalists, and to the South Australian state, which 
had invested nearly a million pounds in a railway project that was made 
unviable by the anti-Chinese laws. The way these elements acquiesced in their 
defeat suggests that it was imposed by the wider ruling class, with whom they 
had so much in common, rather than by hostile working class elements, against 
whom they might have been expected to show stronger and more strident 
resistance, and to find other ruling class support for such resistance. 
                                                 
76 Karl Marx, Capital: A critique of political economy, vol. III, The process of capitalist production as a 
whole, edited by Frederick Engels, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1959, p. 253. 
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Methodology 
The methodology of this thesis has been to examine the arguments of ruling 
class political leaders, and to link them with the broader structures of thought 
to which they refer; to seek empirical confirmation that this broader agenda 
actually related to real issues facing governments or the ruling class; and to plot 
ways in which these ideas shaped policy and strategy in a wider sense. 
Consequently, a large number of secondary sources were used in searching for 
insights into the key elements of bourgeois thought in general, and also more 
specifically on British anti-slavery debates, the political strategies of John Stuart 
Mill, imperial policy, global political rivalries in the 1880s, ideas of colonisation 
and discussions of social control. 
Newspapers were a major source, of fundamental importance when studying 
the structure and content of political thought. The Brisbane Courier was used 
extensively for political and conservative opinion in Queensland around which 
a significant part of my narrative is built. I also drew heavily on Sydney’s 
Evening News, the colony’s largest circulation newspaper, and the Sydney 
Morning Herald. There were a very small number of high quality journals 
published in the period, including Melbourne Review, The Sydney Quarterly 
Magazine and the Victorian Review, an important monthly publication which 
drew contributions from many of the leading intellectuals in Australia during 
its seven year life from 1879 to 1886. Here the reader can often find ruling-class 
intellectuals debating national policy in a sophisticated manner. Local 
newspapers were also valuable, as were scandalous, satirical and polemical 
magazines, such as the Lantern (Adelaide), the Stockwhip (Sydney) and the 
various mutations of Harold Grey’s Pilgrim (Sydney). Finally I undertook a 
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major project studying regional Queensland newspapers during periods of 
racist agitation, guided by Denis Cryle’s The press in colonial Queensland.77
Among the key primary sources used in this thesis were parliamentary papers, 
the record of parliamentary debates, and Colonial Secretaries’ correspondence 
for New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia. These were 
the major sources for strategic and policy discussion within and between 
governments. Also important in this regard was the private correspondence of 
colonial political leaders. Here the most fruitful collections were those of Sir 
Henry Parkes (Mitchell Library), Sir Samuel Griffith (Mitchell Library), CH 
Pearson (Latrobe Library), Sir Samuel Way (Mortlock Library) and Sir Thomas 
McIlwraith (John Oxley Library). I found little to be gained from the papers of 
businessmen and women. Even from those businesspeople who became 
politicians, the surviving archival records are dominated by immediate business 
concerns and while I used the papers of people such as Robert Philp, PF 
McDonald (Queensland), John Warren, and George and Edward Hawker 
(South Australia), they contributed only marginally to this thesis. 
I have not attempted to write a history of the development of racial thought in 
Australia; nor describe the development of the new White Australia 
nationalism that became a significant factor ideologically in the late 1880s. It is 
my belief that the contours of racial and nationalist thought in Australia were 
substantially shaped by Australian ruling class priorities, as well as by the 
imported racism of the British empire, and I hope that this thesis provides a 
useful starting point for subsequent efforts to describe and explain these. Nor 
                                                 
77 Denis Cryle, The press in colonial Queensland: A social and political history 1845-1875, University 
of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1989. 
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have I systematically researched the various anti-Chinese movements, although 
I examined them where relevant. I found little serious history of the many 
radical-plebeian movements of the time, movements led by middle class people 
and mobilising people described as “working class” in the daily press. These 
would be useful subjects for future research. 
I have focused primarily on New South Wales and Queensland as the two 
colonies which played the greatest role, and restricted this thesis to the years 
1876-1888. Charles Price considered 1888 to be: 
the year by which the Canadians, Americans, Australians and New 
Zealanders, after much debate and many changes of mind, had at length 
thrashed out their feelings and attitudes to the Chinese and had decided 
to impose restrictions tantamount to complete exclusion from permanent 
settlement. It was then relatively easy to extend these restrictions to other 
peoples.78
In choosing this time frame I do not seek to diminish the importance of earlier 
or later developments. The policy of preventing nearly all non-European people 
from settling in Australia had developed, fitfully, from the 1840s, when liberals 
in the New South Wales Legislative Council and self-styled representatives of 
the working class had led a campaign against the importation of several 
                                                 
78 Price, Great white walls, p. xi. This opinion is shared by Ann Curthoys, “Liberalism and 
exclusionism: A prehistory of the White Australia policy” in Jayasuriya, Walker and Gothard 
(eds), Legacies of White Australia, p 31. David Johanson wrote in 1960, “The period from the 
mid-seventies to 1890 is the decisive one in the history of the White Australia policy.” See 
“History of the White Australia policy” in Immigration Reform Group (ed Kenneth Rivett), 
Immigration: Control or colour bar? The background to ‘White Australia’ and a proposal for change, 
Melbourne, 1962, p 6. For John Hirst, “Before the Commonwealth was established, the colonies 
had acted together to exclude Chinese and other Asians. Federation was not needed to make the 
White Australia policy”, The sentimental nation: The making of the Australian Commonwealth, 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2000, p. 22. 
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thousand indentured Chinese labourers. Their concerns revolved around the 
impact of large scale indentured labour on society—the “immorality” of the 
Chinese, the liberal fear that Chinese labour would inhibit British 
immigration—and the supposed similarity of the importation to the reviled 
slave trade. In her subtle and important PhD thesis, Ann Curthoys argued that 
this liberal opposition “was directly derived from the Colonial Office”—hardly 
a bastion of working class and labour politics—“and radical positions”—by 
which is meant, those who shared the politics of elite liberals such as John 
Stuart Mill.79 The arrival of tens of thousands of Chinese people as part of the 
gold rushes, and the consequent competition between diggers for declining 
quantities of alluvial gold, provided agitators with the opportunity to organise 
a series of violent race riots in Victoria and New South Wales, and led 
politicians to pass the first legislation restricting specifically Chinese 
immigration into Victoria (1855), South Australia (1857) and New South Wales 
(1861). Curthoys argues that the significance of the gold rush riots in New 
South Wales was not that they were the major reason for the passing of anti-
Chinese immigration laws in 1861, but that they tipped the balance in the 
unelected Legislative Council between those favouring indentured labour and 
those opposed.80 Nevertheless, the combination of anti-Chinese riots and anti-
Chinese legislation left a major residue of anti-Chinese racism in Australian 
politics at all levels. 
                                                 
79 Ann Curthoys, Race and Ethnicity, p. 90. “Radical” in this context means British radical 
liberalism of the 1830s-40s; the politics of John Stuart Mill and their impact on the later anti-
Chinese debates are discussed in chapter six of this thesis. 
80 Curthoys, Race and ethnicity, p. 314. 
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But whatever conclusions were drawn by either rich or poor people during the 
gold rushes, all three anti-Chinese immigration laws were quickly repealed, so 
that by 1867 there were no legal obstacles to Chinese immigration into any of 
the Australian colonies.81 Curthoys extensively documented a reversal of the 
gold rush period exclusionism in New South Wales, as townspeople came to 
realise the value of a local Chinese community, both for the economic activity 
they generated, and especially for their skill at growing much-needed 
vegetables and fruit. Within two years of the notorious Lambing Flat (Young) 
anti-Chinese riot of 1861, civic leaders from the town of Forbes were telling the 
NSW government that the reintroduction of Chinese people was an “absolute 
necessity”. Even at Young, Chinese miners were ultimately allowed back 
despite the bitterness aroused by the riot. Curthoys also described a low level of 
newspaper and popular agitation against Chinese people for a prolonged 
period, a quiescence which ended decisively in 1878, with the famous seamen’s 
strike, in which European seafarers successfully fought the employment of 
Chinese crews by the Australasian Steam Navigation company.82
There were important developments after 1888, which included South 
Australia’s abortive attempt to set up a system of Indian indentured labour for 
the Northern Territory and the subsequent debate over handing the Northern 
Territory over to a future federal government; Queensland’s repeal of the law 
ending the recruitment of indentured Islander labour and the subsequent 
populist campaign for ending the labour trade; the South Australian proposal 
for a conference of the three colonies with tropical territory to discuss “coloured 
                                                 
81 Willard, p. 35. 
82 Curthoys, Race and ethnicity, ch 6; also pp. 252-3. 
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labour”; schemes to encourage Japanese immigration; Queensland’s adherence 
to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty; the widening of the 1888 laws in a number of 
colonies to exclude all Asian and African immigrants; and the federation 
debates that saw Indigenous people lose the right to vote and other important 
rights in the federal constitution. Thus, while the legislation of 1901 represented 
a turning point in the exclusion of non-European immigrants to Australia, it 
was a modest one. The principle of White Australia had been adopted by 
colonial premiers at their conference of 1888, and focused on one national 
group—the Chinese. When significant immigration from other Asian countries, 
in particular India and Japan, was seriously mooted in the 1890s, the response 
was another intercolonial conference in 1896 which adopted the principle of 
excluding all “coloured races”. Some colonies had passed exclusionary 
legislation which was later modified to incorporate a superficially non-
discriminatory language test, a dress rehearsal for the later Commonwealth 
system.83 The granting of powers over immigration to the proposed federal 
government was a feature of all the draft constitutions of the 1890s, and this 
represented widespread agreement amongst the leading politicians that 
Australian immigration policy would be uniform and harshly restrictive. 
One feature of this thesis is the extensive use of direct quotation, and on a few 
occasions, repetitive quotation to make a similar point. The positions of many 
key ruling class people and institutions, such as the colonial pastoralists, the 
Sydney Morning Herald, and the various Legislative Councils, have been 
seriously misrepresented at times, and extensive direct quotation has been 
considered necessary to establish my analysis of their opinions. Extensive 
                                                 
83 Willard, pp. 109-115. 
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quotation is also necessary to establish that opinions being ascribed are 
representative, and not exceptional, and to establish the ideological context 
within which debates took place, and decisions made. 
Summary of thesis argument 
This thesis sees the White Australia policy, not as the inevitable product of the 
racism that saturated colonial Australia, but the product of the dominant 
agendas of the Anglo-Australian ruling class. The first concern was strategic: 
that a significant Chinese immigration, especially into areas of low European 
population, could involve the risk of weakening or even loss of Australian 
control of that part of the continent. Major sections of the ruling class believed 
they faced a struggle over which people would colonise Australia. This 
suggested the possibility of future war with China, or the possibility that a large 
Chinese population could be a fifth column during a war with one of the major 
European powers. 
To these fears was added the dilemma of how to manage production and 
exploit labour in northern, tropical Australia. If the British/Australian ruling 
class failed to develop and populate the north, it would stand as a constant 
invitation to any other powerful nation wanting colonies, or land for settlement. 
One of the racist myths of British imperialism—a leftover from slavery—was 
that “white men” could not labour in the tropics, and this was widely accepted 
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in the colonies.84 That left the plantation model as the only acceptable 
alternative, where a tiny population of whites supervised and ruled over a large 
“coloured” labouring population which worked cheaply, under indenture, for 
several years, with very few political rights—a society like that of Mauritius, 
Fiji, or the Caribbean sugar colonies. A century of anti-slavery agitation meant 
that such a model represented an economic, social and political threat to those 
who wanted a society based on free-labour capitalism and parliamentary rule. It 
would also have consigned such societies to economic and social backwardness, 
producing simple commodities instead of advanced manufactures and other 
sophisticated products. In the minds of ruling class strategists, the recent 
American Civil War showed the dire consequences of a racially-stratified 
society. Furthermore, a plantation economy employing large numbers of 
Chinese or other Asian labourers could involve importing a potential military 
danger, reinforcing the fears that led to their first agenda. Having stolen a 
continent they were unable to fully use or develop, they feared other powers 
wanting a share, and they feared those who could develop the continent 
pushing them aside. Those apprehensions grew as Australia’s isolation 
diminished. 
Thus the second major agenda of the dominant elements in the colonial ruling 
class was the minimisation of indentured “coloured labour”, so that a modern, 
industrial economy could be built. The dangers associated with a plantation 
economy could have easily been eliminated by abolishing the special indenture 
                                                 
84 For instance, Raphael Cilento (with Clem Lack), Triumph in the Tropics: An Historical Sketch of 
Queensland, Historical Committee of the Centenary Celebrations Council of Queensland, 
Brisbane, 1959; Kay Saunders, “Uncertain bondage: An analysis of indentured labour in 
Queensland to 1907, with particular reference to the Melanesian servants”, PhD thesis, 
University of Queensland, 1974, pp. 36-39. 
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laws that enabled planters to so ruthlessly exploit Islanders, but Australian 
capitalists had invested heavily in plantations in the South Pacific. Moreover, 
capitalists wanted the ability to indenture white labour for more conventional 
employment. Rather than attack the plantation system and give equal rights to 
Islander labourers—an approach consistent with working class agendas—they 
preferred to protect the plantation system offshore by excluding and victimising 
the labourers, and using racial stereotyping to do so. Nothing more clearly 
indicates the ruling class nature of the dominant discourse around this issue 
and the way it was resolved, than this. 
The third major agenda of the colonial ruling class was the construction of an 
“homogeneous” population, both demographically and culturally. This was 
justified using theories articulated by John Stuart Mill, who had warned that 
representative democracy required national homogeneity. The pursuit of 
homogeneity was not an excuse to exclude Chinese and other non-European 
people; it lay behind ruling class attempts to integrate the Catholic Irish 
through state-run education systems. 
Chinese people were the major group regarded as unable to be assimilated into 
Australia’s British culture. Chinese people were not Christian and could not, it 
was feared, be disciplined using the ideological methods used on people of 
British origin. A large Chinese population would threaten existing political 
structures and techniques for social control. Chinese camps were notorious for 
providing a space for “larrikins” and prostitutes. Chinese people were 
disciplined by their own secret societies which raised the prospect of alternative 
centres of power. To admit large numbers of Chinese to British-Australian 
nationality would undermine the effect of existing nationalist and racist 
ideologies on the white population and necessitate the construction of new 
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nationalist and class collaborationist ideologies. Such a strategy was not even 
considered. 
These somewhat separate issues came to a head in 1888. When China 
complained to the British government about Australian anti-Chinese laws, the 
British demanded explanations from the colonies. The “disloyalty” of London 
was greeted with anger and dismay. The tension was heightened when 
thousands of Chinese labourers entered the Northern Territory, which was 
under South Australia’s control, to work on the Darwin-Pine Creek railway. 
Through the 1880s, the South Australian Legislative Assembly tried five times 
to restrict Chinese immigration to the Northern Territory and five times the bills 
were rejected by the Legislative Council.85 The politicians representing the 
majority of the whole Australian ruling class faced a challenge to their ability to 
shape the kind of society they wanted. An imposed resolution to the “Chinese 
question” was thus necessitated by the intransigence of South Australia’s upper 
house and the fraction of the ruling class it represented, and by the lack of 
confidence colonial political leaders felt in the British government. By 
November 1887, the governments of the three eastern colonies had agreed in 
principle to meet to plan more extreme exclusionary legislation, and some 
political leaders were clearly looking for opportunities to create a crisis that 
would resolve the issue. 
                                                 
85 These will be discussed in chapters 9 and 10; the six bills were: 
1880: all South Australia: defeated in Legislative Council (private member’s bill of JC Bray) 
1880: Northern Territory only: defeated in Legislative Council 
1881: all South Australia: amended to South Australia proper in Legislative Council 
1886: extend to Northern Territory: defeated in Legislative Council 
1887: extent to Northern Territory: defeated in Legislative Council 
1888: all South Australia with same provisions for Northern Territory: adopted 
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The South Australian government’s representative in the Northern Territory 
created a furore when he reported that hundreds of Chinese people were 
heading for the central Australian ruby fields, and the government used this 
report to impose restrictions to be reviewed by parliament. In Victoria and New 
South Wales a crisis was manufactured by the arrival of the SS Afghan at 
Melbourne on 27 April 1888 carrying 268 Chinese passengers. The Victorian 
government forced the captain to leave without disembarking the 52 Chinese 
passengers bound for Melbourne. Even before the ship reached Sydney, 
hysteria was at fever pitch. Tens of thousands of people marched to Parliament, 
led by the Mayor of Sydney, and there were attempts to rush the chamber of the 
Legislative Council. The Parkes government promised to stop any of the 
Chinese from the Afghan, and the three other ships in the harbour, from 
landing; and brought retrospective legislation into Parliament to legalise its 
actions and dramatically reduce the number of Chinese allowed to enter New 
South Wales.86 In Brisbane, the day after the Afghan arrived in Sydney, rioters 
smashed up the Chinese district.87 Within six weeks, the colonies had met at an 
intercolonial conference, held on 12-14 June, and agreed to common legislation 
to virtually prohibit Chinese immigration. As awkward as the Australian 
actions were, the colonial legislation was approved in London. 
The crisis of 1888 cannot be understood simply by looking at the agitation or 
rhetoric of the anti-Chinese campaigners. Only an awareness of the 
fundamental interests involved allows us to understand the crisis, and the role 
                                                 
86 See Markus, Fear and hatred, pp. 143-4; IM Britain, “Victoria, the Chinese and the federal 
idea, 1887-1888”, ANU Historical Journal, no. 6, November 1969, pp. 49-54 for Victoria. 
87 Raymond Evans, “Night of Broken Glass: The Anatomy of an Anti-Chinese Riot” in Fighting 
words: Writing about race, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1999, pp. 79-94. 
Page 46   Chapter 1: Introduction 
played by public mobilisation in helping force a conclusion. This analysis is 
reinforced by the durability of the settlement of 1888. Most of the dynamics that 
led to the crisis of 1888 remained operative for the following 70 years and more. 
The Anglo-Australian ruling class held onto its continent grimly, fearing other 
powers or peoples attempting to use it or take control of it. Japan’s rise to 
military power saw those strategic fears shift, most especially from 1905 to 1945. 
Australian nationalism was constructed as racist and exclusionary, and proved 
an effective means of encouraging class collaboration and containing radical 
working class militancy. The issue of slavery or semi-slavery is the one that lost 
relevance as indentured labour systems proved decreasingly profitable, and 
sugar and other commodity producers moved to a new system based on family 
farms and centralised milling. One consequence of this is that historians have 
radically misunderstood elements of the rhetoric used in the debates over 
Chinese immigration and Islander labour. 
There were a number of second rank issues in the decision for exclusion. One is 
the centrality of gold in ruling class and middle class hopes for accelerated 
economic development and political liberalisation,88 and their concern that 
Chinese miners dug up the gold and took it home, rather than investing it in 
Australia. There were widespread and false allegations that Chinese people 
were immoral, and used opium to seduce white women.89 These played a 
                                                 
88 The flavour of some of these hopes is captured in Paul A Pickering, “’The Finger of God’: 
Gold’s impact on New South Wales” in Iain McCalman, Alexander Cook and Andrew Reeves 
(eds), Gold: Forgotten Histories and Lost Objects of Australia, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 
37-51. 
89 One of the main instruments in promoting the idea of Chinese immorality was the “Report of 
the Select Committee into Common Lodging Houses”, chaired by Angus Cameron MLA, NSW 
V&P, 1875-6, vol. 6, pp. 845-68. It was a completely dishonest exercise, aimed to vilify Chinese 
people (and, I would argue, rescue Cameron’s political career), and had a vast impact on public 
opinion. 
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significant role in whipping up racist hostility to the Chinese, but were not 
central to ruling class strategic thinking. Sir Henry Parkes repeatedly made a 
point of rejecting these allegations; but did not soften his hostility to Chinese 
people. A range of small and medium-sized capitalists complained about 
Chinese competition: furniture makers, tobacco growers, fruit growers and 
teamsters. Mobilisation by these groups did not make Australian policy, but 
contributed to the strength of the exclusionist position. So too, in a more 
significant way, did the trade union, plebeian and bourgeois-dominated anti-
Chinese campaigns. 
Organisation of the thesis 
In chapter 2, I discuss the theoretical assumptions of this thesis, which lie in 
Marx’s historical materialism and his theorisation of base and superstructure. I 
outline and deal with attacks on this from postmodernism, and the alternative 
theories of racism developed by writers such as John Rex and Pierre van den 
Berghe grounded in Weberian sociology. These underpin the “contact” theory 
used by Andrew Markus and other writers. I argue for an understanding of 
colonial Australia as a class society, deal with objections to that analysis, and 
use an understanding of base and superstructure to outline a Marxist theory of 
racism. 
The body of the thesis is broadly divided between three chapters, 3 to 5, which 
outline the three major ruling class agendas, and five predominantly narrative 
chapters, 6 to 10. 
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In chapter 3 I discuss the first ruling class agenda, colonisation, and the 
perception that Chinese immigration threatened British control of sections of 
Australia. I illustrate my argument through a narrative of the attempts made by 
the Queensland parliament in 1876-77 to restrict Chinese immigration. 
In chapter 4 I discuss the second ruling class agenda, anti-slavery, the danger 
that systems of unfree labour would create some kind of semi-slave economy 
and society, and the belief that any substantial Chinese or “coloured” labour 
force would catalyse the development of a racialised, unfree system of labour. I 
outline the specifically bourgeois structure of anti-slavery thought, and the 
post-slavery British critique of other unfree labour systems, including the 
danger that they would produce a stunted economy churning out commodities, 
rather than a modern, wealthy state. I lastly discuss the revisionist histories 
which have challenged the idea that Pacific Islanders were “slaves” in some 
sense. 
In chapter 5 I discuss the third ruling class agenda, the need for a racially and 
culturally homogeneous society to entrench social control by the capitalist state. 
I argue that this was legitimised, if not grounded, in the theories of John Stuart 
Mill, and move to locate the origins of this element in Mill’s thought in that of 
the aristocratic anti-capitalism of the Coleridgians, their rejection of 
enlightenment liberalism, and Mill’s own desire for a politics of social stability 
that protected bourgeois privilege. The chapter then tests the seriousness of this 
discourse by seeing if there were other ways in which homogeneity was 
pursued by the colonial ruling class; in the process briefly discussing the ideas 
behind the systems of national education, in choosing the national origin of 
European immigrants, and disputes over how to deal with Irish Australians. 
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Having theorised the three major ruling class agendas that led to White 
Australia, I move to offer some narrative explanations for various “coloured 
labour” and Chinese immigration laws, explanations grounded in the three 
agendas. In chapters 6 and 7, I look at the development of the politics of 
“coloured labour” in Queensland from 1878 to 1886. Queensland was the only 
colony in which large-scale indentured labour was employed, and the politics 
of “coloured labour” were central to all political debate in the colony over this 
period. I show that, not only did Queensland lead in the restriction of Chinese 
immigration, but also that major sections of the ruling class combined to 
deprive pastoralists of indentured Pacific Island labour. Attempts to set up a 
system of indentured Indian labour were defeated by the Liberals in the 1883 
election and subsequent legislation; and this led to an attempt by sugar planters 
and their allies to separate North Queensland from the South. Northern 
separation was initially resisted by all bourgeois politicians in the South, 
Conservative and Liberal, with major sections of Conservative politics 
determined that any system of indentured “coloured labour” would be 
controlled by a state dominated by southern bourgeoisie. 
In chapter 8, I use the controversy around the seamen’s strike of 1878-9 to 
discuss the class logic of anti-Chinese racism, and in particular, the argument 
that it had an anti-capitalist dynamic. I look at the attitudes of the Sydney 
Morning Herald, showing them to be caught between a hostility to Chinese 
immigration and a fear that anti-Chinese agitation was anti-capitalist, 
protectionist, and tending towards communism. I contrast their position with 
those taken by a range of other conservative papers in New South Wales and 
Queensland. Finally, I sketch ways in which ruling class politicians such as Sir 
Henry Parkes and Sir Thomas McIlwraith were able to use anti-Chinese 
agitation to contain working class and plebeian discontent towards them. 
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In chapters 9 and 10, I examine the factors leading to the Chinese immigration 
crisis of 1888, and the story of the crisis and its resolution. I present a new 
narrative of this pivotal crisis, illustrating the centrality of ruling class 
politicians in events, the disputes among them, and their final decisive act in 
warning the South Australian upper house that it faced a choice between 
closing the door to Chinese immigration at Darwin, and missing out on 
federation. 
The anti-Chinese legislation and hysteria of the late 1880s was an element in the 
process by which an increasingly wealthy and powerful local ruling class 
established a measure of independence from London, partly as a means of 
remaining a loyal part of the empire. White Australia was a declaration that 
Australian politics would be driven by a fear of Asia and Asians, a standpoint 
which remains—despite all the talk of engagement and multiculturalism—a 
significant element of government decision-making today. 
A note on words and comparisons 
Nineteenth-century usages often saw the term “working class” applied to 
anyone who actually worked; the counterpoint being the capitalist who lived 
through risking their capital. I have used “working class” to mean people 
employed by capitalists, and who had no managerial role. I have used the word 
“plebeian” to denote a broader layer of society, including working class people, 
free selectors, artisans, self-employed people and employers who worked 
alongside their one or two staff. The phrase is valuable in representing radical 
activism within this wide social layer, and there is a long tradition of this in 
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Australia. I have used it for organisations such as the Working Men’s Defence 
Association in Sydney from 1877, which is briefly discussed in chapter 8. I 
distinguish such plebeian activism from the more conventionally bourgeois-led 
organisations such as the Political Reform Union from 1878, or the Protectionist-
controlled Anti-Chinese League in Sydney in 1887-88, whose leaderships were 
far from plebeian.90
I have capitalised the words Conservative and Liberal to identify association 
with a political network. This is relevant in Queensland and Victoria, and to 
some extent South Australia, where there were identifiable parties. The use of 
lower-case conservative or liberal denotes a general political orientation. 
The word “race” was used very loosely in the period covered by this thesis. It 
was often used as a synonym for nationality or people, and its use did not 
necessarily imply a racist outlook. 
In order to make sums of money intelligible, I have provided a rough estimate 
of equivalents, on the basis of £1 in the period 1876-88 being worth $300 in 
2006.91
                                                 
90 Markey describes the PRU as “a bourgeois-led protectionist and democratic body with 
working class support”, a description I would agree with, Populist politics, p. 70. 
91 I have done this on a wages basis; estimating that the average wage for a competent labourer 
in the 1880s was around 40 shillings or £2 a week where no board or food was provided, while 
in 2006 a labourer would earn at least $30,000 per annum. See, for instance, the survey of wages 
in the iron trades in SMH 1 July 1879, p. 5, cols. 1-2. Most wages are given in hourly figures, but 
Chapman & Co. labourers received 36s a week. In September 2006, the legal federal minimum 
wage in Australia was $12.75 hour, or $484.50 week, Australian Fair Pay Commission, Wage-
Setting Decision and Reasons for Decision, October 2006 [online] 
http://www.fairpay.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/222E8249-FCA4-42BB-93CD-
32B906C2662B/0/AFPC_Oct2006_Wagesettingdecision_Fulldocument.pdf, p. 19 [accessed 1 
December 2006]. Most labourers earn more than this. At the ASN docks, skilled mechanics in 
1879 earned 10s to 11s a day, or £3 to £3 6s a week; comparable workers in 2006 would expect to 
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earn well over $900 to $1000 a week, suggesting my index may err on the side of 
understatement. Workers today pay significant amounts of income tax, but also receive 
unemployment benefits, medical insurance and other welfare benefits unavailable in the 
nineteenth century. 
One alternative method of comparison would be to use long term price indices. The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics’ calculations show that if consumer prices were indexed at 100 in 1945, they 
were between 45 and 56 in the period 1877-88, with an average of 51.3; whereas in September 
2006, the index was 2766, a multiple of 54 times. From Year Book Australia 2002. [online] 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/632C047B9DC5DA2ACA256F2A000E
CF0B?opendocument [accessed 1 December 2006] I calculated the price index by taking the 
average of 1989 (1714) and 1990 (1839), and multiplied it by the index for September 2006 
(155.7), based on a base-point of 100 for 1989-90 [online] 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/e8ae5488b598839cca25682000131612/938da570
a34a8edaca2568a900139350!OpenDocument [accessed 1 December 2006] Of course, over such 
long time periods, these figures are only valid as orders of magnitude. 
This suggests a three-fold increase in living standards, making any compromise approach 
problematic. I regard the wage-based figure as being more valid because the subjective 
understanding of the reader is more strongly related to their weekly or annual income, than to 
comparative prices. 
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Chapter 2 
Class analysis and colonial Australia 
THE UNDERLYING theoretical assumptions behind this thesis are those of 
classical Marxism, and in particular, the assumption that colonial Australia can 
be understood as capitalist, as a class society, with a ruling class which 
dominated the economy and politics. Historical materialism has been 
productive of some of the greatest historical writing—from the works of Marx 
and Engels themselves, through the contributions of EP Thompson, Christopher 
Hill and the other British Marxist historians, George Rudé and Georges 
Lefebvre, CLR James and Eugene Genovese, and the archaeology of V Gordon 
Childe. 
The propositions of historical materialism have been challenged by Weberian 
approaches and post-structuralism, and within Australian history, by historians 
writing within these intellectual frameworks. In this chapter, I will respond to 
these criticisms and to arguments which reject the idea that colonial Australia 
can be understood in class terms, and outline a Marxist theory of racism. 
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Marxism and class analysis 
At the heart of the Marxist theory of history is the argument that in complex 
societies, the principal means of production are controlled by a minority class 
which exploits the labour of the direct producers. This exploitation is resisted 
by the direct producers, and it is this resistance, as well as competition amongst 
the minority who control society’s resources, that necessitates the parallel 
development of an armed state to impose social order, and a formalised set of 
ideas by which the business of exploitation can be legitimised. In one famous 
passage, Marx theorised this as base and superstructure, the idea that the “legal 
and political superstructure” of society rested on its productivity and its 
relations of production; that changes in the material production of social life led 
to struggles for control of the political superstructure and over the content of 
social ideas.1 For the past 150 years, this formula has been enormously 
controversial. Particular formulations in Marx were used by some—most 
notoriously, by Stalinist regimes and parties—to insist that the nature of a 
society’s state and politics were determined by its economic and class structure. 
Mechanical determinists also asserted that human society had passed through a 
series of predetermined changes in economic and political structure and that a 
final stage, socialism, would be the inevitable result of economic development.2 
Such a reading had little in common with Marx, who emphasised the ability of 
the state, the legal system and ideas (including religion) to partially shape the 
                                                 
1 Karl Marx, Preface and introduction to A contribution to the critique of political economy, Foreign 
Languages Press, Peking, 1976, pp. 3-4. 
2 This tendency is discussed in Chris Harman, “Base and superstructure”, International Socialism 
(UK), no. 32, summer 1986, pp. 4-9. 
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nature of economic relations. Marx also canvassed the possibility that 
revolutionary change could be defeated and social progress radically reversed. 
In an important exposition of Marx’s theory, Chris Harman argued that the 
superstructure of any society was inherently conservative, with the state 
protecting particular systems of exploitation, particular ruling classes, and the 
role of the particular structures of thought in naturalising these.3 It was not only 
the class struggle of the exploited but also the incremental development of 
human productivity, and new relations of production and exploitation, that 
challenged the institutions of the superstructure, which in turn resisted change. 
If exploitation and class struggle necessitated the development of a 
superstructure, the superstructure itself worked to intensify that class struggle, 
as new classes and class elements gained in strength. The ultimate result, Marx 
argued, would be “an epoch of social revolution”, ending in either the 
“revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the ruin of the contending 
classes.”4
Two elements of this theory are particularly important for this thesis. The first is 
that a ruling class is neither to be defined in a narrow political sense, as the 
social group in control of the state; nor in a narrow economic sense, as those 
who own the means of production; but as consisting of the entire layer that 
rules society and benefits from the routine exploitation of other people’s labour. 
In late colonial Australia, this included the medium and large capitalists and 
their managers, large landowners, politicians and top state officials, and the 
                                                 
3 Harman, “Base and superstructure”, esp. pp. 18-23. 
4 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the communist party, Foreign Languages Press, 
Peking, 1965, p. 89. 
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priests, journalists, ‘respectable’ humanitarians, sectarian organisers and 
intellectuals who dominated the production of ideas in society. The issue is 
confused by the nineteenth-century tendency, even in Marx, to designate the 
bourgeois element as “middle class”, long after they had conquered economic 
and political power in Britain.5
Within a ruling class so defined, there is both a division of labour and a conflict 
of interests. For capitalist society in particular, the business of politics and the 
creation of ideas about the world is subcontracted to professional specialists—
politicians, journalists, academics, priests, lawyers and judges. Hal Draper sees 
in Marx an argument that the bourgeoisie has a particular inaptitude for politics 
and ideological development.6 This division of labour also means that there can 
be sharp conflicts between the direct capitalists and their politicians or 
ideologists over specific issues. Alongside this division of labour there is a 
conflict of interests, as different industries call for different state measures and 
different ideological justifications. These conflicts are frequently fought out 
within the state apparatus, and compromises reached. The long conflict 
between manufacturers (and others) and pastoralists (and others), over free 
trade and protection in late colonial and early federation Australia, is an 
example of this.7
                                                 
5 See Hal Draper, Karl Marx’s theory of revolution: Volume II: The politics of social classes, Monthly 
Review Press, New York, 1978, p. 290; see also p. 169n. 
6 Draper, Karl Marx, vol. II, chapter “Intellectual labor and laborers”, pp. 486ff; this is also 
extensively discussed in his Volume I: State and bureaucracy, Monthly Review Press, New York, 
1977. 
7 Phil Griffiths, “The decline of free trade in Australian politics, 1901-1909”, BA (Hons) thesis, 
Macquarie University, 1998. 
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If rival economic interests, or rival ruling class strategies, lead to conflict and 
some kind of resolution, that resolution is then embodied in laws, institutions 
and ideas—superstructural elements—and these in turn shape the further 
development of class relations and the productive forces of society. The victory 
of protectionism in 1907 changed the Australian economy and ideas about 
Australian society. The stability of this victory and its capacity to become an 
enduring policy were dependent on the continued accumulation of capital at a 
rate sufficient to match the capital attached to rival nations. By the 1970s, this 
strategy was failing as a means to accumulation, and a radical shift took place in 
ruling class thinking, with a new, neo-liberal paradigm triumphing in the 1980s, 
which in turn also had a dramatic effect on class relations and productive 
capacity.8
This thesis argues that the structures of racial exclusion in Australia should also 
be seen in this way—as the result of a fight within a ruling class that had a 
variety of economic interests and strategic opinions. One of the former was 
plantation agriculture, especially sugar, which was for decades based on 
substantially unfree labour and relations of production with very different 
dynamics to those based on so-called “free labour”. The solution to this conflict 
involved the state imposing more and more onerous restrictions on the use of 
unfree labour. The victory of the exclusionists paved the way for federation, 
shaped the composition and size of the Australian working class, and limited 
capitalist development in the north. 
                                                 
8 These issues are canvassed in Paul Kelly, The end of certainty: Power, politics & business in 
Australia, revised edition, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards (NSW), 1994; and David Love, Straw 
polls, paper money, Viking, Ringwood (Vic), 2001, albeit from a neo-liberal point of view. 
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Seeing the ruling class as divided does not obviate an understanding of the rich 
and powerful in colonial Australia as a class. A vast panoply of ideas and legal 
institutions were defended by all of them, including wage labour, property law, 
the nation state, and national citizenship. The common bourgeois reaction—
economic, legal and ideological—to the great strikes of the early 1890s was 
compelling evidence that Australia had its own powerful ruling class; as was 
the ability of their politicians to bury previously bitter disagreements and unite 
into a single right wing party when finally confronted with a mass labour 
party.9 Such an understanding reflects the methodology of historical 
materialism—to find the class and sectional/class interests behind major 
conflicts in politics and ideas. 
The second element of Marx’s theory important for this thesis is the proposition 
that the outcome of class and social struggles is never pre-determined, but 
shaped by the relative political and material resources of each side, their ability 
to mobilise force and popular support, and the determination and resolution of 
each side, which includes the quality of its leadership. If this thesis appears to 
focus disproportionately on the role of Sir Henry Parkes, it is not just because 
his papers are amongst the few to survive from amongst his contemporaries, 
but also because of his extraordinary ability both to lead the bourgeoisie of New 
South Wales, and represent their interests. 
Marx’s theory of base and superstructure was attacked from within Marxism by 
EP Thompson, as “a bad and dangerous model”, because of the way it was used 
                                                 
9  Griffiths, The decline of free trade, passim. 
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by Stalin to remove human beings from the making of history,10 and asserted 
that “class is a cultural as much as an economic formation.”11 Thompson’s 
primary target was the anti-humanism of Althusser and his followers, but one 
of the legacies of his argument was a generation of social historians who looked 
at the world from the experience of those at the bottom, ignoring the broader 
structure of class relations shaping that experience. 
Thompson’s own work did not reflect these theoretical positions. It was 
materialist, grounded in the development of new relations of production and 
focused on class struggles that were driven by conflicting interests, and alive to 
the impact of changing relations of production on ideas and institutions and the 
impact of politics and legal structures on economics. The making of the English 
working class described the transformation of a disparate layer of wage earning 
artisans and labourers, who identified predominantly with their separate trades 
and the struggle against the landed interest, into a self-conscious class, singular, 
in open conflict with its symbiotic rival—the class of (especially manufacturing) 
employers, and the government. The strike, trade union and radical press 
tended to replace plebeian mass actions such as the “food riot”, while 
politically, the radical constitutionalism of the 1790s, gave way to Owenism and 
quasi-socialist political economy. Underpinning this class polarisation were 
changed methods of production, changed economic relations, and also a 
rapprochement between the landed gentry and emerging manufacturers, 
pushed together by their mutual counter-revolutionary panic.12 The essays 
                                                 
10 Quoted in Harvey Kaye, The British Marxist historians: An introductory analysis, Polity Press, 
London, 1984, p. 172. 
11 EP Thompson, The making of the English working class, Penguin, Harmondsworth (UK), 1968, p. 
13. 
12 Thompson, Making of the English working class, passim. 
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making up Customs in common looked at the growing polarisation between 
patricians and plebs, the fights over enclosure of the common lands, and the 
attempts to enforce the imperatives of the commercial grain market against 
those who insisted on feeding the local community in times of dearth.13 Whigs 
and hunters found Thompson searching for the reasons behind the sudden 
declaration of fifty new capital offences in England in 1723, and discovering an 
eruption of “class war” in the forests of East Berkshire and Hampshire, driven 
by rival claims for the use of forest resources between the declining gentry and 
yeoman class of the long-established forest communities, and the newly rich 
landowners and lords (temporal and ecclesiastical) who asserted their right to 
graze their deer unimpeded in “their” forests. Also involved was a struggle 
over the legal and ideological bases of economic life as “non-monetary use 
rights were being reified into capitalist property rights”14. Matt Perry has 
suggested that for Thompson and other humanist Marxists, such as Eugene 
Genovese and Christopher Hill, the “contradiction between the explicit 
theoretical abandonment of base and superstructure and the practical 
attachment to it, allowed their work to continue within the very best tradition of 
Marxist history” while undermining the ability of future historians to clearly 
grasp the theoretical issues involved in understanding the past.15
                                                 
13 EP Thompson, Customs in common, Penguin, London, 1993. 
14 EP Thompson, Whigs and hunters: The origin of the Black Act, Penguin, London, 1990, p. 244. 
15 Matt Perry, Marxism and history, Palgrave, Basingstoke (UK) and New York, 2002, p. 123. 
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An Australian ruling class? 
While historians have largely ignored the role played in the development of 
proto-White Australia laws by the rich businessmen, squatters and lawyers who 
dominated the colonial parliaments before 1888, is it fruitful to consider this 
social layer as a class, and specifically as a ruling class? I argue that it is. 
Certainly in economic terms, there is compelling evidence that Australian 
capitalism in the colonial era was dominated by a ruling class. Bob Connell and 
Terry Irving saw the period of colonial self-government as one in which the 
mercantile bourgeoisie asserted its hegemony. This involved the defeat of the 
landowning gentry who were dominant before 1840, the termination of state-
controlled, unfree labour, the development of financial institutions that were 
able to concentrate large amounts of money capital for lending and investment, 
the increasing penetration of urban capital into pastoralism, and an increasing 
proletarianisation of working-class life and sharper class polarisation. 
Politically, they argued that the self-governing parliaments were numerically 
and hence politically dominated by urban colonial businessmen and their 
specific agendas for economic development.16
Unfortunately, there is very little historical analysis of colonial capitalists and 
their political agendas. Dick van Dissel argued that the Adelaide gentry 
constituted the ruling class of South Australia,17 while Manning Clark saw the 
                                                 
16 RW Connell & TH Irving, Class structure in Australian history, Second edition, Longman 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1992 (first pub 1980), pp. 83-114. 
17 Dirk van Dissel, “The Adelaide gentry, 1850-1920” in Eric Richards (ed), The Flinders history of 
South Australia: Social history, Wakefield Press, Netley (SA), 1986 , pp. 333-370; also Dirk van 
Page 62   Chapter 2: Class and colonial Australia 
1870s and 1880s as “The golden age of the Australian bourgeoisie.”18 In a 
careful discussion of the economic and social developments which led to the 
rise of the New South Wales Labor Party in 1890, Ray Markey saw the late 
colonial period as a pre-industrial, mercantilist one in which “a new urban 
financial and industrial ruling class” began to emerge.19 EL Wheelwright and 
Ken Buckley likewise asserted that the “mercantile class” was “the leading force 
in the bourgeoisie”.20 Andrew Wells described the colonial economies of the 
1880s as a mixture between the large scale production of wool, minerals and 
agricultural commodities for the world market, industries where productivity 
was high and capital accumulation and economic power concentrated; and an 
urban economy of large numbers of petty producers and the self employed in 
which production was labour intensive and class differentiation “muted”. An 
important section of the colonial ruling class, the largest finance capitalists, 
were located in London.21 Wells’ attempt to establish a different emphasis in 
our understanding of Australian capitalism in this period was interesting and 
suggestive, but undermined by his failure to engage with rival accounts (and 
not just that of Connell and Irving), the paucity of his discussion of mercantile 
capital in Australia, and his neglect of the growing element of manufacturing 
                                                                                                                                               
Dissel, “The Adelaide gentry 1880-1915: A study of a colonial upper class”, MA thesis, 
University of Melbourne, 1973. 
18 AW Martin quotes Clark making this comment in 1954, “Political groupings in New South 
Wales, 1872-1889: A study in the working of responsible government”, PhD thesis, ANU, 1955, 
p 27. 
19 Raymond Markey, The making of the Labor Party in New South Wales 1880-1900, New South 
Wales University Press, Kensington, 1988, pp. 20-2. 
20 Ted Wheelwright and Ken Buckley, No paradise for workers: Capitalism and the common people in 
Australia 1788-1914, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988, p. 110. 
21 Andrew Wells, Constructing capitalism: An economic history of eastern Australia, 1788-1901, Allen 
& Unwin, Sydney, 1989, pp. 140-1. 
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that was capital intensive.22 Manufacturers constituted a significant element in 
the colonial ruling class. 
A few historians have seriously examined the close links between business and 
politics in colonial Australia.23 The most meticulous examination of the New 
South Wales Legislative Assembly for the period 1872-87 concluded that, “a 
single social class predominated”.24 Its author, AW Martin, called this the 
“middle classes”, but it is clear that he meant what a Marxist would understand 
as the ruling class. “Persons connected with the pastoral, mercantile and 
professional callings always accounted together for over seventy per cent of the 
membership of the Assembly,” he wrote.25 There were compelling practical 
reasons for this.  
Except in unusual circumstances, it was thus necessary for a man to 
possess an independent income before contemplating an entry into the 
                                                 
22 For example, in 1891, Victoria’s 30 gas plants represented an investment of £1.8 million, an 
enormous amount, and their capital/labour ratio was ten times the average, NG Butlin, 
Investment in Australian economic development, 1861-1900, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (UK), 1964, pp. 207-8. Mort’s Dock in Sydney was always a very large employer, 
with 1000 staff in 1886, Connell & Irving, p. 111. The scale and nature of colonial manufacturing 
is discussed by GJR Linge in Industrial Awakening: A Geography of Australian Manufacturing, 1788-
1890, ANU Press, Canberra, 1979. 
23 Duncan Waterson, Personality, profit and politics: Thomas McIlwraith in Queensland, 1866-1894: 
The John Murtagh Macrossan Lecture, 1978, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1984; 
DB Waterson, Squatter, selector, and storekeeper: A history of the Darling Downs 1859-93, Sydney 
University Press, Sydney, 1968; GP Taylor, “Business and politics in Queensland, 1859-1895”, 
New Zealand Journal of History, vol. 1, no. 1, April 1967, pp. 75-92; Lyndon Thomas Megarrity, 
“Robert Philp and the politics of development in Queensland 1890-1903”, PhD thesis, 
University of New England, 2001. 
24 Martin thesis, p. 290. He used these words about Britain in the eighteenth century, but 
immediately added that, “For different reasons, a similar situation had developed in New South 
Wales”. See also pp. 59-60. 
25 Martin, thesis, p. 46 and accompanying table. He did not see these professionals as in any way 
an independent force: “many of the large professional group had a considerable community of 
interest” with the “pastoral and mercantile representatives”, he wrote on the same page. 
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political sphere. Evening sittings of Parliament made it possible for 
Sydney men actively engaged in business or the professions to become 
members. Financial means were a still greater necessity to country 
representatives.26
The long and bitter agitation for payment of members was driven by anger in 
the working class and the plebeian middle class at their practical exclusion from 
political decision-making, just as this agitation informed the hostility of 
conservatives. 
One problem with many Australia-wide analyses is that they largely focused on 
New South Wales and Victoria, and did not deal with the unevenness of 
development across the continent. The struggles over “coloured labour” in 
Queensland are central to the development of the White Australia policy. There 
are several reasons for this, all grounded in the later development of both 
frontier and urban capitalism in Queensland. The pastoral frontier was still 
expanding in the 1880s, and the plantation-based sugar industry experienced a 
first great boom which ended in 1884, and then another period of expansion in 
the 1890s, while urban capitalist development in Brisbane and the other major 
centres really only took off in the 1880s, decades behind Sydney, Melbourne 
and Adelaide. 
Nevertheless, I think it is mistaken to see the Queensland ruling class as 
dominated by “the squatters and planters who controlled the huge pastoral 
holdings of the interior and the sugar producing belts along the Queensland 
coast”, as Bill Thorpe seemed to do in his pioneering discussion of class, 
                                                 
26 Martin, thesis, p. 48. 
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colonisation and capitalism in colonial Queensland.27 There is a widespread 
agreement that Queensland pastoralists had lost their dominant political 
position by the early 1870s.28 The governing Liberal party of 1883-88 had few 
squatters in its ranks, unlike the Liberal administrations of Macalister in the 
1860s; while the significance of the emergence of the McIlwraith Conservative 
party in the late 1870s was that it represented an alliance between pastoral 
capital and miners, sugar planters and some finance capitalists, including 
McIlwraith’s business partners.29 McIlwraith’s place in Queensland party 
politics was described by his loyal deputy, John Murtagh Macrossan, as follows: 
You were never the head of the squatting party although you trusted 
once that you were—and annoyed and angered me very much by doing 
so—and that you were proud of it. The only party you ever were the real 
head of was the little party which gathered around you on the 
opposition cross benches and the few non-squatters which for various 
reasons joined you since. I never regarded myself as a member of a 
squatting party. We simply used them and they used you as the only 
shield they had between them and the devil [ie Griffith and the 
Liberals].30
                                                 
27 Bill Thorpe, Colonial Queensland: Perspectives on a frontier society, University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1996, p. 198.  
28 Charles Schindler, “The evolution of political parties”, Journal of the Royal Historical Society of 
Queensland, vol. 1, no. 3, August 1917, p. 138; Waterson, Squatter, selector and storekeeper, p. 
231; PS Callaghan, “Political alignments in the Queensland Legislative Assembly 1878-99“, BA 
(Hons) thesis, University of Queensland, 1968, pp. 19-22; Palmer in QPD, vol XX (1876), p. 215; 
Duncan Waterson, Personality, profit and politics: Thomas McIlwraith in Queensland, 1866-1894: The 
John Murtagh Macrossan Lecture, 1978, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1984; 
DK Dignan, “McIlwraith and the squatters”, Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, 
vol. IV, no. 3, December 1950, pp. 412-19. 
29 GP Taylor discusses the development of the McIlwraith business network and its political 
manifestations in “Business and politics in Queensland, 1859-1895”, New Zealand Journal of 
History, vol. 1, no. 1, April 1967, esp. pp. 80-86. 
30 Letter Macrossan to McIlwraith, 25th May, 1883, in McIlwraith-Palmer papers, Oxley Library, 
OM64-19/20. The letter was written when the McIlwraith government was facing rebellion by 
squatters over its plans for a transcontinental railway, with election defeat also looming. 
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Thus, the history of the McIlwraith government 1879-83 was in part a history of 
tension and conflict between the Cabinet and an ultra-squatter “subsection”; 
and this in turn reflects the significant shift in political power which had taken 
place just before the period covered by this thesis. The enormous economic 
power of the squatters, and the dependence of Queensland capitalism as a 
whole on pastoral income, could not deliver them hegemony over the rest of the 
ruling class and the middle class. This was plaintively acknowledged by the 
conservative Maryborough Chronicle: 
Mr Buzacott has to a great degree been a representative of the pastoral 
interest, and though this industry is the source of the trade of 
Rockhampton, and the growth of which depends on its profitable 
extension, yet, as will be found always the case, as population settles in 
large numbers and forms large towns, the mass of the people lose sight 
of the springs whence flow the prosperity they enjoy, and the cry is 
raised of capital against the people, the latter being supposed to be 
represented by the Liberal party, the former by the Opposition. 
Rockhampton has reached a stage which Maryborough went through 
some time ago, when the people would have none but a Liberal to rule 
over them.31
In large part, this was because the squatters were seen as opposed to the 
development of a broadly-based capitalism, in which small farmers and urban 
interests would flourish. Thus the squatters made enemies out of many who 
were also either rich, or ambitious small owners. As a consequence, the growth 
in urban, mining and small-farmer/selector capital underpinned the political 
defeat of the Queensland squatters. Aspects of this process have been discussed 
by Duncan Waterson in his study of class and power on the Darling Downs, 
                                                 
31 Maryborough Chronicle 23 Nov. 1878. 
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home of the “pure Merino” squatters. Waterson saw the storekeepers of the 
three main towns of the region as the people “who, together with their 
associates the small farmers, contested and finally broke the squatters’ 
stranglehold.”32  
While pastoralism underpinned the municipality’s [Toowoomba’s] 
progress and prosperity, administrative, service, processing and even 
manufacturing functions expanded at a faster rate, particularly during 
the late ’sixties and throughout the ’seventies.33
However, to town businesspeople, by attempting to monopolise the land, 
“Pastoralism appeared to be blocking economic opportunity, political change 
and social advancement.” So the urban capitalists mobilised voters in general to 
defeat the squatters politically. But this victory would not have been enduring 
had it not led to new opportunities for investment and profit. But, “Once the 
selectors [small farmers] were established and the power of the squatters was 
broken…the storekeepers’ radicalism died. By 1893 they, as well as the 
surviving squatters, were the economic conservatives of the Downs.”34 Denis 
Cryle’s discussion of the press in Queensland showed the squatters attempting 
to use control over newspapers to translate their economic power into political 
control, and eventually failing because urban liberals counter-mobilised, using 
their own, rival newspapers to cohere the population behind their program of 
extensive colonisation and land settlement.35 In Brisbane, leading Liberal 
                                                 
32 Waterson, pp. 19-20. 
33 Waterson, p. 22. 
34 Waterson, p. 23. 
35 Denis Cryle, The press in colonial Queensland: A social and political history 1845-1875, University 
of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1989, passim. 
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politicians were involved in setting up a rival bank to the McIlwraith-Drury 
dominated Queensland National Bank.36
To the political weakness of the squatters must be added the relative decline in 
pastoralism as a driver of economic growth. Thorpe’s view of the Queensland 
ruling class reflects a belief that capital accumulation in society was driven by 
the dominant export industries, a view which is shared by those who argue the 
“staple theory” of Australian economic development.37 This approach was 
trenchantly criticised by economic historian Noel Butlin, who argued that 
investment was the primary driver of economic growth in Australia, with much 
of the capital coming from Britain. While pastoral and mining exports remained 
crucial, the Australian economy after 1860 “was moving rapidly, it would seem, 
in a direct away from that indicated by its natural factor endowment”, towards 
construction and the development of import-replacing manufacturing.38 Butlin 
considered the urbanisation of Australia its most remarkable feature. 
These broader Australian developments were also reflected in the growth of 
capitalism in Queensland. Table 2.1 shows that while investment in agricultural 
and pastoral business was a major proportion of total private sector investment 
from 1871-85, investment in residential construction was greater; and that in 
1886-90, agricultural and pastoral investment stalled. Table 2.2 shows that from 
1870-1892, new capital formation in the Queensland pastoral industry never 
                                                 
36 GP Taylor, p. 86. 
37 See, for instance, JW McCarty, “The staple approach to Australian economic history”, 
Australian Economic History Review, vol. IV, no. 1, Feb. 1964, pp. 1-22. 
38 NG Butlin, “Growth in a trading world: The Australian economy, heavily disguised”, 
Australian Economic History Review, vol. IV, no. 2, Aug. 1964, pp. 138-58. See also his Investment 
in Australian economic development, 1861-1900, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 
1964. 
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exceeded the level of current surpluses in the industry, and that from 1883, 
there was very little new investment in the industry. These figures together 
show that over the period covered by this thesis, most capital was invested 
outside pastoralism and plantations, and suggest that squatters either 
consumed their surpluses, or invested them outside Queensland pastoralism. 
 
Table 2.1 Estimates of new capital formation and replacement outlays in 
Queensland, 1866-90 (£000)39
Sector  1866-70 1871-75 1876-80 1881-85 1886-90 
New 2189 5548 3957 9110 7756 Total Private 
sector Replace 417 698 1000 1454 1833 
New 213 1934 1717 2352 98 Agricultural 
and pastoral Replace 260 355 573 819 808 
New 1079 3065 1803 5135 5328 
Residential 
Replace 71 120 152 225 319 
New 685 212 121 863 967 
Industrial 
Replace 40 130 128 184 297 
New 208 255 164 388 874 Shops and 
offices Replace 43 67 84 119 164 
New 4 82 152 372 489 
Mining 
Replace 3 26 63 107 245 
New 1370 1242 3357 6402 7945 Total Public 
Sector Replace 143 268 426 817 1677 
                                                 
39 GJR Linge, Industrial Awakening: A Geography of Australian Manufacturing, 1788-1890, ANU 
Press, Canberra, 1979, pp. 676-77. 
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Table 2.2 Estimates of pastoral surpluses and new capital formation in 
Queensland, 1870-92 (£m)40
Year 
Current 
surplus 
Imputed 
gains 
from 
livestock 
increase 
New 
capital 
formation 
1870 1.12 0.06 0.02 
1871 1.47 0.43 0.04 
1872 1.33 0.12 0.43 
1873 1.58 0.60 0.44 
1874 1.70 1.60 0.44 
1875 1.65 1.63 0.59 
1876 1.74 1.61 0.43 
1877 1.68 0.33 0.43 
1878 1.42 0.70 0.88 
1879 1.35 1.13 -0.14 
1880 1.66 1.82 0.22 
1881 1.51 2.66 0.93 
1882 na 4.69 0.91 
1883 2.71 2.62 0.35 
1884 1.97 -0.73 0.16 
1885 1.60 -0.48 na 
1886 1.45 -0.14 -0.26 
1887 2.16 1.66 -0.16 
1888 2.28 2.06 na 
1889 2.47 1.18 0.17 
1890 2.57 2.69 0.35 
1891 3.37 3.38 -0.14 
1892 3.35 2.33 -0.14 
                                                 
40 Boot, HM, “Debts, drought, and foreclosure: Wool-producers in Queensland and New South 
Wales, 1870-1905”, Australian Economic History Review, vol. XXVII, no. 2, Sept 1988, p. 36. 
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Thus a significant proportion of Queensland’s private investment took place in 
Brisbane in the 1880s, as urbanisation occurred even more rapidly in 
Queensland than in the more developed colonies. By 1881, Brisbane’s 
population had doubled from 15,029 in 1871 to 31,109, and then tripled over the 
next decade to 93,657 in 1891.41 There is nothing in the profile of Queensland’s 
exports, nor in the expansion of the pastoral, sugar or mining industries, to 
explain such a rapid increase in the capital city’s population. There was also 
substantial urbanisation in Queensland’s regional centres; by 1891, 
Rockhampton had 14,392 people, Charters Towers 13,320, Ipswich 13,059, 
Maryborough 11,724, Gympie 10,972, Toowoomba 10,936 and Townsville 
10,356.42
While there have been debates about the nature of Australian capitalism and its 
ruling class, there has also been a strong current of both contemporary writing 
and later historical interpretation that sees late colonial Australia as either a 
classless society, or one in which universal suffrage had put control of the 
government effectively into the hands of “the people” or “the mob”, depending 
on your political standpoint. Connell and Irving have pointed out that both the 
USA and the Soviet Union also had their myths of a classless society.43 Such an 
argument is contradicted, compellingly, by the frequent poverty, hardship and 
                                                 
41 TA Coghlan, A statistical account of the seven colonies of Australasia, 1895-6, Charles Potter, 
Government Printer, Sydney, 1896, p. 47.  
42 Bowden, Bradley, “‘Some mysterious terror’: The relationship  between capital and labour in 
Ipswich, 1861-96”, Labour History, no. 72, May 1997, p. 82. See also AJ Boyd, “Queensland: An 
introductory essay” in Price Fletcher (ed), Queensland: Its resources and institutions, William 
Clowes & Sons, London, 1887. 
43 Connell and Irving, pp. 11-12. They suggest that this “sense of classlessness…grew from a 
particular balance of class forces moving through a particular course of politico-economic 
development. It was, paradoxically, the expression of a particular kind of class consciousness, 
and that is a major reason why it has persisted.” 
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uncertainty of colonial life for wage-earners, working-class women and the 
unemployed.44 While an immense amount of law and a significant police and 
prison apparatus protected property, before the 1890s there was almost no 
legislation for injured workers, unemployed people or the sick; nor for small 
investors trusting in the governance of “leading men” such as those who made 
the laws in Victoria in the lead-up to the catastrophic bank crashes of 1893. It 
seems a strange popular democracy that could be so negligent of the immediate 
and vital interests of the mass of people entitled to vote. 
Ronald Lawson was one who rejected the Marxist model of class structure in his 
illuminating study of Brisbane in the 1890s. He imagined that Marxism 
demanded “two distinct, self-conscious, antagonistic classes”, and was 
incompatible with a social structure embodying a “regular gradation of status 
groups bridging the gulf between the extremes”.45 Yet there is a rich Marxist 
tradition of analysing the gradual process of class differentiation, and the many 
different forms that intermediate classes have taken in modern capitalism.46 
Lawson situated himself within an emerging revisionist current, which 
included Denis Murphy and JB Dalton and rejected the quasi-class analysis of 
Robin Gollan and left nationalist historians. Part of Lawson’s argument seems 
                                                 
44 Shirley Fitzgerald, Rising damp: Sydney 1870-90, Oxford University Press, 1987; Anne O’Brien, 
Poverty’s prison: The poor in New South Wales 1880-1918, Melbourne University Press, Carlton 
(Vic), 1988. 
45 Ronald Lawson, Brisbane in the 1890s: A study of an Australian urban society, University of 
Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1973, pp. 78-9. 
46 In The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1954, Marx 
analysed the class politics of the peasantry and small proprietors, and the role played by their 
leadership at a time of social crisis. Geoffrey de Ste. Croix has pointed out that in The poverty of 
philosophy, Marx discussed a class divided society in which the class struggle had “not yet 
assumed a political character”, The class struggle in the ancient Greek world: From the archaic age to 
the Arab conquests, Duckworth, London, 1981, p. 60. 
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to be that classes were not hardened because social mobility still existed in 
Brisbane, though he astutely pointed to the rapidly diminishing prospects 
during the 1890s that someone of humble birth could join the rich.47 This offers 
no contradiction to classical Marxism, which does not see class as a quasi-caste 
or rigid hierarchy. A certain measure of social mobility simply suggests that 
some working-class or middle-class people became capitalists, and changed 
their class location. 
Class analysis, however, is not about exceptional (or lucky) individuals who 
escape the grinding poverty of working class or plebeian life. The degree to 
which class had hardened in colonial Australia is shown in a remarkable study 
by WD Rubenstein. He examined probate returns for Victoria from 1860 to 1974 
to determine the distribution of wealth, and found that relative inequality 
declined from colonial times into the twentieth century. For Victoria in 1880, he 
found that 72% of men and 91% of women died owning no noticeable property. 
For those who did leave some property, no matter how minimal, the average 
estate was £1689, a colossal sum, equal perhaps to half a million dollars in 2006 
values. Rubenstein concluded: 
If Australia offered the highest standard of living in the world to the 
working class, as was widely believed, it was not high enough to permit 
more than a minority to own a house, and bank account, or, indeed, 
measurable property of any kind.48
                                                 
47 Lawson, pp. 79, 63. 
48 WD Rubenstein, “The distribution of personal wealth in Victoria 1860-1974”, Australian 
Economic History Review, vol. XIX, no. 1, March 1979, pp. 26-41; quotation p. 38. 
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Lawson’s own study supports a Marxist analysis of colonial Australia as class 
divided. He showed “a high degree of social differentiation” in Brisbane. When 
the 1890s depression hit, he found that most of the elite suffered only modest 
losses “which did not drastically affect their style of life”, while workers, who 
relied on a subsistence wage, “often suffered considerable deprivation.”49 In 
dismissing Marxism, he talked of a society in which “there was a wide 
consensus of aims and values, and little meaningful identification with social 
classes.”50 He described the response of the government to the depression as 
“retrenchment”, a polite way of saying that workers (and officials) were sacked 
without any welfare provision. Nevertheless, he admitted that in the clothing 
trades, “Abuses were most common and most notorious”, including 
“sweating”, or outwork; while at the Brisbane Courier, printers were thrown out 
of work by mechanisation, the introduction of linotype.51 It is hard to see in this 
“a consensus of aims and values”. He also described a social elite which 
gathered around the exclusive Queensland Club, people who tended “to look 
down upon the nouveaux riches.”52 If the elite looked down on rich people who 
were a bit uncouth, how did they view the poor? Did they really have “little 
meaningful identification with social class” in Brisbane? Finally, the 
“partisanship and extreme reactionary measures” of the government in the 
maritime strike led to the rise of the Labor Party and in the words of the 
Brisbane Courier, “the complete fusion of the historical factions of our 
legislature”. Even Lawson had to concede that this was a reflection of class 
consciousness, though he imagined it fleeting.53
                                                 
49 Lawson, pp. 42, 43. 
50 Lawson, p. 80. 
51 Lawson, pp. 31, 51, 65, 52. 
52 Lawson, pp. 60, 61. 
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The theoretical shallowness of this revisionist current (and also of its left-
nationalist foil) was discussed by Brad Bowden in his study of class struggle in 
Ipswich. Bowden described a process of rapid capitalist development in which 
ruthless employers were able to contain and defeat the organising efforts of 
working-class people using a combination of repression and paternalism. He 
rejected both the mythology of a labour movement “socialist from the jump”, 
and the historiography of a labour movement emerging from within the 
dominant liberal hegemony, arguing that: 
the social, economic and political structures of life in Ipswich suffocated 
any emerging sense of labour identity. In Ipswich, the “liberal ethos” of 
the employer existed only as a facade. Employment prospects, church 
life, home ownership, admission to public hospitals and charity in times 
of crisis were all largely under the control of a small number of families. 
The emergence of even a feeble labour identity was linked to a prolonged 
and bitter struggle to redress this unequal relationship in order to 
achieve decent wages and working conditions.54
Indeed, it is incumbent on any historical explanation of politics and society in 
Australia in the 1880s to explain the development of that class polarisation 
which erupted so thoroughly and dramatically in the early 1890s in the great 
strikes and formation of the Labor Party. The classes which fought each other so 
bitterly and at times violently in 1890-91 were not created in a few months or 
years; neither was such a profound alienation between them. The crisis of 1890-
91 was produced by economic, political and social developments in the years 
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before, and this crisis stands as a test of all attempts at historical explanation of 
that period.  
At the time, some in the ruling class dissented from the idea of Australia as 
classless. In the prestigious and generally conservative journal, Victorian Review, 
EW Burton argued that: 
The wealthier part of every community, although opposed by the 
countervailing influence of manhood suffrage, commands the greater 
power, even in the popular branch of the Legislature. The direct and 
indirect forces of the richer classes assert themselves in every election. 
Electoral contests can, generally, only be engaged in by men endowed 
with ample means. It is not possible for any representative to win a 
contested seat without the aid of wealthy supporters.55
As an example of this domination, Burton cited the imposition of taxation, 
which had been “apportioned in a manner as unjust as could under free 
institutions have possibly been devised”; by taxing the import of necessities so 
that the total burden fell as much as possible on the working classes. 
Challenges to Marxism 
Over the past two decades, class analysis has been subjected to a full-scale 
assault by poststructuralists, who have rejected the possibility of developing 
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Victorian Review, vol. 7, no. 37, Nov 1882, p. 3. 
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knowledge of the past, arguing that all we have are texts, themselves self-
interested interpretations to which we bring our own agendas. From such a 
perspective, historical endeavour either becomes a literary activity devoid of 
truth-claims,56 or the endless deconstruction of texts, whether ironically or 
playfully.57 Indeed, history itself was an attempt to legitimise either the “grand 
narrative” of progress, or of working class revolution, and hence part of the 
oppressive structure of power-knowledge.58 One response was to focus on the 
experience of the powerless and marginalised;59 another to look for and 
deconstruct discourses of oppression. In reply, the liberal historian, Richard 
Evans, pointed out that it is a pre-existing theory—the supposed bête noire that 
transforms history into metanarrative—that enables the historian to look 
beyond the superficial. “Without Marxist theory…a major and influential 
classic such as E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class would 
never have been written.”60  
A range of Marxists have also answered the critique of postmodernism. For 
Alex Callinicos totality is not an oppressive concept, but the reality of society. 
Capitalism is a global system “into which all the human activities on the planet, 
in all their richness and variety, are integrated…[and] subordinated to the logic 
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Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1973, p. ix, p. x. 
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of competitive accumulation governing the system.”61 Matt Perry argues that, 
far from having any theoretical foundations, postmodernism is grounded in 
“Nietzche’s irrationalism, Saussure’s linguistics, Foucault’s discourse analysis 
and Derrida’s textualism”,62 and both Callinicos and Perry have subjected these 
theories to a powerful critique. To the postmodernist rejection of social theory 
as oppressive, Callinicos responded that “historical inquiry requires some 
conception of how human beings relate to their variable social contexts, and of 
the nature of and the differences between social contexts.” 
The only choice the historian has is between the self-conscious adoption 
of an articulated social theory and the tacit reliance on an 
unacknowledged social theory. Taking the latter course means that the 
generalizations used by the historian escape precise formulation or 
critical scrutiny.63
This became particularly relevant in debates about Holocaust denial. An 
approach to history that denies the ability to establish facts or any notion of 
truth, leaves us without any basis on which to challenge those who insist that 
the Nazi Holocaust did not happen. Indeed, postmodernist Diane Purkiss has 
even argued that “most neo-Nazi historians adopt the most conservative 
possible protocols of discovery, revelation and truth-telling”, which for her 
shows the dangers of relying on evidentiary methods.64 Richard Evans 
challenged this, arguing that the revisionists in fact falsified their evidence. 
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There is in fact a massive, carefully empirical literature on the Nazi 
extermination of the Jews. Clearly, to regard it as fictional, unreal, or no 
nearer to historical reality than, say, the work of the “revisionists” who 
deny that Auschwitz ever happened at all, is simply wrong. Here is an 
issue where evidence really counts, and can be used to establish the 
essential facts. Auschwitz was not a discourse. It trivializes mass murder 
to see it as a text. The gas chambers were not a piece of rhetoric. 
Auschwitz was indeed inherently a tragedy and cannot be seen either as 
a comedy or a farce. And if this is true of Auschwitz, then it must be true 
at least to some degree of other past happenings, events, institutions, 
people as well.65
Nevertheless, all historical evidence is a product of social conditions, and 
requires interpretation. But to see history as “irreducibly theoretical” is not to 
reduce history to some social theory; it is to see history as a dialogue between 
theory and evidence while recognising that empirical evidence “imposes 
inescapable limits on all theorising.”66 Far from being a determinist teleology, 
Marxism is, as Engels put it: “above all a guide to study… All history must be 
studied afresh”.67
In the postmodernist rejection of social theory, Perry finds a mirror image of 
conservative empiricism; “It expresses the same theoretical incapacity of 
dealing with complex dynamic contradictory worlds.”68 This incapacity is 
evident, for instance, in the work of Patrick Joyce, who attempted to rewrite 
nineteenth-century labour history on the basis of a deconstruction of the 
language of class. As Marxist historian, Neville Kirk, argued, this approach 
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66 Callinicos, Theories, pp. 93-4. 
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all too often simply accepts language, and especially the language of self-
representation, at face value. There is also the strong tendency to divorce 
saying from doing and self-presentation from the ways in which one is 
seen and represented by others.69
Kirk in particular rejected the way Joyce accepted the nineteenth-century 
English liberal, John Bright’s, claim to be the “standard bearer of the people” at 
face value, given the long-standing popular memory of Bright as a “tyrant”.70 A 
range of Marxists have challenged poststructuralist theories of language and 
the supposed indeterminacy of meaning, drawing on the social theory of 
language developed by Volosinov and others.71
Much of the poststructuralist critique of Marxism was focused on a caricature, 
drawing on the dogmas of Stalinism, as in Ann Curthoys’ assertion that Marxist 
historical method was “teleological, resting on the idea that history has a 
purpose, is a story only half told, whose ending is already knowable but not yet 
achieved.”72 More substantial was Curthoys’ argument that the divisions in 
society were plural: 
since race, ethnicity, and gender play a very important part in 
determining economic opportunities, social position, and access to 
power. If gender and ethnic differences and conflicts constantly cut 
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across class relationships, how can we continue to see classes as social 
groupings, as collective political actors?73
This argument has widespread adherence, and represents a major challenge for 
Marxist attempts to explain racist social structures, including the racial 
exclusion represented in the White Australia policy. The first thing to note is 
that there is nothing new in this argument. In Marxism and class theory: A 
bourgeois critique, Frank Parkin argued that: 
The most damaging weakness in any model of class that relegates social 
collectivities to the status of mere incumbents of positions, or 
embodiments of systemic forces, is that it cannot account properly for 
those complexities that arise when racial, religious, ethnic, and sexual 
divisions run at a tangent to formal class divisions.74
Parkin’s agenda was to attack Marxism, not develop a theory of race or racism, 
but others who have also argued for a plural or Weberian understanding of 
power did make the attempt. The three writers who had the greatest influence 
on Australians writing about White Australia in the 1970s were Michael Banton, 
Pierre van den Berghe and John Rex.75 They were deeply discontented with 
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mainstream race relations sociology in Britain and America, which through the 
1950s, 1960s and early 1970s had been focused on “empirical” studies, for 
instance of racial tensions and attitudes in specific localities. Writing in 1967, 
Van den Berghe saw the empiricist and anti-theoretical nature of much of the 
existing work as ideological, hiding a complacent liberal optimism about “the 
basic ‘goodness’ of American society” and a social program focused on getting 
minority groups assimilated into the mainstream. Rex saw the contribution of 
professional sociologists as “negligible” at best, and reactionary at worst, with 
some seeing their job as protecting Britain’s political culture from the threat 
supposedly posed by “coloured people”.76
Banton attempted to develop a general theory focusing on the development of 
racist ideas and the social construction of racist behaviour, while both van den 
Berghe and Rex attempted to construct typologies of racial situations and to 
identify those social structures which underpinned forms of institutionalised 
racism.77
Rex rejected Marxism, and instead theorised race relations as a product of the 
relations between social groups of some kind, but in attempting to define these 
social groups he faced the conundrum inherent in this kind of analysis. For the 
conception of “racial group” to mean anything, it must either be something 
objective in human society, or it must be a category determined by human 
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76 van den Berghe, Race and racism, pp. 5-8; John Rex, Race, colonialism and the city, pp. xii, 167, 
180. 
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consciousness. The only possible basis for an objective ascription of “race” is 
biological, and Rex rightly rejected that as having no foundation in science. He 
then considered defining “a situation as racial if the people whom we are 
studying think it to be so”. This, too, he rejected for being “subjective”, and 
because “it sells the pass to the racists” by allowing them to determine that 
“race” really is biological. The result was that he had nowhere left to go, and 
seven pages later, in Race, colonialism and the city, he had decided that a racial 
situation was one “of inter-group differentiation in which men [sic] explain the 
differences between them in terms of biological theories.” Perhaps the racists 
did get to define racial situations, and by extension, racial groups, after all. The 
more serious problem was that the argument was largely circular, racists 
produce racialised situations and races which in turn open the door to racism.78
Pierre van den Berghe’s theory of racism has many similarities to that of John 
Rex. He argued that a “race” is a group that is “socially defined but on the basis 
of physical criteria”, and, “[i]t is not the presence of objective physical 
differences between groups that creates races, but the social recognition of such 
differences as socially significant or relevant.” Racism occurs when there is 
institutionalised inequality between two or more social groups and some kind 
of cultural or physical difference between the groups, socially defined as “race”. 
Again, the existence of “races” is a product of racism; and racism a product of 
unequal relations between races. Again, the argument is almost entirely 
circular.79 One consequence of the Rex/van den Berghe approach is that it 
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naturalises both race and racism. As Colette Guillaumin pointed out, the very 
notion of “race” implies that there are profound natural differences between 
groups of humanity, and that racism has a natural, biological foundation.80
The issue of social group formation is the most problematic part of this 
approach to understanding racism. It is largely assumed that “white” people, 
those belonging to the dominant group, would naturally choose to belong to it. 
But what is not explained is why “black” people, belonging to the subordinate 
group, would choose to belong to the social group defined as “black”;81 their 
acceptance of this status is simply assumed. As Theodore W Allen put it in his 
monumental study of the origins of African-American slavery, “while some 
people may desire to be masters, all persons are born equally unwilling and 
unsuited to be slaves”. Allen insisted that to understand the origins of slavery 
and the idea of the white race in the United States, you needed to study the 
business of social control—how it was that the slave owners and the rest of the 
ruling class were able to impose racial slavery on African labourers, and then 
sustain it by mobilising and disciplining poor whites.82 In criticising the psycho-
cultural approach of Carl Degler, who argued that American slavery was a 
product of English prejudices against black people, Allen insisted that “whatever 
the state of English prejudices at that time, any attempt to hold African laborers in 
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lifetime hereditary bond-servitude was doomed by the African ‘prejudice’ 
against it, as expressed by flight and rebellion.”83 And even when it came to 
cohering the dominant group, the “white” race, where all the benefits were 
concentrated, compulsion was necessary. In his book, Race Relations, Michael 
Banton noted some of the processes by which people designated white were 
compelled to respect and sustain the colour line in the US South. In this analysis 
he argued that social groups cohered as a result of “stimuli”, and that when it 
came to the US South, “there are many stimuli to evoke racial alignment”.84 But 
once again, at precisely the point where racism needed to be explained, there 
was no explanation as to how and why these “stimuli” were able to dominate 
the field when so many people had a direct interest in getting rid of them. One 
common approach, typified by the work of Frank Parkin and reflected in almost 
all writing on the exclusion of Chinese people in Australia, was to see the white 
working class as the group who imposed “social closure” against racialised 
people. David Mason has challenged this approach, pointing out that white 
workers “are themselves excluded from access to valued resources”.85
What Banton, Rex and van den Berghe have in common, despite their analytical 
differences, is a Weberian approach to the structures of racism. All use the 
Weberian device of “ideal types” to describe differing situations of racial 
conflict and domination, and all see “race” as an autonomous structure of 
power in society, reflecting a Weberian (and indeed Nietzscheian) view of 
relations of domination as inherently plural.86 At the level of broad social 
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theory, the British Marxist Alex Callinicos has argued that the central analytical 
weakness of Weberian sociology is its single-minded focus on conflict and 
power, which leads its adherents to “lose sight of what Marx calls the labour 
process—the co-operative activity through which human beings work 
together”.87 The same methodological problem is evident in what I am calling 
“Weberian” approaches to racism.88
This problem becomes most acute when Weberian and other decentred 
approaches are asked to theorise white anti-racism. Any theory of racism must 
be able to offer a consistent explanation of its opposite. If racism represents an 
independent structure of power and privilege, separate from economic power 
and state power, how do we account for white support for black civil rights in 
America, white support for Aboriginal land rights in Australia, and white 
support for refugees and Muslims at the present—even if these currents are in a 
minority? How do we account for the almost total disappearance of anti-
Catholic prejudice in Australia—a prejudice that was extremely powerful (and 
organised) for over a century? It is here that the one-sided focus on power and 
conflict characteristic of Weberian theories becomes most problematic. Some of 
the writers I have discussed have dealt with this issue, and their approaches are 
revealing. Banton saw class solidarity as one way that ethnic identity can 
diminish,89 but didn’t develop the point. Pierre van den Berghe saw the possible 
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destruction of apartheid flowing from contradictions in the successful 
development of South African capitalism, which had broken down tribalism 
amongst Africans and led to the emergence of a militant and political urban 
mass. While apartheid gave whites power, it “prevented the rise of a class of 
Africans with a stake in the status quo” and thus created a wide range of classes 
with “a common interest in radical change” even as it undermined traditional 
African structures of authority. 
In short, then, the ruling white group, as in much of the rest of the 
continent, inevitably undermined what it sought to preserve and 
brought into being what it tried to prevent. It so completely monopolized 
wealth and power, and so rigidly identified itself with the status quo, 
that any change must be against it.90
This elegant and exciting suggestion has far more in common with Marxism 
than Weber, and is quite at odds with the approach taken in the rest of his 
work. 
A Marxist theory of racism 
It has become a commonplace to assert that Marxism is incapable of explaining 
racism, because it supposedly reduces racial oppression to class.91 I would 
argue that, to the contrary, it is precisely the methodology of base and 
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superstructure that allows Marxism to avoid reductionism, and to explain 
racism as building on the structures of class oppression and reinforcing the 
class power of the dominant bourgeoisie. In this section, I will show how 
Marxists have used base and superstructure to construct a theory of racism, 
which I will summarise as nine theses. The rest of this thesis will address some 
of these propositions. 
Alex Callinicos has suggested that Marx himself developed the beginnings of a 
Marxist theory of racism, in the following discussion of anti-Irish racism in 
England in the 1870s. 
Every industrial and commercial centre in England possesses a working 
class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish 
proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a 
competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker 
he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a 
tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus 
strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, 
social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude 
towards him is much the same as that of the “poor whites” to the 
“niggers” in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him 
back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at 
once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. 
This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the 
pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the 
ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English 
working class, despite its organisation. It is the secret by which the 
capitalist class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it.92
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Thus, in free labour capitalism, racism is structured within existing class 
relations. The power to impose this oppression, the control of productive 
resources through which to play different groups of workers off against each 
other, and the control of the means of ideological production—especially 
newspapers—are all functions of capitalism. From Marx’s brief comments, 
Callinicos identified four crucial points which I will identify as theses: 
Thesis 1  Economic competition between workers creates the possibility for 
workers to be divided on “racial” lines. 
Thesis 2  Racist ideology can have an appeal for white workers because, given 
their alienated existence within capitalism, racism offers an identity 
possessing the illusion of power—what WE duBois called “a public 
and psychological wage”. 
Thesis 3  While racialised workers suffer most from racism; white workers in 
general do not benefit from it either; it predominantly benefits the 
ruling class.93
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Thesis 4 As a result, the ruling class makes strenuous efforts to sustain racist 
divisions.94
Given many of the debates about Marxism, it is important to note that Marx’s 
was not solely a theory of racism used to divide and rule the working class: the 
use of racism was only possible because it filled a need in the lives of workers, 
who had been turned into machines for the production of profit and because 
Britain was a great power. Drawing on the insights of WE Du Bois, Alex 
Callinicos compared the “psychological” role played by racism to that played 
by religion, seen by Marx as “the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit 
of spiritless conditions.” Thus racism gives white workers a particular identity, 
and one moreover which unites them with white capitalists.95
Marx also captured the colonial element in anti-Irish racism, suggesting one 
more fundamental proposition: 
Thesis 5  Racism is not just negative “stereotyping”, but is used to strengthen 
and justify real oppression, including colonial or imperial 
domination of other peoples. 
In a remarkable study of the development of white racism in the United States, 
Theodore W Allen has argued that in colonial Virginia, the first ideology of 
whiteness was developed at precisely the moment that indentured African 
labourers were transformed into lifelong chattel slaves, and relations of 
production also transformed. He argued that Virginian capitalists were 
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desperate to divide their labourers, and that the lesser oppression (and minor 
privileges) associated with “whiteness” meant that poor whites could be made 
into a “social control layer”, to enforce the domination of Afro-American slaves 
in the emerging plantation system.96 Ideas about the “inferiority” of black 
people were later exported to Britain to justify slavery as it came under attack.97 
And there is a vast literature on the use of racism to justify Europe’s colonial 
empires. 
There are three further elements of a Marxist theory of racism which are 
immanent in Marx’s own writings. Firstly, there is his internationalism, most 
famously expressed in the injunction: “Working men of all countries, unite!” 
Thus, from a range of passages within the Communist Manifesto, one can distil 
an argument to the effect that: 
Thesis 6  The working class can only achieve lasting victories against 
exploitation and oppression if it is united in struggle. By creating a 
world of cooperative and collective labour on a large scale, modern 
capitalism hence creates the possibility for working class unity, and 
this includes unity across “racial” and national lines. 
A strategic conclusion follows: 
Thesis 7  The task of communists is everywhere to “point out and bring to the 
front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of 
all nationality” and race.98
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Marx’s letter on the Irish movement, from which Callinicos drew, involved one 
further, and also fundamental strategic observation: that the oppression of the 
Irish by the English in both Ireland and England was in turn producing a 
revolutionary response from the Irish, both from the peasants at home, and the 
proletarianised Irish in Britain itself. Thus we might draw from Marx one final 
thesis, that: 
Thesis 8  Racism is contradictory for capitalism: offering short term 
domination, profits and stability, but unleashing a potentially 
revolutionary dynamic, the more so as the more racialised workers 
are integrated into the working class of the dominant-nation. 
Of course, this potential could not be realised unless the working class of the 
dominant national grouping rejected racism. So from around 1867 to 1871, Marx 
was personally involved in attempts to influence the British labour movement 
to support Irish independence, and to educate the German workers’ movement 
on the issue.99 John Newsinger argues, convincingly, that Marx’s assessment of 
the revolutionary potential of Irish workers in the English working class was 
exaggerated, but this does not undermine his general proposition. Apart from 
its unique ability to explain the nature and strength of racism in modern 
capitalism, Marx’s proto-theory had two further strengths: it suggested a theory 
of working class anti-racism, and thus it offered the beginnings of a strategy for 
fighting racism, with the prospect of eliminating it altogether—a strategy which 
Marx’s most serious followers developed into a core element of their everyday 
politics. 
                                                 
99 The development of Marx’s views on Ireland and the struggle to win radical English workers 
to the cause of Irish independence is discussed in John Newsinger, “‘A great blow must be 
struck in Ireland’: Karl Marx and the Fenians”, Race and class, vol. 24, no. 2, 1982, pp. 151-67. 
Chapter 2: Class and colonial Australia  Page 93 
Of all the subsequent contributions to the Marxist tradition on the issue of 
racism, perhaps the most significant was that of Lenin. Lenin developed the 
concept of oppression within Marxist theory in What is to be done? where he 
argued that the revolutionary struggle of the working class was not simply a 
struggle against the conditions of employment and political rights of workers, 
but against all tyranny and all oppression, no matter who the victims were. In 
particular, he laid great stress on the responsibility of socialists and workers in 
the imperialist countries to fight for the liberation of the nationalities oppressed 
by their own nation state.100  
The great racial issue faced by Lenin’s movement was anti-semitism. Lenin was 
opposed strategically to cultural separatism, but his hostility to anti-semitism 
was fundamental. He saw racism as a ruling-class device to contain unrest 
when military force was no longer sufficient. 
When there was no really popular revolutionary movement, when the 
political struggle was not yet connected and integrated with the class 
struggle, simple police measures against individuals and study circles 
had their use… [But] Against the people’s revolution, against the class 
struggle the police cannot be depended on; one must have the backing of 
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the people, too, the support of classes… One must stir up national 
hatred, race hatred; one must recruit “Black Hundreds” from among the 
politically least developed sections of the urban (and, following that, 
naturally, of the rural) petty bourgeoisie; one must attempt to rally to the 
defence of the throne all reactionary elements among the population at 
large; one must turn the struggle of the police against study circles into a 
struggle of one part of the people against the other. 
That is precisely what the government is now doing when it sets Tartars 
against the Armenians in Baku; when it seeks to provoke new pogroms 
against the Jews; when it organises Black-Hundred gangs against the 
Zemstvo people…  
Lenin suggested that racism became necessary once the working class emerged 
as a national class, attempting to shape and challenge national politics. Like 
Marx, Lenin saw the potentially revolutionary consequences of united 
resistance to racist violence. 
Of course, by fanning racial antagonism and tribal hatred, the 
government may for a time arrest the development of the class struggle, 
but only for a short time and at the cost of a still greater expansion of the 
field of the new struggle, at the cost of a more bitter feeling among the 
people against the autocracy. This is proved by the consequences of the 
Baku pogrom, which deepened tenfold the revolutionary mood of all 
sections against tsarism.101
These were no mere words: at the risk of their personal safety, Bolshevik 
activists challenged racism and national chauvinism. In the country that 
invented the pogrom, the Bolshevik party included a disproportionate number 
of Jewish activists in its leadership. At the moment of revolution, it proposed a 
                                                 
101 Lenin, “Preface to the pamphlet: Memorandum of Police Department Superintendent Lopukhin”, 
written in Feb-March 1903 and first published in 1905, in Collected works, vol. 8, pp. 203-5.  
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Jewish socialist, Leon Trotsky, to head the All-Russian Soviet which seized 
power as the elected leadership of the workers, soldiers and peasants. 
One result of this tradition of internationalism and anti-racism (and support for 
national self-determination) has been generations of racially oppressed people 
and their leaders who have identified with “communism”, including large 
numbers from the pre-1939 Jewish communities in Europe, a significant 
minority of Afro-American activists in the 1930s and the 1960s and 1970s, and 
millions more in the Third World. This was reflected in the production of some 
path-breaking Marxist histories of racism and colonialism, such as CLR James’ 
Black Jacobins, and Eric Williams’ Capitalism and slavery. 
One of the most significant recent contributions to understanding racism has 
come from Kenan Malik, whose book, The meaning of race, traces the history of 
racist ideas and their social function. Malik argued that as capitalism developed 
in Europe, the ruling classes needed ideas that would naturalise economic and 
social inequality in an era of formal, legal equality. Racism was thus a product 
of ruling class needs, not a starting point for social discourse.102 In this Malik 
was implicitly building on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony.103 Both Malik and 
                                                 
102 Kenan Malik, The meaning of race: Race, history and culture in western society, Palgrave, 
Basingstoke (UK) and New York, 1996. In recent years, Malik has abandoned some of his own 
theory to become a warrior against Islamism in the name of defending the enlightenment. 
103 Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed & trans Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971, esp. pp. 12, 235; 
Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from Political Writings, 1921-1926: with additional texts by other Italian 
Communist leaders, trans & ed Quintin Hoare, International Publishers, New York, 1978, pp 454-
462; Williams, GA, “The Concept of ‘Egemonia’ in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some notes 
on interpretation”, Journal of the History of Ideas (New York), vol. 21, no. 4, 1960, pp. 586-599. 
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Martin Barker have shown how cultural racism was rebuilt in the 1980s and 
1990s as part of the neo-liberal offensive.104 Thus we might conclude with: 
Thesis 9 Racism is an integral part of the hegemonic ideas of capitalist society, 
because of the role it plays in naturalising inequality in political 
systems in which individuals are nominally equal, but radically 
unequal economically and socially. 
This is the broad methodology I will use in identifying the economic and class 
roots of the White Australia policy. 
                                                 
104 Malik, Meaning of race, and Martin Barker, The new racism: Conservatives and the ideology of the 
tribe, Aletheia Books, University Publications of America Inc, Frederick (Maryland), 1982.  
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Chapter 3 
Chinese people as a strategic threat 
[W]hat we cannot help seeing are two enormous overflowing 
reservoirs. Two rivers are issuing from them; the white river 
and the yellow river, the one fertilising the lands through which 
it runs with the seeds of Christian civilisation, and the other 
threatening to destroy them. Already at several points these 
rivers are meeting, dashing against each other, and contending 
for the mastery. What will be the final issue? The twentieth 
century will inscribe it in its annals. 
—Baron von Hübner, 18841
FROM 1876 TO 1894, Chinese people and the Chinese Empire were seen as 
strategic threats to control of the Australian continent by the Anglo-Australian 
ruling class. At its simplest and most visceral, the ruling class feared the 
Chinese as rivals in the colonisation of Australia—the only serious rivals.  
In this chapter, I will discuss the centrality of colonisation in Anglo-Australian 
ruling class strategy and the reasons that China was feared as a rival colonising 
 
1 Hübner, Baron von, Through the British Empire (2 vols.), John Murray, London, 1886, vol. 2, p. 
509. 
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power. I will then consider the central role of gold rushes—as both levers for 
increasing British population and colonisation, and as increasing the sense of 
danger from China. In 1877, Queensland passed its first law restricting Chinese 
immigration, and I will show that this was motivated by fears that it would lose 
control of the north to Chinese people.  
For the Anglo-Australian ruling class, colonisation was fundamental to their 
view of what they were doing in the world. Australia’s colonists were at the 
forefront of the British Empire, expanding the greatest force for civilisation in 
the history of humankind. One of Australia’s religious leaders, Rev J Jefferis, 
saw colonisation as the divine mission of England: “We have to settle and 
organise commonwealths, in which our own people shall grow up orderly, free, 
virtuous, and religious”, and on that basis opposed the use of Chinese labour in 
place of European.2 The rhetoric of colonisation was pervasive, and 
immigration policy, land legislation, railway construction, education and many 
other issues were debated within a rubric of “the work of colonisation”. The 
potential could be seen in the growth and the future hopes of the United States 
of America.  
Colonisation also had an economic and a strategic importance for the Anglo-
Australian ruling class. Edward Gibbon Wakefield had argued that an empire 
of settlement colonies was necessary to alleviate the pressures created by 
widespread poverty and declining rates of economic growth in Britain.3 These 
                                                 
2 Rev J Jefferis, The Chinese and the seamen’s strike: A lecture, Foster and Fairfax, Sydney; Gordon 
and Gotch, Brisbane, 1878, pp. 5-6. Jefferis was recruited by the Fairfaxes in 1877 to preach at 
Pitt St Congregational Church for the princely sum of £1000 per year. 
3 June Philipp, A great view of things: Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Thomas Nelson (Australia), 
Sydney, 1971, pp. 14-28. 
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were themes that would continually recur through the rest of the nineteenth 
century. In his celebrated series of lectures, The expansion of England, Sir John 
Seeley insisted: 
We must cease altogether to say that England is an island off the north-
western coast of Europe, that it has an area of 120,000 square miles and a 
population of thirty odd millions. We must cease to think that emigrants, 
when they go to colonies, leave England or are lost to England… When 
we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole Empire 
together and call it all England, we shall see that here too is a United 
States. Here too is a great homogeneous people, one in blood, language, 
religion and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space.4
But active support for British immigration was also controversial. In 1870, 
Sydney’s Evening News commented on the class dimensions involved: 
While the bulk of the population, as is only reasonable to expect, are 
lukewarm on the general subject [of immigration], the mercantile classes 
are keenly alive to the advantages which a steady stream of immigration 
would confer on them and indirectly on various other sections of the 
community.5
Indeed, the paper thought that some from the mercantile classes were so keen 
for immigration to be increased that they did not consider the possible 
negatives. Immigrants needed to be able to settle on the land, otherwise all the 
problems of city life in Europe would be imported. 
                                                 
4 Sir JR Seeley, The expansion of England: Two courses of lectures, Edited and with an introduction 
by John Gross, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1971 (1883), p. 184. For the 
influence of The expansion of England, see Marika Sherwood, “Race, empire and education: 
teaching racism”, in Race & Class, vol. 42, no. 3, Jan-Mar 2001, pp. 10-11. 
5 Evening News (Syd), 2 March 1870, p. 2, col. 2 editorial. 
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It was this fundamental and broad ruling class, imperial agenda—the British 
colonisation of Australia—that was supposedly threatened by Chinese 
immigration. Chinese people were seen as the only rivals to Britain in the 
colonisation of Australia. Only China had the population and colonising energy 
to send enough of its sons (and ultimately, daughters) to supposedly “swamp” 
the European population. As early as the 1830s Herman Merivale, that great 
and widely-read theorist of colonisation, had described China as “another of the 
great colonizing countries of the globe… its industrious people swarm into 
every part of the Eastern Ocean, where there appears to be an opening for their 
exertions”.6
Anxiety about China focused, to the point of obsession, on its population of 400 
million people. Alongside having the human material, China was believed to be 
forced to colonise by overpopulation and famine. It was constantly argued that 
wherever the Chinese settled, they pushed out everyone else.  On introducing 
his government’s Chinese Immigration Restriction Bill in March 1879, New 
South Wales Premier, Sir Henry Parkes, painted China as a land “containing 
nearly 400,000,000 of souls, where the conditions of life were so trying that it 
was hard to find standing room, where any outlet would be eagerly seized 
upon.” China was just “an easy journey from us over a pleasant sea” and 
without restriction, Chinese people “would outnumber the Europeans on this 
soil”.7 Parkes had long believed there to be a plan by the Emperor of China to 
colonise Australia. In a memo of April 1881, as he worked to build support for a 
second attempt at laws to restrict Chinese immigration, he ordered his police 
                                                 
6 Herman A.M. Merivale, Lectures on Colonization and Colonies: Delivered before the University of 
Oxford in 1839, 1840 & 1841, Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, London, 1861, p. 147. 
7 SMH 6 March 1879, p. 6, col. 1.
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chief to question new Chinese arrivals for “information that can be obtained as 
to the movement in China which has resulted in the arrival of these vessels—
whether it is a private speculation or an emigration under official sanction. In 
any case what numbers are likely to follow.”8 Seven years later, and again 
Premier, he warned his Governor, Carrington, of “the overshadowing fact 
giving it a grim significance — every year growing more palpable — that 
behind these thin intruders there are 400 millions like them.”9
When South Australia’s Chief Secretary, William Morgan, moved in 1880 to 
support a private members’ bill to restrict Chinese immigration into the 
Northern Territory, he too warned that, “the Northern Territory was only 
removed by some eleven day’s steaming from a place where there were 400 
millions of Chinese, which might send out unlimited swarms of people to settle 
down upon the Northern Territory”.10
Fear of Chinese numbers was overwhelming amongst ruling class legislators. 
South Australian Education Minister, and later Government Resident in the 
Northern Territory, J Langdon Parsons, a supporter of “coloured labour”, 
declared that, “the chief reason why he feared Chinese immigration 
was…chiefly because of their enormous numbers.”11
                                                 
8 Memo from Parkes to Fosbery, NSW Inspector General of Police, 19.4.81, in Colonial 
Secretary’s Correspondence, special bundle 4/829.1, letter M18212. Fosbery reassured Parkes, in 
a report dated 21.4.81, that the emigration was a private speculation and had no official 
connection, Report to the Inspector General of Police by Robert Anderson, Inspector and S 
Johnston, Sub-Inspector, same location. 
9 Letter from Parkes to Carrington, 8 June 1888, Parkes corresp., A876, vol 6, pp 141-4. 
10 SAPD 1880, col. 1040. 
11 SAPD 1881, col. 112. 
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That sense of threat was particularly acute regarding northern Australia—the 
area closest to China, where the European population was so slight, and where 
the climate was believed to favour the Asian over the European, an issue I will 
discuss in chapters 4, 6 and 7. In the Queensland Legislative Council, the 
squatter, William Yaldwyn: 
We were near neighbours to a teeming mass of Chinese;—nearly 
400,000,000 of them were separated from us by a narrow stretch of placid 
ocean. It was a stern struggle for existence in that closely packed country, 
and the advantages possessed by a rich and sparsely inhabited colony 
like Queensland must be only too apparent to them. The peaceful 
invasion had begun; it was idle to think it would cease.12
Even those politicians who stood up to oppose anti-Chinese bills, often made it 
clear, as did Archibald Jacob in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly in 
March 1879, that, “the introduction of Chinese here in any numbers would be 
injurious to the best interests of the country”.13
This argument peppered nearly all the parliamentary and public debates on 
Chinese immigration from 1877 to 1888. It is also to be found in the editorial 
columns of Australia’s colonial newspapers, great and small. The pro-sugar 
planter, conservative, Maryborough Chronicle declared in 1878 that, “the people 
of Queensland should wish that the teeming millions of China should not 
overflow into this country”,14 while the paper’s nemesis, the anti-planter 
Queensland liberal, William Brookes, just weeks later compared China with 
                                                 
12 QPD vol XX, p. 619. 
13 SMH 21 March 1879, p. 3, col. 4. 
14 30 Nov. 1878. 
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Ireland during the famine. “This meant emigration from China on a scale that 
no one living had ever seen or read of.”15
The colonisation of Australia had a profound military dimension for the British 
Empire. The great Whig Prime Minister, Lord John Russell, saw all Britain’s 
colonies as supplying markets for her manufactures, and military supplies and 
support in war. But when it came to the colonies of settlement, he saw: 
a general advantage in the possession of Canada & Australia wch. [sic] is 
hard to define but not difficult to perceive. The British race in those 
colonies form in time of war one nation with us nearly as much as 
Aberdeen or Cork…16
This reflected one of the basic propositions of all military theory in the 
nineteenth century, the idea that the “numerical strength of the population 
is…an element of war resources”.17 It was such a commonplace that it was 
always assumed, but rarely stated. One who did state it was the recently-
defeated Queensland Premier, John Douglas, writing in 1880 on the subject of a 
future Australian federation: “The method, indeed, by which States have grown 
great is almost uniform in history. They gathered population and territory”.18
The unspoken assumption here was that people of British origin, under the rule 
of a colonial government, would be loyal to the empire; that the colonial ruling 
                                                 
15 The Week (Brisbane), 18 January 1879, p. 76. 
16 Letter to Grey, 19 August 1849, quoted in Philipp, p. 64. 
17 JCR Colomb, The Naval and Military Resources of the Colonies, ?1879, bound with others as 
Australian Pamphlets in Mitchell Library. Colomb was an influential writer on military issues 
in Britain at the time. 
18 “An Australian nation”, Melbourne Review, no. 17, Jan 1880, pp. 5-6. 
Page 104   Chapter 3: Chinese people as a strategic threat 
class and the colonial state could exercise effective social and political control 
over its subjects. The converse—that settlers from another country would be 
loyal to the rulers of that rival power—implied a potential weakness if the bulk 
of the colonising population was not of British origin. On that score, the British-
Australian ruling class was particularly vulnerable, especially with regard to 
the tropical northern third of the continent. The offensively named “empty 
north” would become a popular theme in political debate from the early 
twentieth century onwards. 
Over the long term, the settlement of British people in the sparsely-settled north 
acquired a military importance to Australian governments. This was concisely 
expressed in 1905 by Alfred Deakin, who talked about: 
the strongest reasons of all why white men should not only be found in 
Victoria and New South Wales, but in Queensland and every other part 
of Australia, and that is our peremptory and absolute need for self 
defence. We have to realise that it is much cheaper to have white settlers 
planted on the soil than to maintain a standing army to defend 
unoccupied territory.19
For ruling class politicians, European settlers were also “an addition to the 
power to resist the pressure of Chinese to which they would inevitably be 
submitted sooner or later”.20 Alfred Deakin described the White Australia 
policy as “much more than the preservation of our own people here. It means 
                                                 
19 Deakin, Alfred, Presessional Speech of Mr Alfred Deakin, M.P. to his constituents at The Alfred Hall, 
Ballarat, 24th June, 1905, Melbourne, 1905 (his “Notice to Quit” speech), p. 16. 
20 Speech by James Boucaut, former Premier SA, given in SA LA, 1877, cited in Louise Renfrew, 
“Wilton Hack and Japanese immigration into the Northern Territory: 1876-1877”, BA (Hons) 
thesis, University of Adelaide, 1992, p. 33 (reference is probably SAPD 18 July 1877, p. 418). 
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the multiplication of our own people so that we may defend our country and 
our policy.”21 The Royal Commission into the Sugar Industry, which reported 
in 1912, was reflecting a very long-held, ruling class view when it warned that: 
If the idea of “White Australia” is to become an enduring actuality, some 
means must be discovered of establishing industries within the tropical 
regions…the supreme justification for the protection of the Sugar 
Industry is the part that the industry has contributed, and will, we hope 
continue to contribute to the problems of settlement and defence of the 
northern portion of the Australian continent.22
In other words, the White Australia policy was not just a policy of excluding 
“coloured” immigrants, but of assisting British people to migrate and settle. 
Gold: A lever for colonisation 
If British colonisation was at the centre of all ruling class strategy for the 
Australian colonies, then gold came to hold a central place in schemes for 
expanding British settlement. During the gold rushes of the 1850s there was a 
                                                 
21 Quoted in Myra Willard, The history of the White Australia policy to 1920, Melbourne University 
Press, Carlton (Vic), 1967 (first published 1923), p. 204. See also the speech of F McKeon at a 
public meeting in Dalby, 30 August 1876, discussing the new Land Bill. McKeon argued that, 
“there was an absolute necessity for the legislature to establish a permanent yeomanry on the 
soil. The present hostile attitude of Russia and her gradual encroachments on the possession of 
Great Britain were facts with which all were well acquainted, and we were equally aware that 
this Colony was wholly unprepared to resist the aggressions either of Russia or any other 
power that might invade our shores. The question was, how to establish this permanent 
yeomanry.” Dalby Herald, 2 September, 1876. 
22 Quoted in Sandra M Tweedie, “Between depressions: Australian dilemmas in the quest for 
Asian markets, 1893/1933”, MComm (Hons) thesis, University of New South Wales, 1982, p. 
185. 
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tripling of the non-Indigenous population of Australia. Paul A Pickering has 
described the extraordinary hopes that liberals in NSW had that the discovery 
of gold by Edward Hargraves would attract “throngs of willing migrants” and 
lead to the transformation of their society.23
Gold was seen as a lever for economic development. In 1851, Henry Parkes’ 
paper, the Empire, had argued that, “The greater proportion of those who shall 
emigrate to New South Wales, even with the avowed object of digging for gold, 
will eventually settle down to the ordinary avocations of life, or become the 
producers of some new source of wealth.”24 Thus gold mining was an 
exceptional industry, and exceptional laws were needed to preserve it for 
Europeans, points explicitly made by Queensland’s Secretary for Public Lands, 
John Douglas in debate on the 1876 Goldfields Bill.25 When introducing the bill 
into the Legislative Council, CS Mein declared that the colony owed a huge 
debt to European miners and prospectors for developing the gold fields, thus 
giving an impetus to trade.26  
In 1880, after discussing the intention of the Berry Government in Victoria to 
spend £20,000 on prospecting and other attempts to develop mining industries, 
the Brisbane Courier argued that gold mines, “when prosperous, contribute 
largely to the support of every other industry in the colony, and attract a 
                                                 
23 Pickering, Paul A, “‘The finger of God’: Gold’s impact on New South Wales” in Iain 
McCalman, Alexander Cook and Andrew Reeves (eds), Gold: Forgotten histories and lost objects of 
Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2001, pp. 37-51. 
24 The Empire, 23 June 1851, in Pickering, The finger of God, p. 39. 
25 QPD, vol. XX, pp. 380-1. 
26 QPD, vol. XX, p. 618. 
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population for whose introduction we have not to pay.”27 In this we can see the 
source of a specifically ruling class resentment of Chinese gold miners. Not only 
were Chinese people in general a threat to British colonisation of this vast 
continent, but Chinese miners plundered the special resource that governments 
hoped would bring British migrants without cost. In 1886, South Australia’s 
Education Minister, John Cockburn, introduced a Gold Mining Act Amendment 
Bill into parliament, saying: 
a goldfield that was worked by Europeans was a focus of prosperity to 
all the adjoining settlements. They required the squatters’ meat, and the 
stores of the tradesmen, and generally circulated money in a way that the 
Chinese did not… If the Chinese were permitted on the goldfield it 
might as well be wiped off the map.28
In a deputation to Sir Samuel Griffith, the Employers Association of 
Queensland described the difference between Chinese and European mining 
thus: 
White diggers, although exhausting alluvial deposits of gold, set the 
wealth they create circulating through the community, thus 
strengthening and developing every industry. The gold they win thus 
remains as a permanent benefit to the country. The Chinese on the other 
hand, working in association as diggers, carriers, storekeepers and 
merchants not only win the gold but supplied all the necessities of the 
miners, thus arresting and retaining any indirect profit which the 
country might have obtained from their presence. The whole profits 
went to China, and when the Chinese thus working had exhausted a 
portion of the alluvial field, the gold was gone, and none of the wealth 
                                                 
27 Brisbane Courier, 27 Feb 1880, p. 2, cols. 4-5. 
28 SAPD 1886, col. 453. 
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created in the process remained in the colony… The result is that instead 
of finding a permanent population planted on the field, we have it left on 
our hands, vacant and sterilized.29
The goldfields were seen as part of the front line in the battle between Britain 
and China to colonise Australia, and this attitude seems to have shaped much 
of the rhetoric used in this and similar debates. Chinese miners were accused of 
rushing in to take advantage of the gold Europeans had found, never 
prospecting themselves. This was not true; some fields were discovered by 
Chinese prospectors, and on others, European miners and prospectors sold 
their claims to Chinese miners. Nevertheless, for Queensland’s John Murtagh 
Macrossan, the Chinese miner “invariably trod upon the heels of the European 
miners, and on every hand took possession of their ground”. It is revealing that 
Macrossan’s main concern was that European miners who rushed from one 
goldfield to another, would often come back to find their temporarily 
abandoned claim being worked by Chinese miners.30  
The logic of this was to ban Chinese, or other “aliens”, from the gold fields. 
Addressing Queensland’s 1876 Goldfields Bill, WE Murphy MLA argued that, 
“if they were to legislate on these matters they should do so in such a way as to 
encourage their own countrymen more than to encourage foreigners”.31 The 
following year, WG Bailey argued that Chinese miners “crowded out the white 
digger” and moved that all foreigners (ie non-British) be banned from the 
                                                 
29 Report of Deputation on 18 July 1887, file 87/5583, filed with 87/6523, in Queensland State 
Archives, SRS5253-1-514. 
30 QPD, vol. XX, pp. 377-78. The same point was made by Peter McLean, p. 377, but CH 
Buzacott disagreed, p. 469. 
31 QPD, vol. XX, pp. 382-3. 
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goldfields.32 The idea was picked up by the ultra-conservatives as an alternative 
to explicit immigration restrictions, but rejected because it still left open the 
possibility of large-scale Chinese immigration for other labouring.33 At other 
times over 1876-7, the idea of restricting Chinese immigration by banning aliens 
from goldfields was supported by Macrossan, and in the Legislative Council, by 
such eminent squatters as HG Simpson, AH Brown, JP Bell, Sir Arthur Palmer 
and FT Gregory.34 In 1886, Cockburn’s solution to the Chinese “threat” in South 
Australia’s Northern Territory was to imitate Queensland’s law which 
prohibited Chinese miners from entering a gold field for three years after its 
discovery—unless it was discovered by Chinese miners. 
This broader ruling class agenda enables us to understand, in a new way, the 
central role of the gold miner in the mythology of White Australia, which is 
presented as a working man’s struggle against capital.35 Until now, historians 
have tended to focus on the actual rioters on the goldfields, who were 
overwhelmingly miners, rather than those who organised them and those in 
positions of real power, whose broad strategic agendas called for anti-Chinese 
agitation and legitimised anti-Chinese violence. 
                                                 
32 Speaking on the Gold Fields Act Amendment Bill (1877), ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, p. 248. 
Bailey withdrew his amendment after debate. 
33 See WH Walsh in ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, p. 362. In the event, Walsh’s amendment attracted 
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34 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII (1877), p. 359 (Macrossan), ORDLC Qld, vol. XXII, pp. 94-5 and 109-
112 (Simpson), ORDLC Qld, vol. XXII, pp. 84-5 and 115-7 (Brown), ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII 
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The Queensland anti-Chinese laws of 1876-77 
In 1875, there were no legal restrictions on Chinese immigration into any of the 
Australian colonies, nor had there been since 1865. After the anti-Chinese 
agitation during the gold rushes had died down, and the anti-Chinese laws in 
Victoria and New South Wales had been repealed, the first new restrictions on 
Chinese immigration came in Queensland in the years 1876-77. The trigger for 
these new laws was the Palmer River gold rush, which saw large numbers of 
Chinese people arrive to dig for gold and make their fortunes in the far north. 
The Chinese Immigration Restriction Act, passed in Queensland in 1877, 
became the model for anti-Chinese laws in the other colonies in the early 1880s, 
and Queensland’s laws of 1884 were more restrictive again, not surpassed until 
the prohibitive laws passed in most colonies in 1888. In a very real sense, 
Queensland led the way towards White Australia. 
Most Queensland politicians supported some form of indentured “coloured 
labour” for the sugar industry, and many supported widespread use of 
racialised Asian labourers. But in 1877 they came to regard Chinese labour as 
different, and a special threat. The central issue was their growing fear that the 
colonial government could lose effective control of a large area in the north of 
the colony to Chinese people and even the Chinese Empire. To some, the 
danger was an actual “invasion” that was happening then and there, which 
would force “white” people to take up arms and fight. To others, the danger 
was that the British population of Queensland would be “swamped” by a much 
larger Chinese population, and that the dominance of British institutions, laws 
and culture would be threatened. But however it was expressed, the fear was of 
a loss of control due to an influx of population, a sense of “strategic” danger. 
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The Palmer River gold rush was on the same scale as colonial Australia’s 
greatest, with a million ounces of fine alluvial gold being extracted, most of it 
from 1874-6.36 But the Palmer was also the most remote and inaccessible of the 
great goldfields: situated on Cape York Peninsula, west of the Great Dividing 
Range, north-west of what is now Cairns, and some 2000km north of Brisbane. 
It required a long, arduous and dangerous journey over a makeshift track from 
the port of Cooktown to reach the field. 
Most of Queensland was, at the time, sparsely settled by Europeans, with a 
white population of less than 200,000 in 1877. The northern, tropical half of the 
colony had only a few thousand Europeans. There was virtually no 
infrastructure in Far North Queensland apart from the rudimentary port of 
Cooktown. The British empire might have seized this territory, and the 
Queensland government might have been given authority over it, but the 
government had little ability to control what happened there. In all the 
discussion of the Palmer River gold rush in the Queensland parliament, there 
was an enormous sense of vulnerability. 
The politics of Chinese immigration in Queensland changed dramatically from 
1874 to 1877. When the liberal Macalister government came to office in January 
1874, it had no intention of restricting Chinese immigration. Indeed in July that 
year, under pressure from the sugar industry, the government asked the 
Governor, the Marquis of Normanby, to write to the British Consul at Amoy in 
southern China, asking him to facilitate the importation of Chinese labourers 
for the sugar industry, assuring him that agreements reached in China between 
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Chinese labourers and Queensland planters would be valid, and that Chinese 
labourers so imported would be covered by the colony’s Masters and Servants 
Act.37 However, by the time the Consul in Amoy had replied, in January 1875, 
the Queensland Government had gone cold on its own idea.38 By April 1875, the 
Government was trying to stop, not facilitate Chinese immigration, warning 
Hong Kong, that: 
all steamers carrying Chinese to Cooktown will be liable to be detained 
there until the Health Officer satisfies himself that they are fit subjects to 
be landed; also, that it is proposed that all aliens shall be subject to a 
miner’s right of £4, and a business license of £8.39
This radical turnaround was in response to the large-scale arrival of Chinese 
miners and merchants in Cooktown, most of whom were on their way to the 
Palmer River diggings. The Queensland government’s message to Hong Kong 
in April 1875 also warned of measures that were contained in a bill which 
proposed to amend the Gold Fields Act of 1874. This bill, moved by the 
Secretary for Public Works and Mines, Henry King MLA, but not a government 
measure, was never proceeded with. 40 Meanwhile the Government’s earlier 
attempts to facilitate the importation of Chinese labourers now caused it some 
embarrassment, as did the new Governor Cairns’ attempts to revive interest in 
importing labourers during 1875.41 It is extremely difficult to see the timing of 
                                                 
37 “Immigration of Chinese and Indian Coolies” in Qld V&P, 1875, vol. II, p. 560. 
38 Letter from HH Massie, Under Colonial Secretary, to Governor’s Private Secretary, dated 14 
January 1875, in “Immigration of Chinese and Indian Coolies”, Qld V&P, 1875, vol II, p. 566. 
39 Telegram dated 13 April 1875, in Qld V&P, 1875, vol. 1, p. 95. 
40 Bill first moved on 29 April 1875, see Qld V&P, 1875, vol. 1, p. 21. The government’s failure to 
proceed with King’s bill appears to have been one of the reasons for his resignation from the 
government in May 1876. 
41 In a minute to Governor Cairns, Premier Macalister wrote, dishonestly: 
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this move as a product of violence on the gold field, or plebeian agitation, 
though elements of both were present. As Kathryn Cronin has shown, there 
was far more violence and agitation against Chinese miners from 1867-72 than 
in the Palmer rush, but no move by the ruling class parliament to restrict 
Chinese immigration. This violence included an anti-Chinese riot at Crocodile 
Creek in 1867, a roll up at Gympie in 1868 that drove Chinese miners out of a 
previously abandoned site, Chinese miners being driven from goldfields at the 
Norman, the Gilbert Range, and Cape River in 1869, and a violent attack on 
Chinese miners at Cloncurry in 1871 in which six Chinese and two whites were 
shot. By contrast, after meticulous research, Cronin documents threats only 
against Chinese miners at Oakey Creek, Stoney Creek, Finegold Creek, 
Limestone Creek, and Sandy Creek, all part of the Palmer River rush and all in 
the areas of the Palmer where whites were in a majority. She also found 
incidents in 1876 of white miners causing trouble if Chinese miners took over 
temporarily abandoned mines.42
                                                                                                                                               
The Government never contemplated Chinese emigration to Queensland; on the 
contrary, when requested to appoint an agent in China for the purpose, they have 
always declined to do so. 
A perusal of the Executive Minute of 30th July, 1874, shows that the Minute 
contains simply an answer to three questions contained in the previous 
correspondence. These answers are simply matters of fact, and the Government are 
entirely ignorant of what was written by Lord Normanby. 
The Government are opposed to any action that would savour of encouragement 
to Chinese immigration. 
From “Immigration of Chinese and Indian Coolies”, in Qld V&P, 1875, vol. II, p. 569. 
42 Kathryn Cronin, “‘The yellow agony’: Racial attitudes and responses towards the Chinese in 
colonial Queensland” in Raymond Evans, Kay Saunders, Kathryn Cronin, Race relations in 
colonial Queensland: A history of exclusion, exploitation and extermination, University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia, 1988 (First published 1975), pp. 279-83. Cronin’s evidence of violence against 
Chinese miners is scattered throughout her chapters, but these pages contain the material 
summarised. 
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In 1876, with the number of Chinese miners on the Palmer passing 10,000, the 
Queensland government, now led by George Thorn, introduced legislation to 
discourage any further Chinese immigration.43 In parliament, it proposed 
dramatically increasing the duty on rice, from two pounds a ton to one penny a 
pound (ie £9.6.8 ton); and moved to raise the price of miner’s licences for Asian 
and African people from ten shillings to three pounds, and the cost of a gold 
fields business licence from four pounds to ten.44 These proposals were 
extensively debated, and passed both houses of parliament, but the 
amendments to the Gold Fields Act were reserved by the Governor on 11 
October 1876, and ultimately disallowed by the Colonial Office in London on 27 
March 1877. Lord Carnarvon, the British Colonial Secretary declared that the 
bill offended Britain’s policy of open borders, and in particular contravened 
various treaties of peace and amity entered into between Britain and China, 
which gave the citizens of both powers the right to enter each other’s territory—
a provision primarily designed by Britain to give it access to trade. Carnarvon 
also warned that the legislation discriminated against Chinese people from 
                                                 
43 Thorn became Premier on around 6 June 1876, see DB Waterson, A biographical register of the 
Queensland Parliament 1860-1929, second revised edition, Casket publications, Sydney, 2001, p. 
187 (for Thorn) and p. 118 (for Arthur Macalister, whom he succeeded). The move against 
Chinese immigration was virtually the first act of the new government, after surviving a major 
no confidence debate. This restructuring of the Ministry seems to have been provoked by Henry 
King’s resignation from the Ministry; and if so, it is probable that it was related to the Chinese 
issue. 
44 The Premier introduced the Gold Fields Act Amendment Bill on 12 July 1876, see Qld LA, V&P, 
1876, vol. I, p. 34. The proposal for an increase in the duty on rice was first outlined by the 
Treasurer, Dickson, on 26 July 1876, see QPD, vol. XX, pp. 362-3; and a Customs Duties Bill to 
give effect to the proposed increase was moved on 10 August 1876, see Qld LA V&P, 1876, vol. 
I, p. 579. Both proposals were first debated in the Ways and Means debate, see especially QPD, 
vol. XX, pp. 388-476.The Gold Fields Bill passed on 7 September 1876, see QPD, vol. XX, pp. 633-
38; but assent was reserved on 11 October, and the Bill sent to London for its decision. The 
Customs Duties Bill passed in September; and was assented to by the Governor on 25 
September. 
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Hong Kong and other colonies who, “in virtue of their birth-right, have 
acquired the status of natural-born British subjects.”45
A huge furore followed. The obligations placed on the Australian colonies by 
the British-Chinese treaties, and the rights of Chinese subjects of the empire, 
would feature in immigration debates until the end of the century; and it 
gradually became the objective of the majority of the Anglo-Australian ruling 
class either to avoid, or free themselves from, these obligations. 
The liberal government, now headed by John Douglas, responded in the 1877 
legislative session by introducing a slightly different Gold Fields Bill, which 
passed unamended through the Legislative Council.46 They also pushed 
through a Chinese Immigrants Regulation Bill, the first legislation to explicitly 
limit the number of Chinese people allowed to enter Queensland. The 
government proposed to allow only one Chinese person  for every five tons of a 
ship’s tare; that was increased by the Legislative Council to one for every ten 
tons. The bill also imposed a £10 entry tax, which would be refunded if the 
immigrant left within three years and had been of good behaviour. It passed in 
an amended form through the Legislative Council and was promptly assented 
                                                 
45 He approvingly quoted an earlier despatch by Sir John Young, inter alia, “exceptional 
legislation intended to exclude from any part of Her Majesty’s dominions the subjects of a State 
at peace with her Majesty is highly objectionable in principle.” See despatch from The Secretary 
of State for the Colonies to The Officer administering the Government of Queensland, London, 
27 March 1877, in NSWLA V&P, 1876-77, vol. 1, pp. 687-9. 
46 Introduced 12 June 1877, see Qld V&P, 1877, vol. 1, p. 76; also ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, pp. 203-
4; passed by Legislative Council 12 July 1877, see Qld V&P, 1877, vol. 1, p. 166. Assented to by 
Governor, 2 October, see Qld V&P, 1877, vol. 1, p. 386. 
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to by the Governor,47 a tacit admission that the previous year’s action in 
disallowing the bill had been a mistake.48
These political events provide the context for the most serious anti-Chinese 
violence in far north Queensland. In mid-October 1876, after the passing of the 
Gold Fields Act Amendment Bill and several days after its reservation by the 
Governor, a large crowd of armed whites prevented Chinese people from 
landing at Trinity Bay (Cairns). When those Chinese people arrived at 
Hodgkinson, they were denied rations, forcing them to leave.49 Cronin 
documents the emergence of an organised anti-Chinese movement at Charters 
Towers, Thornborough and Hodgkinson from May 1877,50 but this only 
happened after London’s rejection of the Gold Fields bill, the event which 
galvanised ruling class Queensland to campaign for restrictive legislation, and 
which saw anti-Chinese racism and hysteria dominate much of the Brisbane 
and regional press. 
Four features of this history stand out. Firstly, the Queensland government’s 
own actions shifted in response to the arrival of large numbers of Chinese 
people; from a willingness to facilitate the importation of labourers in 1874; 
                                                 
47 Introduced 19 June 1877, see Qld V&P, 1877, vol. 1, p. 99; Also ORDLA Qld, vol. 23 (1877), p. 
277; passes through Legislative Council on 8 August, see Qld V&P, 1877, vol. 1, p. 256. Assented 
to on 20 August, see ORDLC Qld, vol. XXII, p. 197. 
48 There are two interesting aspects to Governor Kennedy’s prompt assent to this anti-Chinese 
legislation. Firstly, it was against his own personal opinions; indeed he became notorious for 
having some Chinese servants. He had received instructions to assent to the legislation. 
Kennedy’s opinion is recorded in his dispatches to London, QSA PRV8225-1-1, confidential 
despatches, 16 May, 16 June, 30 July, 11 August 1877. Secondly, the Colonial Office’s acceptance 
of the legislation had already been suggested to the Legislative Council by its President, Sir 
Maurice O’Connell; see his speech, ORDLC Qld, 1877, p. 121.   
49 Cronin, Yellow agony, p. 282. 
50 Cronin, Yellow agony, p. 283, also pp. 279, 282. 
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reversing that and vacillating over anti-Chinese measures in 1875; an attempt in 
1876 to make mining and immigration to Queensland more of a financial 
burden; and finally, in 1877, legislative restriction on immigration and exclusion 
from new goldfields. 
Secondly, there was a shift in the nature of the argument about Chinese 
immigrants. In the 1876 debates, MPs raised a range of general concerns about 
large scale Chinese immigration, emphasising the allegation that the Chinese 
did not pay their way, a device for gaining the approval of the Governor and 
the Colonial Office. But in 1877, with the number of Chinese immigrants on the 
Palmer reaching 17,000, politicians focused on a strategic fear for control of the 
colony. 
Thirdly, it is clear that these were not measures aimed at “coloured” 
immigration or “coloured labour” in general, but at Chinese immigration in 
particular. Attempts to explain the White Australia policy as a product of “the 
xenophobia and race hatred of the Anglo-Saxon,” miss the highly differentiated 
nature of the ruling class response to “coloured” people from different origins.51
Finally, in 1877, in the aftermath of London’s disallowance of the 1876 
legislation and with the number of Chinese miners at its height, the unelected 
and conservative Queensland Legislative Council proved itself more militant in 
opposing Chinese immigration than the elected Legislative Assembly, a 
position which fundamentally contradicts the established mythology and 
historiography. 
                                                 
51 Robert A Huttenback, Racism and empire: White settlers and colored immigrants in the British self-
governing colonies 1830-1910, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1976, p. 58. 
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The shift in official arguments about Chinese immigration can be seen by 
contrasting the way two sets of legislation were introduced. In bringing in the 
1876 bills to punitively tax Chinese miners and Chinese businesses on the gold 
fields, and to raise the duty on rice, Treasurer James Dickson argued that these 
measures represented a judicious way of making these immigrants help the 
state revenue; and would also discourage the immigration of the Chinese.52 This 
is very different to the alarmism with which George Thorn, Minister for Works, 
reintroduced the Goldfields Bill into the Legislative Assembly in June 1877: “the 
Government hoped to put an effectual stop to the invasion which had taken 
place in the Northern parts of the colony, and more especially on our 
goldfields.”53 In debate, John Douglas, the new liberal Premier, was 
melodramatic. 
He did not hesitate to make use of the term “invasion”, for it really was 
an invasion, and as they were backed up by many millions of their 
countrymen, at no very great distance from the shores of this colony, it 
may also be called a dangerous invasion—nay, a more dangerous 
invasion than any whch [sic] they might be called upon to resist by 
armed effort.54
[T]hey [ie Queenslanders] were the nucleus of what would eventually be 
a great nation; and what might be the consequence of this Chinese 
invasion of the present time who could tell? It might entirely reverse and 
change their prospects as a people.55
                                                 
52 QPD, vol. XX, p. 356. 
53 ORDLA Qld, vo.l XXIII, p. 234. 
54 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, p. 245. 
55 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, p. 246. 
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And with the Chinese preponderance on the Palmer, “the white population 
were not very certain that they might not have to defend themselves by force of 
arms.”56
Many Europeans in the North had armed themselves, with the full 
knowledge that they would, sooner or later, have to defend themselves. 
It had been stated that the Chinese were occupying only places which 
had been abandoned by the European diggers; but this was wrong, and 
if the Chinese still congregated in such numbers in the gullies of the 
Palmer, Europeans would not long remain, and the whole country before 
long would be occupied by the Chinese. These were the really serious 
facts of the question they had to deal with.57
Was this purely demagogy? In a private letter to New South Wales Premier, Sir 
Henry Parkes, regarding a proposed new colonial defence program, Douglas 
wrote: 
I must confess that personally I see no necessity for much expenditure on 
defensive works… The invasion which causes us the greatest anxiety at 
the present time is this Chinese inroad. It is a serious affair you will find. 
Sir Arthur Kennedy seems to be satisfied that the Queen’s Government 
will not give way about it, and that they will insist upon Chinamen being 
placed on an equality with our own people - I think that they will not 
insist but in the mean time we are in a fix.58
Douglas’ private dismissal of the need for defence installations—a position he 
would never have taken publicly at the time, given that Britain was on the brink 
                                                 
56 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, p. 247. 
57 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, p. 248. 
58 Letter to Parkes, 4 June 1877, Parkes corresp, A881 p. 141. 
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of war with Russia—gives authenticity to his professions of strategic concern 
over Chinese immigration. 
In the 1876 debates, a handful of MPs only had argued from a position of 
immediate strategic concern towards the so-called Chinese “invasion”, most 
notably the Postmaster General, CS Mein, William Yaldwyn, and William 
Bailey.59 In the 1877 debates, Douglas’ focus on the supposed strategic threat 
was echoed by the majority of speakers. For Thomas Stephens, a former 
Colonial Treasurer who had retired from running the Brisbane Courier 
newspaper: 
It was certain that with the present influx of Chinese, two or three years 
would not pass before Government would find that every Government 
officer, every white man, would be driven from the North; as the 
Government of the colony could not, and would not, raise an army, they 
could leave it to the English Government to keep the northern territory 
of Queensland in order. A naval force might or might not be available, 
but a military force would be required to regulate or coerce the Chinese 
two hundred and fifty miles inland from the coast.60
Now we are all aware that politicians say all kinds of things to get their way. 
What was interesting in the 1877 debate was the way that MPs who openly 
advocated the virtues of Chinese labour in the pastoral and sugar industries 
shared the strategic concerns of the Premier. Voting on the Goldfields Bill in 
                                                 
59 Mein, on 6 September 1876, moving the Gold Fields Act Amendment Bill in the Legislative 
Council, QPD, vol. XX, p. 618; Yaldwyn on the same day in the council, p. 619; Bailey in the 
Legislative Assembly on 18 October, QPD, vol XX, p. 1018. 
60 ORDLC Qld, vol. XXII, p. 115. 
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1876 followed party lines almost perfectly;61 however in 1877 most 
conservatives supported the anti-Chinese legislation. The conservative 
Opposition leader, AH Palmer, a leader of Queensland’s pastoralists, “believed 
that in their place the Chinese were very useful members of the community.” 
But he “wished it to be understood that he was not an advocate for filling the 
Northern portion of the colony with Chinese, in the way they were swarming 
into it now”. If the government’s scheme for restricting Chinese immigration 
“was, in his opinion, a proper one, it would receive his support. This dangerous 
influx of Chinese might be checked in a legitimate way...” And, “[T]he rush of 
the Chinese to the Northern portions of this territory is such an evil that 
legislative action upon it has become absolutely necessary if we are to preserve 
it for the British race, and that legislation should be almost immediate.”62
The conservative JM Thompson was the only politician to explicitly reject all 
this as scare mongering, and he got only implicit support in this from Francis 
Ivory, WH Walsh and FT Gregory, all ultra-squatters.63 But they were deserted 
by most on their own side. For the immensely wealthy squatter, Joshua Peter 
Bell, ”No action in this matter could be too strong…to prevent this country 
being inundated by Chinese”.64 Conservative squatter, Charles Haly, declared 
that, “No measure could be too strong to put down the Chinese invasion”.65 The 
                                                 
61 MacDonald was the only MLA to vote for the Thorn (liberal) government on a no-confidence 
motion and against the Goldfields Bill second reading; whilst Macrossan and Bailey were the 
only MLAs to vote against the Thorn government, and for the bill being read a second time. 
62 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, pp. 248, 353. 
63 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, p. 355 (Thompson); p. 235 (Ivory); p. 362 (WH Walsh); ORDLC Qld, 
vol. XXII, p 83-4 (FT Gregory), though he later accepts the need to “check” the Chinese influx, p. 
117. By “ultra-squatter”, I mean those who fought for the commercial and political interests of 
squatters in a particularly strident and unyielding manner. 
64 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, pp. 352-3. 
65 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, p. 250; see also p. 362. 
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emerging conservative leader, Thomas McIlwraith, expressed relief that the 
government “intended to introduce legislation which would put a stop to 
Chinese immigration on its present scale”.66 His followers agreed: CH Buzacott 
thought “it was necessary to put a complete stop to Chinese immigration for the 
present”;67 while JM Macrossan even raised the spectre of disloyalty if the 
British refused to allow them to stop the Chinese. “He thought that even if the 
colonies of Australia had to resign whatever benefits they were likely to derive 
from their connection with Great Britain, it would be better for them to do so 
than to allow their country to become an appendage of the Chinese Empire.”68  
George Grimes MLA, a liberal sugar planter, believed that: 
the position of affairs with respect to the Chinese invasion was a very 
serious one, and threatened the existence of Queensland as, he would not 
say a British but an Anglo-Saxon colony. Anything that could be done to 
check this influx of Chinamen would, he felt sure, be hailed with 
satisfaction by every member of this House… 
It might seem a simple thing to Lord Carnarvon, that there would be 
17,000 Chinamen in Queensland; but to Queenslanders—who knew how 
small was the proportion of Europeans, and how easy it was, considering 
their proximity to China, to make the 17,000 17,000,000.69
The Queensland Upper House then toughened up the proposed law 
considerably—halving the number of Chinese people that could arrive on a 
ship, from one per five tons registered weight, to one per ten tons; and 
removing a clause which allowed Chinese people to get their £10 entry tax 
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returned if they left within three years, a clause the Assembly reinstated. Where 
British subjects of Chinese origin were excluded from the restrictions, the 
Council tried to include them, until the Assembly rejected that amendment as 
well. 
Concern about large-scale Chinese immigration was felt by the leaders of most 
other colonies. In June 1876, in the wake of Governor Cairns’ reserving the 
Queensland Gold Fields Act Amendment Bill, Victorian Premier Graham Berry 
assured his Queensland counterpart, John Douglas, that 
The Legislature and Government of Victoria have not been unmindful of 
the grave national danger which an inordinately large Chinese 
immigration would occasion, and from time to time have checked and 
controlled the same by legislation, imposing special taxes and imposts on 
Asiatic aliens, not alone or even chiefly for revenue purposes, but 
distinctly to limit the numbers of a race which carries with it social and 
physical dangers.70
Fear of the strategic implications of Chinese immigration was also strong 
amongst Queensland’s newspapers. From 1876 to 1877 there was a major 
change in the editorial line of the Brisbane Courier, the colony’s “leading” 
newspaper. In 1876 the Brisbane Courier had rejected the scaremongering: 
“There is no reason, we believe, to fear a Chinese invasion.” Quite the contrary, 
the Queensland government controlled a vast area, “[s]tretching as it does far 
into the tropics”, but unsuitable as a region for white labour. The Chinese who 
had come to the Palmer could be of immense value in developing the north, as 
they had developed and peopled the Straits Settlements and Burma: 
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we should apply ourselves to the task of making the best of a race 
possessing a vast capacity for usefulness as applied to a territory which 
can never be very attractive to the great bulk of those people who 
constitute the rank and file of the European immigrating classes.71
There were two caveats to this argument: firstly, a concern at the “repugnance” 
shown by Chinese labourers towards plantation work;72 and secondly, that the 
Queensland state might not be able to control them. 
The real question…is not so much whether we should avail ourselves of 
the redundant population of Asia to colonise the northern shores of 
Australasia, but is society sufficiently consolidated; has the system of 
colonisation under which population has gradually extended up the 
shores of Eastern Australia become sufficiently matured, and is it 
sufficiently confident in its own powers to undertake this task of 
controlling the advancing tide of immigration which may set in from 
China?73
In 1876, the paper was more concerned with the wide-scale suffering and death 
of Chinese miners on the Palmer, and their desire to make Chinese miners pay 
as much as possible for the privilege of mining in the colony. As late as 13 
March, the paper was still open to accepting significant Chinese immigration. 
An editorial discussed an inquiry set up in California on the subject of Chinese 
immigration, and commented that, “the evidence published in the San 
Francisco papers leads us to infer that it will be favorable to the Mongolian 
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73 Editorial, Brisbane Courier, 26 July 1876. 
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immigration.” The paper summarised some of this favorable evidence, in order 
to “assist our legislators”.74
On 31 March 1877, the paper’s position suddenly changed, just after news came 
that London had vetoed the Gold Fields Act Amendment Bill of 1876.75 The 
language of the Brisbane Courier was now strident, accusing the imperial 
government of “encouraging Chinese immigration, contrary to the wishes of 
the colonists”, and Lord Carnarvon of, “assisting the Chinese invasion”. On the 
substantive question, there was a complete U-turn. “Australia cannot be both 
Chinese and British”; “every Chinese immigrant, if he does not supplant a 
European laborer, by his presence amongst us, renders the colony less attractive 
to European immigrants.” Comparisons with Singapore, “only useful as an 
entrepôt”, were now explicitly rejected.76
In particular, the paper now embraced the idea of a strategic danger; a 
continuation of the increasing rate of Chinese immigration “would almost 
transform the colony of Queensland into a Chinese settlement... The danger 
with which the British population of Australia is now threatened is urgent and 
great”. By 8 May it was anticipating joint Australian action “to repel this 
invasion of a race which, if not promptly resisted, could merely by its force of 
numbers overwhelm these colonies as with a flood”.77 On 18 August it attacked 
“the shallow selfishness of many of the arguments used in favor of Chinese 
immigration”, and a correspondent who “thinks the Chinese may be the very 
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people wanted for the development of Northern Australia”, arguing, “[t]he 
Chinaman...threatens our right of self preservation, our duty to our families, 
our country, and our civilisation”. The paper declared its aim as “making 
Queensland from south to north a British colony”.78
The ‘dangers’ of a relatively-unsettled, colonial settler state 
In late 1876, the British Foreign Office sent J Dundas Crawford, “an attaché to 
the British Legation in China, and a fluent speaker of the Chinese language”, to 
the Australasian colonies to investigate and report on colonial concerns 
regarding Chinese immigration.79 In his secret and well-informed report, 
Crawford commented that this concern was a product of “the exaggerated 
influence of a doubt as to the permanency of white conquest.”80 Fear that 
European domination was in doubt was also a theme in American William 
Hepworth Dixon’s highly influential, White conquest, published in 1876;81 and it 
was also central to Charles Pearson’s 1893 classic, National life and character: A 
forecast. 
In retrospect, these fears, and the arguments used to support them, seem 
bizarre, and it would be easy to dismiss them as nothing more than an 
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irrational, racist extravagance.82 But the widespread agreement within the 
ruling class, that significant numbers of Chinese immigrants would be a real 
danger—a position taken by both supporters and opponents of restriction, 
suggests that there was something more than racist paranoia involved. The 
imagining of present and future dangers, and of other people and states as 
enemies, is at the heart of “strategy”.83 The actual rivalry of states, and their use 
of war and colonisation to expand their power, makes some of this imagining 
“rational” from the point of view of the ruling classes involved. 
It is in this sense that there was a ruling class logic to their fear of Chinese 
immigration. If the colonial ruling class exaggerated—wildly—the danger to 
their control which might result from Chinese immigration, it was largely 
because their grip on northern Australia was so slight. And they could see few 
means to strengthen it. Most believed that white men could not work in the 
tropics, that the tropical climate was dangerous to the health of Europeans, and 
that the area was only suited to supporting Asian or African people. Thus, they 
feared a few thousand Chinese immigrants because they could, potentially, be 
the means by which a few tens of thousands settled, and then more, until they 
dominated the north. They were unmoved by arguments that the vast majority 
of Chinese immigrants saw themselves as temporary migrants, intent on saving 
some money and going home to die. And no matter how weak the Chinese state 
was in the present, Australia’s politicians imagined dangers posed by a 
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modernised China, centralised and well led. The Chinese state might have been 
opposed to the emigration of its subjects, but emigrate they did. China may 
have had no expansionary intentions, its own military efforts may have been 
defensive and anti-imperial, but Australia’s ruling class imagined the future 
capacities of a country with 400 million people. In twenty, fifty or a hundred 
years, a resurgent China might then be able to use a settled Chinese population 
in northern Australia to expand its empire and export some of its (supposedly) 
surplus population. This anxiety about China’s potential, as distinct from its 
contemporary power, was succinctly expressed in 1881 by Sir George Innes 
MLC, Minister for Justice in the Parkes-Robertson government. 
I do not care whether the time is near or far remote when we are likely to 
be inundated by such hordes as to form a majority of the population; the 
liability to such a disaster renders it a politic and proper measure to limit 
or prohibit Chinese immigration.84
A reflection (and indeed a product) of this ruling class imagining of future 
possible strategic dangers was the publication of invasion fantasies in Australia. 
These had initially focused on France and Russia (and other countries too) as 
possible “invaders”,85 reflecting Britain’s historic strategic rivalries and the 
emergence of French and Russian interest in the Pacific. Then in the late 1880s, 
China began to feature prominently. Neville Meaney has pointed out that three 
“Asian invasion” novels—William Lane’s notorious White or Yellow?: A Story of 
the Race War of A.D. 1908, serialised in the Boomerang from February to May 
                                                 
84 NSWPD, vol 5, p. 651. 
85 Robert Hyslop has located 192 war scares in Australia during the nineteenth century, with the 
1850s as the most troubled period; “War scares in Australia: in the 19th century”, Victorian 
Historical Journal, Vol 47, No 1, 183rd issue, February 1976, pp 23-44. 
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1888; Kenneth Mackay’s The Yellow Wave (1893); and CH Kirness’ The Australian 
Crisis (1908/9)—represented the three successive phases in the fears whipped 
up in Australia, Chinese immigration, Chinese invasion, and Japanese 
invasion.86 The strengthening of fears of a Chinese invasion reflected the change 
in China’s military status after 1885, a result of its partially successful resistance 
of French invasion of Indo-China.87
The possibility of a self-sustaining Chinese community in northern Australia 
was also given credibility by the new, successful communities Chinese people 
had built in California, and across south-east Asia. The second half of the 
nineteenth century saw large-scale migration from southern China, driven by 
overpopulation and poverty, and attracted to areas of economic opportunity, 
and not only to the United States and Australia. It was a movement beyond the 
control of the central government in Peking, which was opposed by many in the 
southern provinces. From being an island with a few hundred people in 1819, 
when Sir Stamford Raffles arrived to establish a trading port, the population of 
Singapore had grown to 95,000 by 1871, 55,000 of whom were Chinese. By 1881, 
32,000 more Chinese people had moved there, and a further 35,000 by 1891. 
From 1881 to 1913, between 37,000 and 103,000 Chinese men sailed every year 
from Hong Kong to Singapore alone, and many more to other destinations.88 
Perhaps the Chinese-driven development of Singapore, and other towns and 
cities in south-east Asia would eventually be mirrored in northern Australia; 
                                                 
86 “’The Yellow Peril’, Invasion Scare Novels and Australian Political Culture” in Stewart, Ken 
(ed), The 1890s: Australian literature and literary culture, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 
1996, pp 258-263. 
87 This is discussed more fully in chapter 9. 
88 James Francis Warren, Rickshaw coolie: A people’s history of Singapore (1880-1940), Oxford 
University Press, Singapore & New York, 1986, pp. 15-18. 
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indeed there were Chinese merchants in Darwin who intended exactly that.89 
By 1888, some 7000 Chinese people were living and working in the Northern 
Territory, and this was part of the reason for the Chinese immigration crisis of 
1888.90 The Singapore example, of Chinese merchants, businesspeople and 
labourers creating a predominantly Chinese society, was frequently mentioned 
in parliamentary debates on Chinese immigration.91
Thus the extreme sensitivity of Australia’s colonial ruling class to relatively 
small numbers of Chinese people was in part a semi-rational, class response, 
given that they had annexed a vast, extraordinary, land mass—an entire 
continent—most of which could not be quickly settled, nor brought under close 
administrative control, by the British or their colonial surrogates. Given that 
British-Australian colonisers could not intensively use the land they had 
annexed, they were determined to keep other peoples from using it, or settling 
on it. Across hundreds of millions of hectares of “unsettled” land, even a small 
“alien” settlement was thus believed to be a strategic danger in a way that it 
would not have been in a “settled” area. The political consequence was the 
building of a “wall” to keep out undesirable “others”. Thus Chinese exclusion 
and the “White Australia” policy, and the intensity of these policies, are not just 
products of Australia as a colonial settler state, but of it being a relatively 
unsettled colonial settler state. 
                                                 
89 Margaret Patricia Rendell, “The Chinese in South Australia and the Northern Territory in the 
Nineteenth Century: A study of the social, economic and legislative attitudes adopted towards 
the Chinese in the colony“, MA thesis, University of Adelaide, 1952, pp. 85-6. 
90 More fully discussed in chapters 9 and 10. 
91 See Charles A Price, The great white walls are built: Restrictive immigration to North America and 
Australasia 1836-1888, The Australian Institute of International Affairs in association with the 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1974, p. 160; speeches of Baker, SAPD 1881, Playford, 
SAPD 1888, col. 205; col. 634, Ramsay, SAPD 1888, cols. 215-224; see also article summarising 
views of Prof. EW Gilliam, Mackay Standard, 20 October 1886. 
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The Queensland ruling class galvanised behind restrictive 
legislation 
The final element of the “White Australia” myth which is contradicted in the 
pivotal experience of Queensland in the late 1870s, is the idea that the exclusion 
of the Chinese was a product of the agitation of the working classes or plebeian 
miners.92 An examination of the Brisbane Courier for the years 1876 and 1877 
showed just one report of a protest against the substantial Chinese immigration 
into the Palmer River goldfields. On 15 and 17 October 1876, a crowd of whites 
had fired on Chinese people attempting to land at Trinity Bay (Cairns). The 
government sent in extra police and the tensions were contained.93 
Significantly, this incident occurred after the passing of the first anti-Chinese 
laws in parliament, with all the attendant anti-Chinese rhetoric, and a few days 
after the Governor, Cairns, reserved them for the consideration of the Colonial 
Office.94 When the Courier’s weekly stablemate, The Queenslander, came out for 
restrictions on Chinese immigration in March 1876, seven months before the 
attack at Trinity Bay, it claimed that there had not been any kind of racial war 
on the goldfields; that while “some snarling occurred between the races, they 
were, as a rule, too fully and profitably employed to be able to spare the time 
necessary for a settlement of their animosity of race and color.”95 Within a 
                                                 
92 This appears to be the argument of Kathryn Cronin in Yellow agony, p. 283. 
93 This was first raised in parliament, QPD, vol. XX, p. 1018 (LA Adjournment debate, 18 
October 76), and then QPD, vol. XX, p. 1046 (LA Question without notice, 19 October 76). These 
were included in the verbatim reports of parliament in the Brisbane Courier. A short follow up 
item was published in the Brisbane Courier, 20 October, p. 2 col. 7. 
94 This was the Gold Fields Amendment Bill, reserved on 11 October. The Governor was then sent 
a substantial petition against Chinese immigration from Cairns (the place), dated 18th October; 
letter 76/2870 in QSA, Col Sec inwards corresp, SRS5253-1-229. 
95 Queenslander, 25 March 1876, p. 16. Hostility to Chinese miners was far more intense than the 
magazine allowed. 
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month, the magazine was railing against “The invasion of the Chinese”, and 
publishing “humorous” items on how Chinese people supposedly had the 
worst smell of all foreigners.96  
The mainstream political and press reaction against Chinese immigration into 
Queensland in 1876-7 simply cannot be understood as some kind of “working 
class” campaign. This is not to deny or downplay the significance of plebeian 
anti-Chinese agitation or actions. Kathryn Cronin has documented a series of 
anti-Chinese agitations, and brutal attacks on Chinese miners on Queensland 
goldfields from 1867 to 1872.97 But with the opening of the massive Palmer 
River goldfield in 1873, there seems to have been a decline in such tensions. 
Indeed, it was at this time that the Queensland government took the first steps 
towards recruiting Chinese agricultural labourers for the sugar industry—an 
action that is inexplicable if one sees government policy as shaped by goldfields 
violence. Cronin’s own research would suggest that the re-emergence of anti-
Chinese agitation on the goldfields in 1875 followed, rather than led, agitation 
in parliament for measures to restrict Chinese gold mining and Chinese 
immigration, and the adoption of anti-Chinese campaigning by the press.98 
                                                 
96 Queenslander, 29 April 1876, p. 16; 1 April 1876, p. 17. 
97 Kathryn Cronin, Yellow agony, pp. 279-81. 
98 The first legislative move to restrict Chinese miners on Queensland goldfields came on 29 
April 1875, from Henry King MLA, V&P Qld, 1975, vol. 1, p. 21. He tabled “a bill to amend ‘The 
Gold Fields Act of 1874’ so far as relates to Asiatic and African Aliens”, but it seems that it was 
never debated, and was removed from the Order Paper at the end of the parliamentary session, 
V&P Qld, 1875, vol. 1, p. 357. The first plebeian move against Chinese miners since 1872, noted 
by Cronin, came in June 1875, with white miners on a number of Palmer River goldfields, 
posting notices threatening Chinese with death, Yellow agony, p. 282. Cronin notes increasingly 
serious actions against Chinese miners in the north in late 1876, after the passage of the Gold 
Fields Act of 1874 Amendment Bill, and its reservation by the Governor in October, Yellow 
Agony, p. 282. The organisation of a series of anti-Chinese associations at Thornborough, 
Hodgkinson and Charters Towers happened only after the Gold Fields Act of 1874 Amendment 
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Significantly, most of the anti-Chinese actions in this period were on (often 
remote) goldfields, and these were not mirrored by protests or organising in the 
larger towns and Brisbane. The predominant pressure for restrictive legislation 
came from above, not below. 
The fear of Chinese colonisation of northern Australia was a specifically ruling 
class concern. Working class people in Sydney or Melbourne or Brisbane had no 
reason to fear settlement by other people two or three thousand kilometres 
away. Chinese people in Darwin were no threat to “white” jobs in Sydney. It is 
significant that, during 1876-77, while the Sydney Morning Herald was agonising 
over the “enormous number of Chinese who are locating themselves in 
Northern Queensland”,99 there was virtually no response from either the trade 
union movement in Sydney or Melbourne, nor from the populist plebeian 
movement in Sydney. This latter is especially significant, because a mass 
movement against state-funded assisted immigration was built in Sydney 
during 1877, a movement powerful enough to seriously threaten the grip of the 
Premier, Sir John Robertson, on his seat in parliament. In the dozens of mass 
meetings held during 1877 to protest against assisted immigration, there were 
only a few off-hand references to Chinese immigration, and as late as January 
1878, there was no mention of opposition to Chinese immigration in the 
                                                                                                                                               
Bill was vetoed in London, leading to both a public campaign by the Queensland Government, 
and its decision to introduce restrictive legislation. 
99 This conclusion is based on a thorough reading of SMH coverage of the anti-assisted 
immigration meetings held in 1877. Quote from SMH 18 May 1876, p. 4, cc. 5-6; other editorials 
dealing with the Chinese “crisis” in Queensland  on 11 Aug. 1876, p. 4, cc. 4-5; 19 Aug. 1876, p 4, 
c 7-8; 22 Aug. 76, p. 4, cc. 5-6; 10 Nov. 1876, p. 4, cc. 3-4; 15 Dec. 1876, p. 4, cc. 5-6; 14 April 1877, 
p. 4, cols 4-5; 23 May 1877, p. 4, cols. 5-6 and p. 5 col. 1; 6 June 1877, p. 4, cc. 4-5; 8 June 1877, p. 4, 
cc. 5-6 & p. 5, c. 1; 15 June 1877, p. 4, cc. 5-6; 23 June 1877, p. 4, c. 3-4; 4 July 1877, p. 4, cc. 4-5; 25 
Sept. 1877. 
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Manifesto of the protectionist Political Reform League.100 Once the labour and 
plebeian movements in Sydney had been aroused by the decision of the 
Australasian Steam Navigation Company to replace European with Chinese 
sailors, then the issue of Chinese colonisation in the north did become an issue 
for them; but only then. In this context, labour movement and plebeian 
organisers simply repeated a wide range of objections to Chinese immigration 
which had already been developed and publicised by the establishment media. 
The Brisbane Courier itself revealed both its own class position, and the class 
nature of the anti-Chinese movement, in May 1877: 
the opposition to Chinese immigration here is not maintained by 
disorderly loafers or by discontented working men alone, but springs 
from the painful conviction forced upon thoughtful, liberal-minded, and 
leading men throughout the colony that an overpowering Asiatic 
immigration, such as we are more than threatened with, would be 
destructive of our best interests…101
Queensland led the rest of Australia towards the White Australia policy, 
because whatever differences they had over “coloured labour”, conservatives 
and liberals in the ruling class agreed that they wanted their class and the 
British empire to both rule and colonise the territory. 
                                                 
100 See, for instance, SMH, 18 Oct. 1877, p. 5, c. 5; SMH 18 Oct., p. 5, c. 3. The only mention of 
Chinese immigration that I could find in the election campaign was a question at a meeting for 
the marginal candidate for West Sydney, AS Hamilton, SMH 16 Oct. 1877, p.3, cc. 4-5. For the 
PRL Manifesto, SMH 25 Jan. 1878, p. 3, c. 7. Seamen’s Union leader, Thomas White, who would 
lead in attacks on Chinese people during the seafarers’ strike of 1878-9, was one of its vice-
presidents, as was Walter Cooper, a former SMH journalist who had written anti-Chinese 
exposé stories. 
101 Editorial, Brisbane Courier, 8 May 1877. 
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Conclusion 
While the British government had asserted its sovereignty over the whole of 
continental Australia in 1829, the Anglo-Australian ruling class felt little 
confidence in its actual control of the continent. The British population of 
Australia in 1876 was still under two million, but most of those were in Victoria 
and New South Wales. The European population of Queensland was barely 
160,000 in 1876, most of whom lived in the south-east corner. The vast expanses 
of northern Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia were 
effectively unpopulated by Europeans. 
Colonisation was a central strategic and economic priority for the Anglo-
Australian ruling class. Chinese immigration was seen as a threat to this. China 
had the numbers that could threaten European dominance of vast areas of the 
continent, and European and Chinese capitalists had developed the structures 
to facilitate large-scale emigration. Chinese migration into North Queensland 
and the Northern Territory was seen as a far more threatening problem due to 
the tiny numbers of European settlers in those regions. And this anxiety was 
most acute about the northern goldfields, which could either be a lever for 
British colonisation and economic development, or a magnet for the Chinese. 
Strategic fear of Chinese immigration dominated in the Queensland ruling class 
after March 1877. The following year, Queensland’s conservative newspapers 
would campaign in support of the Seamen’s Union as it fought to stop its 
members being replaced by Chinese sailors in the famous strike of 1878, 
discussed in chapter 8. All subsequent legislation regulating “coloured labour” 
in Queensland was debated in the light of its supposed impact on British 
colonisation, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7. 
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This concern then grew during the 1880s, as China was believed to have 
increased its military power and this rival source of colonisation came to have a 
more threatening strategic dimension. This expanded Chinese “threat” was 
intensified by the perceived disloyalty of the British government towards 
colonial interests, most spectacularly over its disavowal of the “annexation” of 
New Guinea by Sir Thomas McIlwraith in 1883, which was followed by the 
actual annexation of the northern half of New Guinea in 1884 by Germany. The 
idea that Britain could be trusted to look after Australian ruling class interests 
was also undermined by the belief that Britain had an alliance with China in 
opposition to Russian expansion eastwards. 
Ruling class anxiety over China as a strategic threat reached its peak in 1887-88, 
and was sparked when the Chinese Emperor sent a delegation of 
Commissioners to Australia to report on the treatment of Chinese people in the 
colonies. The Sydney Morning Herald and New South Wales Premier Sir Henry 
Parkes believed that the Commissioners were sent to pave the way for the 
establishment of a Chinese colony in Australia. Chinese government complaints 
were then taken up by the British government, reinforcing the impression in 
Australia that Britain was prepared to sacrifice local ruling class interests in 
pursuit of its global agenda. The strategic dimension to the crisis of 1887-88 will 
be discussed in chapters 9 and 10. 
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The spectre of slavery, or: 
Who will do ‘our’ work in the tropics? 
IN JANUARY 1888, in the midst of a growing Australian hysteria about 
Chinese immigration, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a 
stiffly-worded “please explain” to the Australian governors demanding a report 
outlining all “exceptional legislation affecting Chinese subjects” and the reasons 
for it.1 Perhaps the most interesting and complete reply came from Tasmania’s 
Attorney-General, Andrew Inglis Clark,2 who argued that if significant 
 
1 The Chinese Minister in London, Liu Jui-fen (Lew-ta-Jen), had complained to the British 
Foreign Office about laws discriminating against Chinese immigrants to the Australian colonies, 
and in particular to the imposition of a £10 poll tax (letter of 12 December 1887, copy sent to all 
Australian colonies in letter from Sec State Colonies London, HT Holland, to colonial governors, 
23 January 1888, NSWLA V&P 1887-8, vol. 2, p. 221. The colonial governors then asked their 
ministers to draft responses. 
2 Clark was to become a major figure in the drafting of the Australian constitution. John Hirst 
called Clark the “best informed delegate” at the 1890 federation conference, and emphasises the 
importance of the draft constitution he brought to the Constitutional Convention in 1891, The 
sentimental nation: The making of the Australian Commonwealth, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 2000, pp. 11, 31, 291-2; see also Henry Reynolds, “Inglis Clark: Some afterthoughts” 
in Richard Ely: with Marcus Haward & James Warden, A living force: Andrew Inglis Clark and the 
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numbers of Chinese people should come to the colonies they would either 
threaten “the supremacy of the present legislative and administrative 
authorities”, or, if they accepted an inferior social or political status, they 
would create a combined political and industrial division of society upon 
the basis of a racial distinction. This would inevitably produce in the 
majority of the remainder of the population a degraded estimate of 
manual labour similar to that which has always existed in those 
communities where African slavery has been permitted, and thereby call 
into existence a class similar in habit and character to the “mean whites” 
of the Southern States of the American Union before the Civil War. 
Societies so divided produce particular vices in exaggerated proportions, 
and are doomed to certain deterioration.3
It is important to note that Clark was not arguing that Chinese immigrants 
would undercut established wage levels for European labourers. His argument 
was far more profound—that in sufficient numbers, Chinese immigrants might 
produce a fundamental change in the economic, social and political structure of 
Australian colonial society such as to drive it backwards. Clark was outlining 
two separate, but related objections to allowing the Australian colonies to 
become a mixed-race society. The first was a concern to avoid the economic and 
social backwardness that would result from allowing a slave-style regime to 
arise. This was the second key ruling class agenda behind the making of White 
Australia, and will form the focus of this chapter. Also embodied in Clark’s 
                                                                                                                                               
ideal of the commonwealth, Centre for Tasmanian Historical Studies, University of Tasmania, 
Hobart, 2001, pp. 396-401, p. 396. 
3 Memo from Andrew Inglis Clark to PO Fysh (Tasmanian Premier), dated 24 April 1888, NSW 
State Records, Col Sec special bundles 4/884.1. Clark’s memorandum was regarded as 
sufficiently important for it to be published in SMH 15 May, 1888. The paper described it as 
“exceedingly able”. 
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memorandum was a belief that parliamentary democracy was impossible in a 
mixed race society, which will be more fully discussed in chapter 5.4
Most postwar writers have failed to take these concerns seriously. Not so earlier 
writers like Keith Hancock. In Australia, Hancock presented the question as one 
in which a mixed race society is a danger to everyone; threatening 
“demoralisation of the coolie over-driven by white capital, demoralisation of 
the poor white overwhelmed by coolie competition, demoralisation of the half-
breed children of coolie and poor white who can find no firm place in either of 
the competing civilisations.” There was more than a whiff of the politics that led 
to the “stolen generations” in this. Hancock argued that it would be dangerous 
to “give a share of political power to aliens”, but dangerous too would be the 
alternative: “a successful tyranny over Orientals would destroy the character of 
[Australian] democracy”.5
In the 1880s, the dangers of slavery were not a problem from the distant past. 
Brazil and Cuba still had massive slave populations. The American Civil War, 
the most murderous war ever to engulf a European-style society, was of recent 
                                                 
4 Clark’s memorandum has been the subject of a detailed study by Richard Ely, “Inglis Clark’s 
1888 ‘Memorandum’ on Chinese Immigration” in Ely et al, A living force, pp.71-101. Ely’s 
discussion is marred by egregious errors, claiming, for instance, that in 1887, “about 1000 
Chinese immigrants entered the [Northern] Territory”, p. 72, whereas 1000 entered the NT in 
December 1887 alone, leading to greatly exaggerated fears at the time. He discussed “Illegal 
arrivals, including illegal arrival of Chinese”, p. 92n, but at the time being discussed, July 1887, 
no arrivals were illegal because no Chinese immigration legislation had been passed in 
Tasmania. Ely also fails to see the political background to the memorandum. He draws out 
Clark’s insistence on the fixity of the Chinese character, but does not comment on the clear 
references to slavery. He mentions JS Mill being another “who shared Clark’s view that the 
Chinese were simply not assimilable”, pp. 84-5, as if Mill were following Clark, rather than the 
opposite; Mill was Clark’s hero; Reynolds, Inglis Clark, p. 400. More importantly, Ely does not 
see Mill’s wider theoretical structure, which is discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
5 WK Hancock, Australia, The Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1961 (first pub. 1930), pp. 61-2. 
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memory. Indeed, when Andrew Inglis Clark was writing his memorandum, the 
end of the American Civil War was as recent to him as the election of Bob 
Hawke as Prime Minister was to Australians in 2006. Henry Parkes had been a 
young Chartist in England in 1833, when the British Parliament voted to 
emancipate the empire’s West Indian slaves. 
The question of who would do the work, under what kind of social relations 
and what kind of legal structure—a question central to any ruling class—was 
debated throughout nineteenth-century Australia. One of the first, great social 
movements—against the transportation of convicts in the 1830s and 1840s—was 
built almost entirely within the discourse of anti-slavery, and against some of 
the very richest people in New South Wales, including pastoralists who craved 
their labour. The response of some pastoralists to the drying up of convict 
labour, the importation of a few thousand Chinese labourers and other so-called 
“coolies” in the 1840s and early 1850s, was seen as an attempt to consolidate an 
aristocratic, semi-slave regime. 
It was not just the businesspeople, artisans and labourers of Sydney who were 
opposed to the Australian colonies being developed on the basis of “coolie” 
labour. In 1841, the British Colonial Secretary, Sir James Stephen, warned the 
Governor of New South Wales: 
To expedite augmentation of wealth in New South Wales by introducing 
the black race there from India would, in my mind, be one of the most 
unreasonable preferences of the present to the future which it would be 
possible to make. There is not on the globe a social interest more 
momentous…than that of reserving the continent of New Holland as a 
place where the English race shall be spread from sea to sea unmixed 
with any lower caste. As we now regret the folly of our ancestors in 
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colonising North America from Africa, so should our posterity have to 
censure us if we should colonise Australia from India.6
However, nearly forty per cent of Australia’s land mass is in the tropics, and 
most of Australia’s politicians were convinced of the racist myth that “white 
men” could not safely do manual labour in tropical climates. Failure to develop 
capitalist enterprise in the north was, in the minds of the ruling class, 
unthinkable, so they were left with the thought, terrible to many, that the only 
form of economic development that was possible involved plantation-based 
agricultural production using some form of indentured “coloured labour”. But 
this in turn raised the spectre of slavery, and hence economic backwardness, 
moral corruption, aristocratic rule and social degeneration. A “black north” 
would mean importing a massive population of “coloured aliens” who would 
be a standing menace to the safety of both the northern and the more 
conventionally bourgeois southern colonies and hence to their economic and 
political structures. Finally, divergent social systems on the one continent 
would carry the terrible possibility of a future internecine war.  
All these fears and dilemmas were sharpened by the experience of Pacific 
Island labour on the sugar plantations of Queensland (discussed in this chapter 
and chapters 6 and 7), by the campaign for a separated North Queensland 
colony from 1884 onwards (discussed in chapter 7), and in the late 1880s, by the 
refusal of the South Australian Parliament to close the door to Chinese 
immigration through Darwin (discussed in chapters 9 and 10). 
                                                 
6 Quoted in Ann Curthoys, “Race and ethnicity: A study of the response of British colonists to 
Aborigines, Chinese and non-British Europeans in New South Wales, 1856-1881”, PhD thesis, 
Macquarie University, 1973, p. 92. 
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In this chapter I begin by delving into the intellectual structure of British anti-
slavery, which combined humanitarianism, evangelical moral individualism 
and laissez-faire economics. Theories of slavery provided the framework used by 
the dominant element within the colonial ruling classes to grapple with the 
issue of “coloured labour”. I then consider the post-slavery issue of indentured 
labour, which was seen as a new kind of slavery, and the modern controversies 
over whether or not Pacific Islander indenture in Queensland resembled slavery 
in any way. A great deal of anti-Chinese rhetoric also drew on anti-slavery and 
the chapter will describe the way Chinese immigration was seen as carrying the 
seeds of a future structure of slavery. I then discuss the ruling class dilemma 
over who would do their work in the tropics, before concluding the chapter by 
describing one manifestation of the problem of the north: the extraordinary 
proposal from Sir Henry Parkes in 1879 to amalgamate Australia’s temperate 
colonies, with Queensland left to pursue a separate and different existence. 
The political economy of anti-slavery 
New World slavery is today rightly remembered for its racism and utter 
brutality. But the success of the British anti-slavery movement from the late 
eighteenth century through to emancipation in the years 1833-38 was a product 
of more than humanitarianism.7 Britain’s anti-slavery campaigners and 
politicians came to see slavery as a threat to British notions of order and 
                                                 
7 One other crucial element in the abolition of slavery, not directly relevant to this thesis, was 
the massive revolts waged by slaves; see especially Robin Blackburn, The overthrow of colonial 
slavery 1776-1848, Verso, London & New York, 1988. 
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morality, to Britain’s control of its colonies, and its economic future. For the 
popular mind, slavery was presented, first and foremost, as immoral and 
opposed to Christian virtue. There was immorality of the most obvious kind: 
the unrestricted sexual relations between slaves, and the sexual exploitation of 
female slaves by their masters. Slavery denied the basic humanity of the 
individual slave. The hostility of planters towards any attempt to convert their 
slaves to Christianity became notorious. They 
argued that black people were not human beings but animals without 
souls to save. “What, such as they?” they cried.  “What, these black Dogs 
be made Christians? What, shall they be like us?”8  
The result was an undeclared war between planters and missionaries, with the 
harassment, jailing and murder of missionaries in the West Indies, actions 
which scandalised deeply religious (and increasingly evangelical) British 
society. 
Behind this moral crusade was the fear that an immoral society faced collapse 
and ruin, as the corrupt and decadent French monarchy and aristocracy had 
been destroyed by revolution after 1789. The Quakers argued that “nations 
were chastised for their sins”.9 Thus Richardson sees Wilberforce and his 
campaign for “serious Christianity” as in part an attempt to persuade the idle 
                                                 
8 Peter Fryer, Staying power: The history of Black people in Britain, Pluto Press, London and Boulder 
(Colorado), 1984, p. 146. 
9 See David Turley, The culture of English antislavery, 1780-1860, Routledge, London & New York, 
1991, pp. 21-2. 
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youth of the British aristocracy to turn their backs on the dissolute lifestyle that 
surrounded them.10
In this world view, nothing so strongly promoted immorality as unlimited 
arbitrary power, the kind of power associated with slave-ownership. This 
unlimited power was dangerous because it denied the historic understanding 
that to rule a people involved obligations of protection and care, however 
limited. Slavery deprived the slave of any stake in society and fuelled rebellion, 
which was dangerous to the state. Slaves were also denied any opportunity for 
their own moral improvement, something that deeply offended the dynamic 
evangelical movement of the time, which emphasised the individual’s “burden 
of personal responsibility” and “dramatized the dangers of moral 
complacency”.11
If slavery corrupted the slave-owner, and deprived the slave of the opportunity 
for moral advancement, so it also corrupted the poor whites in slave societies. 
Perhaps worst of all, slavery tended, “by its vile associations, to degrade honest 
industry, and make men ashamed of useful occupations”.12 According to 
Thomas Halliwell, slavery “brings labor into contempt, and fixes to it the badge 
of degradation”.13 In the slave states of America, those white people without 
                                                 
10 Ronald Kent Richardson, “The signs of power: A study of English anti-slavery thought”, PhD 
thesis, State University of New York at Binghampton, 1982, pp. 135, 143-4. 
11 David Brion Davis, The problem of slavery in the age of revolution 1770-1823, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca and London, 1975, p. 46. 
12 John E Cairnes, The slave power: Its character, career, and probable designs: being an attempt to 
explain the real issues involved in the American contest, third edition, Follett Foster & Co, New 
York, 1863, p. 26. 
13 Thomas Halliwell, The American war considered specially with regard to slavery, Part II, G Watson, 
Dunedin (Scotland), 1865, p. 32. 
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slaves therefore lacked any useful role in society. The work of artisans could 
partly be done on the plantations, and there was little demand for white, free, 
manual labourers. They were thus reduced to a “promiscuous horde” who were 
“little removed from savage life, eking out a wretched subsistence by hunting, 
by fishing, by hiring themselves out for occasional jobs, by plunder.”14 They 
became known as “mean whites”, or “white trash”—and it was the creation of 
this social layer Andrew Inglis-Clark feared in his reply to the Colonial Office. 
As a consequence, there could be no substantial immigration of “white” 
labourers into a slave or plantation economy. 
Alongside the moral critique of slavery went an economic critique. In the late 
eighteenth century, West Indies sugar represented everything that economic 
liberals and manufacturers despised about the mercantilist system and the 
monopoly privileges it gave to planters and merchants. Eric Williams saw the 
attack on slavery as part of the attack on a no-longer profitable mercantilism by 
the dominant, bourgeois wing of the British anti-slavery movement that wanted 
free trade and free labour as the economic foundations of society.15 For these 
economic liberals, no great, wealthy, modern economy could be built on the 
foundations of slave-based production—and this also went to the heart of the 
ambitions of the Australian ruling class. There were many components to this 
theoretical structure, but all served to reinforce the supposed economic, social, 
                                                 
14 Richard Fogel and Stanley L Engerman, Time on the cross: The economics of American Negro 
slavery, vol. 1, Little Brown, Boston & Toronto, 1974, p. 183. 
15 Eric Williams, Capitalism and slavery, Introduction by DW Brogan, Andrew Deutsch, London, 
1964 (first pub 1944), esp. pp. 135-42. See also David Brion Davis, esp. pp. 350-55; James Walvin, 
“The propaganda of anti-slavery” in James Walvin, (ed), Slavery and British society 1776-1846, 
Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1982, pp. 66-7. 
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political and moral primacy of free wage-labour;16 a counterposition recognised 
from the other side by Virginia’s Richmond Examiner, when it attacked Abraham 
Lincoln on his election as President, as “a man pledged to carry on, and if 
possible to complete the warfare of free labour against our own divine rights of 
slave labour.”17
For British liberals, slave-based production was the most expensive and 
wasteful. “The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, demonstrates that 
the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in 
the end the dearest of any,” warned Adam Smith in The wealth of nations.18 One 
issue was the cost of reproducing what Marx called labour power. “The fund 
destined for replacing or repairing…the wear and tear of the slave, is 
commonly managed by a negligent master or careless overseer. That destined 
for performing the same office with regard to the free man, is managed by the 
free man himself,” and in this could be seen  “[t]he strict frugality and 
parsimonious attention of the poor”.19
Free labour led to a greater intensity of labour, whereas “[a] person who can 
acquire no property, can have no other interest but to eat as much, and to 
labour as little as possible...[work] can be squeezed out of him by violence 
only”.20 Free labour also encouraged greater skill in the labourer and technical 
                                                 
16 This point is made by Robin Blackburn, The overthrow of colonial slavery 1776-1848, Verso, 
London & New York, 1988, p. 51. 
17 Quoted in Halliwell, The American war, p. 12. 
18 Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Edited, with an 
introduction, notes, marginal summary and an enlarged index by Edward Cannan, MA, LLD, 
Fifth Edition, Methuen & Co, London, 1930 (1904), vol. 1, book III, p. 364. 
19 Smith, Wealth of nations, vol. 1, book I, p. 82. 
20 Smith, Wealth of nations, vol. 1, book III, p. 364. 
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improvements in production—two of the most vital factors in increasing 
productivity. In Smith’s view: 
Slaves…are seldom inventive; and all the most important improvements, 
either in machinery, or in the arrangement and distribution of work, 
which facilitate and abridge labour, have been the discoveries of 
freemen. Should a slave propose any improvement of this kind, his 
master would be very apt to consider the proposal as the suggestion of 
laziness, and of a desire to save his own labour at the master’s expence. 
[sic]21
These points were taken up and developed by later liberal theorists. Writing 
seventy years after Smith, John Stuart Mill relentlessly emphasised the 
superiority of free wage labour and its ability to provide an incentive for the 
labourer to work with greater intensity, energy, care and intelligence. “An 
Englishman, of almost every class, is the most efficient of all laborers, because, 
to use a phrase, his heart is in his work.” This was a result of a “capacity of 
present exertion for a distant object, and…thoroughness of…application to 
work on ordinary occasions.”22 By contrast, “labor extorted by fear of 
punishment is inefficient and unproductive.” More ominously: 
slavery, even in the most mitigated form, is incompatible with any high 
state of the arts of life, and any real efficiency of labor. For all products 
which require much skill, slave countries are always dependent on 
foreigners... All processes carried on by slave labor are conducted in the 
rudest and most unimproved manner.”23  
                                                 
21 Smith, Wealth of nations, vol. 2, book IV, pp. 181-2. 
22 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, with some of their applications to social philosophy, 
Charles C Little & James Brown, Boston, 1848, vol. 1, pp. 128, 125. 
23 Smith, Wealth of nations, vol. I, book II (Distribution), p. 297. 
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In other words, a slave economy might churn out large quantities of raw sugar 
or raw cotton or raw tobacco, but could never hope to become a modern, 
efficient, industrial society. This was a point developed by the last group of 
great anti-slavery theorists, who wrote in the context of the American civil war. 
JE Cairnes, for instance, argued that because the labour of slaves was so crude, 
it was “quite impossible that he should take part with efficiency in the difficult 
and delicate operations which most manufacturing and mechanical processes 
involve.”24 Furthermore, manufacturing and commerce required “the 
congregation in towns of large masses of workmen,” but “where the workmen 
are slaves,” manufacturing by large groups of slaves “could only be carried on 
at the constant risk of insurrection”. Slavery involved constant danger and thus 
the need to protect the slave state would prevent the growth of manufacturing 
and commerce.25
The declining profitability of West Indian sugar plantations was used as 
evidence for the backwardness of slavery as a system. Indeed in the early years 
of the nineteenth century, their solvency was believed to rest on a tariff which 
discriminated against all other sugar imports into Britain.26 In the United States, 
slave plantations were seen as wasteful because they destroyed the productive 
capacity of the soil, a tendency which was used to explain the demand for new 
slave territories in the American west.27
                                                 
24 Quoted in Fogel and Engerman, Time on the cross, p. 187. 
25 Cairnes quoted in Fogel and Engerman, Time on the cross, p. 187. 
26 Walvin, Propaganda, pp. 66-7 
27 Cassius Marcellus Clay, discussed by Fogel and Engerman, Time on the cross, pp. 159-60; 
Halliwell, The American war, p. 18; JE Cairnes, speech “The revolution in America”, in Political 
essays, Macmillan and Co, London, 1873, p. 88; EW Burton, EW, “Considerations upon the 
upper chamber in the Australasian legislatures”, Victorian Review, vol. 7, no. 37, Nov 1882, p. 13; 
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One of the problems that faced those opposed to slavery was that while slavery 
was disastrous in the medium or longer term for Britain as a whole, in the short 
term it was profitable for planters, merchants and an array of capitalists and 
investors whose wealth derived from the West Indies. There were always 
capitalists prepared to put their own gain ahead of the wider interests of 
society, and this was openly discussed in influential histories that touched on 
the movement against slavery.28 Thus the struggle to eliminate slavery came to 
be seen by capitalist politicians as inherently involving a struggle against a 
minority of their own class. 
The suppression of the slave trade and the abolition of slavery became pillars of 
British nationalism, proof of Britain as the supposed pillar of liberty in the 
world. But the legacy of British anti-slavery was contradictory, and undercut by 
British practice and by the immediate emergence of indentured labour as a 
substitute. 
Indentured labour: The new slavery? 
The slave trade was banned by the British empire from 1807 and slavery in the 
British empire abolished in the Act of 1833.29 In its place grew a system of 
indentured labour, in which Indian, Chinese and other labourers “contracted” 
to work for a number of years for a set wage in a remote plantation economy. 
                                                 
28 For example, William Edward Hartpole Lecky, A history of England in the eighteenth century: 
Volume 6, Second edition, Longmans, Green, and Co, London, 1887, p. 292. 
29 Blackburn, The overthrow of colonial slavery, pp. 314, 457. 
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Gone was the ownership of the labourer; in its place came some of the 
paraphernalia of freely-contracted wage labour. But for many middle-class 
reformers, this was simply a rebadging of slavery, and they were soon pointing 
to the abuses of the new system. The Paris Anti-Slavery Conference of 1867 
warned that, “all the present systems of coolie immigration and contracts of 
labour, although regulated may, and actually do, degenerate into new forms of 
the slave trade and slavery.”30
The issue of indentured “coloured” labour was discussed by Herman Merivale 
in his enormously influential Lectures on Colonization and Colonies, mostly based 
on lectures given at Oxford University from 1839 to 1841. Merivale 
distinguished two paths of economic development for new colonies; one which 
focused on meeting the wants of the colonists, the other which focused 
primarily on production of a single commodity for export.31 In the first category 
were Canada and the northern colonies of America, some of which were 
established purely as places of refuge from religious persecution; in the second 
category were the plantation colonies of the American south and the West 
Indies. 
Unlike the fairly abstract reasoning of Adam Smith, Merivale did not pretend 
that unfree labour was always unprofitable. In some colonies, the production of 
exportable commodities could be extremely profitable, but raised the danger 
                                                 
30 Quoted in Kay Elizabeth Saunders, “Uncertain Bondage: An analysis of indentured labour in 
Queensland to 1907, with particular reference to the Melanesian servants”, PhD thesis, 
University of Queensland, 1974, immediately prior p. 1 (no page numbering). 
31 The highly influential JCR Colomb made a similar distinction; but added a third category, 
that of the military colony; in The Naval and Military Resources of the Colonies, bound in volume of 
Australian pamphlets, Mitchell Library, Sydney, p. 3. 
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that this would produce an insatiable demand for labour. The question was: 
how much free labour was available? “Slave labour,” he wrote, “is dearer than 
free wherever abundance of free labour can be procured…the great demand for 
slaves and the great profitableness of slavery, at the present day, arise 
altogether from that scarcity.”32 This point was also taken up by John Stuart 
Mill: 
Whether slavery or free labor is most profitable to the employer, 
depends on the wages of the free laborer. These, again, depend on the 
numbers of the laboring population, compared with the capital and the 
land. Hired labor is generally so much more efficient than slave labor, 
that the employer can pay a considerably greater value in wages, than 
the maintenance of his slaves cost before, and yet be a gainer by the 
change; but he cannot do this without limit.33
Elsewhere Merivale argued that the critical point in the history of colonies came 
when capital began to accumulate. “If they succeed in procuring and preserving 
a compulsory supply of labour, they become, virtually or actually, slave 
countries; and the sources of their prosperity, and causes of their decline, have 
been traced”.34 In a much later appendix (1861) to his Lectures on Colonisation, 
Merivale paid particular attention to the example of Mauritius, where Indian 
“coolie” labourers had been brought in to provide labour for the sugar industry. 
He was sceptical of claims of the colony’s success: 
                                                 
32 Herman Merivale, Lectures on colonization and colonies: Delivered before the University of Oxford 
in 1839, 1840 & 1841, Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, London, 1861, pp. 303-5, 
emphasis in original. 
33 Mill, Principles of political economy, vol. 1, book II, p. 299. 
34 Merivale, p. 576. 
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what are the future prospects of a colony, in which industry is exercised, 
not by the native population, but by a multitude of strangers, brought 
over by an artificial arrangement for a temporary purpose? If they return 
to their home (which comparatively few do as yet) they carry with them 
their earnings, and impoverish the country they were brought to 
enrich…in everything but the compulsion and the cruelty, the 
immigration trade is but a repetition of the slave trade, and the economy 
of Mauritius resembles that of Cuba. Such a colony is but a great 
workshop, rather than a miniature state.35
The whole point of Merivale’s survey was that durable and long term 
prosperity came from slower, more rounded growth, from an economy based 
on small farmers and free labour. A successful colony needed to restrain the 
planter or commodity producer motivated solely by quick profits.  
The controversy over Pacific Islander ‘slavery’ 
It was the sugar industry that brought to a head all the tensions within the 
Queensland, and indeed, Australian ruling class, over “coloured labour” and 
“slavery” in the north. From 1863, over 60,000 Pacific Islanders were brought to 
Queensland to work under three year indentures, the vast majority in the sugar 
plantations. In response there was a long and bitter campaign against the labour 
trade, and it was one of the issues that divided ruling class politics. 
                                                 
35 Merivale, pp. 346-7. 
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The campaign against Pacific Island labour was conducted within the 
intellectual framework of anti-slavery. One of the first petitions taken up 
against the use of Pacific Islanders, from residents of Brisbane in 1869, saw “the 
system of importing South Sea Islanders as labourers into Queensland as a step 
in the direction of slavery”.36 This accusation was made repeatedly in 
parliamentary debates,37 and by Queensland Governor Musgrave (1883-88), 
who privately told Sir Robert Herbert, the Permanent Under Secretary for the 
Colonies (and former Queensland Premier), that the recruitment of Islanders 
was “a system & arrangements wh. are as much like slavery & the slave trade as 
anything can well be wh. is not avowed as such.”38 These were also the terms in 
which the issue was debated in ruling class journals. In one debate in the 
Victorian Review, John Wisker declared: 
The Kanaka is brought to Queensland in the capacity of a beast of 
burden… When he arrives on the mainland, he is bound hand and foot 
to his employer. Nothing is done for his mental or moral improvement. 
He performs his task when he does not die under it, which latter event is 
a distressingly common occurrence… His wages, should he be fortunate 
enough to get them, are spent upon firearms and strong drink. He is not 
likely to cultivate any other tastes, or, indeed, to be permitted to cultivate 
any... From whatever point of view this wretched business be regarded it 
presents the same aspect. It is a slave trade.39
                                                 
36 Quoted Ruth LL Tomkys, “Queensland Immigration 1859-1901”, MA thesis, University of 
Queensland, 1930, p. 69 
37 See for instance, debate on Polynesian Labourers Bill in Queensland Legislative Assembly, 22 
May 1877, from ORDLA, vol. XXIII, pp. 50-69. 
38 Letter to Herbert, 3 Jan 1884. Musgrave’s own copy is loosely inserted into the book of his 
private letters, Sir Anthony Musgrave’s Private Letters, Oxley Library, Acc 334, tr 1863, A2/5/2. 
39 John Wisker, “The victim of civilisation”, Victorian Review, vol. 6, no. 35, Sept 1882, p. 550. 
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The hegemonic status of the slavery argument can also be seen in the regularity 
with which supporters of Islander labour felt obliged to deal with it.40 Planters 
and their supporters argued that Islanders had freely contracted to work in 
Queensland for three years, and many words were spilled debating the degree 
to which Islanders had understood or consented to the reality of indenture. 
After the system was destroyed by the Commonwealth’s Pacific Island Labourers 
Act 1901, popular, academic and semi-official histories almost always presented 
indentured labour on the sugar plantations as a form of slavery.41
But the late 1960s saw the emergence of a revisionist current.42 Researchers such 
as Peter Corris, Patricia Mercer, Carol Gistitin and Clive Moore delved into the 
experience of Islander communities in Australia and in the Pacific, using oral 
history and the documentary record to put Islanders, their lives, culture and 
agency at the centre. These were pathbreaking histories that greatly expanded, 
and in many ways decolonised, understandings of Island and Islander 
communities. The revisionists rejected the idea that Islanders had been slaves, 
arguing that this represented them as passive victims. They particularly rejected 
the popular view that recruitment had been little more than the kind of 
                                                 
40 For example, Francis M Harricks, “Coloured labour in tropical Queensland”, Victorian Review, 
vol. 6, no. 36, October 1882, p. 660; also George J Perkins, Mackay. An essay upon the rise, progress, 
industries, resources, and prospects of the town & district of Mackay, HB Black & Co, Mackay, 1888.  
p. 33. 
41 Thomas Dunbabin, Slavers of the south seas, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1935; Edward 
Wybergh Docker, The blackbirders: A brutal story of the Kanaka slave-trade, Queensland Classics 
edition, Angus & Robertson, London, Sydney, Melbourne, 1981 (first pub 1970); Hector 
Holthouse, Cannibal cargoes, Rigby, Adelaide, 1969. 
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kidnapping reminiscent of the African slave trade, which had been the central 
issue in debates at the time. For Clive Moore: 
It is demeaning to the intelligence of the Melanesian people to presume 
that they presented themselves to be kidnapped from the same beaches 
on the same islands, generation following generation, for forty years or 
more. The majority made a definite decision to leave their islands to 
spend three or more years in Queensland: on Malaita this applies to as 
many as eighty percent of the recruits.43
The significance of the revisionist critique for this thesis is that it suggested that 
there was no real basis for fears of a slave, or semi-slave society, leaving us with 
the implication that the struggle against Islander labour was either nothing 
more than racism, or a proxy for other conflicts.44
There are major problems with the revisionist approach. It minimised the 
difference between Islander indenture and wage labour in general; underplayed 
the role of coercion; and maximised the difference between the sugar plantation 
in Queensland and slavery in the American south. Thus, Queensland (and later 
Australian) liberals were seen to be legislating against Islanders, rather than 
against a danger to modern capitalism. 
                                                 
43 Clive Moore, Kanaka: A history of Melanesian Mackay, Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies 
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44 Saunders, Uncertain Bondage [thesis], pp. 480-81; DK Dignan, “Kanaka Political Struggle: An 
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Certainly, a debunking of the mainstream and popular histories of the labour 
trade as little more than kidnapping was well overdue. But where the 
mythologists saw only coercion, the revisionist historians admitted and 
described some of it, only to generalise or periodise it away. So Clive Moore, for 
instance, agreed with Kay Saunders that perhaps 25-30% of recruitment 
involved elements of illegality, but emphasised what he saw as the majority 
experience of free choice.45 Thus, as one experience was emphasised, the 
opposite was neatly hidden. Neither did Moore allow for a mixture of coercion 
and “choice”, nor deal with the possibility that coercion coerced more Islanders 
than those immediately affected. When Moore pointed to the 80 per cent from 
Malaita who may have signed up voluntarily for plantation indenture, he left 
out the fact that 80 per cent of Malaitan recruitment occurred after 1885, by 
which point state supervision of recruitment had become fairly intense.46 Moore 
also tried to quarantine kidnapping and coercion to the early labour trade: 
Recruiting in its early stages was primarily by deception and force. But 
kidnapping was not a continuing theme as the recruiting trade 
progressed into the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s. Recruiting became a 
voluntary affair…as the islanders became aware of the real nature of the 
labour trade and life on the plantations…47
Adrian Graves rejected this explanation and periodisation: 
                                                 
45 Moore, Kanaka, pp. 45-7. 
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coercion was not confined merely to an “early and brief” period of the 
labour trade. The best documented cases of kidnapping, involving more 
recruits and recruiters than previously, occurred in the 1880s, twenty 
years into the system, and there were isolated instances reported in the 
1890s.48
He argued, instead, that the methods of recruitment reflected changes in the 
recruiting industry, and the demand for labour on the plantations. The period 
of the worst abuses, around 1883-4, coincided with the height of a sugar boom, 
when recruitment into Queensland reached record levels. Deryck Scarr 
described an intensification of Melanesian Islanders’ “long-standing attitude of 
alternate attraction and repulsion in relation to labour vessels…during the 
1890s [when] [i]nstances of firing on the boats greatly increased,” the reason 
being the resentment of the elders at the recruitment of the young men.49
Graves saw this new Pacific history as lurching into the methodology of neo-
classical liberalism, assuming that “the decision to migrate was rational and 
progressive, the operation of free choice in the context of a competitive labour 
market.”50 So Carol Gistitin, for instance, saw Islanders as “migrants by 
choice…attempting to maximise their opportunities,”51 with little 
acknowledgment of the structural constraints within which any choices were 
made. Graves argued instead that “expansive, intrusive capitalism” disrupted 
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the traditional Islander economy and society, which in turn created both 
personal and social crises that drove many individuals to either seek or accept 
indenture. As part of this process, the recruiters found compradors within the 
coastal communities of the Melanesian Islanders, who used a mixture of 
coercion and the manipulation of traditions of reciprocity to mobilise new 
recruits for the labour trade from inland villages. For this they were rewarded 
with tobacco, guns and other commodities, items that further strengthened 
their local and regional position and their ability to produce further recruits. It 
also deepened the dependence of Islanders on this trade, perpetuating the cycle 
of labour recruitment.52
But if Graves gave us a subtle analysis of structure and agency in recruiting, he 
joined the revisionists in rejecting any comparison with the slavery of the 
American South, which was the approach taken in Kay Saunders’ celebrated 
PhD thesis.53 Graves made essentially two arguments: firstly that the legal 
status of slaves and indentured Islanders was fundamentally different, that the 
Islanders “were both treated and behaved essentially as wage labourers”; and 
secondly that planters were “enthusiastic profit-maximisers”.54 The latter is, of 
course, no argument against the idea that Queensland saw something akin to 
slavery. Robert W Fogel and Stanley L Engerman, in their controversial book 
Time on the Cross made the same claim for the ante-bellum planters of the 
American South,55 and critics of slavery hostile to Time on the Cross have not 
                                                 
52 Graves, Nature, pp. 124-38. Graves’ critique has been replied to by Clive Moore, 
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55 Fogel and Engerman, Time on the cross, vol. 1, esp. pp. 67-78. 
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disputed the profit-seeking orientation of the slave-owners. Even Elizabeth Fox-
Genovese and Eugene Genovese, who opposed any notion that planters were 
capitalists, situated New World slavery as one of the projects of profit-seeking 
merchant capital; the American South was “in but not of the capitalist world”; 
its plantation economy “embedded in a world market”, based on relations of 
production that were pre-capitalist.56
There is, of course, no argument that the legal status of slaves was radically 
different from that of indentured labourers, nor that the indenture system in 
Queensland was not chattel slavery. Moreover, historians as varied as Moore, 
Saunders and Graves have pointed to the increasing role played in the sugar 
industry, from the late 1880s to 1906, by so-called “time expired” labourers who 
had served out their indentures, stayed in Queensland and became wage 
labourers. But for the period covered by this thesis, most Islander labour in the 
sugar industry was provided by indentured labourers. The relevant question is 
not: were indentured Islanders slaves? but, Did the coercion and unfreedom 
involved in the indenture system create economic, social and political structures 
that involved a dynamic similar to that of slavery? Moore, for instance, has 
acknowledged that the legal end of slavery in the British empire in the 1830s 
did not necessarily lead to any significant change in “the related socio-economic 
and concomitant juro-political structure of an ex-slave society”.57
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In order to better understand the dynamic of plantation production in 
Queensland, it is worth reviewing the general nature of wage labour, and its 
importance for capitalists and the capitalist system. For Marx, wage labourers 
are completely dispossessed of any means to sustain themselves outside wage 
labour. They must find the means to keep themselves alive—food, shelter, 
clothing, and the means to reproduce their ability to work—by purchasing 
commodities in the market place. Wage labourers have no means of raising the 
money required to buy those subsistence commodities other than to offer for 
sale their capacity to labour, their labour-power, to an employer. The “freedom” 
of free labour lies in the freedom the worker has to dispose of their labour 
power as their own commodity, which includes the freedom to choose the 
employer to whom they sell it.58 The corollary of this freedom for the worker is 
the freedom of the employer to stop purchasing a worker’s labour power, to 
quickly get rid of surplus or unsuitable employees. All the traditional 
obligations and bonds which tied ruler and ruled to each other are broken by a 
relationship that embodies both “freedom” to move jobs, and the tyranny of 
insecurity for the worker. The dynamism and extraordinary productivity of 
capitalism are inseparable from these relations. For the worker there is also the 
freedom to choose from competing subsistence commodities. Indeed the ability 
to choose the nature of one’s subsistence, although limited in reality, represents 
one of the major incentives for workers to offer employers careful and intense 
labour. The business of producing commodities for the subsistence of the 
working class thus became an arena for capitalist enterprise, competition and 
profit-making, and a central part of the Australian colonial economy.59
                                                 
58 Robert Miles, Capitalism and unfree labour: Anomaly or necessity?, Tavistock Publications, 
London and New York, 1987, pp. 20-26. 
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A brief consideration of these basic propositions immediately exposes severe 
problems for the idea that indentured labour in some way resembled wage 
labour. Queensland sugar planters turned to indentured labour precisely to 
avoid “free labour” relations of employment. They constantly complained that 
white labourers were “unreliable” because they would move on if they found 
conditions intolerable or go on strike when the planter was most vulnerable. 
Sugar cane must be crushed within hours of harvesting or else a large 
proportion of the sugar is lost.60 Strategically timed strikes are a problem faced 
by all employers, but the sugar plantations were mostly in areas without a 
“mature” labour market. One of the fiercest critics of indentured labour was the 
southern Queensland sugar planter, Samuel Grimes, who was able to find 
employees from the general labour market in and around Brisbane.61 But most 
plantations were in the north, and the sugar industry was central to the 
colonisation of coastal Queensland, constantly pushing the frontier of European 
settlement further north. The solution of the planters was to staff their 
plantations with labourers who could not go on strike, who could not be 
dismissed, who had to be given the means of subsistence every day, whether or 
not they worked or worked well, and who had to be paid in full at the end of 
                                                                                                                                               
59 Of course there is not a lot that is genuinely free about this arrangement. Marx has eloquently 
described the violence and state intervention used to forcibly dispossess millions of their means 
of making a living, and to impose on them the obligation to offer themselves for employment to 
capitalists; see Karl Marx, Capital: A critique of political economy, vol. 1, Progress Publishers, 
Moscow, 1954, pp. 667-93. 
60 Evidence of William Langdon, manager at the Pyramid Plantation, Cairns, Mon 14 Jan 1889, 
“Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the general condition of the sugar 
industry in Queensland, and to report upon the causes which have led to the present 
languishing condition of the industry throughout the colony, the best means to be adopted for 
reviving and maintaining its prosperity, and generally, upon the prospects of tropical 
agriculture in Queensland: Together with minutes of evidence and the proceedings of the 
Commission and appendices”, Queensland, V&P Legislative Assembly, 1889, vol. IV p. 126. 
61 Hume Black speech in debate on Pacific Islands Labourers Act Amendment Bill, Tues 5 Feb 1884, 
in ORDLA Qld, vol XLI, p. 253. 
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their three years’ indenture however well or badly they worked. Virtually none 
of the mechanisms of incentive or self discipline which are so fundamental to 
free wage labour were at work here.62
Having resolved that reliable and cheap labour was essential, the planters 
copied the indenture system of the post-slavery colonies. The Pacific Islanders 
they imported were bound to an employer for a full three years, had no right to 
change masters, and were distributed to employers largely according to deals 
made with shipping companies and recruiting captains.63 Employers claimed 
they tried to keep Islanders from the same village or Island together to ensure 
greater harmony and productivity, but this was essentially their choice. Clive 
Moore and others have documented the many ways in which this bondage was 
(very) partially circumvented by employers, including the hiring out of their 
labourers for short periods to others,64 but these in no way changed the 
fundamental nature of the relationship. While the system of indenture meant 
that the individual labourer was released from their bondage after three years, 
new recruits meant that, for employers and the Island communities, the system 
was ongoing.65  
In the absence of strong economic incentives, or any culture of wage labour 
amongst the indentured labourers, planters turned to violence to extract labour. 
The normalcy of this is illustrated by the casual and unashamed discussion of it 
by planters; such as the manager of Rubyanna who, as late as 1896, insisted that 
                                                 
62 In both slavery and indenture, employers developed incentive mechanisms, but these do not 
change the underlying nature of the relations of production. 
63 Moore, Kanaka, pp. 154-5. 
64 Moore, Kanaka, pp. 147-53. 
65 Graves, Nature, pp. 115, 118-38. 
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“the best way to deal with the Kanaka is to use a certain amount of force.”66 
While this violence was neither as brutal nor extensive as under Atlantic 
slavery, it could still be severe, and its importance underlines the similarity of 
relations of production under indenture and slavery. 
However, it was the extraordinarily high death rate that convinced many that 
indentured plantation labour was a species of “slavery”; and it remained high 
despite various measures of state protection. Over the 41 years of the labour 
trade, the average death rate for Islanders was fifty per thousand. This 
compares with a death rate of nine or ten per thousand for male Europeans of 
similar age. Over the thirteen years discussed in this thesis, the period of 
greatest recruitment, the average death rate was well over seventy per 
thousand, and in 1884, the death rate reached the staggering figure of one in 
seven Islanders.67 The cumulative death rate of Pacific Islanders in Queensland 
for the four years 1882-5 virtually equalled the death rate of Australian 
prisoners of war held by Japan, 1941-5.68 Historians long regarded the causes of 
                                                 
66 Quoted in Adrian Graves, Cane and labour: The political economy of the Queensland sugar 
industry, 1862-1906, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1993, p.130. 
67 The death rate of Islanders in Queensland from 1875-88 is below, from Kay Saunders, “‘The 
black scourge...’: Racial responses towards Melanesians in colonial Queensland” in Evans, 
Raymond, Kay Saunders, Kathryn Cronin, Race relations in colonial Queensland: A history of 
exclusion, exploitation and extermination, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1988 (First 
published 1975), p. 188. The figure is deaths per 1000 Islanders in Queensland for each year. 
1875 85.11  1876 63.60  1877 51.39  1878 85.87 
1879 55.78  1880 62.89  1881 64.74  1882 82.64 
1883 75.74  1884 147.74  1885 98.84  1886 58.20 
1887 59.00  1888 52.00  1889 57.00  1890 46.44 
From 1889-94, the death rate ranged between 40 and 60 per 1000; from 1894-1904, from 25 to 40 
per 1000. The recruitment of Islanders for every year from 1863-1904 is tabulated in Graves, 
Cane and Labour, pp. 244-5. 
68 21,649 Australians were held as prisoners of war by Japan in the war of 1941-5, of whom 7777 
died, a death rate of 36%; Humphrey McQueen, Japan to the rescue: Australian security around the 
Indonesian archipelago during the American century, William Heinemann Australia, Port 
Page 164   Chapter 4: The spectre of slavery 
this high mortality as including poor diet, poor housing and clothing, long 
hours of work and overwork, inadequate sanitation and lack of medical care.69 
As part of their argument, revisionist historians rejected this explanation, 
arguing instead that it was caused by the immigration of Islanders into an 
entirely new disease environment, against which they had little or no 
resistance.70 It is not the task of this thesis to resolve this controversy. What is 
not at issue is the extraordinary callousness of the planters and the general 
indifference of the Queensland government regarding the lives of Islanders. 
Everyone knew about the extraordinary mortality rate, and yet, far from being 
restricted or curtailed, the recruitment of Islanders for the industry was 
encouraged by both Liberal and Conservative governments—up to 1884 at 
least—because of the exceptional profits involved. So while Islanders were not 
slaves and their bodies were not “owned” by the planters, the planters and 
squatters did have the de facto right to cynically use up Islander lives by the 
thousand and Islanders had no right and minimal capacity to “escape” this 
danger. It was only when wage labour became the dominant employment 
relationship for Islanders from the mid-1890s, and large numbers of Islanders 
                                                                                                                                               
Melbourne, 1991, p. 322. By contrast, the cumulative death rate of Pacific Islanders 1882-5 was 
35%, representing a total of 3926 lives lost, Graves, Cane and labour, p. 248. Interestingly, 
McQueen sees exposure to exotic tropical diseases as one of the reasons for the high prisoner of 
war death rate, pp. 322-3. 
69 For example, Kay Saunders, Workers in bondage: The origins and bases of unfree labour in 
Queensland 1824-1916, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1982, pp. 85-91. 
70 Moore, Historiography, pp. 64-5. Neo-liberal economic historian, Ralph Shlomowitz, has 
backed this up by calculating that the death rate in the first year of indenture averaged 81 per 
1000, falling to 26 per 1000 subsequently. Moore saw the exceptional mortality of 1884-85 as 
resulting from the recruitment of labourers from new, low contact areas, including the Islands 
to the east of New Guinea. Moore then saw the poor state of European knowledge of tropical 
diseases and medicine, Moore, Kanaka, pp. 245, 250-52, 254-63, 130. Kay Saunders also alludes 
to the impact of unfamiliar diseases generally, and the Melanesian response to sickness, as 
compounding a serious problem, Workers in bondage [book], p. 87. 
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had some right to choose employers, that their mortality rate dropped 
dramatically.71
Thus a series of broad similarities to chattel slavery invite us to consider the 
significance of the differences, the chief of which is the ownership of the human 
labourer by the slave-owner. This, of course, had enormous ramifications for 
the life of the slave or indentured labourer, and for the degree to which 
cooperation could be gained or coercion “needed” on the plantation. Significant 
as this difference was, it does not fundamentally affect the relations of 
production involved. On both slave and indentured labour plantations, 
labourers had been dispossessed of the means of production through the 
process of migration (whether largely coerced or significantly voluntary). 
Labourers were bonded and tied, and for both labourer and employer, the 
incentives and disciplines of wage labour were largely absent. The employer 
was almost totally responsible for the subsistence of the labourer, and thus in a 
position of extraordinary personal power over the labourer. In both the 
American South and Queensland, the planter had either effective control of, or 
substantial immunity from, the local machinery of the state. 
Therefore the revisionist analysis of relations on Queensland’s sugar 
plantations is deeply flawed. Bourgeois (and working class) concerns about the 
indenture of Pacific Island labourers responded to the very real problems 
produced by a system of largely unfree labour. As Prime Minister Edmund 
                                                 
71 See Graves, Cane and labour, p. 245. For Islanders who were allowed to stay in Queensland 
beyond indenture and work as wage labourers, mortality fell to 14 per 1000, which was much 
closer to the European rate. Of course this is also consistent with the disease environment 
explanation. Peter Corris suggests that the shift to working in small groups on family-owned 
farms, rather than plantations, was a factor, see Passage, port, p. 79. 
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Barton wrote to Sir Robert Philp, the wealthy merchant Premier of Queensland 
in 1902: 
It seems somewhat incongruous to suppose that a man cannot be 
virtually a slave unless the law makes him the property of a master, or 
the mere existence of a contract between two persons necessarily 
prevents one of them from being in the power of the other.72
For many in the Queensland ruling class, the plantation system looked 
ominously like the dreaded system of slavery in the American south, with its 
economic backwardness and the seeds of civil war it nurtured. This was the 
system that the planters and their commercial allies wanted to expand on the 
basis of indentured Indian labour. But there was one more significant difference 
compared with the American South: the central state apparatus in Queensland 
was in non-planter hands, and capable of changing the terms on which labour 
was organised to produce sugar. It would continue to limit the system of 
racialised indentured labour until the new Australian national state put an end 
to it in 1904. 
A racially divided working class: The real spectre of slavery 
Historians who overstate the difference between indentured labour and slavery, 
also tend to misunderstand the nature of liberal objections to indenture, and 
why liberals feared a semi-slave regime. Rather than focus on extravagant 
                                                 
72 Quoted in Saunders, Uncertain bondage [thesis], p. 10. 
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statements made in election campaigns, the liberal position can best be 
understood by looking at more careful formulations. One of the most 
sophisticated expositions of the liberal position came in a speech made by 
Queensland Opposition Leader, Samuel Griffith, in an 1882 debate over 
proposals to introduce indentured labour from British India. Griffith centred his 
argument on the dangers of a racially divided working class, a situation which 
would give rise to servile labour. By this, he meant 
the labour of a class different from that of the ruling class in the country, 
and who were not admitted to the same political rights as the ruling 
class. That was servile labour. It was the labourer being held to do duty 
by stringent penal laws, and being carefully supervised and looked after 
by the Government. In a word, it was the opposite in every respect of 
free labour done by persons holding equal political rights with their 
governors, and who had a share in the management of the country. It 
sometimes took the form of slavery, by which was meant a form of labour in 
which the servant got no wages and was obliged to serve for life. That, 
he supposed, was the definition of slavery in its essence, but there was 
not much distinction whether the servitude was for life or for a term of 
years.73
The experience of other countries was that “in every case the existence of a large 
servile population was inconsistent with the existence of free institutions.” 
Getting rid of slavery had involved “a great convulsion” in the United States, 
and, he might have added, a great social struggle in Britain as well. For Griffith 
as for Merivale, the issue wasn’t as narrow as slavery; indeed the social and 
economic structure of the former slave colonies was just as much to be rejected. 
Jamaica and the other West Indies Islands “were not fit for free institutions… 
                                                 
73 ORDLA Qld, 1882, vol XXXVII, pp. 188-9, my emphasis. 
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and they were reduced to the position of a Crown colony, which was practically 
an official oligarchy.” British Guiana: 
was a very rich country, he believed, with a comparatively small number 
of large plantations, a large population mostly of servile labour, and the 
government of the country was in the hands of something less than 200 
persons; and it was perfectly clear that so long as the civilisation of that 
colony went on in that way free institutions could not be applicable to it. 
If they turned to Mauritius they found very much the same state of 
things. The European population, he believed, was something under 
20,000—not much over 10,000—and the Indian population was a quarter 
of a million. They were governed by what he called just now “an official 
oligarchy.” Of course free institutions such as they had in the Australian 
colonies could not possibly be applied to a state of society like that.74
William Brookes, a Brisbane ironmonger, was perhaps the most famously 
obsessive campaigner against Pacific Island labour in Queensland. In an 1884 
debate on the new Liberal government’s Pacific Islands Labourers Act of 1880 
Amendment Bill, Brookes attacked the high mortality rate of Islanders, arguing 
that they had been worked to death. 
The evil of coloured labour was that it placed the servile labourer too 
much under the control of the white man. They might not call that 
slavery, but it was akin to it—cousin to it; and unless they were very 
careful it would soon degenerate into slavery.75
The liberal attack on “slavery” was in reality an attack on the building of an 
unfree, racialised workforce, a structure which had chattel slavery at its 
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75 ORDLA Qld, 1884, vol XLI, p. 355. 
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extreme. The dangers that earlier theorists had seen in slavery were 
extrapolated to become problems with any racialised society, and the 
intellectual structure of anti-slavery was thus mobilised. 
So when debating the 1877 Polynesian Labourers Bill in Queensland, Albert 
Hocking argued that, “When those men were exclusively employed in manual 
labour, it also had the effect of degrading manual labour in the eyes of 
Europeans.”76 Queensland Premier, Sir Samuel Griffith, made the same point to 
Governor Musgrave in 1885: “the function of manual labour is regarded as 
degrading, and if any numbers of the white race continue to be engaged in it, 
they degenerate in social estimation, and are looked down upon as ‘mean 
whites’.”77 It is important to note that this is not an argument that Islanders 
competed with white labourers, although that point too was made. This is an 
argument that manual labour became racialised by the use of indentured, 
“coloured” labourers, and the result was that manual labour was no longer 
acceptable to white workers. 
A second major element to this argument revolved around the idea that a 
racially divided society would give rise to caste distinctions, with society 
tending to divide “into distinctly marked upper and lower classes, and superior 
and inferior races, and hence to acquire aristocratic habits and institutions”, as 
AJ Ogilvy put it.78 Again, this was an idea directly inherited from the anti-
slavery movement and Ogilvy made an explicit connection, warning: “As the 
                                                 
76 ORDLA Qld, 1877, vol XXIII, pp. 50-69. 
77 Quoted in Saunders, Uncertain bondage [thesis], p. 229. 
78 See, for instance, AJ Ogilvy, “National Character--Part 1: A sketch. By an evolutionist”, in The 
Sydney Quarterly, vol. III, no. 11, Sept 1886, p. 535. 
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Northern States of America were to the Southern, so are Victoria and South 
Australia on the one hand to Queensland and Carpentaria on the other”.79 For 
Brisbane’s liberal paper, The Week, McIlwraith’s conservatives and their 
campaign for Indian coolie labour for the sugar industry, “aimed to build up an 
aristocracy on a basis of cheap labour; criminal expirees, Chinamen, 
Polynesians, East Indians, Malays”.80 Such commentary was racist, but there 
was far more than racism involved here. 
The argument about an incipient aristocracy tapped into a rich vein of 
mainstream, bourgeois thought in Australia, which celebrated the struggle 
against the “slavery” of convictism, imposed by would-be squatter aristocrats. 
The 1870s and 1880s saw much local literature on the theme of convict life, the 
highpoint of which was Marcus Clarke’s His Natural Life. Clarke’s politics are 
suggested by his long association as a writer for the conservative Argus 
newspaper in Melbourne. In an obituary for Clarke, the Melbourne banker, 
Henry Gyles Turner, described one of the main themes of His Natural Life as, 
“The dehumanizing effect upon the officials, of the exercise of arbitrary, 
irresponsible despotism”.81
                                                 
79 Ogilvy, National character, 535. According to David Brion Davis, Sir James Stephen, later 
British Prime Minister, had argued that, “the root of the problem [with slavery] was the 
existence of a master class which was allowed to play the part of despot over what are in effect 
British subjects.” pp. 166-7. 
80 The Week, 5 January 1882, p. 12. It is worth noting that The Week opposed the seamen in the 
1878 strike over the ASN replacing Anglo-Australian with Chinese labour, on the kind of liberal 
grounds argued by the Sydney Morning Herald. 
81 in “Marcus Clarke”, Melbourne Review, vol. VII, no. 25, January 1882, p. 12. 
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Chinese people as carriers of slavery 
The same methodology was at work in the debates over Chinese immigration in 
the 1870s and 1880s. As it began to become an issue in Australia in the late 
1870s, the fear was constantly expressed that Chinese immigrants would bring 
with them the elements of a slave-based economy. At one level, it was argued 
that Chinese immigrant labourers were themselves actually slaves or semi-
slaves. So when NSW MLA, Angus Cameron, a trade unionist turned 
businessman, moved in 1880 to restrict Chinese immigration, he spent more 
than a quarter of his speech asserting that Chinese people did not come as free 
men, they could not call their bodies or their souls their own, and they were 
closer to being slaves than anything else. These were arguments echoed by 
other MPs in that debate.82 When William Box debated the 1877 Gold Fields 
Amendment Act in the Queensland parliament, he called the Chinese serfs in 
their own country, while Postmaster General, CS Mein had described them as 
“serfs of their employers”.83 When RW Thompson wrote to Henry Parkes in 
1887, he enclosed a clipping about a new American law banning the 
immigration of contracted labour into the country. He suggested that such 
information might be valuable to Parkes in dealing with Chinese immigration, 
because “these undesirable immigrants are introduced here under contracts of 
servitude”.84
In fact, there was widespread misunderstanding—wilful or otherwise—of the 
nature of Chinese migration. From the 1850s, almost all Chinese migrants to 
                                                 
82 NSWPD First Series, 1879-80, vol. 3, p. 2696. 
83 ORDLC Qld, vol. XXII, p. 72 (Mein); p. 82 (Box). 
84 Letter 26 July 1887, in Parkes Corresp, A917, p. 345. 
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Australia were either entirely free, or migrated on the “credit-ticket” system, 
where their fare to Australia was borrowed, often with their village land as 
security. Until the loan was repaid, the lender usually had some control over 
the services of the labourer, meaning that the broker or money lender was in a 
position to exploit the services of the worker. The aim of most Chinese migrants 
was to return to their village and family having accumulated significant wealth 
in Chinese terms. These facts were known in the Australian colonies, having 
been established by an inquiry by the Victorian Legislative Council in 1857.85
On another level, the portrayal of Chinese people as bearers of slavery, as 
expressed by Andrew Inglis Clark and WK Hancock, rested on the assumption 
that the presence of a sufficient number of people from a supposedly “inferior 
race”—for instance, a situation in which the number of Chinese was broadly 
equal to, or more than, the number of “whites”— would create a racial division 
in the labour market, with the Chinese doing the menial and labouring work in 
slave-like conditions. Part of the problem was simply that white businesspeople 
would impose an economic tyranny on “coloured” people which would 
inevitably spread and reshape the whole of society. Rather than ban indentured 
labour, rather than protect the rights and conditions of the labourer, rather than 
legislate against discrimination according to race, the liberal majority of the 
colonial bourgeoisie imposed its economic development agenda, based on free 
                                                 
85 These facts are broadly agreed; see CY Choi, Chinese migration and settlement in Australia, 
Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1975, p. 13-14; CF Yong, The new gold mountain: The Chinese in 
Australia, 1901-1921, Raphael Arts, Richmond (Vic), 1977, pp. 1-2; also p. 230, footnote 7. 
Michael Williams has given us the most profound study Chinese migration to Sydney and other 
ports in his PhD thesis, “Destination Qiaoxiang: Pearl River delta villages and Pacific ports 
1849-1949“,University of Hong Kong, 2002. 
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labour, choosing to stigmatise Chinese people as servile, rather than bourgeois 
interests as unprincipled and socially dangerous. 
The Brisbane Courier saw the choice before the colony as a civilised society of 
free men or one of “a million Chinese coolies and a thousand employers”.86 
When Attorney General, HJ Wrixon, was helping draft Victoria’s reply to the 
“please explain” from the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1888, he saw the 
Chinese as “introducing an element rather of slave than of free labour among 
us”.87 In the SA Legislative Council in 1888, the colony’s Chief Secretary, JG 
Ramsay, quoted from the Commission which reported to the American Senate, 
that Chinese labourers “can be managed and controlled like unthinking 
slaves.”88 James Powell, who was in 1878, rich enough to be a creditor of Sir 
Henry Parkes, told the latter (after demanding payment of his £80), how he had 
first won his vote in East Sydney, twenty years earlier, by his analysis of the 
“Chinese question”. 
At that time (as now) from an abstract point of view I could not quite see 
the equity or justice of endeavouring to keep the Chinese out of a British 
Colony when at the same time the Imperial Government were knocking 
Chinese Ports open because they would not trade with us, but I did see 
the force of your position that a low and degraded condition of 
Civilization could not be made to work in harmony with an aspiring 
people, worse than all I saw and still see (as I think) the elements of an 
                                                 
86 Quoted in Andrew Markus, Fear and hatred: Purifying Australian and California 1850-1901, Hale 
and Iremonger, Sydney, 1979, p. 85. 
87 Memo dated 28 March 88, P88/831 found with P88/1160, Public Record Office Victoria, 
VPRS1163/P0/141. 
88 SAPD, 1888, col. 224. 
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embryo slavery in the attempt to work Chinese labour in conjunction 
with British interests.89
Kathryn Cronin attacked historians for taking this rhetoric at face value, saying 
they disregarded “the essential point that the so-called ‘economic’ threat posed 
by Chinese was closely tied to the racist acceptance of them as irrevocably 
servile.”90 While Cronin was discussing this rhetoric of “servile Chinese” in the 
context of labour movement agitation, her point was nonetheless extremely 
important. Chinese people in Australia were not “servile”; they were relatively 
free labourers, and there is a long litany of European ruling class complaints 
about their willingness to stand up for their rights. In accepting the view of the 
Chinese as “servile”, the European-Australian labour movement undermined 
significant possibilities for solidarity. 
The point here, however, is different. Extensive plantation production actually 
existed in Australia in the 1880s, built on the basis of unfree labour. The 
possibilities were believed to exist, and perhaps really did exist, for a radical 
expansion of plantation production, in the Northern Territory and North 
Queensland.91 If such production could be organised, it was believed that 
Australian capitalists would have been able to recruit Chinese and other so-
called “coloured labourers” to do the work in unfree conditions. This reflected 
                                                 
89 Letter dated 9 August 1878, Parkes corresp, A901, p. 47. Note that this letter was written 
before the seamen’s strike. £80 was then close to a year’s wages for a labourer, so Powell was 
clearly a man of substance. 
90 Kathryn Cronin, “‘The yellow agony’: Racial attitudes and responses towards the Chinese in 
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not just the racism of Australian capitalists and the Australian political system, 
but the poverty of ordinary people in China, the immense global economic and 
political power of the British empire, and the ability of white employers and the 
Queensland colonial state to impose a system of racial oppression and unfree 
labour. Understanding the ruling class response to Chinese people as “racist”, 
which is Cronin’s approach, fails to see—indeed hides—the more substantial, 
concrete agenda here. 
The issue for most political leaders and newspaper editors in Australia was that 
such an expansion of plantation production would be dangerous for the 
glorious economic and political future they had mapped out for their colonies, 
and the continent as a whole. Thus, at a mass meeting called to support the 
striking seamen in Brisbane in November 1878, William Brookes declared that, 
“he wanted the colony to keep growing and not dwindle to ‘the low level of a 
decayed West Indian island.’” For his part, Simon Fraser MLA warned that 
“nearly all Asiatic races were under a sort of slavery, and were unable to 
understand our institutions” and that Queensland would “degenerate into what 
the poet speaks of as the home of ‘The tyrant and the slave.’”92
                                                 
92 Meeting at the Brisbane Town Hall, 25 November 1878, report in The Week, 30 November 78, 
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The ruling class dilemma: Who will do ‘our’ work in the 
tropics? 
All the fears associated with “slavery” were brought into sharpest relief by the 
problem of “the north”. Just under 40 per cent of the Australian land mass is in 
the tropics. The area involved is colossal, around three million square 
kilometres, almost as big as modern India. But it was widely believed within 
the ruling class that “white men” could not do labouring work in such a hot 
climate.93 This idea was central to the world-view of those politicians who 
opposed anti-Chinese laws, such as Oscar de Satgé, AH Brown and William 
Thornton in Queensland.94 When the British Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael 
Hicks-Beach, gave his reasons for allowing the passage of Queensland’s 
(slightly amended) 1877 Goldfields Act Amendment Act and its Chinese Immigrants 
Regulation Act of 1877, he argued that Chinese labourers would be needed in 
“those tropical districts in which Europeans cannot perform field work.”95
But most politicians opposed to Chinese immigration also believed that white 
men could not labour in the tropics. The Premier of Tasmania, PO Fysh, 
dissented from the resolutions of the 1888 Intercolonial Conference, called to 
develop a united policy among the Australian colonies to practically prohibit 
                                                 
93 For instance, Sir Raphael Cilento (with the assistance of Clem Lack Snr), Triumph in the 
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95 Text read to the SA parliament by John Bray on 28 July 1880, in SAPD 1880, c. 519; also SMH 
21 August 1878, p. 4, c. 6. 
Chapter 4: The spectre of slavery  Page 177 
Chinese immigration. Fysh’s government had pushed through the colony’s first 
Chinese immigration Act in 1887, but he attacked the proposed new law as 
disregarding “the climatic characteristics of the Northern territories of 
Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia, which are a barrier to 
successful occupation, except in pursuit of avocations peculiarly tropical and 
unsuitable to European labour.”96
This created an enormous problem for the ruling class; the only profitable path 
to development in the tropics seemed to involve the kind of future warned 
against by Merivale. This was clearly expressed by one of Australia’s greatest 
liberal theorists, Charles H Pearson. In his internationally celebrated 
speculation, National Life and Character: A Forecast, Pearson described the fate of 
a country into which an “inferior” people was admitted in large numbers: 
Its colonists would soon be divided into a wealthy ruling caste, planters 
or miners, and mean whites; while the blacks, servile or semi-servile, 
would increase year by year, because their labour was necessary to 
maintain and extend the fortunes of the governing caste.97
He was describing a future marked by the features he associated with slave 
societies. The ruling class dilemma was felt most sharply in Queensland. Either 
the government engaged in the dangerous experiment of relying on white 
workers for labour in the tropics; or developed the Australian tropics into a 
kind of semi-slave state based on unfree “coloured” labour; or left the tropical 
                                                 
96 From Tasmania’s official dissenting statement to the 1888 Intercolonial Conference on the 
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areas undeveloped, “empty” and vulnerable. The choices were all a nightmare. 
This was a uniquely ruling class dilemma; the labour movement had no interest 
in promoting plantations in the north, which is one reason the labour 
movement seems so much more strident on the issue. But we should not 
confuse stridency with power. By the 1870s there was a profitable sugar 
industry in Queensland, and few members of the ruling class wanted to see it 
destroyed; but most did not want a “black north” either. The result was an 
extraordinarily confused and agonised debate within the ruling class. 
Many tried to find a way to square the circle. Typical was Sir Samuel Way, the 
politically active Chief Justice of South Australia, who wrote to Sir Henry 
Parkes in that month of crisis, May 1888: 
I believe the Chinese have work to do for us especially in tropical 
Australia—but I do not yield to you in the wish to make extra tropical 
Australia the home of an Anglo Saxon race free from any admixture of 
Mongolian blood.98  
Few in the ruling class argued that there simply wasn’t a problem, but some 
saw the problem as exaggerated. These were most often conservatives, usually 
large landowners or squatters. Richard Chaffey Baker, an immensely rich and 
powerful landowner, mining magnate and the dominant figure in South 
Australian conservatism, told the Legislative Council in 1880 that the Northern 
Territory would either have to be peopled by “Asiatics” or abandoned. But he 
did not entirely dismiss the possibility of danger, saying that he would not 
want to see 100,000 Chinese people in the Territory, and quoted approvingly 
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from a letter from the Territory: “If there was any danger of the place being 
flooded with Celestials it would be another matter. There is no danger of the 
kind”.99 When Liberal Queensland Premier John Douglas, spoke to his 
government’s anti-Chinese Gold Fields Act Amendment Bill, in August 1876, he 
conceded that “under proper control, they [Chinese people] would very likely 
be the very best class they could introduce for developing the tropical resources 
of North Queensland.” But he had a different assessment of the situation to 
Baker; in 1876, there were already too many Chinese in Queensland for him.100
One issue facing the Australian ruling class was that this belief, that white men 
could not work in the tropics, had worked its way deeply into British ruling 
class ideology, initially as a justification for new world slavery.101 In his widely 
read history of England in the eighteenth century, WEH Lecky commented that 
“conditions of climate, and therefore of cultivation, ultimately determined the 
course of negro [sic] slavery in America.”102 Even Adam Smith thought that, 
“The constitution of those who have been born in the temperate climate of 
Europe could not, it is supposed, support the labour of digging the ground 
under the burning sun of the West Indies”.103 David Walker saw “[m]uch of the 
anxiety about the degenerative effects of heat” as coming “from the British 
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experience in India”.104 Sir George Bowen, whose imperial career had taken him 
to rule over many of Britain’s tropical or sub-tropical colonies, including 
Queensland, would have agreed as he warned his superiors in London: 
In a tropical Colony it is simply impossible for Englishmen to work as 
they can work in the temperate climate of England, or of Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. At Hong Kong, it is necessary for the 
preservation of the vigour of the English officials that they should be 
allowed periodical leave of absence.105  
The former Australian liberal, Robert Lowe, now Viscount Sherbrooke, 
confessed to Sir Henry Parkes in 1879 that he did not understand Queensland. 
“I always supposed that in that climate the work could not be done by 
Europeans and now it seems they want to expel the Chinese. Who is to do the 
work.”106 When Queensland’s anti-Chinese Goldfields Bill was disallowed, the 
Governor of NSW, Sir Hercules Robinson, wrote to his Premier, Parkes: 
Nearly one half of the continent of Australia is within the tropics, & can 
never be a home for the Anglo Saxon race. Is it to remain for ever a 
waste? If not by what tropical race or races may it be peopled - & in what 
proportions, & under what regulations & restrictions?107
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In The meaning of race, Kenan Malik argued that, “Racial theories accounted for 
social inequalities by ascribing them to nature.”108 Here was an element in the 
process by which the domination of the white over the black was made an 
inevitable result of nature. To ideas about the impossibility of white labour in 
hot climates, British intellectual racists added a range of deterministic theories 
to explain, as Edward Dicey put it, ”the simple instinctive conviction of 
Englishmen, that the Empire of England is part of the natural order of 
things”.109 These included the idea that Britain’s success was a result of its cold 
climate and the need to labour to survive and prosper there; while a tropical 
environment had condemned indigenous people to primitiveness and 
barbarity. After travelling through the Pacific, Major JC Bell commented, “it is 
useless to imagine that the natives will ever work continuously…when…the 
necessaries of life are so easily attainable without labour.”110 Thus, “high” 
civilisations could only flourish in temperate climates.111
A tropical environment was both dangerous to the physical health of white 
people, and dangerous to their moral fibre and usefulness. Even in temperate 
Australia there were fears for the future of Australian society. In “The coming 
Australian”, James F Hogan saw three main characteristics of those British 
people born in Australia as, “An inordinate love of field-sports”; “A very 
decided disinclination to recognise the authority of parents and superiors”; and 
“A grievous dislike to mental effort”. He located the cause of these in the 
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unfortunate Australian climate, which encouraged living outdoors. Sport in 
particular was “a passion that must be kept in check”.112
The idea that white men could not work in the tropics was gradually 
demolished by a mixture of experience and political intervention.  There were 
fortunes and profits to be made in the north, so white miners prospected, white 
teamsters carried freight, white labourers built roads, railway lines, ports, 
shops, pubs and other buildings and staffed these many workplaces. These 
people gave liberal politicians a sense that “coloured labour” wasn’t necessary 
in the long run, and gradually, politicians like Samuel Griffith and John 
Douglas took up an argument that white labour was possible in the tropics. 
These nationalist politicians found, in turn, fiercely nationalist doctors like 
Raphael Cilento to apply their considerable talents to working out how to make 
it so.  
But climatic determinism hung around for decades. Long after the White 
Australia policy was adopted, a minority of pastoralists and politicians 
continued to insist that “black labour”—which invariably meant racially 
oppressed labour—was necessary to develop the north. Warwick Anderson has 
chronicled the long debate amongst doctors and biologists over the tropics and 
the impact (or otherwise) on Australians’ ability to remain white—or British.113
                                                 
112James F Hogan, “The coming Australian”, Victorian Review, vol. 3, no. 18, Nov 1880, pp. 103-4. 
113 Anderson, The cultivation of whiteness, passim. 
Chapter 4: The spectre of slavery  Page 183 
A divided continent? Parkes proposes to unite the south 
The heightened atmosphere of military tension from the late 1870s pushed the 
British government and many of the Australian colonial governments to seek 
formulas for Australian political unity, primarily to facilitate military defence. 
These discussions frequently raised the problems associated with tropical 
agriculture. Typically, it was Sir Henry Parkes who tested the limits of this 
ruling class dilemma. 
In October 1879, as New South Wales Premier, Parkes proposed an 
amalgamation—not a federation—of Victoria, South Australia and New South 
Wales, in a remarkable article he wrote for the Melbourne Review. What was 
most significant was his pointed rejection of Queensland as part of this merger, 
“because her capabilities of soil and climate so clearly mark her out for a 
colonizing career dissimilar from that of her elder sisters”. In other words—
although Parkes does not say this explicitly in the article—because of her 
tropical climate, Queensland will be a plantation colony, dependent on 
“coloured labour”.114 Parkes accepted that Queensland would be different; as 
late as 1883 he asked the British government to appreciate the “necessity that 
labourers accustomed to tropical heat must be found for carrying on outdoors 
industries in tropical Australia, or that otherwise the land must remain 
unoccupied.”115 Such a society could never be integrated with the British-style 
liberal capitalism of New South Wales and the southern colonies.116 By contrast, 
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he could happily propose the merger of the three because of “the corresponding 
character of their leading pursuits, and their equality of promise in their future 
capabilities” and these can lead to “a reciprocity of patriotic feeling”.117
Given the enormous obstacles to it, and the almost flippant way he dealt with 
them in his article, it might be imagined that Parkes’ proposal was not entirely 
serious. This is not reflected in the doggedness with which he prosecuted it 
privately. He wrote to British Liberal leader, WS Gladstone, for the first time in 
five years to seek support for it, putting his proposal more explicitly: “The 
Colony of Queensland, embracing a large part of northern territory suited to the 
growth of cotton, sugar & tropical products, seems destined to form a nation 
quite distinct from these south-eastern colonies.”118 From John Plummer came 
the opinion that, based on his own discussions with John Stuart Mill, Parkes’ 
views on colonial federation appeared identical to Mill’s.119
His proposal was taken very seriously in South Australia. Former Premier and 
Supreme Court Judge, Sir James Boucaut, wrote to tell Parkes, “I am hot with 
you on Federation, & I wish I could actively help you in the grand cause”;120 
while the Rev J Jefferis felt it necessary to deliver a damning critique of it to the 
South Australian establishment at a meeting in the Adelaide Town Hall in June 
1880. Jefferis was one of the leading churchmen in Australia in the 1870s and 
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1880s,121 a status reflected in the reception he received in Adelaide where he 
was introduced to the meeting by the Governor, with Premier William Morgan 
and Tasmanian Premier Giblin speaking in discussion and Sir Henry Ayres, 
President of the Legislative Council, moving the vote of thanks. Jefferis’ speech 
was extensively covered in the official Adelaide press, and published as a 
pamphlet in December 1880.122 He chided Parkes for excluding Tasmania from 
his confederation, but his main purpose was to argue for the north. He chose in 
part to argue on Parkes’ own ground, pointing out that Queensland’s 
“productions are not all of a tropical or semi-tropical character. If she grew 
sugar she could also grow wheat.” There was another agenda here, and one 
keenly felt by his audience: “if South Australia is invited to join her two 
wealthier sisters, it surely must be on the condition that she carries with her the 
magnificent but much abused and slowly developing Northern Territory.” In 
other words, South Australia would not be separated from her own tropical 
possession. But Jefferis was not proposing continental unity: Western Australia 
is not even to be discussed because it “is still in effect a penal settlement.”123
There is considerable evidence that Parkes convened the Intercolonial 
Conference of November-December 1880, held in Melbourne, to push his 
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agenda along. 124 Only two other colonies were invited: the ones Parkes wanted 
to see amalgamated with New South Wales. The conference had been originally 
proposed to discuss common action against Chinese immigration (and this was 
achieved in Sydney in January 1881), but when faced with a lukewarm 
response, Parkes suggested a conference between the three colonies he wanted 
to unify to discuss border tariffs. The Sydney Morning Herald had a partial 
understanding of Parkes agenda, writing during the conference that: 
[New South Wales Governor] Lord Augustus Loftus remarked, some 
little time ago, that it had been his lot to witness the union of Germany 
begin in a Customs Convention, and grow to what the world has seen. A 
little Conference is being held in Melbourne, at which the idea of a 
Customs agreement between the three southern colonies of Australia is 
being discussed, to see how far it is possible at present, and how far it is 
impossible. That is, no doubt, the natural beginning of federation, and 
apart from compulsion arising from external danger, that is the natural 
beginning for closer union.125
Certainly, customs union seemed to have appeal in South Australia. In the 
March 1881 election campaign, shortly after the second conference, the free 
trade Premier, William Morgan, advocated a customs union with NSW and the 
popularity of this proposal can be gauged by the response of the opposition 
                                                 
124 In the Preface to his pamphlet, Australia confederated, dated 18 December 1880, Jefferis 
commented that “At the Conference recently held in Melbourne, not a few of the matters 
referred to in the following Lecture have been discussed with courtesy and candour, and with 
fair promise of mutual agreement.” p. 3. The November-December 1880 conference adjourned 
and reconvened in Sydney in January 1881 with all the Australasian colonies invited. Historians 
have generally focused on the later event because it made decisions to pass uniform laws 
restricting Chinese immigration—but have done so without noticing the very different 
composition and agenda of the 1880 meeting. 
125 SMH, 1 Dec 1880, p. 4 col. 6. 
Chapter 4: The spectre of slavery  Page 187 
leader, John Bray, who supported it, despite being a protectionist.126 Bray won 
the election, and South Australia’s “tariff was assimilated in some respects to 
that of New South Wales” as a result.127
Once the November/December 1880 conference was agreed to by the three 
colonies, Parkes urged them to try and find “some common ground for 
alliance”, pointing to, “The immense territory of Western Australia and the 
northern part of Queensland [which] appear to me to be destined to a separate 
political existence”, words entirely reminiscent of his Melbourne Review 
article.128
In the end, Parkes’ unification proposal appears to have been rejected by the 
other colonies, and it was opposed by the Sydney Morning Herald.129 But it 
represented an enormous challenge to Queensland’s politicians. Indeed 
Queensland’s former liberal Premier, John Douglas, quickly replied to Parkes’ 
article, firmly declaring the Queensland intended to be part of any future 
Australian federation. 
[T]here are not in Queensland, at the present time, half-a-dozen men of 
reasonable intelligence and ordinary experience who contemplate the 
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existence here of a separate nationality except in association with the rest 
of the Australian states, colonies, dependencies, or whatever else they 
may be called.130
But whatever Queensland’s “public men” contemplated, there were many in 
the south who saw the widespread use of indentured and “coloured” labour as 
a fundamental obstacle to federation with Queensland. It may not be a 
coincidence that Parkes made his proposal just months after a conservative 
government took office in Queensland. 
The debate over whether or not a “black north” was inevitable, dangerous or 
necessary continued until federation, and after, most intensely during the 
campaign for North Queensland separation from 1884-7, which will be 
discussed in chapter 7. It was at the centre of the debate about Chinese 
immigration into South Australia’s Northern Territory. During the final, 
cathartic debate on this issue, in the South Australian Legislative Council in 
1888, Allan Campbell argued: 
The labor question did not merely apply to the Northern Territory, but 
also to the northern portions of Queensland and West Australia. In fact 
the northern portions of Australia were so distinct in all their natural 
characteristics that the southern portions could not legislate for them on 
the labor question. So soon as we got federation of the colonies he 
thought the separation of these northern portions of the colonies from 
the southern should immediately take place. When that time came he 
was sure there would be no further difficulty over the labor question.131
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On the opposite side of the argument, in the late 1890s, North Queensland 
Labor politicians saw federation as a means of destroying black labour.132
Conclusion 
From the 1880s on, the issue of tropical labour in Australia became a burning 
question for the wider Australian ruling class, whose politicians were 
attempting to federate the independent colonies. It was an article of imperial 
faith that “white men” could not work in the tropics, and that profitable tropical 
production would involve unfree “coloured labour” ruled by a small white 
minority. However, mainstream British bourgeois thought had condemned 
such societies as carrying some of the burdens associated with slavery; of being 
economically backward, producing an aristocracy of rulers and a subculture of 
“mean whites”, and being morally repugnant and degenerate. The prospect of a 
“black north” carried with it the even more alarming prospect of a future civil 
war. The development of a large and profitable sugar industry in Queensland 
had created a deep dilemma for the ruling class between current profits and 
future prospects. How they resolved that dilemma will be discussed in future 
chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
The shadow of Mill: The ‘necessity’ of a 
culturally homogeneous society 
Members of the European family of nations joining our community 
become amalgamated with the general population…their habits of life, 
their style of civilization, their religion and morals, and their physique, 
are so much on an equality with our own that they blend readily with 
the population and are heartily welcome. The Chinese stand out in 
marked contrast…and occupy an isolated position in every community 
where they are found… Nor is it the mere fact of this isolation, but the 
impossibility of its being otherwise. The Chinese, from all points of view, 
are so entirely dissimilar as to render a blending of the peoples out of the 
question. 
Victorian Premier, Duncan Gillies1
 
1 Letter from Gillies to Governor, Victoria, 11 April 1888. All the colonial replies to London’s 
“please explain” re anti-Chinese laws were published in Qld LA V&P 1888, vol. 3. Gillies’ letter 
is on pp. 197-8. 
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ONE OF THE consistent themes in ruling class arguments for restricting 
Chinese immigration was the necessity to create an homogeneous society in 
Australia based on British culture, and the supposed inability of Chinese people 
to be assimilated into it. Cultural homogeneity was a necessity; the presence of 
a significant group who could not assimilate would threaten the free 
institutions of the colonies—parliamentary government elected through near-
universal male suffrage, the rule of law and freedom from arbitrary 
government. 
While this dovetails with the argument discussed in chapter 4—that a large 
non-white population would stimulate a racially-divided labour force which 
could take on some of the characteristics of slavery—it was conceptually 
different. This can be seen (even through his obscurantism) in the 1888 
memorandum drafted by Tasmanian Attorney-General, Andrew Inglis Clark. 
The…supposition that the Chinese immigrants would…acquire political 
equality with the remainder of the population, suggests a result equally 
menacing to the permanence of the civilization and structure of society 
now existing in these Colonies, inasmuch as the indurated and renitent 
character of the habits and conceptions of the Chinese immigrants make 
their amalgamation with populations of European origin, so as to 
become constituent portions of a homogeneal  community retaining the 
European type of civilization, an impossibility.2
The issue of homogeneity was central to all the official memoranda, sent by the 
Australian colonial governments to London in 1888, in response to Britain’s 
demand that they justify “exceptional legislation” applying to Chinese 
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subjects.3 I have referred above to the responses of Victoria and Tasmania; in his 
reply to London, New South Wales Premier Sir Henry Parkes warned: 
There can be no sympathy, and in the future it is to be apprehended that 
there will be no peace between the two races…  
The most prevailing determination in all the Australian communities is 
to preserve the British type in the population.  
There can be no interchange of ideas of religion or citizenship nor can 
there be intermarriage or social communion between the British and 
Chinese.4
Writing on behalf of the Queensland Government, Sir Samuel Griffith told the 
Colonial Office that: 
the main and, in the opinion of this Government, the insuperable 
objection to allowing the immigration of Chinese is the fact that they 
cannot be admitted to an equal share in the political and social 
institutions of the Colony. The form of civilisation existing in the Chinese 
Empire, although of a complicated and in many respects marvellous 
character, is essentially different from the European civilisation which at 
present prevails in Australia, which I hold it be essential to the future 
welfare of the Australian Continent to preserve.5
The need to create an homogeneous population was widely asserted by ruling 
class figures in political debates over “coloured labour” and Chinese 
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immigration. During the debates on Queensland’s Polynesian Labourers Bill in 
1880, the Brisbane Courier outlined the over-arching reasons for limiting the use 
of “coloured” labour: 
It is not merely or mainly because white workmen dislike Polynesian 
labor that we are legislating to restrict it within as narrow bounds as 
possible. It is because we are all desirous of forming, as far as climate 
and the circumstances of the colony will allow us, a homogenous 
community. We dwell on the point, because it is the great and all-
sufficient justification for our exceptional laws directed against colored 
aliens.6
The idea that the future Australian federation needed to be a culturally 
homogeneous society, dominated by British culture and British political 
institutions, was widely shared among the colonial ruling class, and especially 
amongst its senior politicians, priests and journalists. When Queensland 
Premier, Samuel Griffith, introduced the Federal Council of Australasia Bill into 
parliament in 1884, as a first step towards federation, the conservative 
Opposition Leader, Boyd Morehead, declared: “I firmly and thoroughly believe 
in a confederation of the colonies in order to make us a great and homogenous 
whole.”7
Chinese immigration in particular was seen as a threat to their shared political 
vision. In a letter to South Australia’s premier ruling class newspaper, the 
                                                 
6 Brisbane Courier, 19 October 1880, editorial p. 2. In colonial discussions on this issue, the word 
“homogenous” was used almost uniformly, where the intended meaning was clearly 
“homogeneous” in today’s usage, ie “composed of parts all of the same kind”, as against 
“corresponding in structure because of a common origin”, The Macquarie Dictionary, revised 
edition, Macquarie Library 1985. 
7 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIII, 1884, p. 127. 
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Register, the business-dominated Anti-Chinese Association of Queensland 
called on South Australia to restrict Chinese immigration into the Northern 
Territory, appealing to “the hope we all cherish of founding a homogenous 
Australian people on this continent”.8  This attachment to homogeneity has 
been referred to by previous historians.9 Myra Willard expressed this 
homogeneity agenda as “the preservation of a British-Australian nationality.”10 
But historians have presented this desire for homogeneity without attempting 
to determine its broader social and political importance. This chapter argues 
that these ideas were given enormous legitimacy by the theory of government 
argued by John Stuart Mill, especially in his Considerations on representative 
government.11 A short discussion of Ernest Gellner’s materialist explanation for 
the pursuit of national homogeneity will lead to my argument that the roots of 
Mill’s theory of homogeneity lie in the Romantic/aristocratic reaction to 
eighteenth-century liberalism. This discussion is contextualised by a series of 
situations in which Anglo-Australian politicians attempted to construct an 
homogeneous population: dealing with European immigrants, rejecting 
Chinese immigrants, and attempting to assimilate the Catholic Irish. The 
interplay between racist prejudice and the racist doctrine of homogeneity 
                                                 
8 The letter was published in the Register (Adelaide), 29 March 1880; it was then read to South 
Australia’s parliament by Opposition leader, John Bray, when moving an anti-Chinese Bill on 
28 July 1880, in SAPD 1880, cols. 517ff; the extract from the Queensland letter is in col. 521. For 
the business-dominated nature of the Anti-Chinese Committee, see Brisbane Courier, 30 Jan 1880, 
p. 3 col. 1, which reports the committee meeting in the rooms of the Chamber of Commerce, and 
preparing a document on the “problem” of Chinese immigration into the Northern Territory. 
9 Charles A Price, The great white walls are built: Restrictive immigration to North America and 
Australasia 1836-1888, The Australian Institute of International Affairs in association with the 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1974, esp. pp. 106-10, 255-60. 
10 Myra Willard, The history of the White Australia policy to 1920, Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton (Vic), 1967 (first published 1923), pp. 188-9. 
11 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Considerations on representative government, edited with an 
introduction by R.B. McCallum, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1946. 
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suggests that while the ruling class were more or less racist as individuals, 
constructing a supposedly homogeneous nation was a major ruling class 
strategy, and deemed necessary to stabilise a class-divided society.  
The necessity for national homogeneity 
The idea that the state should be a culturally homogeneous nation is a relatively 
new idea in human history, first developed in nineteenth-century Europe. 
Ernest Gellner was one of many writers who pointed to the novelty, and indeed 
strangeness, of the idea that “homogeneity of culture is the political bond”.12 
According to Kenan Malik, it was only in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century that “the idea of a homogenous national culture and of a nation as the 
embodiment of an organic history and heritage began to take hold”.13
Certainly, cultural or linguistic homogeneity was not the basis of the first 
nationalisms, in the United States, France and Britain, which Eric Hobsbawm 
called “state patriotism”.14 In the US and France, the original nationalism was 
constructed in an environment of revolution, and built on ideals of freedom and 
equality, supposedly shared by their diverse peoples. In her study of the rise of 
                                                 
12 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism, Phoenix, London, 1997, p. 29. 
13 Kenan Malik, The meaning of race: Race, history and culture in western society, Palgrave, 
Basingstoke (UK) and New York, 1996, pp. 137, and 133-40 more generally. Eric Hobsbawm has 
argued that in the first half of the nineteenth century, apart from the Italian and German 
middle-classes, nowhere else was a common language made the argument for a unified national 
state, Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1990, esp. pp. 102-3. 
14 Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism, p. 87. 
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British nationalism from 1707-1837, Linda Colley argued that it did not 
represent a “homogenisation of disparate cultures”, but a compromise between 
rival and divided ruling class elements who could come together to promote a 
patriotism built on hostility to the rivals (and colonial subjects) of the British 
state. In particular, she argued that British nationalism was built on protestant 
hostility to Catholicism, which was associated both with backwardness and 
Britain’s great rival, France.15 Colley acknowledged that her reference to “Great 
Britain as a nation…may bewilder, and even offend those who are accustomed 
to thinking of nations only as historic phenomena characterised by cultural and 
ethnic homogeneity.”16
I am not suggesting for one moment that the growing sense of 
Britishness in this period supplanted and obliterated other loyalties. It 
did not… As even the briefest acquaintance with Great Britain will 
confirm, the Welsh, the Scottish and the English remain in many ways 
distinct peoples in cultural terms, just as all three countries continue to 
be conspicuously sub-divided into different regions. The sense of a 
common identity here did not come into being, then, because of an 
integration and homogenisation of disparate cultures. Instead, 
Britishness was superimposed over an array of internal differences…17
                                                 
15 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the nation 1707-1837, Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London, 1992, pp. 5-6. 
16 Colley, Britons, p. 5. 
17 Colley, Britons, p. 6. Keith Robbins disagrees with aspects of Colley’s explanation, however 
he supports that aspect of her argument that is important here, that the British state was not 
created by cultural homogeneity. He differs from Colley in insisting that more than anti-French 
anti-Catholicism was involved, that a process of “blending” of people from the various 
backgrounds was also important and this accelerated during the nineteenth century, “An 
imperial and multinational polity: The ‘scene from the centre’, 1832-1922” in Alexander Grant 
and Keith J Stringer (eds), Uniting the kingdom? The making of British history, Routledge, London 
and New York, 1995, esp. pp. 249-51. 
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We have then, a problem of political history: When, how and why did the 
nation come to be imagined as homogenous?18 And when did this become part 
of mainstream British political theory? In other words, on what did the 
homogenous-nation orthodoxy in Australia rest in 1888? 
Ernest Gellner developed a brilliant, materialist explanation for the deep 
economic and political logic behind homogeneity. In his Nations and 
Nationalism, Gellner argued that an homogeneous national culture was required 
for the functioning of what he called, modern industrialism. A productive 
system relying on innovation and changing technologies created a mobile 
workforce that was necessarily highly skilled. More importantly, he argued, 
work became semantic. Communication became central in the work process, 
and instructions and messages had to be well understood when separated from 
the messenger. 
The capacity either to articulate or to comprehend context-free messages 
is not an easy one to acquire. It requires schooling, prolonged schooling. 
And modern society, given that work is semantic in this manner, 
requires everyone to possess this skill. It is the first society in history in 
which literacy is near universal; to put it another way, it is also the first 
society ever in which a high culture becomes the pervasive culture of the 
entire society, displacing folk or low culture.19
Thus industrial societies required both a common language and a common 
culture, and a language and culture that is common to both rulers and ruled, 
                                                 
18  Here, I use the word “homogenous” deliberately, the modern western nation having come to 
have been conceived as the state of a people with a common origin. 
19 Gellner, Nationalism, p. 29. Nationalism is an updated version of his classic text, Nations and 
nationalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY), 1983; emphasis in original. 
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unlike pre-industrial or “agrarian” society. In this we have another dimension 
to the critique of racialised structures of production, such as the early sugar 
plantations of Queensland, where there was no common language or culture 
between the planter/manager and the mass of gang labour. 
For Gellner, it was this objective need for homogeneity, in the context of a 
system of geographically distinct states, that explained nationalism: 
the principle—so strange and eccentric in the age of agrarian cultural 
diversity and of the “ethnic” division of labour—that homogeneity of 
culture is the political bond, that mastery of (and, one should add, 
acceptability in) a given culture (the one used by the surrounding 
bureaucracies) is the precondition of political, economic and social 
citizenship.20
For all capitalist societies, the modern education system was a vital means for 
creating the educated and culturally-homogeneous labour force needed by 
employers and the state. Not only was this true in the Australian colonies, but 
as I will discuss later, the education system was seen as a vehicle for integrating 
the Catholic Irish population, the most significant element alienated from the 
dominant nationalism and the imperial state. 
However, it is one thing for economic progress to “need” something; it is quite 
another thing for it to happen. Politics, ideas and action are needed to realise 
political change. Gellner argued that Romanticism provided the ideas, with its 
celebration of feelings and sentiment as against cold-blooded rationality, along 
with a philosophy that humans were culturally defined, and that each culture 
                                                 
20 Gellner, Nationalism, esp. pp. 25-30; quotes from p. 29; emphasis in original. 
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was unique. “Romanticism was almost ideally suited to provide nationalism 
with its idiom and its style.”21 This was a widely shared view. But there is an 
explanatory gap here. Why should liberals, who celebrated rationality, 
progress, science and individual merit take up the mystical, backward-looking 
ideas of people who stressed obligation, obedience, the unknowability of nature 
and tradition?22
John Stuart Mill: Theorist of homogeneity 
Perhaps the most significant British theorist of national homogeneity was John 
Stuart Mill. In Considerations on representative government, Mill argued that “free 
institutions” required racial homogeneity, a dominant nationalism, and strong 
support for law and order. “Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially 
if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary 
to the working of representative government, cannot exist”, he wrote.23 First 
published in 1861, Considerations was an exploration of both the advantages and 
dangers (as Mill saw them) of representative government. Of the advantages: 
representative government was “the ideally best form of government “;24 “all 
                                                 
21 Gellner, Nationalism, pp. 66-9. 
22 CEM Martin reported that when the conservative romantic John Ruskin published some 
essays on political economy in the early 1860s, they were “received with a storm of 
disapprobation”,  “The works of John Ruskin”, Victorian Review, vol. X, no. 57, July 1884, p. 293. 
Ruskin attacked buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest (what made your 
market cheap?); and the piling up of colossal fortunes while huge numbers of people were 
buried in misery and degradation, while competition produced anarchy. 
23 Mill, On liberty and Considerations, p. 292. 
24 Mill, On liberty and Considerations, p. 136. 
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free communities have both been more exempt from social injustice and crime, 
and have attained more brilliant prosperity, than any others, or than they 
themselves after they lost their freedom.”25 The extension of the franchise made 
people more patriotic.26 But representative government was not possible for all 
states. Underpinning the reasoning behind this were two notions: that 
representative government would only survive where the people were 
prepared to fight to defend it; and that it required an active, practical citizenry 
as distinct from a passive one.27 So, for a federation to succeed—and this was a 
compelling issue for the Anglo-Australian ruling class in the 1880s: 
there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the 
populations… The sympathies available for the purpose are those of 
race, language, religion, and, above all, of political institutions, as 
conducing most to a feeling of identity of political interest.28
A common history, victories and defeats shared by a people, helped bind them 
together. But without a common language and identity, there would be the 
danger of political fragmentation. 
The influences which form opinions and decide political acts are 
different in the different sections of the country. An altogether different 
set of leaders have the confidence of one part of the country and of 
another. The same books, newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do not reach 
                                                 
25 Mill, On liberty and Considerations, p. 143. 
26 Mill, On liberty and Considerations, chapter VIII. 
27 Mill, On liberty and Considerations, pp. 152-3; 146-8. 
28 Mill, On liberty and Considerations, p. 298. He goes on, naturally enough, to look at that great 
federation, the United States of America, and some of the structural weaknesses which led to 
civil war. Mill’s arguments on the prerequisites for a successful federation were drawn on by 
EW Burton in an article attacking proposals for imperial federation, “The political destiny of the 
colonies”, Victorian Review, vol. 4, no. 20, June 1881, pp. 147-62. 
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them. One section does not know what opinions, or what instigations, 
are circulating in another.29
Lack of common identity was most dangerous in regards to the military, whose 
job it was to kill. Towards foreigners, the soldier could have no sympathy, 
nothing more than the humanity one extends towards animals. So if some part 
of the state’s subjects were as foreigners to the soldiers, they “will have no more 
scruple in mowing them down” than they would towards avowed enemies. 
Such an army could become the executioner of liberty.30 Thus a multi-ethnic 
state could not remain free and democratic over the long term; multiculturalism 
as we know it in Australia would spell danger to Mill. It should not, therefore, 
be surprising that Graeme Campbell, then Independent MHR for Kalgoorlie 
and an opponent of multiculturalism, quoted Mill’s Considerations in a 
parliamentary debate on racial tolerance in 1996.31
Mill’s argument was challenged by Lord Acton. He argued, against Mill, that a 
monocultural nation would become the ally of authoritarianism: 
The presence of different nations under the same sovereignty is similar 
in its effect to the independence of the Church in the State. It provides 
against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single 
authority, by balancing interests, multiplying associations, and giving to 
the subject the restraint and support of a combined opinion… Liberty 
                                                 
29 Mill, On liberty and Considerations, pp. 291-2. 
30 Mill, On liberty and Considerations, pp. 292-3. In earlier articles, Mill had made this point 
with specific reference to the crushing of the national/democratic movement in the 
multinational Austro-Hungarian empire. 
31 Judith Brett, “John Howard, Pauline Hanson and the politics of grievance”, in Geoffrey Gray 
and Christine Winter (eds), The resurgence of racism: Howard, Hanson and the race debate, Monash 
Publications in History, Clayton (Vic), 1997, p. 25; she references CPD 30 Oct 1996, p. 6176. 
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provokes diversity, and diversity preserves liberty by supplying the 
means of organisation.32
Acton warned of the oppression inherent in any attempt to create a national 
state: 
The greatest adversary of the rights of nationality is the modern theory 
of nationality. By making the state and the nation commensurate with 
each other in theory, it reduces practically to a subject condition all other 
nationalities that may be within the boundary. It cannot admit them to 
an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because 
the State would then cease to be national, which would be a 
contradiction of the principle of its existence. According, therefore, to the 
degree of humanity and civilisation in that dominant body which claims 
all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or 
reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence.33
While Acton’s critique stimulated an ongoing debate in Britain, it had no 
discernible echoes in the Australian colonies,34 where Mill’s arguments were 
taken very seriously. For a start, Mill himself was easily the dominant political 
theorist in pre-1870 Victorian Britain.35 In the colonies, his influence was 
extraordinary,36 and much of the discussion on the issue of assimilation and 
                                                 
32 John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, “Nationality” in his Essays on freedom and power, 
selected, and with an introduction by Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Beacon Press, Boston (Mass), 
1948, p. 185. 
33 Dalberg-Acton, Nationality, pp. 192-3. 
34 The debate on these issues is discussed in Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The quest for 
understanding, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1994. 
35 Christopher Turk, Coleridge and Mill: A study of influence, Avebury, Aldershot, 1988, pp. 26-7. 
36 In Australia, “leading men” seem to have regarded Mill as a demi-god. In the most 
sophisticated journal published in Australia before federation, the Victorian Review, Mill is 
repeatedly cited as an authority on issues ranging from the debate over Henry George’s scheme 
for land nationalisation, see Samuel Rinder, “A Californian Political Economist.–A reply”, 
Victorian Review, vol. 4, no. 22, Aug 1881, p. 420; to debates over state subsidies to 
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homogeneity was in terms that reflected his arguments. From time to time 
writers referred directly to Mill’s requisites for the federation of states on a 
lasting basis.37
Far from reflecting the logic of radical eighteenth-century liberalism, or the 
utilitarianism with which he had grown up, Mill’s argument that the nation-
state should be culturally homogeneous reflected the influence of the 
Romantic/aristocratic reaction against liberalism. In his Autobiography, Mill 
described his famous emotional breakdown, and his encounter, in the late 
1820s, with the romantic poets, and then with ideas of the Coleridgians. 
Influenced by German philosophy, they brought into political debate “the 
general doctrines and modes of thought of the European reaction against the 
philosophy of the eighteenth century.”38 The most famous of this reactionary 
current was Thomas Carlyle, “the sage of Chelsea”, whose early writings railed 
                                                                                                                                               
denominational schools, see James L Hegarty, “Primary Instruction in Victoria”, Victorian 
Review, vol. 1, no. 2, p 213-4. Politicians and writers looked for support in Mill, as JA La Nauze 
has described Alfred Deakin doing on his conversion to protectionism, Alfred Deakin: A 
biography, Melbourne University Press, Carlton (Vic), 1965, pp. 37-38. John Plummer’s 
“Recollections of John Stuart Mill” has more in common with modern fan journalism than any 
serious discussion, Victorian Review, vol. 3 no. 17, March 1881, pp. 542-9. For Mill’s influence on 
prominent journalist and North Queensland separationist, William Coote, see Christopher Rous 
Robertson, “A re-evaluation of three nineteenth century Queensland histories: ‘History of the 
colony of Queensland from 1770 to the close of 1881’ by William Coote, ‘In the early days: A 
history and incident of pioneer Queensland’ by J.J. Knight, ‘The Genesis of Queensland’ by 
Henry Stuart Russell”, BA (Hons) thesis, History Department, University of Queensland, 1994, 
pp. 13-14, 34. According to Henry Reynolds, John Stuart Mill was Andrew Inglis Clark’s hero, 
“Inglis Clark: Some afterthoughts” in Richard Ely: with Marcus Haward & James Warden, A 
living force: Andrew Inglis Clark and the ideal of the commonwealth, Centre for Tasmanian Historical 
Studies, University of Tasmania, Hobart, 2001, p. 400. Thus political debate in the late colonial 
period took place in the shadow of John Stuart Mill and his theories.  
37 eg EW Burton, Political destiny, pp. 147-62. 
38 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, Second edition, Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, London, 
1873 pp. 128, 152-3, also pp. 161-2. The key figures Mill mentions as influencing him were 
Maurice and Sterling and then Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 
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against both economic liberalism, and the lack of leadership from the British 
aristocracy: 
British industrial existence seems fast becoming one huge poison-swamp 
of reeking pestilence physical and moral; a hideous living Golgotha of 
souls and bodies buried alive... Thirty-thousand outcast Needlewomen 
working themselves swiftly to death; three million Paupers rotting in 
forced idleness, helping said Needlewomen to die: these are but items in 
the sad ledger of despair.39
Carlyle’s argument was that a doctrine of individualism, selfishness and laissez-
faire would produce the destruction of society, amidst poverty, the spread of 
disease, alienation and bitterness. In return for the indifference of the ruling 
class to their welfare, British workers would give insurrection and revolution, 
as had happened in France when the ruling class had proven itself greedy, 
corrupt and careless about its responsibilities. Chartism represented a warning 
of the dangers to come. In his early writings he rejected the whole of the liberal 
argument; his solution was the revival of a true church and a true aristocracy, 
and a return to the values of the Middle Ages, symbolised in the character of 
Abbot Samson of St Edmundsbury, mythologised in Past and Present.40 This 
book was widely read by Australian colonial liberals nearly half a century 
later:41
                                                 
39 Quoted in Michael Cannon, Who’s master? Who’s man? Australia in the Victorian age, Thomas 
Nelson Australia, West Melbourne, 1978, p 47. I have been unable to find the source of this in 
Carlyle, but it expresses, in concentrated form, the style and content of Carlyle’s writing. 
40 Thomas Carlyle, Past and present, Second edition, Chapman and Hall, London, 1845. 
41 Bruce Mansfield, “Australian nationalism in the growth of the labour movement in the 
eighteen-eighties in New South Wales, with reference to Queensland”, MA thesis, University of 
Sydney, 1951, p. 25. 
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If the convulsive struggles of the last Half-Century have taught poor 
struggling convulsed Europe any truth, it may perhaps be this as the 
essence of innumerable others: That Europe requires a real Aristocracy, a 
real Priesthood, or it cannot continue to exist. Huge French Revolutions, 
Napoleonisms, then Bourbonisms with their corollary of Three Days, 
finishing in very unfinal Louis-Philippisms: all this ought to be didactic! 
All this may have taught us, That False Aristocracies are insupportable; 
that No-Aristocracies, Liberty-and-Equalities are impossible; that True 
Aristocracies are at once indispensable and not easily attained.42
Mill rejected the Coleridgians’ attacks on political economy, and their idealist 
philosophy. But he embraced their political approach: 
They were the first (except a solitary thinker here and there) who 
inquired with any comprehensiveness or depth into the inductive laws of 
the existence and growth of human society. They were the first to bring 
prominently forward the three requisites which [are] essential principles 
of all permanent forms of social existence.43
Mill summarised these three principles in a major essay on Coleridge in 1840. 
The first was a system of education for citizens which aimed at teaching them to 
subordinate their own desires to the broader needs of society; a role played “in 
modern nations…principally by religious teaching”. Without the “restraining 
discipline” of such moral education—for that was what Mill meant—“the 
natural tendency of mankind to anarchy” would assert itself. The second 
principle was a feeling of loyalty to some element of society’s broad 
constitution, “something which is settled, something permanent, and not to be 
                                                 
42 Carlyle, Past and present, pp. 323-4. 
43 John Stuart Mill, “Coleridge” in his, Essays on ethics, religion and society, Volume X, Collected 
works of John Stuart Mill, University of Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, Toronto 
and London, 1969, pp. 138-9. 
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called into question”, which enables society (the socio-economic system and its 
rulers) to weather the storms of internal dissension. This could be adherence to 
a common god, or acceptance of an hereditary ruler or ruling class. Mill’s third 
principle for stability was cohesion amongst the members of society, a sense of 
community or common feeling in some sense—an attachment to the state or the 
nation.44
Here, liberalism met its antithesis. Instead of the fierce rationalism of Jeremy 
Bentham, David Ricardo and James Mill, we had a powerful defence of the 
necessity of sentiment. Instead of worship of the individual and Adam Smith’s 
belief in the benefits flowing to society from the selfish pursuit of wealth, we 
had an insistence on restraint in the interests of social order. Instead of the 
struggle for individual freedom, we had praise for the moral role of religious 
teaching and an insistence on loyalty to some crucial element of the state 
structure. On the publication of Mill’s series of articles, “The spirit of the age” in 
1831, Carlyle supposedly declared, “Here is a new Mystic,” and Mill became 
one of Carlyle’s “most fervent admirers”.45
Mill’s essay on Coleridge theorised the need for ideology in class society. The 
reality of ruthless exploitation was to be hidden (so far as possible) behind ideas 
that emphasised mutual loyalty and “common feelings” of race or nation. The 
                                                 
44 Mill, Coleridge, pp. 133-6. 
45 Mill, Autobiography, pp. 173-6. Mill was not a new mystic in the sense Carlyle had hoped, 
and this soon became apparent, according to Mill. But there was a close intellectual 
collaboration. Immediately on his father’s death, Mill invited Carlyle to become a contributor to 
their London and Westminster Review, and “though each individual article continued to be the 
expression of the private sentiments of its writer, the general tone conformed in some tolerable 
degree to my opinions”; Autobiography, p. 206. Mill gave Carlyle the notes he had accumulated 
for a history of the French Revolution, encouraging him to take up the project. 
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resistance of the working class was to be contained by the development of 
something that was broadly accepted, even unchallengeable, in the political 
structure—the Queen, parliament, whatever symbol that might confer 
legitimacy on the state. Education would be shaped by a ruling class moralism 
that preached the necessity for restraint. Mill here was theorising the need for 
what Gramsci called hegemony, in an age when the old means of hegemony 
(especially religious fear and paternalistic dependence) were disintegrating. 
Racism, nationalism and personal moralism were some of the means through 
which this new hegemony might be constructed. For Mill a government that 
ruled ideologically was more powerful and less threatened than one which 
ruled by force; he identified coercive societies with backwardness and 
fragmentation. This was a widely understood idea within the Anglo-Australian 
ruling class; after yet another attempt on the life of the Russian Tsar, the 
Brisbane Courier suggested that, “A Parliament elected by universal suffrage 
may be far more effective than overcrowded transport ships and deportations 
to Siberia in overcoming the [revolutionary] movement.”46
Where Jeremy Bentham and his fellow materialists rejoiced in the collapse of 
the old ideological order—and wanted to pull down some of the surviving 
institutions which had sustained it—Mill wanted something to replace them. 
He saw the radical French philosophes, whom he had attempted to imitate in his 
youth, as ideological wreckers and destroyers. While they were “innovators, in 
their theories, [they] disregarded the elementary principles of the social union… 
                                                 
46 Brisbane Courier, 19 March 1880, p. 2, cols. 5-6. 
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In the weakening of all government they saw only the weakening of bad 
government.”47
While for Mill, much of this was unavoidable due to the selfishness and 
corruption of the aristocracy, the result was “moral anarchy and unsettledness, 
which we have witnessed and are witnessing.” In his view, they had no sense of 
history, and 
did not acknowledge the historical value of much which had ceased to be 
useful, nor saw that institutions and creeds, now effete, had rendered 
essential services to civilization, and still filled a place in the human 
mind, and in the arrangements of society, which could not without great 
peril be left vacant.”48
In the institutions they destroyed—presumably the monarchy, aristocracy, and 
the primary role of the church—they failed to see “necessary elements of 
civilized society”.49 Mill did not become a Coleridgian, nor did he completely 
abandon Bentham’s materialism, instead consciously and eclectically taking 
what he agreed with from each.50
In Considerations, Mill had a contradictory agenda. He wanted progress, in this 
case towards a more representative form of government, because that would 
ensure future prosperity and stability. However, he also wanted to protect 
property. Like Carlyle, Mill saw the working class as both the coming power 
                                                 
47 Mill, Coleridge, pp. 136-7. 
48 Mill, Coleridge, p. 138. 
49 Mill, Coleridge, p. 138; also p. 139. 
50 Turk argues that “an apologia for eclecticism” was one of Coleridge’s most important 
influences on Mill, Coleridge and Mill, p. 213. 
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and a danger. Paul Smart thought Considerations “characterised partly by a 
dread fear of the labouring classes and their potentially destructive political 
power”.51 Graeme Duncan made the same point: Mill dreaded “the ignorance 
and especially the selfishness and brutality of the mass”; “the uncultivated herd 
who now compose the labouring masses”.52 Mill also feared “that source 
enmity which is universal in this country towards the whole class of employers, 
in the whole class of employed”. And he feared the hatred towards owners of 
property. “When, indeed, the poor are so poor that they can scarcely be worse 
off, respect on their parts of rights of property which they cannot hope to share, 
are never safely to be calculated upon.”53
Thus, in Considerations, there was an extensive discussion of the supposed 
dangers of universal suffrage.54 According to Duncan, Mill was “primarily 
concerned at the use which the poorest and most numerous class might make of 
political power.” A democratic suffrage would likely produce “a legislature 
reflecting exclusively the opinions and preferences of the most ignorant class.”55 
This concern for property and social stability reflected both Mill’s class position, 
and his concern for the future of bourgeois society. Both John and his father, 
James, were part of the imperial establishment, as senior officials of the East 
India Company. Mill’s popular reputation as a champion of liberty and 
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53 Duncan, Marx and Mill, p. 227. 
54 Mill, On liberty and Considerations, pp. 212-222. 
55 Quoted in Duncan, Marx and Mill, p. 228. 
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universal suffrage is wildly exaggerated.56 Only the educated and cultured 
received Mill’s approval. 
Like all the great, radical liberal philosophers, Jeremy Bentham was a 
universalist. The logic of Mill’s position drove him to particularism, and 
especially, to the mystification of the nation: 
That which alone causes any material interests to exist, which alone 
enables any body of human beings to exist as a society, is national 
character… The true teacher of the fitting social arrangements for 
England, France, or America, is the one who can point out how the 
English, French, or American character can be improved, and how it has 
been made what it is. A philosophy of laws and institutions, not founded 
on a philosophy of national character, is an absurdity.57
Where Bentham was a system-builder, working from general principles, Mill 
oriented to the value of tradition, and of history in showing what had actually 
“worked”: 
The very fact that a certain set of political institutions already exist, have 
long existed, and have become associated with all the historical 
recollections of a people, is in itself, as far as it goes, a property which 
adapts them to that people, and gives them a great advantage over any 
new institutions in obtaining that ready and willing resignation to what 
has once been decided by lawful authority, which alone renders possible 
those innumerable compromises between adverse interests and 
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expectations, without which no government could be carried on for a 
year, and with difficulty even for a week.58
Thus the business of creating political institutions, and a national political 
ideology, was a matter of understanding what had succeeded in the past, what 
had been able to work in the popular imagination, what had tapped into pre-
existing prejudices and already had legitimacy. Different institutions were 
needed for each country, as the “national character” of each was different. 
When Mill applied this particularism to the colonial world, he revealed a 
contempt for “backward” peoples that parallelled his contempt for the British 
working class. In Considerations, Mill even argued a progressive role for slavery 
and imperialism: 
a people in a state of savage independence, in which every one lives for 
himself, exempt, unless by fits, from any external control, is practically 
incapable of making any progress in civilisation until it has learnt to 
obey. The indispensable virtue, therefore, in a government which 
establishes itself over a people of this sort is, that it makes itself obeyed. 
To enable it to do this, the constitution of the government must be 
nearly, or quite, despotic.59
                                                 
58 John Stuart Mill, “Remarks on Bentham’s philosophy” in his Essays on ethics, religion and 
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Mill’s theory was therefore profoundly elitist at both the domestic and imperial 
level.60 Considerations is a discussion about how the rich and educated imperial 
minority might best rule society, in which the poor and ignorant, or the 
colonised, are the majority. Indeed, he specifically disavowed the democratic 
ideas of earlier thinkers, “in which it was customary to claim representative 
democracy for England or France by arguments which would equally have 
proved it the only fit form of government for Bedouins or Malays.”61
Duncan saw Mill’s argument as an attempt to mitigate class conflict and avoid 
fundamental cleavages which would destroy society; and hence a manifesto for 
the status quo.62 Thus both class hegemony and racism were fused in Mill: a 
racial idea of the nation became a means to contain class struggle and social 
strife at home, and to maintain the distance between the imperial rulers and the 
colonised of India and elsewhere in the wider empire. 
Therefore, it is not in labourism, but the aristocratic Romanticism and anti-
liberalism of the early nineteenth century, that one of the principal intellectual 
foundations of the White Australia policy is rooted: the idea of the 
homogeneous nation, protected by strong immigration laws against people who 
supposedly could not assimilate into a British culture. John Stuart Mill was not 
the original architect of such politics, but he played a pivotal role in theorising 
and legitimising them for both British and colonial liberals. In practice, the 
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politics of social homogeneity and immigration control would throw up 
contradictions and dilemmas for colonial liberals. This chapter will now 
proceed to discuss how the struggle for a culturally homogeneous society was 
waged in colonial Australia. 
The dilemmas of homogeneity 1: Where do you draw the 
line? 
For colonial liberals, there were several problems with the strategy of 
homogeneity. The first was that Britain, and indeed England itself, were multi-
ethnic societies. What, then did homogeneity mean in these circumstances? The 
entire logic of nationalism, and especially the demand for homogeneity, was to 
draw a line and exclude those who did not fit into the “homogeneous” people. 
Ernest Gellner likened cultural nationalism to the setting up of an exclusive 
club, with membership defined by sentiment; while Eric Hobsbawm pointed to 
the terrible consequences that exclusion implied for those who did not fit easily 
within the definition of the nation.63
Nationalists have long argued over who does and does not “fit” within the 
nation, and what the nation actually consisted of, and these arguments were 
often very messy. To deal with some of this, Mill theorised the concept of 
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assimilation. He argued that stronger nationalities could absorb and transform 
weaker and more backward ones, and that this would benefit humanity: 
Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a 
Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and 
feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people—to be a member of 
the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all privileges of 
French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection and the 
dignity and prestige of French power—than to sulk on his own rocks, the 
half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, 
without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. 
The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as 
members of the British nation.64
In popular form, this was the idea that the English “race” had a unique power 
to assimilate the people of certain other societies. This idea recognised—indeed 
was built on—an acknowledgement that, “Strict purity of blood is not to be 
found in any nation, and the greater part a nation plays in the history of the 
world, the further it is sure to be from any such purity.”65 In a sense, the notion 
of the assimilating power of the English was just another expression of English 
racial superiority which was so dominant in late colonial Australia; but it also 
provided a bridge from a multi-ethnic history—including the multi-ethnic 
history of England itself—to the homogeneity idealised by Mill and others.66 It 
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was celebrated in an 1862 despatch by Queensland Governor, Sir George 
Bowen, describing a trip to the northern ports where he met successful 
“foreigners” who had married in the colony, whose children spoke English, and 
who saw the English national anthem as their own.67 Many saw the United 
States and its famous “melting pot” as an example of this; some with the twist 
that “the dominant English element asserts its supremacy by assimilating the 
stranger.”68
The necessity for assimilation could be used to apply pressure on the acceptable 
non-English to take themselves over that bridge. When J Crozier discussed the 
Irish problem in the Victorian Review, he argued that the Saxons had eventually 
submitted to the Normans, and despite “the most vexatious of tyrannies…in the 
end they coalesced with the victors, and the amalgamation of race resulted in 
producing a united England, strong at home and abroad.” The Scottish 
Highlanders, he argued, had responded to their dispossession by going “out 
into the world to seek for other homes”. The tragedy of Ireland was that it was 
still, after six centuries, unreconciled to England.69 In 1885, the journal’s editor 
lamented: 
Ireland’s greatest misfortune is that she cannot sink her nationality and, 
like Scotland, become English in the broadest meaning of the word. In 
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that case, she would really become an integral and contented portion of 
the British Empire.70
It was, of course, news to many Scots that they had sunk their nationality into 
Englishness. A polite, but tart, reply was published the next month, from 
prominent journalist, Angus Mackay. He warned that while they respected the 
English, the Scots were upset by claims that they were part of England. He 
complained about colonials saying England or English as if there was no 
Scotland or Scots and defended the existence of a separate Irish national 
character. “There is no fear of any power on earth, either of sentiment or force, 
absorbing or destroying Scottish nationality or national feeling,” he warned.71
The Queensland liberals presented the issue of amalgamation in a less 
humiliating or threatening manner. When introducing his legislation to 
encourage the indenture of European labourers to Queensland, Samuel Griffith 
emphasised the multi-racial composition of the English, and the ability of those 
indentured to be assimilated into the mainstream: 
we must remember the stock from which we came. We have in our veins 
the blood of many countries besides England; Germany and Scandinavia 
are both countries related to us in blood, and the people of both these 
countries have shown that they make admirable colonists, not only in 
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Australia, but in the United States and the Dominion of Canada. I should 
be glad to welcome any number of men from either of these two 
countries. They will coalesce with our own race, and form one united 
people.72
In response, the conservative leader, Boyd Morehead, decried the presence of 
German immigrants in Queensland, arguing that they remained a separate, 
national bloc: 
the German vote is now looked upon as a fixed factor in politics in this 
colony. It is looked upon as a solid vote; and because it is a solid vote it 
may be a very good thing for the junior member for Toowoomba… But I 
look at it in a different light. Here we have men coming from the most 
despotic country in the world, and though they enjoy all the privileges of 
our liberal institutions they only blindly bind themselves together and 
become a dangerous political factor… only a few years ago we had an 
instance of it down at Beenleigh, where a German pastor refused to allow 
English to be spoken in his school.73
We cannot know whether this was a true reflection of Morehead’s opinion, or a 
purely opportunist attack on a piece of legislation the conservatives were 
attempting to destroy. Either way, it points to the vulnerability of even the 
whitest of white immigrant communities faced with ruling class elements 
determined to seek political advantage in a climate of national conformism.74 
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Griffith’s Treasurer, James Dickson, in reply to Morehead, made his Premier’s 
point more explicitly: it was a question of creating a new national type: 
In another generation there will be no Germans here, nor Irish, nor 
Scotch, [sic] nor English—they will all be Queenslanders; and the sooner 
we recognise that fact, and become imbued with national feelings, and 
become citizens of this great and fair land of Queensland, the greater will 
the chance of our becoming a large and powerful nation.75
For his part, Sir Henry Parkes took a harsh position, insisting that non-British 
immigrants had to be forcibly dispersed and assimilated. In 1881, about 200 
Italian men, women and children arrived in Sydney, survivors of a failed 
colonisation experiment in tropical New Ireland. The New South Wales 
government agreed to help them settle, but insisted that they disperse into the 
community, something they resisted. The Premier, Sir Henry Parkes, twice 
visited the Italians to insist on their dispersal, warning that, “The Government 
did not approve of having a colony within a colony”,76 and that, “The customs 
of the country and other circumstances render it undesirable, indeed almost 
impossible, for them to settle down altogether in one locality”, even to the point 
where “friends and families may have to separate”.77 The “need” for a 
culturally homogeneous society meant that these traumatised people had to 
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make a new life in a completely alien environment, without the presence or 
close support of their countryfolk.78
At least Parkes’ response indicated that Italians could become “Australians”; 
there were other peoples who were simply not acceptable. When agitating for 
the imperial government to annexe Fiji to the empire in 1874, Parkes insisted 
that Fiji could not be added to New South Wales. In a letter to the Governor, Sir 
Hercules Robinson, he wrote: “the system of representative Government under 
which we live could not by any possible adjustment be extended to a mixed 
population the great majority of whom are in the condition of the aboriginal 
inhabitants of Fiji”.79  
The issue of where to draw the line was not merely a political one. It had an 
impact on the rate of growth in the Australian colonies. Australia’s great rival 
for immigrants was the United States, whose explosive expansion after the mid-
1870s depression rested on a staggering level of immigration: over half a million 
a year on average in 1880-93, never dipping below 200,000 a year during the 
1890s depression, soaring later, in 1905-14, to an average of over a million a 
year.80 The major sources of this staggering immigration were Germany 
(1,031,500 in years 1881-5 and 548,200 1886-1890), the Scandinavian countries 
(352,300 and 304,200), Celtic Ireland (345,400 and 310,100) and Italy (109,500 and 
197,800).81 By comparison, Australian governments were largely uninterested, if 
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not hostile, to encouraging immigration from these countries. Only Queensland 
offered assisted passages to a small quota of Germans and Scandinavians; all 
colonies felt they were getting too many Irish, and none sought Italians, apart 
from a brief Queensland experiment in 1891.82
This approach, of focusing on ethnic selection for an homogeneous population, 
was hegemonic, but not universally supported. In the Victorian Review, Francis 
Myers argued instead for unrestricted European immigration, and a “melting 
pot” approach: 
'Tis a mean, a contemptible thing, that puerile jealousy, which shrinks 
from a fancied danger in immigration unequally apportioned amongst 
the three strains of British blood. Welcome to all! must be the true 
Australian patriot’s creed. Their national impulse will sink beneath the 
influence of new conditions and associations; and children will be born 
to them, stamped with the characteristics, and imbued with the genius of 
their native land.83
Myers argued for the colonies to follow the lead of America and both federate 
and separate themselves politically from the British Empire, to avoid the 
bloodshed that would result from involvement in a European war. In 
particular, he argued for an end to nationally limited immigration programs, 
and for throwing open the ports to all from Europe. 
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There were “practical” proposals too to boost migration to Australia beyond the 
limits set by the population balance formula. ET Wakefield saw large-scale 
emigration as the solution to the poverty of Ireland and proposed the wholesale 
emigration of entire communities, so as to maintain family and local ties. 
Queensland Premier McIlwraith’s 1881 proposal for a trans-continental railway 
through the centre of Queensland might, he thought, provide both the impetus 
for this organised colonisation, as well as an economic incentive. He argued that 
many tropical and sub-tropical agricultural products required a large pool of 
seasonal labour and hence a higher population density. Under his scheme, “in a 
few years your colony would have shot ahead of all the other Australian 
Colonies: and you would live to see attained a degree of prosperity that 
otherwise would not be reached by your great grand children.”84 These 
alternative developmental ideas were rejected at some cost to the development 
of Australian capitalism. 
Arguments about who could or could not be assimilated, and under what 
conditions, would become a feature of Australian political debate over the next 
century; indeed they were still present in the furore over Middle Eastern 
refugees in 2001 and after. But there was one group who were regarded as 
completely unassimilable, and therefore a threat to the homogeneity that rising 
Australia needed: the Chinese. 
                                                 
84 Letters in McIlwraith correspondence, John Oxley Library, OM64-19/9, dated 17 June 1881 
and 30 June 1881 and accompanying document and pamphlet. I could find no record of 
McIlwraith’s own opinions on Wakefield’s scheme—he had clearly encouraged Wakefield to 
adapt it to suit Queensland’s needs. It is possible that it was vetoed by the British-based 
consortium bidding for the right to build the railway (although I found no such reference in the 
many letters from them to McIlwraith in the McIlwraith papers); equally the broad ruling class 
hostility to Irish Catholics could have been enough to make such a proposal problematic. 
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Chinese people as a ‘threat’ to free institutions 
The idea that Chinese people could not assimilate with Europeans was a 
constant theme in ruling class discussions and in the colonial newspapers; and 
many went on to explicitly link that belief to the idea, pace Mill, that this 
supposedly made Chinese people a threat to the “free institutions” so cherished 
by the Anglo-Australian population. During the early weeks of the 1878 
seamen’s strike, the Rockhampton Morning Bulletin argued: 
their tastes, their habits, and their modes of thought are extremely 
dissimilar from those of Europeans; so great, indeed, is the diversity 
between the two races that it is difficult to conceive of the possibility of 
their amalgamating and becoming a homogeneous people. If such 
amalgamation were possible, it could only be effected with the loss of 
very much which the Anglo-Australian colonist holds most dear, in 
social, religious, and political life.85
The editorialists of the conservative Brisbane Courier summed up Australian 
ruling class political thought when discussing the Polynesian Labourers Bill of 
1880. 
Our Legislature has recognised the fact that, in our society, which is 
purely democratic, it is clearly a misfortune to have an intermixture of 
people who cannot fuse into the same mass as the rest of the community, 
and who displace others that could do so.86
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For the journalist, Carl Feilberg, associated at the time with the conservative 
Melbourne Argus, Chinese people “cannot assimilate with a self-governing 
colonial community, and if introduced in large numbers they will cause a 
severe, and perhaps fatal, attack of social and political dyspepsia.”87 Not long 
back from the Intercolonial Conference of 1881, and debating a bill to restrict 
Chinese immigration into South Australia, the colony’s Minister Responsible for 
the Northern Territory, John Langdon Parsons, thought “It was almost 
impossible from such diverse elements [ie British and Chinese] to be able to 
build up a solid, compact, and well-welded State.”88
A wide range of arguments were mobilised to prove that Chinese people could 
not integrate with Europeans in Australia. These included the supposedly fixed 
character of the Chinese, enslavement to custom, passivity and hence supposed 
preference for despotism. These arguments too, either drew on Mill, or were 
reinforced by him. In his classic, On Liberty, he wrote of the “despotism of 
custom” being everywhere “the standing hindrance to human advancement”. 
He linked this to Asian society, and China in particular, where democracy was 
unthinkable:89
A people are no less unfitted for representative government by…extreme 
passiveness, and ready submission to tyranny. If a people thus 
prostrated by character and circumstances could obtain representative 
institutions, they would inevitably choose their tyrants as their 
representatives, and the yoke would be made heavier on them.90
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These concerns were widely echoed in Australian politics. In the 1879 debate on 
Parkes’ Chinese Immigration Regulation Bill in the NSW Legislative Assembly, 
James Greenwood said the Chinese had “inertia stamped upon their faces…it 
would take ages to lift them up and make them worthy of the liberties the 
people here enjoyed”,91 while Daniel O’Connor argued that the Chinese “had 
not the ingredients of improvement in them”.92 In the South Australian 
Legislative Council, Dr. Campbell thought “the Chinaman’s greatness had been 
his ability to stand still… His inferiority was like his country’s poverty—it was 
simply from lack of development.”93 During the second reading debate on the 
Gold Fields Act Amendment Bill (1877), the Government Minister in the 
Queensland Upper House, Charles Stuart Mein referred to the report of the 
Joint Special Committee of the House of Representatives and Senate on Chinese 
immigration into the US, and argued that, “The American race is progressive, 
and in favour of a responsible representative Government. The Mongolian race 
seems to have no desire for progress, and to have no conception of 
representative and free institutions.”94 This position was echoed by his premier, 
John Douglas: “They do not desire the franchise; they could not intelligently use 
it; and if they had it they would control the elections… They understand no 
form of government but despotism”.95 For Carl Feilberg, an enlightened 
autocracy was “the form of government suited to the [Chinese] race”.96 Again, 
the point here is not simply that leading journalists and politicians had a racist 
view of Chinese people, but that they linked it to the future of “representative 
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and free institutions” in Australia. For Feilberg, the unchanging nature of the 
Chinese person, and their orientation to autocracy, was a reflection of “a 
hundred generations of poverty… The untiring industry, the frugality, and 
perseverance of the Chinaman are the inherited instincts of his race”.97
Another of John Stuart Mill’s conditions for representative government to work 
was a population that respected and assisted the police: 
a people must be considered unfit for more than a limited and qualified 
freedom, who will not co-operate actively with the law and the public 
authorities in the repression of evil-doers. A people who are more 
disposed to shelter a criminal than to apprehend him…required that the 
public authorities should be armed with much sterner powers of 
repression than elsewhere, since the first indispensable requisites of 
civilised life have nothing else to rest on.98
In colonial Australia, there were constant allegations that Chinese people would 
not help the police. The South Australian MLC, James Ramsay, quoted from a 
report by the NT Resident: “Inspector of Police reports that…Chinese will not 
assist police with information which will lead to the detection of crime, unless 
in serious offences committed on their own countrymen.”99 A related issue was 
the allegation that Chinese people had their own parallel system of police, 
punishment and courts.100 While such a situation would inherently challenge 
any state apparatus—and this concern was freely expressed—this was raised as 
proof of their supposed incapacity to be assimilated, and the threat this posed 
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to “free institutions”. To these allegations was added the charge that Chinese 
“camps” or communities were both dens of immorality, and places of refuge for 
immoral and criminal Europeans. 
It was not just Chinese people who were judged incapable of assimilating. The 
Brisbane Courier extended this badge of exclusion to Pacific Islanders as well: 
 It is idle to expiate on the moral qualities of the Polynesians, and to 
reckon up the number who are baptised and go to church. Hon. 
gentlemen who dwell on these points should go further, and face this 
question—are Polynesians men of whom they are prepared to admit 
individuals into their houses on terms of perfect social equality, or to 
welcome as occupants of the benches beside them in the Council 
Chamber? If not, they are alien particles intruded into our body politic, 
which cannot preserve its democratic character unless composed of 
individuals on whom there rests no bar of race or color that may operate 
to prevent them from mingling with the general body of citizens, 
exercising all their privileges and social opportunities.101
None of these arguments went unchallenged, and the fact that politicians and 
others were at pains to show Chinese people Europeanising themselves 
suggests the importance of this debate. Thus in the Queensland Legislative 
Assembly in 1876, Oscar de Satgé, a conservative squatter, contended that soon 
after Chinese people arrived in the colony, they moved from a diet of rice and… 
began to eat flour and meat, and if they were allowed time, adopted 
European habits in other respects. He had watched the Chinamen on the 
Clermont gold fields, where there were some hundreds, and he found 
that amongst them…several publicans, for the Chinese took to grog in 
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the end; and, in fact, they became a respectable class of society—if that 
was to be thought respectable…102
Of course, de Satgé was purely interested in defeating the liberals over the issue 
of so-called “cheap labour”. In New South Wales, Dr Bowker claimed that, 
“Fifty years had not given us sufficient experience of the Chinese to say that 
they could not assimilate to our laws.”103 The point here is not just that there 
were voices against excluding Chinese immigrants, but that they felt obliged to 
argue within the intellectual framework established by John Stuart Mill. 
Was it all just racism? 
Most discussions regarding the suitability of Chinese immigrants were 
saturated with racism. So, was all this talk about homogeneity just a cover for 
this racism? Was homogeneity just a polite—seemingly neutral—way of 
insisting on a racist agenda? Telling the imperial government that restrictive 
legislation was motivated by a desire for homogeneity made the business of 
dealing with the Chinese government easier than telling them Chinese subjects 
were regarded as inferior. Was it simply the case that antipathy towards 
Chinese people that prompted exclusion? 
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Chapter 5: The shadow of Mill  Page 229 
The entire doctrine of building an homogeneous society was, of course, racist: it 
stereotyped people according to their social and cultural origins. It is also clear 
that the doctrine of homogeneity worked to legitimise racial categorising. At the 
same time, there was a fluidity about the idea: some people were not quite so 
bound by their culture, and they were the people who could assimilate.  
It is impossible to disentangle completely the issues. Were politicians motivated 
by a strategic vision (that was racist), or by personal prejudice, or both? The 
period we are discussing comes after two great surges of racism in Britain itself, 
one sparked by the Indian war of independence of 1857, and the second by the 
massacre of Black people unleashed by Jamaica’s Governor Eyre in 1865.104 A 
survey of Sydney’s Evening News for the 1870s showed the paper to be saturated 
with racist stereotyping.105
The assertion that Chinese people could not “assimilate” was not borne out in 
practice. There is a considerable and growing scholarship discussing the history 
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of Chinese people and Chinese communities in Australia, and one of the 
common themes to have emerged is that, alongside racism, there was a 
significant, if uneven, level of Chinese integration into mainstream Anglo-
Australian society.106 For instance, Morag Loh has shown how one Chinese 
herbalist in the early twentieth century had an extensive European practice in 
Gippsland, while Kate Bagnall has unearthed evidence of considerable mutual 
sympathy between white Australian women and the Chinese hawkers who 
visited their homes.107 In his study of the 1873 Clunes “riot”, when Chinese 
miners were recruited to break a miners’ strike, Jerome Small found that the 
Chinese miners recruited had had little contact with European-Australians, and 
that the European Clunes miners were warned of the scabbing by Ballarat 
Chinese miners who were well integrated into their predominantly European 
community.108
Apart from the supposed dislike felt by European Australians towards Chinese 
people, there were two issues upon which the debate about homogeneity 
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focused most intensely: intermarriage, and voting. No-one pursued these 
themes with more vigour than Sir Henry Parkes. At a crucial moment in his 
campaign, introducing his anti-Chinese bill of 1888, he declared: 
I have maintained at all times that we should not encourage or admit 
amongst us any class of persons whatever whom we are not prepared to 
advance to all our franchises, to all our privileges as citizens, and all our 
social rights, including the right of marriage.109
The issue with voting was simple: giving Chinese people an influence over 
politics and the state could ultimately threaten Anglo-Australian colonisation, 
and the ruling class’s control over the continent (as discussed in chapter 3). 
Sydney’s best-selling newspaper, the Evening News, declared that, unlike the 
squatters and their conservative supporters, the liberals 
have realised that the free social, as well as political, life of the colony 
would be endangered by the presence of a large population which could 
not be trusted with political rights, and they have legislated 
accordingly.110
When it came to marriage, the problem for Parkes, and many other anti-Chinese 
ideologues, was that some “white” women were prepared to marry Chinese 
men. In Victoria, there were 250 marriages between Chinese men and European 
women in 1866-80; while in NSW in 1878, 181 European women were married 
to Chinese men, with another 171 de facto marriages.111 Confronted with 
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evidence of this from a report of the slum areas of Sydney, he responded that it 
not only condemned the Chinese, but also “our own sisters... It was a most 
frightful stigma on the character of English women… [It] describes a state of 
female depravity impossible to believe.”112 In the South Australian parliament, 
John Moule MLA described his family as not recognising a marriage between 
one of their family and a Chinese man. “He objected to people coming with 
whom we could not assimilate.”113 Clearly, the ability to assimilate was in the 
eye of the beholder. In the late 1880s, Melbourne and Sydney, detectives were 
assigned to find women living with Chinese men, and to ascertain whether they 
could be charged with vagrancy.114
Intermarriage was a fundamental mechanism for the strategists of 
homogeneity. Indeed the Protector of Aborigines in New South Wales 
suggested, in 1882, that with “the Black aborigines…fast disappearing 
&…destined to soon become an extinct Race”, that “the great number of half-
castes…should not be…allowed to live a gipsy life…[but] compelled to work 
for their own living—and thus ultimately merge into the general population.”115 
There were, however, a variety of viewpoints on the issue of intermarriage. One 
of the chief complaints about Chinese immigrants was that they were mostly 
male, that they didn’t bring women, and it was darkly hinted that they must 
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have been engaged in widespread homosexuality. Some religious figures 
concluded that it might be a good thing if Chinese men married suitable white 
women, which put them at odds with people like Parkes. Indeed, Rev John 
Dunmore Lang, a leading liberal agitator in mid-nineteenth century New South 
Wales, and a longstanding opponent of Chinese immigration, became one priest 
who did marry many Chinese men and European women, leading him to soften 
his attitude to Chinese immigration in general. On his death in 1878, thousands 
of Chinese people marched in his funeral procession. In the controversy 
surrounding the ASN dispute of that year, the Bishop of Melbourne suggested 
that the colonies should encourage intermarriage and social intercourse 
between Chinese and Europeans.116
A handful of ruling class figures argued against the doctrines of racial 
superiority and racial purity. Henry Copeland MLA, a significant figure in New 
South Wales politics in the 1870s and 1880s, supported legislation to restrict the 
entry of Chinese people in the parliamentary debate of 1879, on the grounds 
that he wanted a European population settled in the colony, and supported the 
seafarers strike of 1878-9 when their employer, the Australasian Steam 
Navigation Company (ASN), replaced them with Chinese sailors. But he 
rejected any idea that “Europeans were such a God-descended race that they 
were entitled to monopolize the greatest portion of the earth’s surface.” These 
were interesting sentiments coming from a long-time gold miner, and 
representative for a goldfields electorate. He also specifically rejected the 
broader fear of racial contamination. When challenged, he replied with an 
argument familiar to pastoralists and stock-breeders: 
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He thought rather that the mixture [of Europeans and Chinese] would 
invigorate the race. There was nothing like a cross. He would ask hon. 
gentlemen to set aside foolish prejudices and say where they could find 
prettier children than those resulting from marriages of Chinese with 
white women.117
More typical was the response of the maverick ultra-conservative Captain 
Arthur Onslow MLC. With an arrogance unique to the most elevated of the 
ruling class, he declared that, “the class of women who marry the Chinese are 
so utterly debauched that it is the Chinese who suffer from the marriages… I 
cannot think that any decent woman would submit to the embraces of a 
Chinaman.”118
However, there is nothing in revulsion at intermarriage that inherently leads to 
a politics of exclusion. Many American whites were repelled at the idea of 
intermarriage with blacks, and even passed laws to prevent it, but this did not 
imply an agenda of exclusion. Some in the Anglo-Australian ruling class who 
considered the Chinese inferior and degraded, wanted them for low-paid 
manual labour. Moreover, amongst the Anglo-Australian ruling class, there was 
revulsion at the idea of marriage across class lines, of marrying down. The 
maverick right wing liberal, Arthur Bruce Smith, lamented that: 
It is too frequently supposed by the more fortunate, and more delicately 
nurtured side of society, that the distinction among men in wealth, 
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education, and social position, is of an innate and permanent character; 
and that what are called the working classes, constitute a distinct species 
of human nature, designed by Providence for the purpose of doing the 
rough and objectionable work of the world.119  
Nevertheless, the idea that national homogeneity was necessary allowed racist 
hostility towards Chinese people to be fashioned into an agenda of exclusion. 
Equally, those who rejected racist paranoia could also be convinced of the need 
for exclusion. In the New South Wales Legislative Council in 1881, John Watt 
supported the Parkes government’s second attempt at restrictive legislation, but 
he did so while rejecting much of its argument. “I do not participate in the 
terrors conjured up” by the government, he declared. “I have no fear that our 
civilisation will be endangered or that the Chinese will come here in such large 
numbers as to overwhelm us.” In many situations, he argued, Chinese people 
had saved communities through their supply of vegetables, or their steady 
labour. But he still supported restriction, for reasons of homogeneity. “The 
national instinct, however, is opposed to the Chinese, and we may rely upon it 
that the national instinct is true.” This argument was challenged by Philip 
Gidley King, another supporter of restriction, who nevertheless argued that 
“Those who are guided by instincts are generally inferior to those who are 
guided by reason. Instinct guides the lower animals…”120
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Many of those who opposed the restriction of Chinese labour did so on the 
grounds that a larger population of Asian labourers would mean that, “The 
labourer and the skilled artisan would be forced higher up the social scale, and, 
rather than work in association with the Chinaman, he would take the higher 
position.”121 Frederick Darley MLC drew on Mill’s approach to reject any idea 
of allowing the development of “a subservient class composed of Chinese, or 
some other inferior race of people” because “It would be impossible to form a 
nation out of such a community.”122
The dilemmas of homogeneity II: What is to be done about 
the Irish? 
Another reason that the pursuit of homogeneity was central to the ruling class 
was that, unlike Britain or the Austro-Hungarian Empire or France, Australia 
was a colonial settler state. The vast majority of its population were immigrants, 
or the children of immigrants. From 1787 onwards, the peopling of Australia 
had at every step been a deliberate process. Governments had spent vast sums 
of money to attract immigrants, and parliaments, newspapers and the public 
had debated the kind of people they wanted. Standing in the shadow cast by 
John Stuart Mill, Australia’s colonial politicians felt that every decision about 
the peopling of Australia would have profound political consequences for the 
future. The argument for homogeneity was not simply a device to exclude 
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(disliked) Chinese people. This can be seen in the dilemmas the Anglo-
Australian ruling class faced in dealing with the Catholic Irish, who were 
particularly contentious as immigrants. In part this was because the colonies 
faced a conundrum. Poor Irish Catholics were easier to get as potential 
immigrants, and their labour was needed. However, they also came with 
potentially dangerous ideas: both Roman Catholicism, which was seen by the 
Protestant establishment as an obstacle to progress; and a profound antipathy 
to Britain as a result of conflicts in Ireland itself. 
One way the southern colonial governments found to deal with this “problem” 
was to insist that, “immigrants should be brought from England, Scotland and 
Ireland in proportion to the total population of those three kingdoms.”123 In 
other words, while there was no active restriction of Irish people coming to live 
in the colonies, there was a restrictive quota in place to limit the number 
assisted. The degree to which colonial governments were sensitive about this 
ethnic mix can be seen from the reaction to the British government’s proposed 
Irish Land Bill of 1881, which included a provision for the assisted emigration 
of agricultural labourers to British colonies. From New South Wales came a 
very sharply worded protest: 
the Legislature of New South Wales has made it a condition in the public 
expenditure for Immigration that the immigrants from England, Scotland 
and Ireland should not be in such excess in respect to any one country as 
to disturb the national elements of the three Kingdoms at present 
prevailing in the population of the Colony.124
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Immigrants were welcome so long as they “are persons suited to the work of 
colonization and to the independent exercise of their rights under our free 
Institutions”, but not if they were going to bring seditious doctrines and create 
discord.125 Likewise, when an Ulsterman approached Daniel Cooper for his 
opinion on a plan to set up an agricultural colony in New South Wales, he was 
disabused. Cooper reported the approach to Sir Henry Parkes, saying: “I told 
him at once it could not be done and if it could you were dead against Irish 
Colonies as Irishmen were very good Colonists when scattered among the 
others but were just as troublesome in Australia as in Ireland when in a 
flock.”126  
All the dilemmas and tensions surrounding Irish immigration and the desire for 
an homogeneous population came to the fore in the development of state 
education in the Australian colonies. In his historical survey of education in 
Australia, AG Austin found remarkable uniformity in colonial legislation, with 
all six colonies setting up national education systems between 1872 and 1893, 
systems which abolished state aid to church schools.127 In all the debates on 
national education, the large numbers of uneducated and therefore “ignorant” 
children was a major issue, as was the failure of the denominational schools to 
deal with the problem. But social cohesion and the creation of a culturally 
homogeneous society were just as central. Hyams and Bessant saw a link 
between the principles underlying the new education systems, and the future 
White Australia policy. Australia’s colonial politicians had embraced: 
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the goal of a unified society. Social cohesion in a community in which the 
newcomer predominated was to them a vital aim… Ethnically and 
culturally the same purpose was to be pursued in later years by the 
imposition of strict barriers to non-European immigration into the 
country.128
Social homogeneity was created in the national schools in much the same ways 
it was in the factory system: through the imposition of standardisation in 
teaching and recreation; through the observation, classification and 
measurement of children and teachers, and through intense and detailed 
supervision. This was the project of a gigantic bureaucracy, consciously 
constructed for the purpose.129
One of the greatest obstacles to the much-desired social cohesion was religious 
sectarianism, and the claims of some churches—most especially the Roman 
Catholic—to the allegiance of the faithful, an allegiance superior to that claimed 
by the nation-state. Hyams and Bessant argue that the hardening of liberal 
attitudes towards the churches was not just a product of growing secularism, 
but an “expression of concern that strong popular identification with sectional 
groups within the community might encourage social divisiveness.”130 Austin 
too found Australia’s liberal politicians, “while not anti-religious…hostile to the 
claims of the Churches, and opposed the intervention of any authoritarian 
institutionalism between the State and the individual.”131 The authoritarian 
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institution that most concerned liberal politicians in the late nineteenth century 
was the Catholic Church. In one of the most racist diatribes ever published 
against the Irish in a “respectable” publication, AM Topp argued that Victoria’s 
Education Act was “the most efficacious means” to destroy the power of the 
Church and “assimilate this alien race”.132
A problem here for many in the ruling class was that religion was still the 
cornerstone of public morality, and an education system without a religious 
basis would be amoral and unthinkable. Sir John Robertson’s attempt to 
introduce a new compromise in the struggle over national and secular 
education in New South Wales in 1876 foundered on the opposition of his 
Treasurer, the banker Sir Alexander Stuart, who told Parliament that the 
Victorian education system had failed because “it endeavoured to dissociate 
what never could be dissociated, education and religion.”133 The 1888 invasion 
fantasy, The battle of Mordialloc, reflected the same outlook: the Australian 
colonies were morally and economically disintegrating, in part because the 
politicians had responded to religious dissension by excluding religion and 
history from the schools. “In no country, perhaps…could a more dangerous 
experiment have been tried with the education of its rising youth.” Instead, the 
young breathed “an atmosphere of the densest materialism.”134 This dilemma 
underpinned the bitterness of the debates over religion and education, and 
church and state. 
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In Victoria and New South Wales in particular, there were conflicts between the 
Catholic Church and government over the abolition of state aid to 
denominational schools. In 1879, Sydney’s new Catholic Archbishop, Vaughan, 
launched an extraordinary attack on the state schools of New South Wales, 
denouncing them as “seed-plots of future immorality, infidelity and 
lawlessness”, and declaring that they were worse than the Scavenger’s 
Daughter, a medieval instrument of torture, because they were “the most 
effective instruments…for squeezing very gradually and almost imperceptibly 
the Catholic faith out of a Catholic people.”135 This attack was met with hysteria 
from evangelicals and secular liberals alike. The Parkes government responded 
with its Public Instruction Act, passed in early 1880, which made primary 
education nominally compulsory, cheap and widespread, and abolished 
payments to denominational schools. 
Sir Henry Parkes has rightly been seen as an anti-Catholic bigot, but he was also 
one of the most sophisticated ruling class ideologists and politicians in colonial 
Australia. His desire for an homogeneous society created an enormous tension 
with his militant Protestantism, and the electoral advantages that sectarianism 
brought him. In the early 1870s, as the bitter sectarianism he stirred up after the 
attempted assassination of the Duke of Edinburgh was receding, Parkes 
retreated—forming an electoral alliance with the Catholic political network to 
get his candidates elected and form a strong government.136 His broader desire 
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for some kind of reconciliation between faiths was reflected in a private letter 
he wrote to the leading Victorian Catholic, Gavan Duffy: 
I fervently pray to God that a way may be found out for your “race” to 
mix with mine as fellow citizens, apart from that power which hitherto in 
every political crisis has guided them in one direction right or wrong… 
So long as obstacles are opposed to our being one Australian people, we 
shall be a factious & senseless rabble.137
The rapprochement did not last long, and the struggle over state education 
from the mid-1870s to the mid-1880s represents the height of sectarian 
bitterness in the history of New South Wales. But religious rivalry was not the 
only fundamental issue here. Indeed, Parkes’ biographer, AW Martin, sees him 
as having been repelled by the sectarianism of James Greenwood, the 
evangelical cleric who led the Public Schools League in New South Wales and 
who was said to see Catholics as “creatures who ought to be swallowed up, 
having been first grilled by a sufficient heat of public agitation”.138 Leading 
Catholic politicians, such as Michael Fitzpatrick, John McElhone, WA Duncan 
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1880, Parkes “worked himself up into perhaps the most emotional anti-Irish peroration he had 
ever delivered—and feverishly returned, full circle, to the frank anti-Catholicism of his pre-1872 
days”, p. 313. 
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and George Day, rejected their Archbishop’s attack on state schools, and 
declared themselves in favour of national education, even though they rejected 
Parkes’ bill.139 In his speech moving the Public Instruction Bill, along with swipes 
at the Catholic hierarchy, Parkes emphasised the importance of forging a 
unified, homogeneous, national people: 
Surely the Catholic religion…cannot be a thing, the teaching of which 
renders it necessary to separate the Catholic children from the other 
children of the country. They must mix in after years, and be associated 
with each other in all the duties of every day life. Let them be workers, 
traders, men of competent means; let them go anywhere they may, into 
whatever groove of society they come—they must mix with persons 
entertaining other opinions… let us remember that we are above 
everything else free citizens of a free commonwealth. Whether we are 
Englishmen, Scotchmen, or Irishmen, or whether we are the sons of some 
foreign land, over and above every other consideration we ought to be 
Australians.140
The bruising battle over secular state education showed the lengths to which 
the dominant current within the ruling class was prepared to go to build an 
homogeneous society.141
These divisions had a wider implication. No attempt to develop a nationalism 
that included the Irish could be described as “English” or “British”. This, I 
                                                 
139 For Fitzpatrick, NSWPD, vol. 1, pp. 315-32; for McElhone and Day, Barry Bridges, “Sir Henry 
Parkes and the New South Wales Public Instruction Act, 1880” in S Murray-Smith, Melbourne 
studies in education, 1975, Melbourne University Press, Carlton (Vic), 1975, p. 192; for Duncan, 
Martin, Parkes, p. 313. 
140 NSWPD, vol. 1, pp. 274-5. 
141 Ironically their victory in imposing compulsory national, secular education led to an 
enormous, and successful, effort by the Catholic Church to establish its own, near-universal 
system of schools. 
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believe, is the real significance of the concept of a “white” Australia. As Parkes’ 
comments show, it was potentially inclusive of the Irish, as well as the 
substantial numbers of northern European immigrants, whom most politicians 
believed could assimilate easily into their “British” society. It meant that 
immigrants of Irish, and especially Irish Catholic origin, could identify with 
Australia and Australian nationalism, even if they hated the empire to which 
the Australian state was committed. Douglas Cole has argued that, “ethnic 
consciousness of being British was never sharply distinguished from that of 
being white.” Nevertheless, it was distinct. For every WD Forsyth: “Scratch 
White Australia and you find British Australia”—something those of Irish 
Catholic origin would have had difficulty doing—there was a Bulletin, which 
wanted to preserve Australia “for the Anglo-Saxons and kindred races.” The New 
South Wales protectionist politician, EW O’Sullivan, sought to merge the Irish 
and British into an “Anglo-Celtic Race”.142 By describing Australia as “white”, 
the Australian state could present itself as the defender of something 
supposedly important to the Irish Catholic. 
The dilemmas of homogeneity III: Is liberalism to be 
betrayed? 
It is rarely acknowledged that throughout the nineteenth century, the British 
tradition was one of open borders. This was a tradition associated with 
                                                 
142 Douglas Cole, “‘The crimson thread of kinship’: Ethnic ideas in Australia, 1870-1914”, 
Historical Studies, no. 56, 1971, pp. 516-7, my emphasis. 
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liberalism, and free trade liberalism in particular, and it was a policy that 
Britain had attempted to impose on China. The use of immigration controls to 
protect the “homogeneity” of Australian colonial society represented a 
challenge to this principle, and thus posed a dilemma for many colonial 
politicians. Some of those who decided to abandon open borders felt obliged to 
give good reasons for doing so; while a few others tried to maintain open 
borders in the colonies even as the pressure within their class intensified for 
restriction on Chinese immigration.  
The strength of the open borders hegemony can be seen in the apology made by  
the Douglas government’s minister in the Queensland Legislative Council, 
Charles Stuart Mein, when moving the second reading of the Gold Fields Act 
Amendment Bill (1877): “under ordinary circumstances, it is objectionable, and 
contrary to the spirit of the British nation, to interfere with the peaceful 
introduction, or passage through, or residence in its territories, of the people of 
any other nation not at war with Great Britain.” But there was a higher law: self 
preservation.143 John Malbon Thompson, the long-time MLA for various 
Ipswich electorates and former Minister for Lands under Palmer, drew on the 
tradition of open borders to oppose the bill. He “maintained, and had always 
maintained, that there should be free intercourse between all nations. He could 
not see that because the Chinese were yellow, wore pig-tails, and wrote in 
extraordinary characters, therefore they should be excluded from the colony”.144 
Like many others opposed to immigration restriction, he saw it as an example 
                                                 
143 ORDLC Qld, vol. XXII, p. 76.  “Self preservation” was often code for the defence of British 
institutions, and more particularly, the British peopling of Australia. 
144 In debate on the Gold Fields Act Amendment Bill, 1877, in ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, p. 244. 
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of a detested protectionism.145 In the New South Wales parliament in 1879, 
Michael Fitzpatrick argued that Britain “opened her arms to the whole 
universe, that her shores offered an asylum to the enslaved and the oppressed 
of all nations.”146 The recently deposed Colonial Secretary was speaking in 
opposition to Sir Henry Parkes’ Chinese Immigration Bill. For his part, Parkes 
was keen to emphasise that he was only proposing restriction: “There was no 
such thing to be found in the civilized world as one nation prohibiting the 
landing of people on its shores. But they had the right to restrict”.147
For the vast majority of parliamentarians in New South Wales, protectionism 
was seen as another betrayal of liberalism, and long and often did they lecture 
protectionist Victoria on this point. And for many immigration restriction was a 
form of protectionism, and this caused considerable angst for liberals who 
wished to restrict Chinese immigration. The distinguished MLA, Saul Samuel, 
declared himself a free trader, “but there were other considerations than those 
of free trade, and one important one was to preserve the British character of our 
community.”148 This was to be a significant part of the ruling class debate over 
the ASN dispute in 1878-9 (discussed in chapter 8). 
Samuel Griffith was one of the few to reject the idea that a tradition of open 
borders existed. He argued that there was no tradition of allowing aliens to 
come in large numbers; indeed, “until recently it was almost an [sic] universal 
                                                 
145 QPD, 1876, vol. XX, p. 373. In this case he was referring to attempts to stop Chinese 
immigration into the United States. A similar point was made by the squatter-politician, Joshua 
Peter Bell, in opposing the increased tariff on rice in 1876 which was intended to discourage 
Chinese immigration, QPD, vol. XX, pp. 390, 485. 
146 SMH 6 March 1879, p. 6, col. 1. 
147 SMH 21 March 1879, p. 3, col. 6. 
148 SMH 10 April 1879, p. 2 col. 4. 
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law not to allow the free ingress of foreigners into a country’s territory. It was 
entirely a modern development to allow this, except within a very few years, by 
any country in Europe except England, and even by England only within a 
comparatively recent period.”149
Time and again, the issue of excluding Chinese people was posed as one of 
“national survival”, which was code for the need for an homogeneous society. 
In the 1879 debate, Garrett thought it “a national question”, ie “to preserve the 
British Australian character of the community”.150 Angus Cameron, the former 
union leader who had campaigned vigorously against ASN, also put his 
opposition in national terms. He claimed to wish that Australia could open its 
arms to people of the whole world, but “there is great danger of our national 
character being completely undermined.” The danger came from “men, who for 
selfish purposes may take it into their heads to ignore the national character”.151 
Even Fitzpatrick, who opposed the bill, thought ASN unwise and 
“unpatriotic”.152 When Rockhampton’s Morning Bulletin discussed the seamen’s 
strike it declared that, “We have little sympathy with theorists who contend 
that foreigners of whatever race or colour should be admitted into our common 
wealth on equal terms with our own people.”153
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Conclusion: The sublime logic of homogeneity 
The broad ruling class policy of constructing an homogeneous people, of 
predominantly British background, drawn roughly equally from the different 
British peoples, was a key element in Australian population policy, as well as a 
major foundation for the White Australia policy. When Henry Reynolds 
discovered Mill, he commented: 
It seems to me, then, that we could have had Australian nationalism 
much as it was, with restrictive immigration, with deportation of the 
Kanakas, with restrictions on Aborigines, if it had just been based on 
Mill’s liberal nationalism and not on Social Darwinism.154
This chapter demonstrates that White Australia was in significant part based on 
Mill’s liberal nationalism. In an article focused on the period 1880-1920, Mark 
Francis has argued strongly against historians who see Social Darwinism as 
shaping the attitudes of Australian colonial officials towards Aboriginal 
people.155 The same, I would argue, applies to attitudes towards Chinese 
people. Whilst Herbert Spencer was enormously influential on colonial liberals, 
most criticism of Chinese people focused on Chinese culture, and the way it 
shaped Chinese people. Indeed, when Australian ruling class intellectuals 
discussed “the future Australian race” in the 1880s, the debate was between 
environmental determinists and moralists; Social Darwinism was a minor 
                                                 
154 Henry Reynolds, “Racism and other national discourses” in Geoffrey Gray and Christine 
Winter, The resurgence of racism: Hanson, Howard and the race debate, Monash Publications in 
History, Clayton (Vic), 1997, pp. 36-7. 
155 Mark Francis, “Social Darwinism and the construction of institutionalised racism in 
Australia”, Journal of Australian Studies, no. 51, 1996, pp. 90-105. 
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element.156 Indeed, the entire doctrine of assimilating (white) foreigners runs 
counter to it. 
The doctrine of homogeneity stood above individual differences in opinions on 
race, in very much the same way as doctrinal differences became secondary to 
the belief that some religious observance was the cornerstone of morality. 
Indeed, people who disliked racism (as Mill himself professed to do) could be 
won to the demand for Chinese exclusion on the basis that homogeneity of race 
was necessary for stability, and to preserve liberal political institutions. Any 
doubts could be assuaged by the consequences of Britain’s failure to assimilate 
the Catholic Irish,157 or the news of ethnic/racial rioting and other tensions in 
the United States and elsewhere. Indeed, the more that nationalists insisted on 
imposing cultural and linguistic homogeneity, the more tensions around 
nationality increased, thus “proving” the necessity for homogeneity for a stable 
and united state. More than one ideologist has argued that racist White 
Australia had protected the country from the racial tensions experienced in 
other countries. This was indeed, a sublime logic. 
                                                 
156 Indeed, attitudes amongst the ruling class towards the “lower orders” had as much in 
common with Social Darwinism, as attitudes towards “inferior races”. For Australia, see Bruce 
Smith, Liberty and liberalism, p. 168; for Britain, Lorimer, Colour, class, esp. pp. 92-130. 
157 The dangers of a cultural divide between rulers and ruled were described by MC McCarthy 
O’Leary in “Ireland since the Land League”, Victorian Review, vol. X, no. 60, pp. 575-79: “The 
gentry of the country belonged, for the most part, to an alien race and to an unpopular religion. 
The descendants of English settlers, of James’ planters or of Cromwell’s soldiers, they held but 
little in common with the lower order. The very distinctions of rank necessitated a difference in 
occupations, whilst on Sunday—on that day which is supposed to unite all Christians in 
humble adoration of the Giver of all Good—the landlord and his family went in solitary state to 
church, whilst his tenantry were to be seen flocking in crowds along the roads to worship at a 
different shrine. Such singular circumstances could not fail to serve as a bar of separation to 
keep asunder those whom similar hopes and a community of interests should have united most 
closely together.” 
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The doctrine of homogeneity would never have achieved the dominance it did 
without the intensifying propaganda around race emanating from Britain, and 
especially after the near-war with Russia in 1877-8 and the resulting mania 
around “jingoism”. There is a great deal of evidence to support historians who 
insist on the influence of British racism. However this is incomplete as an 
explanation. People didn’t believe in “racism”, they believed certain things 
about particular “races”. Many believed in the superiority of the English “race”; 
but there was no reason why the Catholic Irish should share this opinion. 
Opinions on Chinese people might have been derogatory, but most of the 
English race patriots had vicious opinions of the Irish, and they were not going 
to exclude them. Homogeneity was a strategic doctrine that called for some 
kind of agreed description of the nation as a whole. It had the advantage of 
allowing many different racist views to be sustained within it. A person could 
be anti-Irish (or anti-English) and support a white Australia. In their daily lives, 
most Chinese and European Australians lived together in relations of 
accommodation. The doctrine of homogeneity allowed people to like their local 
Chinese vegetable seller, but support the prohibition of Chinese immigration as 
state policy. 
Bede Nairn summed up this general approach well in his “Epilogue” to the 
1989 re-publication of Civilising Capitalism, in which he defended the White 
Australia policy, minimising and rationalising its racism. As well as pointing to 
trade unionists’ fear of Chinese labour market competition, Nairn argued that 
what mattered to them was not “class consciousness”—which, he argued, they 
didn’t have in any Marxist sense—but Henry Parkes’ “crimson thread of 
kinship”. 
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To their north were many millions of people with ancient and strikingly 
different forms of religious, social and political organisation. Their non-
white colour identified not only these people, but also their incompatible 
systems and customs. Australia understandably saw them as a threat to 
the nation they had formed.158
For Nairn, the essence of White Australia was unity, not prejudice, which was 
marginal. “What is now known as racism was the subsidiary part of the 
primary objects of national cohesion, stability and defence”, he wrote.159 This 
unity included unity of race, of culture, customs and political system. 
Australians could not have had its British-based democracy, more democratic 
than Britain itself, without this unity.160
This idea, that democracy depended on racial unity, was a myth; a myth 
theorised by John Stuart Mill, and promoted by countless politicians after him. 
The myth was designed to construct ideological bulwarks to limit and contain 
working class discontent and rebellion, and that is how it was understood here 
by senior colonial politicians. In 1887, Sir Henry Parkes wrote to his fellow 
Premiers arguing that it was “a question of policy of the first magnitude to 
cement society together by the same principles of faith and jurisprudence, the 
same influence of language and religion, and the same national habits of life.”161 
When he wrote those lines, all of those principles were under challenge. Parkes 
was widely hated amongst the political working class in New South Wales; and 
June 1887 had seen a substantial republican movement successfully challenge 
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public meetings called to discuss celebrating Queen Victoria’s jubilee. Indeed, 
the monarchist meetings could only go ahead when the militia was called out to 
protect them from “disloyal” elements.162
Far from being an instrument of working class protection or empowerment, 
White Australia was designed and understood to be an instrument of 
ideological domination, all the better to ensure exploitation. When Alfred 
Deakin introduced the Immigration Restriction Bill in 1901, he argued that 
racial homogeneity was central. 
A united race means not only that its members can intermix, intermarry 
and associate without degradation on either side, but implies one 
inspired by the same ideas, an aspiration towards the same ideals, of a 
people possessing the same general cast of character, tone of thought – 
the same constitutional training and traditions – a people qualified to 
live under this Constitution – the broadest and most liberal perhaps the 
world has yet seen reduced to writing – a people qualified to use without 
abusing it, and to develop themselves under it to the full height and 
extent of their capacity.163
He spoke these words in the wake of the Great Depression of the 1890s, a 
depression that had seen the new trade union challenge to capital smashed, but 
which had also seen the savings of most in the middle class wiped out in a 
series of spectacular bank crashes in 1893. Class bitterness was palpable, and 
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democracy loathed by the rich and powerful. The idea of Australia being a 
society in which rich and poor could intermix and intermarry was laughable; as 
was the idea that the people shared “the same general cast of character, [or] 
tone of thought”. 
Luke Trainor has written that, “Not all concealment is ideology but the concept 
does involve a deception whereby some contradictions are obscured and with 
them, the class interests they serve.”164 Certainly the White Australia policy, 
and the nationalist mythology that surrounded it, was both ideological, and 
constructed to conceal the class interests it served. But it was more than this: it 
was the lynchpin of a ruling class strategy of social control and social cohesion, 
a strategy theorised by John Stuart Mill. 
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Chapter 6 
The politics of ‘coloured labour’ in 
Queensland, 1876-1882 
THE CONFLICTS which led to the adoption of the White Australia policy were 
experienced most intensely in Queensland, and about Queensland, in the years 
from 1876 until the deportation of the majority of Pacific Islanders in 1906.1 It 
was the colony whose tropical industries were most advanced, and whose non-
European, non-indigenous population was the largest. Here the ruling class 
found itself grappling with the question of who should comprise the labouring 
class in the tropics. While some focused purely on the profits they might make, 
others were troubled by the possible consequences of such decisions—for 
colonisation, continued “white” immigration, the structure of their economy 
and society, investor confidence and investment flows, military security, the 
structure of their ideology and the problems of social control. 
 
1 In colonial discussion, Pacific Islanders and labourers brought from New Guinea were 
generically described as “Polynesians”, despite all being “Melanesian”. Indian labourers 
indentured for field work were commonly described as “coolies”. 
Page 256   Chapter 6: ‘Coloured labour’ in Queensland, 1876-82 
The dilemmas were enormous. Queensland capitalists had organised a dynamic 
and fabulously profitable sugar industry, which in turn opened up the tropical 
coast of Queensland to wider capitalist development. However planter success 
was founded upon the exploitation of Pacific Island labourers, and when they 
proved too few in number, the planters employed Chinese people, labourers 
from other Asian countries, and campaigned for the right to indenture Indian 
“coolies”. In the minds of most liberals, townspeople, selectors and miners, 
these coloured labourers and wealthy capitalists were harbingers of a society 
more like the backward American South than the powerful industrial economy 
of Great Britain. Indentured labourers allowed Queensland’s pastoralists to 
survive the trials of drought, fluctuating prices and “unreliable” white labour 
during the late 1860s and 1870s, but employing them narrowed the white 
labour market in parts of the inland. Strategic safety, white colonisation, and 
modern economic development competed with the temptations and necessities 
of current profit in a devoutly capitalist society. 
As a result of the intensity and length of the struggle over coloured labour, 
Queensland had the most sharply party-divided parliamentary politics of all 
the Australian colonies. Then, when the majority of the Liberal party joined the 
Conservatives in 1890, opposition to coloured labour galvanised behind the 
new Labor Party. The issue also created divisions inside the rival parties, with 
many urban Liberals impatient with their party leadership’s tolerance of Pacific 
Island labour in the sugar industry; while the extreme squatters of the 
Conservative party caused trouble for their urban/commercial colleagues with 
their own demands for “cheap coloured labour” on pastoral properties.  As 
McIlwraith’s deputy, John Murtagh Macrossan, put it in February 1884, in a 
debate on new laws to further restrict Chinese immigration: 
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The colonies of Victoria and New South Wales are not in the same 
danger that we are. They have no large capitalists wishing to introduce 
Chinese in gangs to work on plantations or to do any other kind of 
work…2
White Australia mythology has Queensland as the “black labour” colony, but 
this is less than half the story. This chapter and the next illustrate the many 
important ways in which Queensland’s bourgeoisie led Australia into the White 
Australia policy, and how the dominant element of Queensland’s Conservative 
party, the urban commercial bourgeoisie, led by Sir Thomas McIlwraith, played 
a major role in that process. As Lyndon Megarrity has found, there was a 
conservative “vision of a ‘White Queensland’ in which non-whites would play a 
discreet (and unacknowledged) pioneering role.”3
Queensland passed the first post-gold rush legislation restricting Chinese 
immigration in 1877, and tightened it dramatically in 1884, well in advance of 
the other colonies. In 1885, Queensland legislated to end the recruitment of 
Pacific Island labourers, to take effect from the end of 1890; and in the 1888 
election, the winner, McIlwraith, declared that the issues of Pacific Island labour 
and Indian “coolie” labour were dead. Thus, by the time colonial governments 
met in June 1888 to adopt a de facto White Australia policy and agree on harsh 
anti-Chinese legislation, Queensland had spent more than ten years 
constructing a series of legislative impediments to “coloured” labour and non-
European immigration. While Islander indenture was revived in 1892 by Sir 
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Samuel Griffith in perhaps the greatest political about-face of nineteenth-
century politics, Griffith refused to join with South Australia, which was trying 
to find a way to recruit indentured Indian labourers, in a conference to discuss 
the labour problems of the tropical colonies. For Griffith, renewing indenture 
was a limited measure to aid a specific industry; the general principles of White 
Australia remained. 
For their part, a majority of Conservative party politicians supported anti-
Chinese laws when introduced by the Liberals in 1877 and 1884, and they 
legislated in 1880 to deny indentured Pacific Island labourers to a significant 
group of their supporters, the inland pastoralists. While he attempted to set up 
a scheme of indentured Indian labour, McIlwraith insisted—under pressure—
that the labourers be returned home, forcibly if necessary, at the end of their 
indentures. When the sugar planters campaigned for northern separation as a 
result of Griffith’s coloured labour legislation, all the southern Conservative 
politicians voted against it in parliament, thus inflicting a major defeat on what 
most saw as the movement for a “black north”. Having decided against Chinese 
immigration, the Conservatives put themselves at the head of a series of vicious 
anti-Chinese agitations—in support of the 1878 seamen’s strike, in the agitation 
that started in North Queensland in 1886, and in the bitter election campaign of 
1888, where they set out to paint the Liberal Premier Griffith as pro-Chinese. 
The conflict over coloured labour saw political principle and self-interest both 
intersect and collide. In the Conservative party there were those like WH Walsh 
who opposed all attempts to restrict coloured labour, while the Liberal party 
boasted those like WH Brookes who resisted the pragmatism of their leaders 
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and fought to eliminate all coloured labour from the sugar industry.4 But it was 
more normal for the tension between principles and capitalist development to 
dog the major parties and individual politicians. The leading Liberals wanted to 
get rid of coloured labour, but they also wanted profits and economic 
development. To cripple the profitable sugar industry would have led to both 
immediate disinvestment in that industry, and to investor caution more widely. 
Capitalist expansion was as much a liberal principle as free labour. On the 
conservative side, British and white control of the colony was the principle 
challenged by coloured immigration. 
For their part, the sugar planters were willing to cut a deal over any legislation 
that left their industry intact and profitable; while the shopkeepers and 
businessmen mostly fought to ensure that the labouring population was white, 
free, growing, and able to spend their wages in the town on the beer, clothes, 
shoes and flour they manufactured or sold. So the shopkeepers and publicans 
of the Darling Downs were more concerned to deprive squatters rather than 
sugar planters of indentured labour, a move the squatters resisted in their own 
self-interest.  
The tensions between principle and capitalist development led to charges of 
hypocrisy. Sir Samuel Griffith in particular was charged with inconsistency on 
the issue of coloured labour and no doubt there was an element of truth in this, 
fuelled by extravagant comments on the campaign trail. However Griffith was a 
largely consistent politician, balancing partially contradictory principles and 
rival capitalist interests. He wanted a modern, free-labour, industrial capitalist 
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economy and he also wanted a profitable sugar industry. His various policy 
lurches were all responses to the particular challenges and opportunities of the 
moment, as he saw them. He could not have maintained his leadership of the 
Liberal party over two decades had there not been substance and underlying 
continuity in his positions on this central issue. It is for the historian to uncover 
the substance and continuity. 
All these cross-currents led to a series of policy distinctions; over who should be 
allowed coloured labour, over the conditions under which coloured labourers 
might be introduced and indentured, over the ethnicities which were tolerable 
or not. Sugar planters were treated most sympathetically because their industry 
was deemed impossible without “coloured” labour, as white people were 
supposedly unable to work in the tropical heat, and too unreliable and 
expensive for such a pioneering industry.5 Plantations set up in “unsettled” 
areas needed the most elementary clearing of vegetation and the establishment 
of infrastructure. Queensland’s sugar planters were competing with 
international rivals who almost all used indentured labour. The claims of 
squatters were regarded less favourably, the industry prospering in other 
colonies on the basis of free, white labour. 
When it came to the origin of indentured labourers, a distinction was drawn 
between the Chinese, who were regarded as the most dangerous for reasons 
already described in chapter 3, and Pacific Islanders who were regarded as the 
least harmful by many, because of the small population of the Islands from 
which they came. However the destruction of society on those Islands, and their 
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depopulation due to recruiting, became a source of controversy. Indian 
labourers were seen more equivocally; they came from a large population, like 
the Chinese, but one that was under the control of the British empire. Some 
imagined a future Indian invasion; others saw British control as insurance 
against that. 
The ruling class debate over Pacific Islander labour, 1876-77 
In the forty years after 1863, more than 62,000 Pacific Islanders were “recruited” 
to work as labourers in Queensland, mostly on sugar plantations, along with 
significant numbers of Chinese, Sinhalese, Javanese, Malays, Japanese, 
indigenous and other peoples.6 For the sugar planters and their supporters, 
indentured coloured labour was necessary because only indenture guaranteed 
that labour would be available when it was needed. Over many years they 
campaigned for a system of regulated, Indian “coolie” labour to replace 
Islanders and an end to the uncertainty they faced over labour supply. 
For its part, liberal Queensland mobilised against Pacific Islander labour, in one 
of the most sustained political struggles of the late colonial period. Amazingly, 
there is no comprehensive history of the movement against indentured labour 
in Queensland.7 This thesis will not attempt to fill that void; the outline offered 
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below aims instead to draw out the broad political concerns which motivated 
various elements within the ruling class, and the way the whole debate 
contributed to the ultimate adoption of a White Australia policy nationally. 
Certainly in Queensland the debate over Pacific Islanders dwarfs the parallel 
debates over Chinese or Indian “coolie” immigration; and the administration of 
the recruitment and indenture system generated a vast official correspondence. 
Chapter 4 outlined the intellectual framework of anti-slavery that informed and 
shaped the movement against indentured Pacific Islands labour, and most 
historians have discussed the anti-Islander movement in that light. Many have 
also seen this movement as driven by working class fears of competition from 
cheap labour. While this was undoubtedly an element, for the period prior to 
1890, labour historian, Joe Harris, believed that “the working class played 
supporting roles and bit parts only.”8 However, there is a second ruling class 
agenda that is central to these debates. In this chapter I argue that whatever the 
motivations of working class people in Queensland, for ruling class 
parliamentarians and newspaper editorialists, Pacific Islanders were seen as a 
danger to white colonisation, and specifically to Queensland’s strenuous efforts 
to attract British and European immigrants—an agenda fundamental to ruling 
class hopes for the future, and one to which the working class was largely 
hostile.  
                                                                                                                                               
policy to 1920, Melbourne University Press, Carlton (Vic), 1967 (first pub 1923), chapters 7-9, pp. 
135-187; Joe Harris, “The struggle against Pacific Island labour, 1868-1902”, Labour History, no. 
15, November 1968, pp. 40-48; DK Dignan, “Kanaka Political Struggle: An analysis of the 
attitude of conflicting groups to the introduction, and employment in Queensland, of South Sea 
Island labour”, Third year honours essay, University of Queensland, Fryer library, University of 
Queensland, c1949. 
8 Harris, Struggle, p. 40. 
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This colonisation/white immigration agenda can be seen in the first restrictions 
placed on the use of Pacific Island labourers, which were aimed at stopping 
pastoralists employing them. In April 1877, the new Douglas administration 
introduced a regulation: 
that no applications for permission to introduce South Sea Islanders will 
in future be granted to other persons than those actually employed in 
tropical or semi-tropical agriculture. 
And further, that no transfers of South Sea Islanders will be permitted 
unless to those engaged in such agriculture.9
This regulation remained in force—with one significant exception to be 
discussed below—for three and a half years until the principle was enshrined in 
the Pacific Island Labourers Act of 1880. 
From the very earliest years of the labour trade, Pacific Islanders had been 
indentured by pastoralists. While the first Islanders were introduced in August 
1863 by Captain Robert Towns, it was not until 1867 that a significant number 
arrived.10 As a result of pressure from the British government, legislation to 
regulate the recruitment, employment and return of Islanders was passed in 
1868 by the squatter-dominated parliament. The extent of squatter involvement 
in the labour trade is reflected in the high proportion of Islanders working on 
inland stations; in 1868, some 488 Islanders out of 1147, and in 1869, 697 out of 
                                                 
9 Queensland Government Gazette, vol. XX, no. 68, 14 April 1877, p. 1138. 
10 Dignan, Kanaka political struggle, p. 7. The numbers introduced were 148 (1865), 177 (1866), 
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1539.11 However, from the very first, liberals opposed the use of Islanders by 
the squatters. When the first bill to regulate the employment of Islanders was 
debated in the Queensland parliament, Liberals (unsuccessfully) moved an 
amendment to restrict their employment to coastal areas.12 In 1870, after their 
defeat in the elections, the Liberals set up the Political Reform Association to 
campaign, inter alia, on the issue of Islander labour.13
The intertwining of ruling class anti-slavery and white colonisation agendas is 
illustrated in the concerns raised by the Brisbane Courier—then still a liberal 
paper—in 1867: 
the coolie gives no adequate return for his services. He does not build, 
neither does he settle upon the land. How different if white labour is 
employed. Fair wages are paid, a family supported; goods are bought, 
the tradesmen on all sides are benefited, not alone the butcher, the baker, 
the grocer, but the shoemaker, the tailor, the cabinet maker, the saddler, 
and a host of others; and social progress is fostered; trade is stimulated 
and encouraged, the land is settled upon and cultivated by men with 
families; and the demand for recreation (mental as well as physical), and 
for instruction creates a supply; so that all classes are improved, and the 
status of society is raised.14
Dignan argued that from 1870 to 1872 there was a significant hardening of 
liberal opinion against Islander labour.15 By 1876, it represented a major 
                                                 
11 Kay Saunders, Workers in bondage: The origins and bases of unfree labour in Queensland 1824-1916, 
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1982, pp. 45, 40. 
12 Dignan, Kanaka political struggle, p. 14. 
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14 Brisbane Courier, 23 September 1867, quoted in Dignan, Kanaka political struggle, pp. 15-16. 
15 Dignan, Kanaka political struggle, pp. 34-5. 
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controversy in Queensland politics, driven by stories of Islanders being 
mistreated, and by an economic recession that made large numbers of white 
workers unemployed while Islanders were used extensively on pastoral 
stations.16 Legislation was promised by Liberal Premier, George Thorn, but his 
government was weak.17 By March 1877, Thorn was gone, and John Douglas 
became the Liberals’ third Premier in three years. 
Douglas gazetted his regulation limiting the indenture of Pacific Island 
labourers to tropical and semi-tropical agriculture five weeks after being 
appointed Premier. He made two attempts to enshrine this restriction in 
legislation, which would also have increased employer obligations towards 
Islanders and government supervision over Islander employment. In 1877 his 
Colonial Secretary, William Miles, attempted to amend the bill in committee by 
moving that no licenses for recruiting Pacific Islanders be issued after 31st 
December 1880.18 Sensing an opportunity to destroy the bill, it seems that the 
ultra-squatters in parliament supported Miles’ amendment—it would not affect 
them, as either version of the bill would legislate the existing regulation against 
recruiting Islanders to work on pastoral stations. The Attorney-General (and 
future Premier), Samuel Griffith, spoke against Miles’ amendment. The final 
                                                 
16 On mistreatment, see evidence of Sheridan to Select Committee, “Report of the Select 
Committee to enquire into the condition of Polynesians”, Qld LA V&P, 1876, vol. III, pp. 93-105;  
on controversy, see TA Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia: From the first settlement in 1788 
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Melbourne, 1969 (first published 1918), vol. III, pp. 1508-9; Letter of Thomas Jemenson in the 
Brisbane Courier, 29 July 1876, p. 6, c. 3; speeches in parliament in 1976 by Henry King, WH 
Groom, WH Pettigrew, John Douglas and Simon Fraser, QPD vol XX, pp. 183, 189, 204, 220, 267. 
17 It appears that Thorn may have bought his government time in office by agreeing to allow 
sugar planters and pastoralists to run their own Select Committee to inquire into the 
recruitment and employment of islanders. For a scathing review of the Select Committee, see 
Brisbane Courier, 24 November 1876, p. 3, cols. 4-5. 
18 Miles’ amendment is discussed in a Brisbane Courier editorial, 18 June 1877, p. 2, col. 5. 
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result was that the Douglas government abandoned the bill, and Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates record no further debate after an inconclusive committee 
discussion on 19 June 1877. Another attempt to pass a similar bill in 1878 was 
also abandoned by the Douglas government, but its regulation remained in 
force, with the acquiescence of parliament. 
The arguments for the 1877 bill placed a great deal of emphasis on the threat 
posed to British colonisation by the extensive use of Islanders in the interior. 
Colonial Secretary Miles believed that “if these Islanders were to be allowed to 
flow into the colony, European immigration must cease; else they would drive 
white labour out of the field, in which case the colony, instead of progressing, 
would start upon a course of retrogression”,19 a position that again united 
concern for colonisation with concern about the consequences of a semi-slave 
regime. While informing parliament that there were now 1241 Islanders 
working in the interior, Premier John Douglas also reflected the broader 
obsession with European colonisation: 
for every cheap Islander introduced a European labourer was driven 
away…working men would tell them that their chances of employment 
were lessened by every Polynesian who was imported; working men 
knew this well, and had means of communicating this information to 
their friends at home. Nothing damaged Queensland more in the home 
labour market, on which it must ultimately depend for supply, than the 
report which reached there in reference to the Polynesian question.20
                                                 
19 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, 1877, p. 50 
20 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, 1877, p. 53. 
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For Attorney-General, Samuel Griffith, anything which discouraged white men 
from coming to the colony would hinder its progress, while for Colonial 
Treasurer, Garrick: 
two streams of immigration could not well be carried on together. The 
fact that men on coming to the colony would have to compete with black 
labour must always be a serious drawback to getting European 
immigrants; and if they were to continue that labour to any considerable 
extent, Queensland might eventually become like one of the West Indian 
colonies—merely a small colony, practically, of black people—a result he 
was sure no person in the colony would desire to see.21
Significant figures in the Conservative opposition supported the bill. Its new 
leader, Thomas McIlwraith, with extensive pastoral interests of his own, argued 
that “an immense number of the population had withdrawn themselves from 
the colony. And this was largely owing to their having to compete on such 
unequal terms with black labour.” His solution was tariff protection for a sugar 
industry run by white farmers.22 He took this position in effective opposition to 
most other pastoralists. The Dalby Herald, a mouthpiece for the squatters, 
condemned the bill: 
it is not only class legislation in favor of the sugar-planters, but political 
class legislation as well. The capitalists and agents, who are really the 
great holders of the sugar estates, will benefit by it to the exclusion of the 
farmer, and why those should be helped, who are well able to help 
themselves, to grow cane at a lower rate than the small planter, we 
cannot tell.23
                                                 
21 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, 1877, p. 59; Griffith comments p. 56. 
22 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, 1877, p. 63. 
23 Dalby Herald, 26 May 1877. 
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Conservative, John Murtagh Macrossan, declared himself against Islander 
labour altogether, calling it “this discredit to the colony, and this great 
discouragement to European emigration.”24 Patrick O’Sullivan, the storekeeper, 
publican and property investor who would vote for a McIlwraith government 
in 1879, argued three grounds for the total exclusion of Islanders, the first being 
that, “the employment of Polynesians interfered with that of white people, our 
own race, who, when bringing their capital, intelligence, and enterprise to the 
country should find scope for their free exercise.” He pointed out that, “If free 
selection were established all over the colony”—as it was in the southern 
colonies—“there would be plenty of white labour, and no other required.”25
None of the speeches that constituted the majority in the debate saw 
competition by coloured labour against European in “working class” terms as 
threatening wages and conditions; it was instead a threat to their future profits 
and prosperity and to their system of colonisation. Most historians have 
radically mis-read this rhetoric as driven by a working-class agenda. Indeed, 
the high immigration agenda of the ruling class politicians and conservative 
newspapers like the Courier ran directly counter to the wishes and demands of 
the fledgling labour movement. 
But within this large parliamentary majority, there was a division. Some were 
genuinely against any further labour trade; others were prepared to accept it for 
the future of the sugar industry. Premier Douglas would have liked to abolish 
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Islander labour altogether, except that the Islander labourers “bolstered up a 
large interest representing the investment of large capital, and it was very 
difficult to abolish it all at once.”26 The former Liberal Colonial Secretary, RM 
Stewart, thought Islanders should be confined to industries where they were 
indispensable, such as sugar because he did not think it could be grown in the 
north by white labour.27 On the Conservative side, Macrossan was for 
restricting Islander labour as much as possible.28  
There was a strong thread running through the debate that account had to be 
taken of the sugar industry, and that its reliance on black labour must be 
respected. Some said it should be allowed time to either change or close down. 
Certainly there was hostility to Miles and his supporters when they advocated 
putting a definite stop to Islander recruitment from the end of 1880. Were it 
passed, suggested the Brisbane Courier: 
all improvement upon sugar properties must at once cease; it is even 
probable that further cultivations will at once be abandoned on many 
southern plantations, and by the end of the given years the sugar 
industry of Queensland will have ceased to exist. The value of this 
industry is, we think, scarcely appreciated by the colonists at the present 
time… This year, after the almost total destruction of the cane by rust in 
the previous season, the value of the crop, rum and sugar, amounted to 
about £500,000; in the coming season an increase of 50 per cent is 
anticipated.29
                                                 
26 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, 1877, p. 53. 
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28 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXIII, 1877, p. 58. 
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Thus, as the Brisbane Courier argued in 1880, there were essentially three ruling 
class positions on the issue of Pacific Island labour: unrestricted access for all 
employers under regulation; prohibition as soon as possible; and then a third 
position, the Courier’s own, which I would label, a “pragmatic colonisation” 
position. 
The third party is composed of those who propose to deal with this 
question from a practical, not a theoretical basis. They will permit 
Polynesian labor to be employed, but only under such conditions as will 
prevent it from displacing white labor. Since the sugar plantations in this 
colony have been created only by the help of black labor, it cannot be 
said that the employment of that labor on them has displaced white, nor 
is it likely that if the black labor was disallowed it would be replaced by 
white. Seeing, then, that the employment of Polynesians on the 
plantations has not interfered with white labor, and that the prohibition 
of their employment would probably destroy what is already one of the 
most valuable of our Queensland industries, the great majority of 
colonists have resolved to restrict the employment of Polynesians as 
nearly as possible to the plantations, but not to deprive the sugar 
planters of their services. This was the principle of the Polynesian Bill 
introduced in 1878 by Mr. Douglas.30
This leads us to consider why it was that in 1877, after three years of inaction, a 
Liberal government finally took decisive action, and was effectively supported 
in that by a large section of the Conservatives. Clearly the recession of 1876-7 
had an impact, creating widespread bitterness at the employment of Islanders, 
that bitterness including storekeepers, small business people and artisans, as 
well as labourers. However, this is an inadequate explanation; the Queensland 
ruling and middle class was quite capable of ignoring the sufferings of the 
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European working and plebeian classes when it suited them. I argue that 1877 
represented a turning point on this issue for the same reason it did on the issue 
of Chinese immigration; the Queensland ruling class believed it faced a 
challenge to European colonisation of the north and that Britain would not 
adequately resist this. As discussed in chapter 3, the perceived Chinese threat 
placed an even greater premium on successful British/European colonisation, 
and that is reflected in the emphasis on successful immigration in the 1877 
debates on Douglas’ Polynesian Labourers Bill.  
News that the Thorn government’s weaker anti-Chinese legislation had been 
vetoed in London arrived in Queensland around 29 March 1877.31 Almost 
immediately, on 31 March, the Brisbane Courier switched to a virulently anti-
Chinese position for the first time, a position it maintained thereafter. Douglas 
issued his regulation denying pastoralists indentured Islanders on 13 April, just 
two weeks later, and a week before writing to the other colonies seeking their 
support against London’s decision on the Chinese question. 
When the Brisbane Courier discussed the latest annual report by the Registrar-
General in its editorial of the 24 May 1877, in the midst of the parliamentary 
debate over Islander labour, the paper focused on what it saw as an alarming 
level of non-European immigration; finding that while the increase to 
Queensland’s population by European immigration was 5700, this was being 
challenged by an increase of Chinese and Islander people of 5400.32
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This was the context for the parliamentary discussion of Islander labour and the 
terms under which it would be allowed, and the reason, I believe, that the really 
sore point for most politicians was the employment of Islanders by pastoralists. 
If pastoralists in the southern colonies could make large profits using white 
labour, Queensland’s pastoralists were now going to be expected to do the 
same. Some Conservative politicians were as hostile to the pastoralists on this 
point as the Liberals.  Macrossan thought: 
the employers were themselves to blame for it. He had known that white 
men, when looking for labour, were told by the squatters, “We do not 
wish to employ you; the Kanakas are our men.” In short, white labour 
had been driven out of the North… Some persons might suffer, but that 
invariably happened in great and salutary changes of this kind. But there 
was this consolation, that their sufferings had been brought about by 
their own folly, in preferring coloured labour to white.33
The Conservative brewer, Patrick Perkins, backed him up: 
The character which the country out West had acquired was such, that 
when labourers in search of employment were recommended to go there 
they refused to do so. They were under the impression that nobody need 
apply for employment there but black men; and if, instead of advocating 
and encouraging that class of labour, employers out there had turned 
their attention to white labour, and had established some mutuality of 
feeling and some community of interest with that labour, he believed the 
present state of affairs would not be in existence. They had, therefore, 
brought this upon themselves.34
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The squatters were beaten. The leaders of both the Liberal and Conservative 
parties went to the 1878 election on a platform of confining Pacific Island 
labourers to the sugar plantations. 
The squatters defeated: The Pacific Islands Labourers Act of 
1880 
The new Conservative government of Thomas McIlwraith, which took office in 
January 1879, might have avoided legislating on the issue of Pacific Islanders 
altogether, but the behaviour of the pastoralists and their parliamentary 
leadership ensured that their defeat in 1877 would be cemented in legislation 
and surrounded by bitterness. In early 1880, with the Premier in Britain, the 
ultra-squatter Colonial Secretary, AH Palmer, lifted the ban on pastoralists 
recruiting Islanders. By the time a handful of squatters had brought new gangs 
inland, sections of the Queensland outback were in uproar. There were public 
meetings in several towns, and in Aramac, ministers Palmer, Morehead and 
Buzacott were burned in effigy.35 The Courier’s report of the Aramac protest 
meeting emphasised its middle class nature: 
The storekeepers say the Kanakas are no benefit to them, as after 
working their time out, they are taken to a seaport town for reshipment, 
and there spend their three years’ earnings. The publicans say they do 
them no good because the Act forbids the sale of liquors to Islanders; and, 
as many of the station managers say, they “hate the sight of them”… 
                                                 
35 Brisbane Courier, 26 February 1880, p. 2, col. 5 and col. 7; 6 March, p. 6, col. 4; 15 March 1880, p. 
2, cols. 3-4; p. 6, cols. 5-6; 20 March 1880, p. 6, col. 2. 
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A league is formed here consisting of all classes of the community, 
subscriptions for its support to consist of not less than one shilling.36
Behind the scenes, there was rebellion in the Conservative Cabinet. Postmaster-
General, CH Buzacott, wrote to McIlwraith that the issue had damaged the 
Conservatives in Rockhampton.37 Six years later, Palmer’s actions still rankled, 
and John Murtagh Macrossan, forced to defend his role in the scandal, would 
claim that he “was a long distance from Brisbane when it took place, but…the 
action of myself and another member of the Cabinet had the effect of 
preventing that action from being repeated.”38
Partly as a consequence, the government brought in a new Pacific Islands 
Labourers Bill in August 1880, and the miscreant Palmer had the responsibility 
of moving the bill, sections of which he clearly despised. The bill introduced a 
series of reforms that had long been advocated. The wages of Islanders were to 
be paid every six months, and a bond was to be paid to secure their wages and 
their return home should their master become insolvent. A fee was to be 
charged on all labourers recruited to pay for better government supervision. 
New controls were placed on transferring a labourer to another employer, and a 
new dietary scale was introduced. Hospitals were to be set up for Islanders, and 
the death of any Islander was to be reported to authorities. All these measures 
were generally agreed. 
                                                 
36 Brisbane Courier, 15 March 1880, p. 6, cols. 5-6. Note that one shilling would be equivalent to 
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38 Speaking during the debate on northern separation, ORDLA Qld, 1886, vol. XLIX, p. 641. 
Macrossan was replying to a speech by Robert Aland, see p. 629. 
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Kay Saunders sees the clauses in the 1880 bill banning the indenture of 
Islanders for pastoral work as flowing from changes to the structure of pastoral 
production, as investment in infrastructure such as fences and dams made a 
large, unskilled workforce less necessary.39 While these changes were certainly 
occurring, and reducing the demand for labour on each property, there was 
nothing in this debate which supports her conclusion, and the bitterness with 
which it was conducted suggests that real interests were indeed being affected. 
A wide range of issues was canvassed in debate on the bill. Hard line liberals 
argued for abolition of Islander labour, planters argued their case for a 
profitable industry and pastoralists defended their use of Islanders. The 
dangers of slavery were canvassed, while conservatives denied that anything 
approaching slavery could be found on Queensland plantations. Liberal leader, 
Samuel Griffith, and his lieutenants disavowed any desire to deny Islander 
labour to the sugar planters, and instead tried unsuccessfully to also apply the 
restrictive provisions of the bill to time-expired Islanders. 
But beneath the veneer of respectable debate and parliamentary manoeuvre, the 
squatters were angry. Their government was legislating to deny them cheap 
labour, the kind of “crime” they normally associated with Liberals. John 
Stevenson declared the bill had nothing to do with the interests of the 
“Polynesians” or European workers; the culprits were “a few agitators, 
publicans and storekeepers in certain townships who had raised an excitement 
on the question”, a charge repeated later by squatter, Lumley Hill.40 The most 
violent attack came from leading conservative, Boyd Dunlop Morehead. 
                                                 
39 Saunders, Workers in bondage [book], p. 46. 
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Morehead was one of Queensland’s leading stock and station agents, 
immensely wealthy, and a large-scale business pastoralist on the McIlwraith 
model. In parliament, he was a tenacious defender of pastoral interests, but the 
broader unpopularity of the pastoralists and the narrowness of their outlook 
meant that his contributions were often little more than muck-raking or point-
scoring. A future Premier, he possessed little of Palmer’s political intelligence or 
broad understanding of society. Like Palmer, he possessed an effortless 
arrogance matched by few other politicians. Within a few months, McIlwraith 
would reconstruct his ministry, using the opportunity to promote both Palmer 
and Morehead out of the elected Assembly, Palmer to the Presidency of the 
Legislative Council, and Morehead to the Council as Postmaster-General and 
government representative there. 
But now, in September 1880, Morehead was expected to assist his government 
to pass a law depriving his constituency of cheap labour. It was too much. With 
the bill in its committee stage, discussing the clause restricting Islanders to 
tropical or semi-tropical agriculture, he launched an extraordinary attack on the 
sugar planters and their leader, his conservative colleague, Francis Tyssen 
Amhurst. It is doubtful that Amhurst was used to such abuse—he was the 
brother of Lord Amhurst of Hackney, and like many of the largest planters, a 
lesser son of the British aristocracy.41 Morehead began by telling parliament that 
he was not there to defend the use of Pacific Island labour by pastoralists; “the 
day was gone by for that; and so he believed the day of their employment by 
sugar-planters would go by.” The thing that made him angry was that “animus 
was shown towards that class of people who were at present the mainstay of 
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the colony—the idea now was to do all they possibly could to hamper the 
squatters and to pet and pamper the sugar industry.” 
The hon. and selfish member who represented Mackay [Amhurst] 
seemed to think of nothing beyond Foulden—that sugar plantation of his 
which was so appropriately named. That hon. member seemed to think 
that the whole management of the immigration affairs of the colony 
should centre in and about the sugar producing districts. He did not 
believe that the hon. member cared one straw whether any more white 
men were introduced into the colony… Now that sugar had become an 
export, all the hon. member cared about was its production by 
blackfellows. 
This was slightly unfair; during the 1878 election campaign, Amhurst had 
defended the use of Pacific Islanders on pastoral stations.42 As for Amhurst 
himself: 
Let hon. members look at the hon. member for Mackay, who was a 
typical sugar-planter, and then look at the hon. member for Clermont,43 
who was a typical squatter, and see which was the most fattening 
occupation of the two. Were they going to further assist the hon. member 
for Mackay to get his full—to fatten still further on the State? Were they 
going to make him even richer than he was now? 
Finally Morehead found some comfort in measures that would impinge on 
employers of Islanders: 
It was the tendency of this measure to make the sugar-planters rich at the 
expense of the State… He was therefore glad to see a measure proposed 
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43 Henry Weld-Blundell. 
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which would provide for a proper system of inspection to be paid for by 
taxing the employers themselves. That was a step in the right direction. 
Any amendment that would be proposed which would injuriously affect 
the hon. member for Mackay should receive his hearty support.44
Not a word of censure from Morehead’s fellow parliamentarians is recorded in 
Hansard, and in the colony’s leading newspaper there was not a hint of his 
personal attack.45 But it was not the end of pastoralist resistance.  
In the squatter-dominated Legislative Council, carriage of the bill was in the 
hands of Charles Hardie Buzacott, one of Queensland’s most sophisticated 
newspaper journalists and publishers, and one of the leaders of the town-
conservatives who supported McIlwraith. Buzacott had an unenviable task; 
persuading the unaccountable Councillors to pass a law that challenged their 
own economic interests, and those of their friends. 
The need for legislation to protect islanders reflected a general problem 
in racially-divided societies: it had been proved in all countries where 
servile labour was employed that there were men of European descent 
who did ill-treat their labourers and that exceptional legislation must be 
authorised, if the community in which such labour was employed 
wished to preserve itself from the stigma attaching to men who ill-
treated their fellow-creatures who were not in a position to protect 
themselves.46
                                                 
44 ORDLA Qld, vol. XXXIII, p. 840. 
45 The Brisbane Courier’s report of parliament the next day reported Morehead’s outburst thus: 
“Mr. MOREHEAD pointed out that the sugar industry had been unduly fostered. If the planters 
must have this description of cheap labor, it was only fair that the squatters should have it so as 
to produce their wool cheaply, as this was the only reason why the planters cried out for cheap 
labor. He did not advocate the employment of the labor in the outside districts.” 29 September 
1880, p. 3, c. 4. There was no other indication of Morehead’s behaviour elsewhere in the paper. 
46 ORDLC Qld, vol. XXXI, p. 138; Buzacott’s whole speech is pp. 136-8. 
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This was a specific problem for Queensland because there had been abuses, and 
it had become “a matter in which their reputation was concerned”. They were 
also impelled to act because of the constant agitation on the issue, “which had 
not had a beneficial effect. It had been the cause of much ill-feeling and 
recrimination. It had made a considerable section of the population dissatisfied 
and disposed to maintain an agitation”—a swipe at Palmer’s indiscretion, and a 
warning to the Council to “give their consideration to the measure with 
unprejudiced minds”.47 But there was a glaring problem with the legislation—it 
proposed to legislate “discrimination which should be exercised between one 
class of employers and another”, something which both offended the general 
ruling class view of proper legislation, and hurt the specific fraction of the 
ruling class which filled many of the seats in the Legislative Council. Buzacott’s 
response was tortured: as unfair as it was, “It was necessary for the honour and 
credit of the colony that they must have legislation”, but “legislation they could 
not have unless they consented to legislate illogically and inconsistently”. And 
this is what he asked them to do: “The politician must compromise and must 
keep before him what was possible, rather than what was theoretically and 
absolutely right.”48
But it would take more than the tortured logic, pragmatism and veiled threats 
of a local newspaperman, no matter how distinguished, to get these proud, 
wealthy and successful men to swallow this bitter pill. For Thomas Murray-
Prior, Rockhampton squatter and son of an officer in the 11th Hussars, it was 
introducing slavery. “He could not see why, in the first place, any employer 
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had not a right to employ such labour as he deemed necessary, and why South 
Sea Islanders should not be free”; though of course what he meant by freedom 
for the Islander was not, perhaps, a definition most people would recognise. For 
the Darling Downs squatter, James Taylor, it was a tyrannical bill, iron-handed 
in its measures which required employers to seek favours—the right to employ 
Islanders—from mere officials. Pioneer sugar planter Louis Hope saw the bill as 
the work of a few publicans who feared losing business, an opinion shared by 
that proud attack-dog of the pastoral cause, WH Walsh, who complained that 
the designs of the Almighty, who had given them such a fine tropical estate to 
develop, were being frustrated.49
One of the few squatter-politicians who showed a glimpse of the legislative or 
political skills which were supposed to accompany the eminence of a seat in the 
Council was Gordon Sandeman. He shared their contempt for the bill, but also 
saw that throwing the bill out could endanger a great capitalist interest in the 
colony, the sugar industry, and warned, “if the Bill were thrown out now they 
should very likely in the future have a change of Government”. But his 
colleague, Francis Ivory, the squatter son of a Scottish judge who had 
represented the Burnett region with its plantations and pastoral stations in the 
lower house, was having none of this. He was openly in favour of cheap 
labour—which was nothing more than capital brought into the colony. The 
problem “had originated with the publicans and storekeepers, because the 
Polynesians did not get their wages paid in the interior, so that the publicans 
and storekeepers might have milked them dry before they came to the coast.” A 
                                                 
49 For Walsh’s politics and role in party struggle, see Denis Cryle, The press in colonial 
Queensland: A social and political history 1845-1875, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia 
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frustrated Buzacott might have later reminded him (over a stiff drink) that their 
Conservative government would not exist without the support of publicans and 
storekeepers like Patrick O’Sullivan, the brewer Patrick Perkins, and others 
whose sympathies were with the urban commercial classes. But Ivory had 
others to blame as well, including the sugar planters who were responsible for 
most of the deaths of Islanders, and immigrants from Britain, who were 
a discontented class of labourers—trades-unionists who had been forced 
out of England…and who brought with them all their antipathies and 
antagonistic feelings to men who had worked themselves into positions 
of independence; and it was to pander to the feelings of these people that 
a young colony like this was supposed to sacrifice all its best interests.50
This was all too much for the Postmaster-General. He “had been exceedingly 
surprised at the tone of the debate”. The attacks on those demanding the 
restriction of Islanders were insulting to the public in general, and honest and 
disinterested men in particular. Worse, “Some of the speeches delivered by hon. 
gentlemen who were employers of labour seemed to indicate that those hon. 
gentlemen looked at the question simply from their own standpoint.” He 
lambasted them for being completely out of touch with public opinion. “The 
feeling of the people…was unmistakably demonstrated. They were bound to 
yield”: 
They might resist that expression of opinion in the Council, and they 
might throw the Bill out, and for years obstruct the settlement of the 
question; but if hon. members would remember what was done by the 
last Government that was in power, they would see that it would be just 
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as much in the power of succeeding Governments to decree that no 
licenses should be issued at all…51
After a few more bad-tempered comments, the second reading of the bill was 
easily carried, but the skirmishing continued into the committee stage where 
definitions were argued over, and a raft of minor changes made. In a new 
attempt to punish the planters, the Council voted for a clause, moved by the 
Liberal leader, CS Mein, to limit the daily work for Islanders to eight hours.52 
This attracted an immediate protest from Maryborough plantation owner and 
MLA, Henry Palmer, saying the clause would be disastrous for the planters. 
There was no reply to this as the Council moved to the vote.53  Back in the 
Legislative Assembly, the eight-hours provision was knocked out—which 
suggests how little influence the working class had in shaping this legislation—
and after more minor changes, the bill was accepted by both houses and signed 
into law on 18 November 1880.54 The Brisbane Courier was pleased with the bill: 
No doubt it belongs to that kind of legislation which is objected to by the 
extreme advocates of non-interference with private enterprise. It forbids 
the employer to get his labor where or how he finds most convenient. 
But it is in accordance with the policy which this community has 
deliberately adopted, that of regarding the settlement of a European 
people, capable of forming a homogenous society, as the first 
consideration. We are anxious to develop our resources by the quickest 
and surest means, provided always that the development shall not 
interfere with the realisation of this hope.55
                                                 
51 ORDLC Qld, vol. XXXI, 1880, pp. 156-7. 
52 ORDLC Qld, vol. XXXI, 1880, pp. 178-80.  
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54 Queensland Government Gazette, vol. XXVII (July-December 1880), pp. 1257-70. 
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The Pacific Islands Labourers Bill 1880 illustrates many of the key elements of the 
majority ruling class strategy on coloured labour. Indeed, it is the Conservative 
Party disciplining a significant part of its own constituency, with the support of 
the Brisbane Courier, that illustrates the ruling class nature of the strategy being 
imposed. The European, and predominantly British, colonisation of the 
Australian continent was central to their view of a prosperous and safe future, 
and the north was not to be exempted. Equally, the colonies were to build 
modern, wage labour economies, and not sink to the level of an indentured 
labour colony. While the explosive economic growth and profits offered by a 
successful sugar industry were to be nurtured, the problems inherent in using 
indentured labour were to be contained—they would not be allowed to 
determine the overall nature of the colony. Indeed, the Brisbane Courier 
celebrated the good fortune of Queensland’s ruling class “in securing the 
services of a race of people who, while performing the work we require, are not 
likely to open the floodgates and pour in upon us a tide of colored humanity.”56 
Faced with the intransigence of the Legislative Council, the Courier did not limit 
itself to an argument for pragmatic concessions. It declared: 
It is not merely or mainly because white workmen dislike Polynesian 
labor that we are legislating to restrict it within as narrow bounds as 
possible. It is because we are all desirous of forming, as far as climate 
and the circumstances of the colony will allow us, a homogenous 
community. We dwell on the point, because it is the great and all-
sufficient justification for our exceptional laws directed against colored 
aliens.57
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The planters fight for indentured Indian labour 
With the final defeat of the squatters in 1880, the focus of the “coloured labour” 
debate in Queensland moved firmly back to focus on the sugar industry. The 
explosive growth of the industry, and the demands of the planters for coloured 
labour, would lead to a vast struggle over coloured labour, a conflict that would 
escalate and polarise until the planters were fighting for the break-up of 
Queensland itself. This is a fight the planters would lose, and lose principally at 
the hands of the rest of the capitalist class in Queensland. 
High prices and high profits from the late 1870s led to a massive expansion of 
the sugar industry, both geographically and in terms of capital invested. Where 
11,005 acres of cane were grown in 1878, the figure was 38,557 acres in 1885; 
while sugar produced rose even more spectacularly, from 12,356 tons to 55,796. 
The centre of the industry moved further north, as the areas around Brisbane 
and Maryborough became relatively less important. Production developed 
rapidly in the far north, and Mackay became the centre of the industry. In six 
frenzied months, from October 1881 to March 1882, 240,000 acres of land 
around Mackay were sold for plantations and prices trebled.58 The capital 
structure of the industry was also transformed, with the wealthy planter 
residing on his plantation giving way to joint-stock companies owning 
plantations run by local managers. The sources of capital also shifted, as 
Melbourne-based businesses and British capital moved in.59
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One important result was an enormous pressure to recruit more labourers. 
Indeed, from an average of around 2000 labourers per year, from 1874 to 1877, 
which dipped to a low of 1463 in 1878, recruitment in the following years shot 
up to 2182, 1995, 2643, 3139 and peaked at 5273 Islanders at the height of the 
boom in 1883. Recruiters were pushing the limits of what their existing Island 
sources could provide, but even that was not enough for the planters. They 
constantly complained of labour shortages—in parliament, newspapers and 
private correspondence. Recruiting ships moved into areas previously 
unexploited, especially in and around New Guinea.60 There was a reversion to 
kidnapping and forced enlistment. A new series of recruiting outrages shocked 
Australian and British society in the mid-1880s, threatening the very existence 
of the labour trade. The Islands themselves began to suffer a crisis of 
depopulation, a development which troubled the leading planters. 
The planters responded by turning their hopes and demands to India, which 
had provided hundreds of thousands of indentured labourers for the sugar and 
other industries of many far-flung British (and French) colonies, including 
Mauritius, British Guiana, Trinidad, Jamaica, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Malaya and 
Natal.61 For the planters, the Conservative party and the Brisbane Courier, the 
call for “coolie labour” would dominate their view of the future, and their 
                                                 
60 Saunders, Workers in bondage [book], p. 97 has a table showing the origin of Pacific Island 
recruits each year. Vanuatu (New Hebrides) is the dominant source until 1882; the Solomons 
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61 Hugh Tinker, A new system of slavery: The export of Indian labour overseas 1830-1920, Oxford 
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strategy for settling the “coloured labour” debate for decades to come. 
However, as soon as the cry was raised, the Liberals began their resistance. 
The importation of Indian labourers (“coolies”) had been the original “coloured 
labour” proposed for Queensland, as the newly-established colony sought 
economic advantage from the American Civil War. Enterprising capitalists and 
the fledgling government hoped to grow cotton to feed British textile mills 
whose American supplies were imperiled by the war. Negotiations with the 
British government of India were concluded, legislation passed in 1862 and 
regulations published in 1863 to allow and control the indenture of “coolies”. 
This effort was still-born, due to the success of sugar grown with cheaper 
Islander labour, and the regulatory framework was allowed to lapse. In 1874, 
there was a new attempt to get the Queensland government to regain 
permission from India to indenture labourers. Thomas Fitzgerald, pioneer 
sugar planter, cohered the three north Queensland members of parliament and 
together they published a “Northern Manifesto”, five demands which they 
insisted would represent ”justice for the North”. One of these was “coolie 
labour” for the sugar industry. 
When Fitzgerald’s motion for Indian labour reached parliament, the Legislative 
Assembly split three ways. Fitzgerald himself argued for “coolies” on the basis 
of the particular needs of the sugar industry in the tropical climate of North 
Queensland. The recently elected Liberal Premier Macalister argued a position 
hostile to any “coloured labour” in Queensland. According to IN Moles, who 
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has discussed the history of the “coolie labour” issue in Queensland,62 
Macalister misjudged the mood of the Assembly. But so too did the squatters 
Ivory and Morehead, who supported Fitzgerald’s motion as a means of 
introducing cheap labour more generally. In the process they crystallized a 
third position, led by John Murtagh Macrossan, the north’s most important 
politician for nearly two decades. Macrossan had intended to support 
Fitzgerald, but Ivory and Morehead changed his mind, because he was opposed 
to any labour that would compete with Europeans.63 Fitzgerald’s motion was 
defeated.64 Macrossan’s position did not just represent a split in conservative 
ranks, but also found support amongst liberals who were prepared to 
countenance “coloured labour”, if it were strictly limited to producing for 
profits for the sugar industry. Macrossan’s position presaged the dominant 
bourgeois position adopted from 1877 (and legislated in 1880) over limiting 
Pacific Islands labourers to tropical and semi-tropical agriculture. 
In early 1881, with the sugar industry facing a shortage of Pacific Island 
labourers, the McIlwraith government began a new push for indentured 
Indians. The Colonial Secretary, Sir Arthur Palmer, wrote to the Indian 
government seeking Queensland’s re-inclusion on the list of approved places 
for indenture.65 The motive, said Palmer, was the difficulties they expected the 
sugar industry to have recruiting coloured labour from the Pacific. Alfred 
Hewitt of Pleystowe Plantation, Mackay, had written to Palmer the previous 
                                                 
62 IN Moles, “The Indian Coolie labour issue in Queensland”, Journal of the Royal Historical 
Society of Queensland, vol. 5, no. 5, 1957, pp. 1345-72. Moles’ article was far more subtle than 
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month to tell the government to appoint an Indian Coolie Commissioner: “It is 
startling to see how many Mills & plantations are slacking & only labor is 
wanted to develop a grand industry on land unsuited for anything else.”66  
From the first the government proposed to limit the employment of Indian 
labourers to tropical and semi-tropical agriculture, accepting the ruling class 
consensus of 1877. While Palmer’s approach to India remained secret for some 
time, the government’s strategy was revealed when it placed on the Estimates 
to be approved by Parliament, money for a government agent in India. The 
Liberals prepared—confidently—for battle over the issue, but when the 
expenditure item came up for debate, Palmer withdrew it, saying, 
”preparations were not sufficiently forward to admit of an immigration agent 
being sent into British India, and if the money were voted there would be no 
use for it.”67
In fact, it was to take another two years before the McIlwraith Government was 
able to finalise regulations that were acceptable to both the town conservatives 
in the ministry and the British Government of India. In particular, the 
government found that in its first draft of regulations controlling indentured 
labour from India, it had made no provision to confine “coolies” to tropical or 
semi-tropical agriculture after their first indenture was finished. The drift of 
post-indenture coloured labourers into the general labour market was an issue 
the Liberals had focused on in the debate over the Pacific Island Labourers Bill 
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in 1880.68 McIlwraith proposed a regulation to jail for six months any Indian 
labourer who did not re-indenture or return home, a provision the British 
Government of India rejected, insisting that “No penalty…[should] be imposed 
on any Indian immigrant who may have been induced to evade the law.” It 
proposed, instead, punishing the employer, with a regulation that made it 
illegal to employ Indian labourers except under an agreement ratified by 
government officials.69 The British Indian government was able to impose a 
series of other unwanted conditions on the indenture of labourers, including 
provisions regulating hours of work, weekly days off, higher minimum wages, 
a specific Protector of Immigrants who spoke Indian languages and would be 
paid for by Queensland, and that 40 adult females would be recruited for every 
100 adult males.70  
While McIlwraith was negotiating, Griffith was campaigning. In 1882, in 
parliament, he moved the repeal of the existing Coolie labour laws.71 His 
argument centred on the dangers of racialised labour—servile labour. For 
Griffith, the issue was not as narrow as “slavery”; indeed the social and 
economic structure of the former slave colonies was just as much to be 
                                                 
68 This led to “some slight alterations” being proposed; McIlwraith to Indian Government, 21 
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71 The “Labourers from British India Act Repeal Bill”, moved by Griffith on 18 July 1882, 
ORDLA Qld, vol. XXXVII, p. 98; the second reading debate is on 27 July, ORDLA Qld, vol. 
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rejected.72 Griffith also took up the supposed danger to British colonisation. The 
regulation that would force Indian labourers home—the “slight alteration” 
proposed by McIlwraith—would not protect Queensland. The British Indian 
Government insisting on a significant proportion of women coming with male 
labourers proved that as far as they were concerned: 
the coolie should come here, not as a mere labourer to work for a short 
time and then go back, but that he might, in fact, remain in the colony 
and become a settler in it.  The Government of India were troubled with 
a redundant population just as they were in England, and were anxious 
that their people should emigrate and settle elsewhere.73
James Dickson, the leading liberal and prominent Brisbane merchant and 
banker who was said to represent the importers in Queensland politics,74 
focused on the danger that Indian labourers represented to the British 
colonisation of Queensland. He argued that Pacific Islanders had been accepted 
as “a temporary expedient”, to “enable planters to overcome the pioneering 
difficulties of successfully cultivating sugar.” Islanders represented no 
fundamental threat because their numbers were so modest: 
He did not think they would in any way assume such large proportions 
as to cause alarm for the future. Coolie immigration he considered quite 
a different question. In introducing coolie immigration no one could fix 
its extent, no one could tell to what extent they would settle in the 
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colony, or to what extent they would affect their social institutions and 
the progress of the colony.75
He echoed Griffith’s concern over the mandated importation of women from 
India: 
Would they not be employed as domestic servants in the households on 
the plantations? If so…there was no limit to which the thing might go. 
They were introducing a class of people accustomed to the imitative arts 
and skilled in mechanical industries, and some of their race had shown 
marked ability in the professions. There was no denying the fact that all 
occupations and pursuits in the colony would be open to their class; and 
if once established there he could see clearly that there would be very 
little room and very few attractions left to induce his fellow-countrymen 
to make the colony their home.76
For Dickson the issue was not simply to establish profitable industries: “They 
might buy accumulation and wealth too dearly” it if involved “the degradation 
of the population”. There was “no country in the world where there was a 
mixed servile and free population which could be said to hold a leading 
position among the nations.”77
In response to Griffith, McIlwraith moved that all regulations under the Coolie 
Labour Acts would have to be passed by parliament, and not just gazetted by 
the government, and insisted that he would do nothing to endanger the 
progress of white colonisation: 
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Page 292   Chapter 6: ‘Coloured labour’ in Queensland, 1876-82 
He believed they should do all they could to assist the sugar-planters in 
their work; at the same time he considered it was their duty, as colonists, 
to provide for the well-being of their fellow countrymen—those white 
races at home whom they wished to do so much to encourage to come 
here… He saw, therefore, no danger whatever to the colony from the 
introduction of those men, provided they were not allowed to mix 
among the general population.78
This did not impress William Kellett, the successful stock and station agent (and 
former pastoral manager) who had helped bring McIlwraith to power in 1879. 
The proposal to bring 40 Indian women for every 100 male labourers “simply 
meant that those people were to settle down here and become colonists in every 
respect, and he believed in a very short time they would have equal votes and 
rights with the white population of the colony.” The result, he feared would be 
“that before many years were over they could be inundated from India”.79
Two days before the parliamentary debate, William McIlwraith, a part-owner of 
the Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, wrote that he saw Griffith’s proposed repeal 
of the Coolie labour laws “as an attempt upon the part of Sam to compel you to 
commit yourself farther than you have done.”80 If so, it was a success, for it was 
only McIlwraith’s timely concession on Coolie labour regulations that allowed 
the government to narrowly defeat repeal, 27-23. It would prove a hollow 
victory. 
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Chapter 7 
The politics of ‘coloured labour’ in 
Queensland, 1883-1886 
The decision of Queensland’s sugar planters to press for the right to recruit 
indentured Indian labour broke the broad ruling class consensus which had 
hitherto tolerated their use of indentured Pacific Islanders. It was the Indian 
“coolie” issue that most sharply divided Liberals from Conservatives, and on 
the one occasion when the issue was put to the test, the Queensland general 
election of 1883, the Conservatives were defeated. The planters’ push for Indian 
labourers helped provoke a raft of restrictive labour legislation by the new 
Liberal government, and this in turn led the planters to gamble on separation 
for North Queensland. It was in this contest that the real balance of forces 
within the ruling class was revealed. While the urban-conservatives, 
represented by the Brisbane Courier, supported the planters in their desire for 
Indian labour, that support was conditional on a broader political structure 
which quarantined what they believed would be the effects of racialised labour, 
and prevented any shift away from a predominantly white Queensland with a 
modern, free-labour economy and a parliamentary political system. Thus, when 
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the planters took their demands to the extreme of campaigning for a separate, 
new colony of North Queensland, the Courier and the southern conservatives 
abandoned them, and their arguments provide us with a profound insight into 
the real agendas of a major element of the Queensland ruling class. 
The planters’ aggression in seeking labour during the boom years of 1883-4 led 
directly to a new round of atrocities by recruiting ships, creating such a scandal 
that the Liberals were forced to pass legislation to terminate the Pacific Islands 
labour trade after 1890, and accelerate their own plans for a sugar industry 
based on white labour. Thus the planters faced the prospect of no “coloured” 
indentured labour at all once the labourers recruited in 1890 were sent home. 
Ultimately, as Adrian Graves has argued, the push for “coloured labour” for 
Queensland’s sugar plantations was undermined by a long crisis in the 
plantation system of production itself, a crisis that saw a long and painful shift 
to production based on (white) family farms and central mills processing the 
cane. Alongside this went a crisis in the indenture of South Sea Islander labour, 
a crisis which led to Islanders being increasingly employed as higher-paid wage 
labourers on farms, with a declining number of first-indenture Islanders 
recruited to work on a declining number of plantations. Graves’ emphasis on 
the material underpinnings to the ability of the state to abolish Pacific Islands 
labour represents a welcome rejection of the notion that the White Australia 
policy was simply about racism,1 but however important the microeconomics of 
cane production, politics were just as important. Plantations were retained for 
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decades longer in Mauritius, Fiji and the West Indies. The strategic and 
economic vision of key ruling class leaders in Queensland, and nationally, 
narrowed the options for producing sugar. The fact that this vision also 
coincided with changes in the methods by which sugar could be profitably 
produced undoubtedly reduced the level of conflict on the issue, and ensured 
that Queensland retained a large sugar industry. 
By 1887, Queensland had enacted harsh legislation against Chinese 
immigration and stopped naturalising Chinese residents, it had removed 
legislation that might have made the indenture of Indian labourers possible, 
and it had legislated to end the labour trade in indentured Pacific Islanders. The 
push for North Queensland separation, which many feared would produce a 
black-labour plantation economy, had been blocked by the united action of 
liberals, southern conservatives, and the Colonial Office. When the 
Conservatives won the 1888 Queensland election, they did so on a platform 
very similar to that which would ultimately become the White Australia policy. 
The ‘coolie’ issue destroys McIlwraith 
The year 1883 represented the death-rattle of the Conservative government. 
McIlwraith’s proposal to allow the building of a transcontinental railway on the 
land-grant principle through outback Queensland from Charleville to the Gulf 
of Carpentaria threw a major portion of the squattocracy into active opposition 
to him and profoundly undermined his government. His attempts to secure 
Indian labour for the sugar planters galvanised the urban and rural liberals 
against him in what amounted to a new crusade. Even worse, the issues came 
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together as many speculated that McIlwraith’s real agenda was to build the 
transcontinental with “coolie” labour. Neither the support of the Brisbane 
Courier on both these issues, nor the widely-supported annexation of New 
Guinea in April 1883, could save McIlwraith. 
It was the “coolie” issue more than any other which destroyed his Premiership. 
The letters he received from his closest supporters are eloquent testimony to 
that. William McIlwraith warned him from Rockhampton in July 1882, as the 
debate was opening up: “This Coolie question is a bothersome business, and I 
wish I saw you well rid of it. It is one of the questions in connection with which 
appeals may be made to the feelings and prejudices of the lower class, & they 
tell at the ballot-box.”2 The wealthy capitalist William Forrest, warned him from 
the Melbourne Club, “I much fear that the Coolie question primarily, & the Trns 
Contl in a secondary degree will kill you at the next election.”3
As his key supporters began debating strategy for the 1883 parliamentary 
session and the election campaign to follow, there were divisions. The leading 
sugar planter, Hume Black, wanted the Conservatives to take up the “coloured 
labour” issue aggressively. In May 1883, he toured the far north, and reported 
good meetings and success in arguing for “coolies”: 
At Herberton the miners were enthusiastic, especially as they never 
thought I would have plunged recklessly into the labour question up 
there. Somehow I managed to get hold of their attention from the start & 
                                                 
2 William McIlwraith to Thomas, 25 July 1882, letter no. 464 in McIlwraith papers, Oxley 
Library, OM64-19/15. 
3 Forrest to McIlwraith, 14 Feb 1883, letter no. 565 in McIlwraith papers, Oxley Library, OM64-
19/17. 
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laid such a plain statement of the case before them such as they admitted 
had never been done before. With regard to the labour question I find far 
less opposition than I expected. Everywhere along the coast the people 
are doing no good towards extension of cultivation for want of labour & 
at the next election it will not be “do away with coloured labour” but 
regulate it. Even in the Torres & at Herberton they say—Have it on the 
coast but we won’t have it up here. I have especially pointed out that it is 
quite impossible to prevent coolie labour being imported but that the 
danger is in having it without regulations confining its employment.4
John Hamilton, the doctor and sometime miner who represented Gympie, was 
quite opposed to this strategy: 
In the first place its hardly conceivable the prejudice which exists against 
Coolies — I have noticed it in Gympie, Wide Bay District & Brisbane — 
It’s useless to explain that the restricted introduction of Coolies will 
prevent the unrestricted introduction of a worse race [Chinese], their 
reply is that Coolies are more objectionable.5
For Hamilton, the government was in a hopeless bind on the issue: 
If we do face the question next year it won’t benefit the sugar industry. 
The Indian Government won’t of course assent to the regulations which 
were sent there and if we in consequence lessen the restrictions 
Parliament won’t consent to them and the fear of a dissolution or a 
resignation of the Ministry would not in the last session have the same 
effect as it had in previous ones in inducing men on our side to vote with 
the Government on the question. It would have the reverse effect as it 
                                                 
4 Hume Black to McIlwraith, 15 May 1883, letter no. 584 in McIlwraith papers, Oxley Library, 
OM64-19/18, emphasis in original. 
5 John Hamilton to McIlwraith, April 1883, letter no. 587 in McIlwraith papers, Oxley Library, 
OM64-19/18. 
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would be a safe and a good card for them to play at the next election & 
I’m sure you can spot men in our crowd who would play it.6
John Murtagh Macrossan was in no doubt about the problem the conservatives 
faced. In his own electorate he said, “Townsville is the enemy’s stronghold. 
There the anti-Coolie cry will bear the best fruit.”7 But he also thought they had 
a chance, if they deflected concern over “coolies” onto the Chinese issue. 
The Coolies will be a great thorn in our side but if properly handled 
between this and the election the Chinese can be made a still greater 
thorn in Sam’s [Griffith’s] side. Don’t you forget that at Roma The [sic] 
Chinaman is a more dangerous competitor than the Coolie to the 
working man.8
According to Macrossan, the biggest problem was that the planters themselves 
were doing too little to win the public argument: 
The planters everywhere in the districts up here have been very supine. 
Men who will not help themselves by the very small duty of looking 
after the roll are unworthy of the sacrifice we have made and are making 
for them. I have been tempted more than once to throw them and the 
Coolie to the devil.9
                                                 
6 John Hamilton to McIlwraith, April 1883, letter no. 587 in McIlwraith papers, Oxley Library, 
OM64-19/18. 
7 Macrossan to McIlwraith, 25 August, 1883, letter no 636 in McIlwraith papers, Oxley Library, 
OM64-19/19. 
8 Macrossan to McIlwraith, 25 May 1883, in McIlwraith papers, Oxley Library, OM64-19/20. The 
significance of Roma is that McIlwraith was to give a major electoral speech there on 7 June. 
9 Macrossan to McIlwraith, 13 August 1883, letter 641 in McIlwraith papers, Oxley Library, 
OM64-19/19. 
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One consequence was backsliding and inconsistency in their own ranks as the 
pressure mounted. Macrossan complained: “Cooper like the infernal fool he has 
always been would support colored labor at Cairns and go against it at 
Herberton.”10 In Rockhampton, the Conservative, Ferguson, kept his seat by 
campaigning as “an uncompromising opponent of land grant railways and 
coloured labour, and if these subjects are mentioned in the Governor’s Address 
he will vote against the Ministry and the address in Reply.”11 William 
McIlwraith railed privately against this treachery, but when Griffith moved in 
parliament to put McIlwraith out of office, Ferguson voted with his old leader. 
However, the Conservatives were routed, and Griffith had a majority of 35 to 
20.12
Approval for the recruitment of Indian labourers for the sugar industry was 
finally given  by the British Government in India in a letter dated 15 September 
1883, just as the McIlwraith government was being destroyed at the polls. When 
the Indian government finally received a response from Queensland, it was 
from a new Premier, informing them that there would be no recruitment of 
indentured labour from India, and apologising for the waste of their time.13
                                                 
10 Macrossan to McIlwraith, 2 Sept 1883, in McIlwraith papers, Oxley Library, OM64-19/23. 
11 Will McIlwraith to Thomas, 21 August 1883, letter no. 643, in McIlwraith papers, Oxley 
Library, OM64-19/19. 
12 Roger B Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1984, p. 
88. The actual tests of strength between the Conservatives and Liberals when Parliament first 
met after the election saw Griffith win votes 29-17 (for Groom rather than Scott to be Speaker, 
ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 7); blocking McIlwraith’s attempt to get new estimates printed (30-19, 
p. 11); and adjournment (p. 24). To these numbers must be added the votes of Dickson, who was 
out of Queensland and made Treasurer on his return, and the two Liberals who won the seats of 
Cook and Aubigny, after successfully challenging the election of two McIlwraith supporters. 
13 Qld V&P, 1883-4, vol. 1, p. 1423. 
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The Liberals triumphant 
The new Premier, Samuel Griffith, intellectual and energetic, set about recasting 
Queensland labour law and restructuring the sugar industry. First he attempted 
to repeal the Labourers from British India Act, but was narrowly thwarted in the 
Legislative Council; he finally succeeded in 1886. Then Griffith amended the 
Pacific Islands Labourers Act of 1880 to restrict Islanders to field work. The Chinese 
Immigrants Regulation Act of 1877 was also amended to reduce the number of 
Chinese people who could come by any ship—even if not travelling to 
Queensland—from one for every 10 tons of its tare to one for every 50 tons; to 
increase the entry tax from £10 to £30; and to end the refunding of the entry tax. 
A Native Labourers Protection Act, which prevented the employment of 
Aboriginal people on ships within Queensland waters, was passed with the aim 
of reducing abuses associated with bêche-de-mer fishing. It also provided for 
written work contracts for Aboriginal workers. The Immigration Act was 
amended to provide greater government support for the indenture of European 
immigrants. In the first year of the Liberal regime it seemed that, apart from the 
new Land bill, parliament debated little other than labour and immigration law. 
The overall effect of this activity was to limit the labour options for sugar 
planters and the work options for Pacific Islanders. This reflected the Liberal 
government’s strategy, which I see as one of quarantining the sugar industry, 
and applying moderate pressure on the planters. They were to be guaranteed “a 
practical supply of labour”; but no more.14 The legislative whirlwind of 1884 
                                                 
14 Speech of Garrick, Postmaster General and Leader of the Government in the Legislative 
Council, on the Bill to Repeal the Labourers from British India Act, ORDLC Qld, 1884, vol. XL, p. 56. 
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was intended to box them in without destroying them and the profits they 
generated. 
With the shortage of labour from the Pacific Islands, planters had taken to 
employing Chinese people, and in 1883, 2578 had arrived in the colony, the first 
really substantial intake since the 1877 legislation.15 The planters had been 
prepared to pay the £10 poll-tax.16 Griffith responded with the Chinese 
Immigrants Regulation Act of 1877 Amendment Bill. In the parliamentary debate, 
leading Conservative, John Murtagh Macrossan, pointed out that it cost £25 
each to obtain Pacific Island labourers, and a further £6 to return them to the 
Islands. Even with a poll-tax of £20, as proposed in the initial draft of the Bill to 
amend the Chinese Immigration Act of 1877, the Chinese labourer would be 
cheaper to recruit. Indeed, the planters were prepared to pay £30 to recruit an 
Indian labourer. “I have no wish to injure the planters,” he declared, “but I have 
a strong desire to protect the Europeans.” This led to the poll-tax being raised to 
£30.17 Sugar planters were to be strongly discouraged from employing Chinese 
labourers. 
Some sugar planters had experimented with labourers from other sources, 
including the Malay Peninsula. The Premier was sanguine: “I think the persons 
who have tried that experiment have already become so heartily sick of the 
result of it that we need not anticipate any serious attempt to renew it.”18 The 
                                                 
15 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 346. 
16 Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith, p. 102; Hume Black in ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 439. See also 
letter from Butterfield and Swire to Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong, 14 May 1883, in Qld LA 
V&P, 1883-4, vol. 2, p. 1422. 
17 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 348. 
18 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIII, p. 273. Adrian Graves suggested that part of the problem was a 
failure to make agreements with foreign governments; see his Cane and labour: The political 
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government made no move to limit or ban the introduction of labourers from 
other parts of Asia, but made it clear that they would do so if they thought it 
necessary. When Swallow and Derham, who owned “Hambledon” plantation, 
asked about the possibility of importing Japanese labourers, Griffith responded: 
there is at present no law in force prohibiting the introduction of 
Japanese subjects… If at any future time the introduction of Japanese 
should prove injurious to the welfare of the Colony I have no doubt that 
restrictions on their introduction would be imposed by Parliament.19
Griffith had made the same point in Parliament when Macrossan had argued 
that restricting the importation of Islanders or Indian labourers would lead to 
hundreds or thousands of Malays and others being introduced.20 An “almost-
white Queensland” policy was being constructed. The government wanted the 
                                                                                                                                               
economy of the Queensland sugar industry, 1862-1906, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
1993, p. 38. This assertion seems strange. Where Graves asserted that negotiations with the 
Indian government broke down, in fact they did not; the Indian government agreed to permit 
the recruitment of indentured labourers when the Queensland parliament passed legislation 
agreed between Queensland and India. The problem for the planters was that negotiations had 
taken two years—the issue mentioned by Graves, Queensland’s reluctance to pay for the 
administration of the system to protect Indian labourers, had been one of the reasons for the 
delay—and the Indian government’s agreement came as the Conservatives lost power. Graves 
argues that, “One of the important factors in the unwillingness of countries to have labour 
treaties with Queensland was the colony’s notorious reputation with respect to the ill-treatment 
of Pacific island labour and the state’s unwillingness to frame legislation which guaranteed the 
rights of migrant workers.” Cane and labour, p. 38. These assertions may be true, but are not 
substantiated by his reference, which is to a letter by Derby, the British Colonial Secretary, 
dated 18 July 1883, in which he rejected a request by planters to recruit indentured Chinese 
labourers in Hong Kong. Derby’s brief letter simply said that the Governor of Hong Kong was 
not to permit such indenture unless Queensland said it wanted such immigration, and then 
passed laws to protect the indentured immigrants in the same way India insisted that its 
labourers were protected; Qld LA V&P, 1883-4, vol. 2, p. 1421. No Queensland government 
wanted Chinese immigration, which is why the planters tried to arrange it privately, even 
during the McIlwraith regime. Britain would have faced an angry response from the 
Queensland government, and no doubt a considerable public agitation, had it allowed any such 
scheme. 
19 Quoted in Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith, p. 102. 
20 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 239. 
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sugar industry to restructure itself eventually around European labour. Its 
model was the established and successful sugar industry of northern NSW 
where European small farmers grew cane for the mills of companies like the 
Colonial Sugar Refining Co.21
Given the problems of an immature labour market, the government set out to 
facilitate the use of white indentured labour. They amended the Immigration Act 
to provide even greater subsidies for the passage of agricultural labourers from 
Britain, Germany or Scandinavia who agreed to work in Queensland under 
indenture—subject, like Pacific Islanders and others, to the draconian 
provisions of the Masters and Servants Act. Under the new subsidies, an 
employer could land a male or female labourer under forty years old in 
Queensland for £1, a fraction of the cost of recruiting an Islander, and with no 
obligation to pay for their return. Subsidies were also offered to bring the wives 
and children of white labourers.22 The planters expressed their utter lack of 
interest in the legislation. The failure of this legislation to change the nature of 
labour in the sugar industry was clear in 1886, when just 123 of the 10,630 
emigrants who were sent to Queensland by the Agent-General were 
indentured; and they were mostly farm labourers and domestic servants, with 
three venetian blind makers.23
                                                 
21 GC Bolton, A thousand miles away: A history of North Queensland to 1920, The Jacaranda Press, in 
association with the Australian National University, Brisbane, 1963, p. 147; also p. 154. 
22 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIII, 1884, pp. 272-5. 
23 Agent-General’s report for 1886, see Qld LA V&P, 1887, vol. 3, p. 573; Immigration Agent’s 
report for 1886, Qld LA V&P, 1887, vol. 3, p. 600. Earlier, in July 1885, in the Governor’s speech 
opening the year’s parliamentary session, the government regretted ”that little advantage has 
hitherto been taken of the Act passed by you during last session to facilitate the introduction of 
indented labourers from Europe.” ORDLA Qld, vol. XLVI, p. 3. 
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The new Liberal government’s position on Pacific Island labour reflected the 
same strategy. Islanders would continue to be introduced, but for Griffith, “the 
introduction of these islanders is only a temporary measure”:24
When the Government thought the time had arrived for the prohibition 
of Polynesian labour, they would be perfectly prepared to take the 
responsibility of doing so. It was their function to do so… He thought 
himself that the prohibition of the introduction of black labour should be 
concurrent with the substitution of some other labour to take its place.25
Nevertheless, there were 14,000 Islanders in Queensland; “Those persons are 
here, and we have to deal with the matter as we find it…we must do something 
to see that they do not injure the other portions of the community.”26 The new 
Pacific Islands Labourers Act of 1880 Amendment Bill excluded them from working 
machinery, making products marketable, being grooms or coachmen, or horse 
driving or carting except in field work, and removed them from domestic 
service. It also aimed to limit time-expired Islanders to field work, and to ban 
the supply of firearms to Islanders.27 According to Adrian Graves, the 
legislation succeeded: “The tendency to employ more Whites in skilled 
positions was reinforced after the passage of legislation in 1884 restricting 
Pacific Islanders to unskilled tasks in sugar cultivation.”28 It also had the effect 
of reducing demand for indentured Islanders in a situation where demand had 
previously far outstripped supply. Not surprisingly the planters supported the 
passing of the legislation, since it would reduce competition for time-expired 
                                                 
24 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, 1884, p. 134. 
25 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, 1884, p. 333. 
26 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 133. 
27 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, pp. 134-5. 
28 Graves, Cane and labour, p. 37 
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Islanders.29 Graves also argued that an expanding European population also 
facilitated the employment of whites in the sugar industry. 
Kay Saunders saw a profound contradiction in the Liberal position. The policy 
of limiting Islanders to field work: 
ensured the very structure they [the liberals] strove to destroy… [B]y 
insisting that contracted Melanesians work only as servile tropical 
agricultural labourers, Griffith’s legislation was preserving the 
hegemony of the planters; it stopped the Melanesians from being 
recruited into more remunerative capacities either within the sugar mills 
or outside the sugar industry altogether.30
Saunders was formally correct; the legislation weakened the position of the 
Islanders as against their employers, seemingly in contradiction to the 
professed anti-slavery politics of the Liberals. But this missed the bigger point. 
The Liberals were largely indifferent to the position and problems of the 
Islanders; their primary concern was the impact of sugar plantations and 
“servile labour” on the economic structure and politics of Queensland society as 
a whole. They were concerned to ensure a modern industrial capitalist future 
guaranteed in part by parliamentary democracy; not one as a backward 
plantation colony. 
This contradiction in the Liberal position was picked up by the conservatives, 
who threw all the liberal rhetoric about freedom back at them. As originally 
                                                 
29 Speech of Hume Black, ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 140; also p. 242: “he was especially anxious 
the Bill should pass”. 
30 Kay Saunders, Workers in bondage: The origins and bases of unfree labour in Queensland 1824-1916, 
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1982, p. 65. 
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moved, the legislation would have forced current time-expired Islanders back 
onto the plantations, and forced future time-expired Islanders to stay on the 
plantations, their only alternative being to return to their island. The 
Conservatives’ new leader, Boyd Morehead, affected outrage: “Is this man and 
brother, with whom we have shaken hands, to be turned into a slave? Is it to be 
considered sinful to employ such a man?”31
[I]t had been traditional amongst Englishmen that as soon as a man 
touched English soil he was a free man. But it seemed to be a different 
state of affairs in Queensland. Not only was he not a free man when he 
touched this shore—which he was not under the Bill—but even years 
after, when he had carried out all the conditions under which he was 
engaged, he was, after years of freedom, to be seized and told, “You shall 
only do so-and-so or you shall be deported from the colony.”32
This line of argument was not congenial to the planters. They were on the 
defensive, and were happy to make whatever concessions they could to 
maintain the existing system—or at least its essentials. Hume Black believed: 
that no doubt the whole trouble in connection with the kanaka labour 
had been brought about by time-expired kanakas remaining in the 
country and becoming a perfect nuisance in the towns and 
municipalities. He believed that it was the wish of the working men 
especially to see the time-expired labourer legislated for. Those labourers 
came here with the distinct understanding that they should return home 
at the expiration of their agreements.33
                                                 
31 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, pp. 146-7. 
32 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 238. 
33 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 240. 
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And Griffith pointed to the disservice the Conservatives were doing to the 
planters’ cause: 
They were told the other day that the planters were pining for a supply 
of kanaka labour, and that they could absorb any number of them, and 
yet when they proposed by the Bill that some 900 or 1,000 kanakas 
should be available for them they came down and cried out about doing 
an injustice to the poor black.34
Despite this, the Conservatives’ agitation was effective.35 The government 
backed down and proposed that the clauses forcing time-expired Islanders to 
do agricultural field work not apply to those who registered by 1 September 
1884, with proof they had been in the colony for five years. This special class of 
Islanders formed the core of those who were able to resist deportation in 1906.36
                                                 
34 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 318. The “900 or 1000 Kanakas” referred to the time-expired 
Islanders who would be forced back onto the plantations under the legislation as initially 
proposed. 
35 It would be interesting to investigate the motives of the squatters in campaigning for this 
clause, which deprived the sugar planters of the forced labour of the 900 or 1000 time-expired 
Islanders then in Queensland. Was it a belated payback for the planters’ support for the 1880 
legislation which deprived the squatters of Islander labour? See the bitter speech Morehead 
made about the planters in chapter 6. 
36 Clive Moore, Kanaka: A history of Melanesian Mackay, Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies 
and University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 1985, pp. 274-85. The Pacific Island 
Labourers’ Act (Cwealth) of 1901 ended the labour trade from March 1904, and gave the new 
Federal Government power to deport Islanders found in Australia after December 1906 who 
did not have the certificates of exemption granted in Queensland’s 1884 legislation. It was one 
of the major legislative manifestations of the new Commonwealth’s White Australia policy. By 
the end of 1906, some 691 Islanders held the certificates of exemption which protected them 
from deportation. After a Royal Commission, the Commonwealth also decided to exempt 
several hundred more. See Myra Willard, The history of the White Australia policy to 1920, 
Melbourne University Press, Carlton (Vic), 1967 (first pub 1923), pp. 182-5; Moore, Kanaka, pp. 
274-92 and esp. pp. 284-5. 
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Griffith’s Pacific Islanders labour policy also faced a challenge from more 
intransigent Liberals, an element that had grown dramatically with the general 
expansion of the urban and small farmer population in Queensland, and which 
had a sizeable presence in parliament after the Liberal triumph of 1883. The 
hard Liberal parliamentarians were rich farmers, manufacturers and urban 
businessmen who wanted to hasten the destruction of the labour trade. They 
chose to test their strength by introducing an amendment that would limit the 
working week for Islanders to nine hours a day, six days a week.37 This time, 
there was none of the mischief dished up by the ultra-squatters in 1880 when 
they had attempted to wreck the McIlwraith ministry’s legislation by imposing 
an eight-hour day; this time the Conservatives all voted against the 
amendment, to protect the planters’ interests. The hard Liberals were defeated 
13 votes to 26, with eleven of their Liberal colleagues, including most of the 
Ministry, voting against them.38
The hard Liberals took their stance on the basis of a report by two doctors, 
Wray and Thompson, who had reported in 1880 on the appalling mortality of 
Islanders, arguing that it was caused by being overworked by greedy planters; 
just one more element of the plantation system that made it reek of the abuses 
of American slavery.39 The planters’ response was weak, challenging the 
                                                 
37 Moved by Grimes, ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, 1884, p. 334. 
38 The vote is on a change of wording, but it clearly reflects the substantive sentiment on the 
issue, ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 345. Brookes was the only Minister in the Legislative Assembly 
to support the amendment. Seven of the thirteen voting for Grimes’ amendment had been 
elected at the 1883 election; two more had been elected in by-elections the year before. Of that 
nine, all except Higson (Rockhampton) represented electorates in the Liberal heartland, the 
populous south-east corner of the colony. 
39 See Grimes’ speech, ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, 1884, p. 334; Brookes, p. 335; Jordan, pp. 335-6. The 
report of Drs. Wray and Thompson is in Qld LA V&P, 1880, vol. 2, pp. 414-20. 
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mortality figures as exaggerated, and arguing that sometimes in agriculture 
long hours were needed.40  
The repeated assertion that Queensland’s anti-“coloured labour” legislation 
was driven by a desire to protect white working men is challenged both by the 
Liberals’ support for the laws promoting the indenture of white labourers, and 
by the response to Grimes’ nine-hour day amendment. John Ferguson, the anti-
“coloured labour” conservative, suggested that legislating a nine-hour day for 
Islanders would affect white employers: 
How would it work if the shopkeepers were compelled to work their 
employés only eight hours? The sugar planters could not be expected to 
restrict their hours of labour to nine in the crushing season. It would be 
right enough for some seasons of the year to work only six or seven, but 
during the crushing season the work must be done the same as on 
Saturdays in Brisbane, where shopkeepers had their employés working 
sometimes in the morning from 9 o’clock till 11 o'clock at night, though 
on other days they might be at work only eight hours.41
Griffith, supposedly the champion of working-class racial exclusion, voted 
against the hours amendment, fudging the issue by claiming that the factory 
acts in Britain had very complicated clauses on working hours. He argued that 
the planters would not overwork them out of self-interest—a self-interest that 
had not been effective to date—and that the over-riding issue was the need to 
restrict the number of Islanders and their social impact.42 James Foote, the 
                                                 
40 See speeches of Hume Black, ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, 1884, pp. 334, 343-4. 
41 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, 1884, p. 337. Ferguson was a conservative who had campaigned for 
Rockhampton at the 1883 election on a platform opposed to “coloured labour”. He supported 
McIlwraith as Premier, but also Griffith’s labour legislation. 
42 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, 1884, pp. 337-8. 
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wealthy Ipswich shopkeeper and businessman, agreed with the hard Liberals 
that Islanders needed to be protected, but was confident that with careful 
administration by the new government, the abuses of the past would be 
stamped out. “He was not one of those who were desirous of hampering the 
planter too much in dealing with the labour”, a view most large employers 
shared about their own industrial relations.43 William Salkeld, the Ipswich 
auctioneer, attempted to defuse this argument, pointing to the vulnerability 
produced by long contracts of indenture. “White people generally engaged 
from day to day, or from week to week, or at the most from year to year; and 
they were far better able to look after themselves than the Polynesians”;44 itself 
an interesting piece of liberal mythology that illustrates how little this 
legislation had to do with protecting white workers. 
The politics of ‘coloured labour’ immigration in 
Queensland 
The four major debates on labour and race in the Queensland Parliament in 
1884 give an excellent overview of issues surrounding “coloured labour”.45 
What they show is that these issues cannot be understood simply as a conflict 
between the supporters and opponents of “coloured labour” in general. 
Certainly that was one point of division, with some Conservatives unqualified 
                                                 
43 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, 1884, p. 340. 
44 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, 1884, p. 342. 
45 There were in these debates some relatively sophisticated speeches which ranged across a 
wide range of relevant issues; for instance Griffith, introducing the Pacific Island Labourers Bill, 
ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, esp. pp. 133-4. 
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advocates of “coloured labour”,46 while Liberals in general were concerned 
about either “slavery” or “semi-slavery” resulting either from the labour trade, 
or a possible future preponderance of “coloured labour” in the north. By 
contrast, Conservatives by and large dismissed this concern. But most Liberals 
and most Conservatives also distinguished between different types of “coloured 
labour” because in their minds, there were other issues involved—pre-
eminently the related issues of colonisation and strategic control. 
Chinese labour was rejected by most in the ruling class, with strategic concerns 
dominating. For Conservative leader, John Murtagh Macrossan, “Our great 
danger is from the Chinaman. We experience little danger from the kanakas, 
and the Government has taken care that there shall be no danger from 
coolies…”47 His Conservative colleague, John Hamilton, saw 400 million 
Chinese as “infinitely more dangerous than coolies or any other coloured 
labour”.48 When Griffith introduced the 1884 bill to increase restrictions on 
Chinese immigration, the most substantial debate was over whether or not the 
restriction on the number of Chinese allowed should apply to Chinese people 
planning to come to Queensland, or to all Chinese people on a boat stopping at 
a Queensland port, people who might be traveling to another colony altogether. 
Real interests were involved here; the latter, harsher position would discourage 
shipping companies from stopping at northern ports on their way south, and 
this would disadvantage those ports. So the vote was not for or against Chinese 
                                                 
46 For example, WH Walsh, ORDLC Qld, vol. XL, pp. 86-89, 113. O’Doherty had an interest in a 
large plantation. He thought the problem was not the Coolie Act, but whether “the people would 
not day by day and month by month see that the best thing they could do for themselves and 
their children was to encourage cheap labour in the best manner they could.” ORDLC Qld, vol. 
XL, p. 52. 
47 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 347. 
48 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 348. 
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immigration, but how much sacrifice would be imposed on North Queensland 
in order to maintain a high level of restriction. In the Legislative Assembly, the 
latter, harsher position was supported 32-9, with six conservatives included in 
the 32.49
Pacific Islanders were the most acceptable—or least unacceptable—“coloured” 
labourers because their small numbers in the Islands presented no strategic 
danger to British control of Queensland. By contrast, the greater resistance to 
Indian labour by the Liberals reflected their fears for white domination in the 
long term. James Garrick, Postmaster General and Liberal leader in the 
Legislative Council, summed this up: 
The introduction of coloured labour from the South Sea Islands is very 
different from the supply of coolies from British India. In one case we 
bring labourers from islands scattered over a large sea and inhabited by 
comparatively few people, and it is easier to manage those islanders who 
come in small numbers than it would be to control the vast hordes that 
might be brought into the colony from India.50
…or, he might have added, from China. The veteran “anti-slavery” campaigner 
William Brookes made a similar point when discussing the Pacific Island 
Labourers Bill: 
                                                 
49 Debate on this point can be found in ORDLC Qld, vol. XL, pp. 116-20, where the Legislative 
Council voted 11-6 to amend the Bill to make the tonnage restriction apply only to Chinese 
people destined for Queensland; ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, pp. 619-21, where the Legislative 
Assembly voted to remove that amendment 32-9; and ORDLC Qld, vol. XL, pp. 124-132 where 
the Legislative Council finally accepted the Legislative Assembly’s position. This final debate in 
the Council ended bizarrely, with a series of votes taken and the Legislative Assembly’s 
position finally accepted on a vote of 11-9 when two conservatives left the chamber and two 
Liberals returned. One of these, Kevin O’Doherty, commented that, “by voting as he did he 
probably was instrumental in averting a crisis.” p. 132. 
50 ORDLC Qld, vol. XL, p. 40. 
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The Legislature had decided to exclude coolies mainly because they 
existed in such large numbers that they might overrun the colony. For 
the same reason they objected to the Chinese. But they did not object to 
kanakas, because they could not defend themselves.51
John Murtagh Macrossan objected to the Liberal government’s Pacific Island 
Labourers Bill because in his mind, Islanders were simply not an issue. “He did 
not think the Kanaka question was before the country at all during the elections. 
It was the Coolie question that was then before the country.” 
It was not a question of kanakas, but a question of coolies, and of 
Chinese more than of coolies in his electorate; and it was also more a 
question of Malays than of coolies, and the kanakas were left in the 
background altogether. There was a sort of tacit admission, not only in 
his electorate but, so far as he could observe, in all the other electorates, 
that the Kanaka question should be kept out of view altogether.52
Conservatives generally rejected the idea that Indian labourers were a danger. 
Norton saw Indians as acceptable, while Chinese were a “real danger to the 
State”.53 Macrossan argued that, “Chinamen and Malays…are the real danger to 
the working classes, not the coolies”.54 Gordon Sandeman turned the popular 
stereotype of the Chinese sojourner on its head and applied it to Indian 
labourers instead: 
He could say that, from what he knew of the Indian labourer, his desire 
was not, like the Chinese, to settle down in a foreign country. There was 
                                                 
51 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 238. 
52 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 326. 
53 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 57. 
54 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLI, p. 58. 
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no class of people in the world who had a greater objection to foreign 
countries. Their only object was to make a little money and then return to 
their native village, and live upon what they had earned.55
This analysis enables us to see that there were real and genuine lines of division 
between the Liberals and Conservatives on the issue of “coloured labour”, but 
the division was more complex than one between advocates and opponents of 
“coloured labour”. 
Similarly, a close examination of the debates and conflicts over “coloured 
labour” shows that it is impossible to understand it as one of working-class 
pressure against capitalist greed. Certainly, some politicians attempted to give 
it such a character. When the Liberal minister, James Garrick, did this in the 
Legislative Council, the immensely wealthy William Forrest, punctured 
the lofty scorn with which the hon. gentleman treated capitalists. It had 
appeared to him that the Postmaster-General was somewhat 
inconsistent; for was he not one of the largest capitalists himself that we 
had?—and did he not own terraces of houses in George street?56
It is certainly true that the Liberals, at times, identified themselves as the 
champions of working men, but this does not mean that there was any 
proletarian agenda involved in their actions. Indeed, a central part of Griffith’s 
labour strategy was white indentured labour from Europe, something 
politically active workers had generally opposed.57 Indeed, Griffith himself 
                                                 
55 ORDLC Qld, vol. XL, p. 47. 
56 ORDLC Qld, vol. XL, p. 59. 
57 Richard Fletcher quotes Persia Campbell (in Economica No 1, Jan 1921) as arguing that “A 
hatred of squattocracy and convictism, and of indenture systems had left an indelible mark on 
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admitted that, “The principal argument against the introduction of European 
labour—the argument that has always been brought against it—is that its 
introduction will lower the average rate of wages.”58 He disputed this, but no 
party that was genuinely responding to working-class agitation would have 
introduced such a measure.59
The labour trade condemned 
The Pacific Islands labour trade had been surrounded by controversy from the 
beginning, but the recruiting scandals of 1883-4 destroyed the credibility of the 
labour trade, and drove the Liberal government to legislate to end the indenture 
of Pacific Islanders permanently—though this radical move would be reversed 
                                                                                                                                               
the Australian consciousness”, and that this influenced trade union attitudes towards the 
Chinese, in his “The role of the immigration question in gaining for the labour movement 
recognition by society in the period 1877 to 1890 in New South Wales”, MA, University of 
Sydney, 1964, p. 31. The introduction of the Agreements Validating Bill into the NSW 
Parliament by Sir John Robertson was strongly opposed by the Sydney Trades and Labour 
Council. The bill enforced agreements made between employers and workers that saw the 
employer pay for them to come to NSW to work for them, and included penalties up to two 
years solitary confinement. The TLC forced its representative, Angus Cameron, to abstain from 
voting for the bill; this was one of the major incidents leading to a rupture in relations between 
Cameron and the TLC; see Sydney TLC minutes, 3 February, 10 February, 17 February, 13 
April, 20 April 1876, Trades and Labour Council of New South Wales papers, Mitchell Library, 
A3828. The legislation was subsequently used to recruit strikebreakers during the coal dispute 
in the Hunter Valley in late 1879, and leading trade unionist, Thomas White, told the Sydney 
Trades and Labour Council, “hoped that the Agreements Validating Act would be struck out of 
the statute book.” SMH, 22 Aug 1879, p. 6, col. 2. 
58 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIII, p. 273 
59 There are very few situations in which genuine working class sentiment was gauged on the 
issue. See report of John Douglas’ election meeting at the large Union Foundry in Maryborough, 
12 Nov 1878, Maryborough Chronicle, 14 Nov 1878. There is opposition to assisted immigration, 
and discontent at Douglas’ answer to a question on the issue. See also the advertisement on the 
issue in that issue of the Chronicle. 
Page 316   Chapter 7: Coloured labour in Queensland, 1883-6 
in 1892, before it became effective.60 The scandals erupted as a result of a new 
wave of aggressive labour “recruitment” from islands around New Guinea, 
areas previously untapped for plantation labour. This new recruitment began in 
April 1883 and was driven by the increasing difficulty of finding labourers in 
the established areas of the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands, and the 
pressure from planters for more and more recruits as the sugar boom reached 
its peak in 1883-4.  
The New Guinea Islands were a gold mine for the recruiters; they could pick up 
their fill of labourers in a fraction of the time it had been taking. Recruitment 
soared, with 5797 Islanders coming from the New Guinea Islands in just 
eighteen months. However, unlike the communities and young men of the 
established recruitment areas, the young men from New Guinea had no idea 
how long they were being taken for, and what they were expected to do, in part 
because the recruiters were unable to communicate with them. Violent clashes 
marked the new recruitment from the very beginning. Once in Queensland, 
many of the new recruits resisted their labour obligations, and significant 
numbers deserted in desperate attempts to get home.   
Ominously, the new labourers began dying at a colossal rate, probably because 
of their minimal resistance to the new disease environment. On one Mackay 
plantation, Homebush, 85 new recruits died in the nine months to February 
1884. By May, Griffith had banned any further recruitment from New Ireland 
and New Britain; the recruiters responded by focusing on new islands, but the 
high death rate continued. In Mackay in the year 1884, some 823 labourers died 
                                                 
60 This section relies heavily on Peter Corris, “‘Blackbirding’ in New Guinea waters, 1883-84: An 
episode in the Queensland labour trade”, Journal of Pacific History, vol. 3, 1968, pp. 85-105. 
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out of a total of 3697, a rate of 22%, and it was predominantly the new recruits 
who died. 
Revelations about the methods used in recruiting led to a series of well-
publicised trials. The most notorious case was that of the Hopeful and its 
recruitment voyage from May-July 1884 to the D’Entrecasteaux, the Louisiades 
and other islands around New Guinea. Its recruiting agent, Neil McNeil and 
another crew member were both convicted of murdering Islanders who resisted 
recruitment and sentenced to death, a sentence which was commuted to life 
imprisonment after a vociferous and massive campaign by the Conservatives. 
The captain of the Hopeful and its Government Agent, the man supposedly 
charged with protecting recruits and ensuring the integrity of recruitment, were 
both convicted of kidnapping and sentenced to life imprisonment. Three others 
were also jailed for their part. An amendment to the Oaths Act in October 1884 
allowed Islanders (and other “blackfellows”) to give evidence in court, using 
the British Kidnapping Act as its model. 
The scandal had reached such a proportion by December 1884 that Griffith set 
up a Royal Commission to investigate. Its investigation was historic in its 
comprehensiveness. The commission looked into eight voyages and 
interviewed 480 of the 625 labourers recruited. Its report was chilling in its 
indictment, describing the Hopeful’s voyage as “one long record of deceit, cruel 
treachery, deliberate kidnapping, and cold blooded murder.” It found that only 
nine of the 480 recruits had known what they were signing up to. 
The report found that most of the Islanders wished to return home, and the 
government immediately announced its intention to repatriate them, and 
compensate the planters for their loss of labour, which ultimately cost over 
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£20,000, a colossal sum. The Acting Head of the Pacific Islands Branch of the 
Immigration Department, Charles Horrocks, was sacked, and legislation 
introduced in September 1885 to ban the issuing of recruitment licenses after 31 
December 1890. The bill passed both houses of parliament with virtually no 
resistance. 
The political impact of twelve months of scandal was enormous. The 
revelations undermined Britain’s proud but increasingly hollow boast about its 
role in suppressing slavery. The German government protested against the 
labour traffic and asked Britain to help “prevent any transgression of the limit 
which divides the lawful traffic in Polynesians from slave trading.”61 The labour 
recruiter, WT Wawn, who was stripped of his recruiting licence and denounced 
in the Royal Commission, wrote: 
The atrocities committed by the crew of the Hopeful…together with the 
verdict of “guilty” against the offenders, proved a sore blow to the 
labour trade. Very naturally, the unsophisticated public began to ask if it 
was possible that the stories told by missionaries and other opponents of 
the trade, about kidnapping and murders, might not be founded upon 
facts.62
Even in the heart of the sugar industry, Mackay, a promotional pamphlet for 
the town published in 1888 felt obliged to note that the “series of atrocities” 
revealed in 1884-5 
                                                 
61 Sir Raphael Cilento, with the assistance of Clem Lack Snr., Triumph in the tropics: An historical 
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shocked the whole civilised world… Thus the whole system of coloured 
labour was condemned; and throughout Australia and Britain it was 
boldly declared, that North Queensland was fast becoming a slave 
colony, and rivalling in cruelties and tyranny the Southern states of the 
American Union.63
For the Brisbane Courier: 
the labour trade is condemned by the almost unanimous consent of 
Australia and is a scandal to the Empire… The labour trade must cease. 
Even if its continuance in its present maimed condition were likely to 
save the sugar industry—which we do not believe—it would still have to 
be stopped.64
The paper attempted to blame Griffith for the scandals, claiming that recruiting 
in new areas always led to abuses, and that Griffith, as minister controlling 
immigration, had personally authorised all the worst voyages, despite 
knowledge of how labour recruiting had been done. This line was dutifully 
followed by the Melbourne Argus, which declared that “Australia is pretty well 
tired of this South Sea labour traffic. Scandals seem to be inseparable from it.” 
But the equally conservative Sydney Morning Herald considered the Queensland 
government “free from all complicity in these transactions”.65 For both the 
Argus and the Courier the scandal was an opportunity to demand once again 
that the Queensland government replace Islander labour with indentured 
Indians, a position supported by the liberal Queensland Governor, Sir Anthony 
                                                 
63 George J Perkins, Mackay. An essay upon the rise, progress, industries, resources, and prospects of 
the town & district of Mackay, HB Black & Co, Mackay, 1888, pp. 33-34. 
64 Brisbane Courier, 26 May 1885, p. 4, col. 4. 
65 Argus, 13 May 1885, p. 6, cols. 4-5; 14 May, p. 5, cols. 1-2; Brisbane Courier, 7 May 1885, p. 7, col. 
1. 
Page 320   Chapter 7: Coloured labour in Queensland, 1883-6 
Musgrave. For their part, the planters had silenced themselves as part of their 
tactics for pursing the separation of North Queensland. 
There is an arguable case that abolition of the labour trade was not what 
Griffith wanted, but that he was forced to legislate by the enormity of the 
crimes committed around New Guinea and the political backlash. As early as 
February 1884, Governor Musgrave had declared himself “shocked at what has 
come to light since I have been here… The Kanaka labour traffic is a slave 
trade”. He reported that “Griffith has told me that he had no idea it [the labour 
trade] was half so bad.” This was long before the worst of the scandals had even 
occurred, much less come to light, yet Musgrave believed the conduct of 
recruiters so bad that “I doubt that anything but the radical cure of stopping the 
trade & making it piracy will be of any avail.”66 Despite this undoubted 
opportunity to ban the labour trade, Griffith chose to rely on more stringent 
regulation and administration. Griffith had long insisted that he would ensure 
sufficient labour for the sugar planters. Musgrave declared his confidence that 
Griffith was “honest in his desire to do what can be done to prevent these 
iniquities”; yet his efforts failed as the atrocities continued during 1884. 
Certainly, the Courier did not believe that Griffith was about to legislate 
abolition; in fact it taunted him, arguing that his policy of closer regulation of 
the labour trade had been the price for vetoing the use of Indian labour, and 
challenging him “to take the step which should have been taken years ago—the 
total prohibition of the labour trade.”67
                                                 
66 Sir Anthony Musgrave to John Bramston, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
27 February 1884, in private letter book, Musgrave collection, Oxley Library, Acc. 334, pp. 170-
76. 
67 Brisbane Courier, 4 May 1885, p. 4, col. 5. The Courier declared it had always been opposed to 
the labour trade, a staggering dishonesty. 
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With abolition unavoidable, Griffith faced the difficult choice of seeing the 
sugar industry decline, backing down and accepting indentured Indian labour, 
or finding a way to restructure the industry on the basis of white labour. This 
was the most “experimental” and risky of the alternatives, but he pursued it 
with some vigour. In 1885 he introduced proposals to subsidise the erection of 
central sugar mills to be owned by co-operatives of local sugar planters, on 
condition that their cane was grown with white labour. Three such mills were 
erected, and were soon in financial difficulties; nevertheless, as a result of a 
mixture of political and economic pressures, this was the way in which the 
industry was ultimately restructured.68
Separation: The planters try to divide Queensland 
As Queensland’s sugar planters faced obloquy over the treatment of Islanders 
and defeat at the hands of Griffith and the new Liberal government over 
“coloured labour”, they turned in a mixture of desperation and overconfidence 
to a campaign for the division of Queensland and the formation of a new colony 
of North Queensland. Northern separation was a major issue in Queensland 
politics for much of the period from 1885 to 1894,69 and became a proxy issue 
through which much of the struggle over labour was continued in Queensland. 
                                                 
68 Graves, Cane and labour, pp. 23-48, 57-9. 
69 Christine Doran, Separatism in Townsville, 1884 to 1894: ‘We should govern ourselves’, History 
Department, James Cook University of North Queensland, Townsville, 1981, and p. 67 for end 
of the movement; Lyndon Megarrity, “Robert Philp and the politics of development in 
Queensland 1890-1903”, PhD thesis, University of New England, 2001, pp. 92-97. 
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The public face of the separation movement emphasised the raw deal the 
developing north supposedly got from southern politicians who dominated the 
Brisbane parliament a thousand or fifteen hundred kilometres away, who took 
too much in revenue from the north, and spent too little of that money building 
its urgently needed infrastructure. Certainly Edward Shann, writing in the 
1920s, believed they had a strong case.70  
There had already been some agitation in the north for separation, especially at 
Bowen, and the beginnings of a significant separation movement in Townsville 
in 1882 supported by both Liberals and Conservatives, but this had been 
paralysed by the bitter party struggle of 1883. The movement revived in 
September-October 1884, with a wave of public meetings across northern towns 
arousing interest in separation in early 1885. In April 1885, a convention of 
delegates from eleven North Queensland towns was held in Townsville to 
agree on a petition to the Imperial Government for separation from 
Queensland, and to decide on the politics of the movement. The convention was 
a considerable success; the mining centre of Charters Towers being the only 
significant town not represented. The separation petition was also successful, 
gathering over 10,000 signatures, from an area whose adult male European 
population was just 19,000. Even the Premier—who disputed the validity of 
many of the signatures—admitted that perhaps 6000 residents had signed it.71 
                                                 
70 Edward Shann, An economic history of Australia, Cambridge University Press, London, 1930, p. 
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The petition was sent to the Colonial Office in London in June 1886,72 and 
supporters of separation and delegates sent from North Queensland managed 
to secure a number of interviews with Colonial Office officials, including the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, to press their case. Today the movement is 
but a footnote in history, but the Liberals of the time were sufficiently worried 
to devote considerable resources to fighting it. 
For the sugar planters, the idea of a separate northern colony held out the 
prospect of “sensible” legislation guaranteeing them “coloured labour”, and 
cheaply. In a soon-to-be-famous letter, the sugar planters, John Ewen Davidson 
and Sir John Lawes, wrote to the Colonial Office in London in January 1885, 
supporting the separation movement on the grounds, inter alia, that: 
There is an absolute diversity of interests between the inhabitants of 
tropical and temperate Queensland on the subject of coloured labour. 
There are millions of acres of rich land along the north-east sea-coast 
covered with tropical jungle of no use for pastoral purposes, and which 
can only be utilized for tropical production by the means of coloured 
labour. 
This coloured labour, which is absolutely necessary for tropical 
agriculture, is denied to the inhabitants of the North by the 
representatives of the South or temperate portions of the Colony, and the 
development of one of the main sources of prosperity in the Colony is 
thereby completely stopped. The inhabitants of Northern Queensland 
are anxious to obtain coolies from India under proper regulations and 
supervision, and so put an end entirely to the Polynesian labour traffic, 
                                                                                                                                               
349 had left, and 111 signed twice or more. The discrepancies were largest for signatures 
claiming to come from Townsville and Mackay. 
72 The text of the Separation petition can be found in Qld LA V&P, 1886, vol. 1, pp. 440-41. 
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which is a fertile source of omnes troubles and complication. This is 
refused by the South, who last year repealed “The Indian Coolie Act”.73
Of course, the interests of the sugar planters were not the only motivation for 
separation. Townsville businesspeople had their own motives, one of which 
was the desire for their town to be the capital; no doubt this too was one of the 
motives for the long-standing separationist agitation in Bowen. In 1886, the 
Northern Miner, the dominant newspaper in the north’s greatest mining centre, 
Charters Towers, and the group of capitalists around the paper, switched from 
opposition to Separation, to support, in the wake of a dispute with the Premier 
over the latter’s attempts to contain wild speculation in northern mining stocks. 
The switch in Charters Towers briefly added to the credibility of the movement, 
but the exact relative weight of the interests behind the separationist movement 
is not at issue here. Whatever the motives of anyone else, the sugar planters had 
decided to dissolve their struggle for bonded, racialised labour into the 
movement for separation, and this gave the separation movement a certain 
significance in the development of the White Australia policy, and damned it in 
the minds of those opposed to “coloured labour”. 
The entire logic of events, from early 1884 until August 1886, was towards a 
greater and greater polarisation around the issues of northern separation and 
“coloured labour”. The planters were first radicalised by the collapse in sugar 
prices during 1884, which produced a widespread crisis in the sugar industry 
                                                 
73 Letter from Davidson and Lawes to Colonial Office, 14 January 1885, in Qld LA V&P, 1885, 
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that got worse as the year progressed.74 The raft of labour legislation, restricting 
their ability to recruit “coloured labour” and increasing its cost, led them to fear 
that the very future of their now unprofitable industry was threatened. As soon 
as it became clear that Griffith was going to put an end to planter plans for 
indentured Indian labour, the parliamentary leader of the sugar planters, Hume 
Black, warned that the government’s course of action might lead to North 
Queensland separating from the south.75 When arguing against clauses in the 
new Pacific Island Labourers Act Amendment Bill that would keep Islanders from 
working in sugar mills, he claimed to see “nothing but the southern portion of 
the colony represented” on the ministerial benches: “It was essentially a 
Brisbane Government.” At that stage he “deprecated any such idea as that of 
separation”, but thought that a Brisbane parliament could not legislate 
indefinitely for the north.76 Two weeks later, Black was more frustrated: “it 
became more and more apparent how impossible it was in Brisbane to legislate 
for the varied conditions of the colony.”77 The position of the Liberal 
government seems to have hardened even further against the planters when 
some small farmer representatives from north of Brisbane attempted to gain the 
right to hire time-expired Islanders, and Black supported them.78
The polarisation deepened markedly when the leading financial house in the 
sugar industry sought British approval for indentured Indian labour without 
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regulations being enacted in Queensland. In April 1884, RJ Jeffray, Chairman of 
the Melbourne-based brokerage firm, W Sloane and Co, began moves to seek 
permission to import privately indentured Indian labourers into Queensland, 
which Jeffray believed to be possible under Queensland legislation. He drew up 
a letter/petition to the Colonial Office, dated 9 July 1884, which was signed by 
around thirty sugar planters and capitalists with investments in Queensland 
sugar.79 When Griffith received a letter from the Colonial Office asking his 
attitude to the proposal, he was surprised and clearly angry. Any move by the 
Indian government to authorise unregulated indenture would, he replied, “be 
regarded by this Government as a most unfriendly act.”80 Jeffray had believed, 
on the basis of informal approaches, that the Queensland government would 
accept such a privately run system. A tense exchange of letters saw the wealthy 
and powerful Jeffray tell Griffith that the Melbourne-Mackay Sugar Company 
was closing down three of its five sugar mills, and backing the move towards 
separation: 
there is a diversity of interests in the enormous extent of country now 
known under the name of Queensland, and that what may be good for 
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“Hume Black is nothing less than Sloane & Co’s nominee”. Letter to AH Palmer, 23 September 
1878, no. 424, in McIlwraith papers, Oxley Library, OM64-19/45. 
80 Letter from Griffith to the Queensland Governor, 30 September 1884, in Qld LA V&P, 1884, 
vol. 2, p. 929.  
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the Southern districts is not necessarily good for the great and as yet 
partially developed territory of the North. That there cannot be a 
homogeneity of interests in a country stretching from temperate regions 
right through twelve degrees of tropical latitudes (along a coast line of 
over 1,000 miles) is apparent enough…81
Late September 1884 saw the public rejection of the Jeffray scheme by the 
government, and the end of any hopes the planters had that the government 
would seriously assist them with “suitable” labour. In August 1884, when 
Hume Black debated the Immigration Act Amendment Bill, he claimed that the 
government had promised the planters a complete labour scheme to replace 
“coloured labour”, and all they got was a few clauses to make white indenture 
slightly cheaper. The government had even refused to take responsibility for 
finding indentured labour in Britain and Europe, telling the planters to do it 
themselves. In a markedly more bitter speech than previously, Black declared: 
The whole progress of the North was being checked, and checked to 
such an extent that there would be a feeling of irritation, unless better 
counsels prevailed, that there would be one unanimous cry for 
separation throughout the whole of the North… He would far rather see 
federation than separation; but when he saw such determined attempts 
made to ignore the difference of climate between the North and South, 
he said that the present Queen-street Ministry had not the slightest 
consideration for anything north of Rockhampton.82
                                                 
81 Letter from Jeffray to Griffith, 20 November 1884, in Qld LA V&P, 1884, vol. 2, p. 939. From 
the collection of papers published here, pp. 925-40, it is apparent that Jeffray began by writing 
on 10 April 1884, from Aden, to ask his office to informally approach the Queensland 
government as to its attitude to his proposed private indentures. Wrongly advised that the 
government would accept them, he approached the Colonial Office who then wrote to the 
Queensland Governor on 31 July 1884 seeking a response from Griffith; who dealt with the 
issue in Parliament on 25 September and attracted a letter of explanation from Jeffray dated 4 
October. 
82 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIII, p. 276. See also editorial in Mackay Mercury, 14 January 1885. 
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It is from this point that the real beginnings of a Northern Separation movement 
can be dated. By October 1884, the movement had won the allegiance of John 
Murtagh Macrossan, the north’s most significant politician,83 and the first 
public meeting to promote Northern Separation in Mackay was held on 28 
October.84 The newspaper most closely aligned with the sugar planters, the 
Mackay Mercury, listed the Griffith government’s restrictions on “coloured 
labour”, its Immigration bill, and its new land legislation as reasons that 
separation had become necessary.85 As northern ruling-class agitation for 
separation intensified, the Townsville based committee for Northern Separation 
met in mid-October 1884, and its chairperson focused on the treatment of the 
sugar industry—rather than the general mistreatment of the north—as a 
primary reason for taking up the issue anew.86
Late 1884 and the early months of 1885 saw the establishment of Northern 
Separation leagues in many northern towns. Mackay MLA, Hume Black, 
undertook an extensive speaking tour of the north in March and April 1885, 
forming leagues and agitating for separation. His tour ended in Charters 
Towers a week after the Convention, where a separation league was formed 
                                                 
83 Mackay Mercury, 18 October 1884. 
84 Mackay Mercury, 29 October 1884. The meeting was held in the afternoon, ensuring that it was 
dominated by those businesspeople who could afford to attend during a weekday. 
85 Mackay Mercury, 15 October 1884. It is worth noting that two months earlier, 2 August, the 
paper was promoting a petition to the government to change its policies; and a month earlier, 17 
September, the paper was arguing about the government’s policy, rather than promoting 
separation as a solution. 
86 Mackay Mercury, 18 October 1884. This paper is partly damaged, and the name of the 
Chairperson, and the details of the time and date of the meeting, are lost. But it would 
undoubtedly have been within ten days of publication. No Townsville newspapers from the 
period survive. 
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despite the hostility of the town’s dominant newspaper, the Northern Miner, 
which denounced Black: 
It is a shameful thing that a member of the Legislature should be 
permitted go about the colony preaching disunion and treason when the 
Russians are at our doors. We advise the miners and working men to roll 
up to-morrow night and tell this emissary of slave drivers that we are 
opposed to Separation and Coolies.87  
When the Convention met at Townsville, from 9 to 11 April 1885, the majority 
were either sugar planters, or strongly sympathetic to them. However, some 
delegates pointed out that the ambitions of the planters were a serious problem 
for the movement, as were those of the capitalists of Townsville who looked 
forward to making their town the new colonial capital city. The petition 
adopted at Townsville, the first item on the Convention’s agenda, made no 
mention of either the sugar industry, or indentured labour. Thus, from April 
1885 onwards, the movement for Northern Separation consistently and 
assiduously denied that it had any interest in gaining indentured “coloured 
labour” for the sugar planters.88  
                                                 
87 Quoted in Mackay Mercury, 18 April 1885. April 1885 saw the height of tension between 
Russia and Britain over Russian military advances into Afghanistan, to the point where reserves 
were mobilised in Britain, Australian colonial governments desperately shored up local 
defences, and Australian newspapers were saturated with concern over a possible Russian 
attack. 
88 See, for instance, William Coote, “Proposed new colony of Northern Queensland”, Victorian 
Review, May 1885, pp 58-70. Coote was Secretary of the Executive Committee of the North 
Queensland Separation Council. 
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The embarrassing and stupid fictions this produced have misled some 
historians.89 They also distorted the public debate over northern separation. 
Hume Black claimed to have told his fellow planters, 
that if any of them expect by this movement to secure coloured labour, 
from my experience of politics I consider that they are basing their hope 
upon a very false foundation indeed. They will be no nearer getting 
coloured labour in the event of separation taking place than they are 
now.90
This position was ridiculed by the widely respected liberal, Henry Jordan: 
Our friends in the North have now determined to take this for their 
motto, “No coolies—no black labour.” So, then, after all, the Premier, Sir 
Samuel Griffith, has not sacrificed the interests of the northern part of the 
colony by his black labour policy—by keeping out coolies, by regulating 
Polynesians, by stopping kidnapping, murder, and all the other 
                                                 
89 Christine Doran writes that IN Moles saw “separationism and the movement to supply 
coloured labour for sugar cultivation” as “distinct”, in her Separatism, p. xvi. Unfortunately, 
Moles’ BA Hons (penultimate thesis), “A brief history of the separatist movements in North 
Queensland”, Queensland University, 1955, is missing. When I approached the History 
Department of Queensland University in October 2005, I was told that this thesis could no 
longer be found; nor was it available through the university library. Neither was B Hart’s “New 
state movements in Queensland since 1885”, 1950, available. Moles’ published article, “The 
Indian coolie labour issue in Queensland”, Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, 
vol. 5, no. 5, 1957, pp. 1345-72, does not make this argument in its brief discussion of separatism. 
Among those who see separation as a predominantly pro-planter movement are Edward Shann, 
An economic history, pp. 247-59; Kay Saunders, Workers in bondage [book], p. 55; Graves, Cane 
and labour, p. 69. 
90 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIX, p. 539. In fact, what Hume Black had actually said to his fellow 
planters, when reporting on his tour of the north from February-April 1885, was this: 
In the North there was an intense antagonism against coolie labor, and if the planters 
thought they could get that labor against the wishes of the people they were mistaken. But 
the planters were willing to leave their fate to the decision of the people of the North. He 
regretted if his remarks should discourage the planters, but he held out the hope of a 
rational discussion of their interests. They would have an intelligent representation of the 
requirements of individual industries… When asked if they intended the tropical sugar 
industry to perish the meeting shouted no. (Mackay Mercury, 25 April 1885, p. 2, col. 4.) 
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atrocities… They have discovered in the North at last that the Premier is 
the saviour of his country.91
Black told Parliament that, 
what the majority hope is that, in the event of separation taking place, 
the agricultural industry in Northern Queensland will be considered 
sufficiently important to justify the new Government of the North in 
giving it a fair consideration, fair treatment—treatment which it has 
never received from the Government of the South.92
Black’s demand for fair treatment would become the focus of Liberal attacks. 
What, asked Treasurer, James Dickson, was this “fair play” the planters wanted 
that they were not getting? When he answered his own question—saying it was 
“black labour”—Hume Black did not respond.93 The conservative squatter and 
investment banker, Ernest Stevens, asked Black what he meant 
when he asks that the planters should have fair consideration? It cannot 
be in the direction of getting white labour at a payable rate, because that 
was offered them and they would not take it. They could not see their 
way to employ any sort of white labour. If that is the case it must be in 
the direction of black labour. Well, I think that is sufficient ground for 
members representing the part of the country which is not interested in 
black labour, and does not believe in it, to oppose the movement for 
separation to the full extent.94
                                                 
91 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIX, p. 635. 
92 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIX, p. 539. 
93 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIX, p. 550. 
94 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIX, p. 565. 
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The separation movement’s attempt to bury the “coloured labour” issue did not 
wash with the Brisbane Courier, which had consistently supported the campaign 
of the planters to be allowed both Islander and indentured Indian labour.95 It 
ridiculed the insistence of the separation movement that separation would not 
produce a black north: 
The Northern sun will not shine the less fiercely; the languors which the 
unchanging heat of the tropics induce in the European constitution will 
not be abated, because the separation leaders have managed to persuade 
their bearers that the laws of nature will be turned aside for their benefit. 
In the North, as in every other tropical country under the sun, manual 
labour will sooner or later devolve upon coloured men; and it will be 
sooner, we are convinced, if separation takes place.96
The real motive of the planters in pushing for northern separation is clear. In 
January 1885, the Separation movement in Mackay launched a petition to the 
Imperial Government asking that the colony be divided. After a paragraph that 
showed the size and importance of the North, compared with Queensland at 
the time of separation from New South Wales in 1859, the petition addressed 
the grievances of the North. They were, it claimed, the relative lack of 
representation in the legislature, that government borrowings were used to 
benefit the South, that they were remote from the seat of government, and the 
different needs of tropical colonies, especially where sugar was a major 
industry: 
the Government of the said colony has not only failed to supply suitable 
labor for the requirements of tropical agriculturalists, but has prohibited 
                                                 
95 Brisbane Courier, 28 August 1886, p. 4, cols. 5-6. 
96 Brisbane Courier, 21 August 1886, p. 4, col. 6. 
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them from taking steps to procure such labor for themselves; that large 
acreages have in consequence been thrown out of cultivation; that there 
is every reason to apprehend that in a short time those properties will, in 
consequence of the action of such government, have to be abandoned; 
that the sugar industry is the only one which has caused extensive 
settlement on the Northern Coast lands…97
When the Separation Convention discussed the Mackay petition, Power from 
Cooktown insisted that it had nothing to do with the petition they had adopted, 
and Rutherford from Port Douglas warned delegates they 
should be very careful how they dealt with the petition of the Mackay 
people. For his own part he saw nothing in it objectionable, but seeing 
that several people in the North imagined the principal industry of 
Mackay was a prominent feature in their desire to obtain Separation, it 
was doubly important the petition should have careful consideration 
before being adopted by the Conference.98
When the Mackay, Walkerston and Eton delegates returned to Mackay to report 
to the local committee of ruling class figures, they had determined that in their 
own interests, the planters and their supporters had to publicly bury the labour 
issue.99 The sugar planter and pastoralist, ES Rawson, reported on reaction to 
the Mackay petition for separation: 
The Convention agreed to its being sent home by a majority of 9 to 5, but 
the delegates from the district, on consideration resolved in the 
circumstances that it was advisable to ask permission to withdraw the 
petition, which was accordingly done. Mackay was the only district 
                                                 
97 Mackay Mercury, 17 January 1885. 
98 Mackay Standard, 17 April 1885. 
99 Walkerston and Eton were towns within a short distance of Mackay. 
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which wished to send a separate petition, and as an undue significance 
would be attached to the requirements of labor for tropical industries in 
connection with the Separation movement, he was sure the meeting 
would approve of their action in the matter (Hear, hear).100
Hume Black also addressed the meeting, reporting on his extensive speaking 
tour of the north, warning that “there was an intense antagonism against coolie 
labor”, but “if the Coolie item was excised they were Separationists to a 
man”.101 The planters would have to bury the issue in the short term and trust 
in their ability to win the argument in a new parliament. Given the support of 
the key figures in the Townsville separation movement for the sugar planters, 
this seemed a risk worth taking.102
Thus from April 1885, the debate over indentured “coloured labour” was 
subsumed into the struggle over Northern Separation. This further polarised 
opinion on the issues, and was no doubt one reason why the Liberal 
Government moved in 1885 to end the recruitment of Pacific Island labour at 
the end of 1890 and then in 1886, moved successfully to repeal the Coolie Labour 
Act. When it did these things, there was little more than perfunctory debate in 
parliament, in sharp contrast to the long and bitter debates of 1884. For the 
                                                 
100 Mackay Mercury, 25 April 1885. 
101 Mackay Mercury, 25 April 1885. 
102 This support can be seen in the comments by Dr Ahearne, the Townsville-based chair of the 
Separation Convention, the subsequent role played by individuals like Townsville-based Robert 
Philp, and the attitude of the Townsville press, to the extent we are aware of it. The Mackay 
Mercury, 7 March 1885, a month before the Convention, quoted the Townsville Herald thus: “It is 
becoming plainer every day that unless planters are allowed to obtain labor of a suitable kind, 
within the next twelve months the sugar industry of Queensland will completely disappear. 
Whether that is preferable to the admission of Indian coolies under restriction, is open to 
argument as a political question; but there can be no escape from the economical fact of the 
certain extinction of the sugar industry without coolies.” 
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North, the issue was no longer reforming Queensland but leaving it; as a result, 
the southern Conservatives could no longer fight over these on the basis of the 
needs of the North. 
Separation blocked 
The movement for North Queensland separation was contained, by northern 
liberals and by a mostly hostile southern ruling class, over a decade and a half, 
from 1885 to federation. During the 1890s, the rise of the labour movement in 
North Queensland was to invest separation with the appalling prospect that a 
separated colony might be controlled, not by “sensible” businessmen, but by 
the Labor Party with their extreme opposition to any “coloured labour”. Many 
devout separationists quietly lost their stomach for the cause.103
The movement suffered two crucial setbacks in 1886-87. The first was in the 
Queensland Parliament on 2 September 1886, when a motion for separation 
moved by Macrossan was not only defeated—that was expected—but defeated 
by 40 votes to 9, with every non-northern politician, Conservative as well as 
Liberal, voting against it. The movement, however, had never recognised the 
authority of the southern parliament to decide the issue—that was the 
prerogative of the Imperial Government. But when the movement finally won 
an audience with the Secretary of State for the Colonies in April 1887 in 
                                                 
103 Shann, An economic history, p. 258. 
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London, he rebuffed them.104 The Queensland election of 1888 punctured the 
image of a north united for separation. In an election which the Conservatives 
won in a landslide, five of the sixteen northern seats went against the southern 
trend to anti-separation Liberals, up from just one of eight in 1883.105
Many reasons have been given for London’s rejection of the northern separation 
movement. Griffith had warned the Colonial Office that if the British 
Parliament decided to divide Queensland, it would have problems dealing with 
the Queensland debt, which was around £21 million in 1887.106 Who would 
guarantee the security held by the bondholders? Clearly, the Queensland 
government could not be expected to guarantee the whole amount, if nearly 
half its territory and more than half its exports were removed from it. Neither 
would the bondholders be satisfied if they were expected to accept the security 
offered by the new colony—a circumstance which had not been considered 
when they lent their money. The separationists were never able to satisfy the 
                                                 
104 Sir Henry Holland’s rejection of the separation petition is contained in both a letter to the 
Queensland Governor, 14 June 1887, and a transcript of his interviews with the North 
Queensland separationist delegation of Hume Black, Isidore Lissner (MLA Kennedy) and Tory 
MP Harold Finch-Hatton; see Qld LA V&P, 1887, vol. 1, pp. 441-52. 
105 There were eight northern MPs in the general election of 1883. Subsequently, in 1885, two 
new northern members were added to redress the most stark imbalances. One of these came 
from the division of Townsville and the creation of a new electorate, Musgrave, out of the rural 
areas surrounding the town. The second came from making Townsville electorate a two-
member constituency. See Griffith’s speech introducing the Additional Members Bill of 1885, 
ORDLA Qld, vol. XLVI, p. 88. Hence, in the vote on Northern Separation in 1886, the north had 
10 MPs, one of whom, Rutledge, voted against it. The first member for Musgrave was the 
Townsville-based Robert Philp, who played a major role in the northern separation movement, 
and subsequently became Premier of Queensland. There was a subsequent and more 
comprehensive electoral reform in 1887, which then produced a much enlarged parliament 
elected in 1888. These changes reflected the rapid population growth of Queensland. 
106 In his letter to Governor Musgrave, intended for despatch to London, 19 January 1887, Qld 
LA V&P, 1887, vol. 1, esp. p. 425. In his covering letter, Musgrave backs Griffith re allocation of 
the public debt of Queensland, p. 420. 
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British government on this extremely sensitive point,107 although in 1890, when 
London-based supporters of separation approached the major colonial and 
London banks, they appeared indifferent to the problem and even supportive of 
the impact of separation on the security of their loans.108 The Colonial Office 
was also wary of using imperial powers to divide a colony with nearly thirty 
years of self-government, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of 
its elected members of parliament.109
In Queensland, the rejection of the separationist petition also involved broader 
issues. The leading pastoralist, John Donaldson, spoke against any further 
reduction in the size of the local market.110 The demography of northern 
Australia became a significant part of the only sophisticated element in the 
debate over separation. It had earlier been discussed in an important article by 
Carl Feilberg, in the Victorian Review, in 1880.111 Feilberg argued that 
traditionally, when Europeans lived in tropical areas, they were able to organise 
and extract enormous wealth but not produce a strong community: 
a race that is dependent on the physical exertions of an alien people for 
the supply of its every-day needs has but a feeble hold on the land… 
Colonisation, in the true sense of the word, is only possible where 
colonists, taking possession of a tract of wilderness, are able to carry out 
with their own hands all that their brains can plan.112  
                                                 
107 Doran, Separatism in Townsville, pp. 42-3. 
108 Letter from Harold Finch-Hatton to Lord Knutsford, 17 December 1890, in Rawson 
Collection, Oxley, 2967/04. 
109 Qld LA V&P, 1887, vol. 1, p. 442. 
110 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIX, p. 638. 
111 Carl A Feilberg, “The future of north-eastern Australia”, Victorian Review, vol. 1, no. 5, March 
1880, pp. 699-711. 
112 Feilberg, The future of north-eastern Australia, pp. 707-8. 
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But North Queensland promised to be different, because miners were the 
dynamic element in the North Queensland economy. This meant that the 
growth of mining would lead to a preponderance of miners among white 
settlers; they would put down roots as agriculturalists and settlers; and would 
retain their traditional hostility to “coloured labour”. Thus, “in Northern 
Queensland, everything tends to prevent the occupation of the country after the 
usual tropical fashion, by white men directing the labour of coloured 
workmen”.113 Should the miners dominate, and produce a society of white 
selectors, graziers and labourers, North Queensland 
would be a community of a quite different sort from the feeble societies 
which, in Mauritius or the West Indies, direct a swarm of coloured 
labourers, with whom they can find no bond of sympathy except in the 
common degradation of vice. It would be full of the rough vigorous life 
of a democracy, a society kept pure by the constant interchange of social 
relations, in which the continual upward and downward currents 
removed effete particles from the top of the structure to supply their 
places by stronger material from the bottom.114
Leading Townsville separationist, WV Brown, turned to Feilberg’s argument in 
the parliamentary debate on separation, in an attempt to prove the movement 
was not about black labour. Feilberg’s article proved, he argued: 
that separation will make it more difficult for the planters to get coloured 
labour than it is now, because the miners will then have more influence. 
At the present time a large section in the south of the colony are not very 
much opposed to coloured labour, and they go with the planters to a 
certain extent, but the miners will always oppose coloured labour, and 
                                                 
113 Feilberg, The future of north-eastern Australia, p. 704. 
114 Feilberg, The future of north-eastern Australia, p. 708 
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there is not the slightest chance of planters getting coloured labour in the 
colony of North Queensland.115
The Brisbane Courier rejected this argument. Since Feilberg had written, mining 
had not grown as fast as it might, while capitalists had rushed into the sugar 
industry. “The balance of power has shifted,” it wrote, “and the influence of the 
planters in the North would be much greater now than seemed likely then. 
Sugar cultivation, if the capitalists eager to go into it have their way, would go 
ahead at a rate that would leave no time for the slow development of an 
acclimatised European community of farmers.”116 The question for the paper 
was therefore to protect the democratic and liberal quality of Australian society 
and politics: 
Political severance from the great bulk of the European population of 
Australia will intensify the social effect of the change [in population]. We 
do not refer to the possibility of slavery, or any nonsense of that sort, 
talked by people who ought to know better; but to the obvious effect of 
labourer and employer being separated by the broad bar of colour and 
race. A Northern aristocracy—a race aristocracy—will confront the 
Australian white democracy, and no strong effort of imagination is 
needed to picture the result.117
Danger therefore lay in an Australia in which north and south developed along 
radically different political lines. The spectre of the American Civil War lay 
heavily over its argument: 
                                                 
115 ORDLA Qld, vol. XLIX, pp. 552-3. 
116 Brisbane Courier, 28 August 1886, p. 4, col. 6. 
117 Brisbane Courier, 21 August 1886, p. 4, col. 6. 
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if tropical Australia is politically severed from the South—for the 
movement started in Northern Queensland will not stop there—we may 
leave to our children such a legacy of evil as that from which America 
only rid herself by the most terrible fratricidal war which the modern 
world has seen.118
The Courier’s argument led to a sharp rebuke from the Townsville Bulletin, which 
accused the Brisbane paper of peddling the old lie about slavery.119 The Courier 
responded sharply, insisting that it did not refer to the issue of slavery. The 
question was the political impact of class relations: 
Our contention is that in a purely tropical colony field work, at least, and 
probably all manual labour, will ultimately fall into the hands of 
coloured men, and if the white community inhabiting such a colony is 
politically severed from the rest of Australia, and thus cut off from 
constant intercourse with the great body of the Australian democracy, it 
will undergo a social change, and harden into a caste-race aristocracy. If 
on the other hand separation does not take place, the employment of 
coloured people in the Northern portion of the colony will not affect the 
bulk of the white population, who will remain, in any case, in the South, 
and the influence of the democratic majority will predominate. In other 
words, if separation does not take place, the Northern whites, though 
employing coloured labour, would remain in touch with the great body 
of their Australian countrymen; whereas, if they do separate, they will 
lose touch and drift apart.120
It is important to emphasise that this was not the Liberal position, but it shared 
many of its assumptions. A modern, progressive, liberal and democratic society 
required both racial homogeneity, and crucially, a social link between those 
                                                 
118 Brisbane Courier, 21 August 1886, p. 4, col. 6. 
119 See also Townsville Herald, 28 Aug 1886, p. 9. 
120 Brisbane Courier, 3 September 1886, p. 4, cols. 5-6. 
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who worked and those who exploited. In Australia, with its vast tropical 
territory, this meant an almost-white Australia would be necessary, a nation in 
which the south politically dominated the north. This was the ruling class 
settling its internal differences, and contrary to the mythologists, the broader 
labour movement was largely uninvolved. The weekly meeting of the Brisbane 
Trades and Labour Council held a few days after Macrossan moved the 
separation motion in the Queensland Parliament did not even discuss 
separation, much less mobilise on the issue.121
In the southern colonies, the two major conservative papers had little to say on 
separation. The Melbourne Argus did not run a single editorial on the issue 
during (or shortly after) the great events which marked the movement: the 
April 1885 convention, the June 1886 presentation of the petition of 10,000 
signatures to the Acting Governor, nor the August-September 1886 
parliamentary debate on the issue. This is a silence worth investigating. The 
paper did publish reports from its Brisbane correspondent who dismissed the 
agitation: 
I do not think there is any real bottom to the movement except in 
Townsville, which reckons on being the capital, and among the sugar 
planters. Meanwhile the latter go on with the farce of pretending that 
they are anxious to separate for quite other reasons than the desire to 
obtain what black labour they require, and the others “make believe” to 
credit them.122
                                                 
121 Brisbane Courier, 25 August 1886, p. 5, col. 5. 
122 Argus, 17 April 1885, p. 6, col. 2. 
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In January 1887, their Brisbane correspondent claimed that outside Townsville 
and the sugar towns, there was little more than acquiescence in separation; 
“very few people would be concerned it if never came”.123 The owners and 
managers of the Argus had a particularly close relationship with financial 
institutions and individuals with large investments in Queensland, and the 
paper strongly advocated the recruitment of indentured Indian labour,124 but it 
is probable that the paper’s Victorian supporters included both large-scale 
investors in Queensland sugar, and others whose interests were pastoral and 
urban, and who were therefore deeply divided on the issue of separation. Such 
a division on a sensitive Queensland issue may have led to caution by the 
paper’s editors.125
Unlike the Argus, the Sydney Morning Herald was very sympathetic towards 
Queensland’s Liberal Premier. It described Griffith as having demolished the 
case for separation put by Davidson and Lawes on behalf of the planters in 
1885, and backed Griffith’s social and political objections to large-scale 
“coloured labour”: 
                                                 
123 Quoted in North Queensland Telegraph and Territorial Separationist, 1 February 1887. 
124 Editorial, Argus, 18 April 1885, p. 9, col. 3. 
125 In 1881, as Premier, Thomas McIlwraith had used RJ Jeffray, Chairman of the Melbourne 
broking firm, W Sloane & Co, to complain to the Argus about its treatment of McIlwraith in the 
famous “steel rails” scandal. Gordon Evans replied to Jeffray that McIlwraith’s complaint was 
with the Australasian, and that, “I have frequently spoken to its Editor & tried to impress upon 
him that he should be careful in dealing with Queensland questions. I have reminded him again 
that all our friends in Victoria, who hold interests in Queensland, are supporters of the 
McIlwraith Ministry, and that on that account he should be quite sure that he is in the right 
before indulging in unfavorable criticism. I have also spoken to the Argus people in the same 
strain”. Gordon Evans to Jeffray, 5 July 1881, in McIlwraith Papers, Oxley, OM64-19/9. The 
letter was sent to McIlwraith by Jeffray. 
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Mr. Griffith does not stand alone in his opinion as to the conditions 
under which coloured labour on a large scale may be employed without 
social or political embarrassment. A suggestion similar to that quoted 
above was made in these columns some years ago; but the applicability 
of the scheme to the actual circumstances of any part of Australia is a 
doubtful matter.126
Thus it seems there was, at best, only modest sympathy for the planters and 
their separation movement from those in the south most likely to support them; 
and intense hostility from liberals. The vast majority of the ruling class in 
Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland had made up its mind. Most were 
against the use of “coloured labour”, but even those sympathetic to it, limited 
their sympathy to the needs of sugar capitalists, and wanted to make sure it 
was regulated and controlled by the priorities of modern, urban capital. 
What was resolved by 1888? 
By 1888, an observer could be forgiven for thinking that the “coloured labour” 
debate in Queensland had been resolved. The colony’s parliament had passed 
strongly restrictive laws against Chinese immigration in 1884, and as a result of 
the Inter-colonial conference on Chinese immigration in June 1888, its 
representative committed the government to pushing through the virtually 
prohibitive measures decided upon at the conference. Indentured labour from 
India had been decisively rejected at the 1883 election, and its leading 
proponent, Sir Thomas McIlwraith, was returned to office in 1888 declaring the 
                                                 
126 SMH 22 April 1885, p. 8, col. 6 and p. 9, col. 1. 
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issue dead. The Liberal government had legislated to end the recruitment of 
Pacific Island labourers from the end of 1890, and that too had been publicly (if 
not privately) accepted by the Conservative party which won the 1888 
election.127 The attempt by the sugar planters to divide Queensland so that they 
could avoid all these restrictions had been rebuffed in both Brisbane and 
London. Both major political parties had embraced the ideal of a “White 
Queensland”. 
Looking back from 1901, an observer might draw the opposite conclusion: that 
nothing had been really resolved by 1888. The Pacific Islands labour trade had 
been re-legalised in 1892 and, as a result, Queensland embroiled in another 
decade of “coloured labour” debates. There had been renewed agitation for 
northern separation, and a resolution to that effect had even passed the 
Brisbane Assembly in 1897, albeit on the casting vote of the Speaker.128
Indeed, it had taken federation and the actions of the new Protectionist 
government, backed by both the conservative Freetrade party and Labor, to 
resolve the Queensland conflict on the basis of the long-established national 
ruling-class consensus. Non-white immigration was stopped, Pacific Islander 
recruitment banned from 1904, and the majority of Islanders deported in 1906. 
The national ruling class resolved, very firmly, that sugar would be grown by 
white labour, and the economic disadvantage involved would be compensated. 
                                                 
127 Brisbane Courier, 14 May 1888. 
128 Shann, An economic history, p. 258. 
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A large tariff would protect Australian sugar from imports, while a substantial 
bounty would reward growers who used white labour only.129
But while the divisions and campaigns of the 1890s were bitter, the argument 
had narrowed dramatically. The Royal Commission into the sugar industry in 
1889 had argued that the industry could not survive without the reintroduction 
of Pacific Islands labour, yet the conservative governments of 1888-90 made no 
move in that direction, despite the presence of the planters’ leader, Hume Black, 
in those governments. Robert Philp, who had emerged as another leader of the 
sugar planters, saw modern machinery, rather than indentured labour, as the 
future. In 1888 he told parliament: 
I am not one of those who believe that it is by the wholesale introduction 
of coloured labour that the sugar industry will be set on its feet… I 
believe it is by the importation of machinery and by all kinds of labour-
saving appliances that that industry will be firmly established… why 
should this Government not offer inducements to investors to try and 
invent machinery that will do away with a great deal of the labour now 
required by the sugar planter?130
The turn back to Islander labour came after the great strikes of 1890 and 1891, 
and during Griffith’s second Premiership, 1890-93, in coalition with McIlwraith. 
Liberals and Conservatives buried their differences in the face of economic 
depression and labour movement mobilisation. Griffith’s revival of Pacific 
Islander recruitment in 1892 was presented as a temporary expedient while the 
                                                 
129 Willard, The history of the White Australia policy, pp. 185-6; Lyndon Megarrity, “‘White 
Queensland’: The Queensland government’s ideological position on the use of Pacific Island 
labourers in the sugar sector 1880-1901”, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 52, no. 1, 
March 2006, pp. 9-10. 
130 Megarrity, Robert Philp [thesis], p. 221, citing Philp in QPD, vol. LV, p. 371. 
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sugar industry continued its restructuring towards family farms supplying 
central mills, all employing white labour. Without this concession, argued 
Griffith, a major industry would collapse as mills were closed and their 
equipment moved to plantation colonies. In his (in)famous “Manifesto”, Griffith 
reaffirmed the political objections to “coloured labour” he had argued as 
Liberal leader in the 1870s and 1880s and presented the sugar industry as a very 
different one from that of 1885. The plantation system based on gang labour 
was in decline, the planters were keen to hand over growing the cane to small 
farmers, and sugar cane grown by white labour could be profitable.131  
Adrian Graves’ discussion of the massive restructuring of the sugar industry in 
the 1890s, explains the economic underpinnings to the planters’ ultimate 
“acceptance” of the broader ruling class insistence that white labour must 
dominate the sugar industry.132 After 1892, employment relations in the 
Queensland sugar industry were very different from the pre-1885 period. 
Griffith’s vision of white labour growing sugar would not be realised until after 
1906, but through the 1890s, the majority of Islanders were either wage 
labourers, or on short-term indentures, and this gave them a measure of 
bargaining power, which they used.133 After Griffith was elevated to the 
Queensland Supreme Court in 1893, the coalition, Nationalist, government 
continued to assist the restructuring of the industry around small, white-owned 
farms, using modern central mills for crushing.134 It also allowed them to use 
                                                 
131 Griffith’s “Manifesto” was published in the daily newspapers on 12 February 1892, and read 
by him into Hansard, 29 March 1892, in ORDLA, vol. LXVII, pp. 8-9. 
132 Graves, Cane and Labour, esp. pp. 57-73. 
133 Saunders, Workers in bondage [book], pp. 153-63; Peter Corris, Passage, port and plantation: A 
history of Solomon Islands labour migration 1870-1914, Melbourne University Press, Carlton (Vic), 
1973, pp. 44, 49-50, 86-7; Megarrity, ‘White Queensland’, p. 2. 
134 Megarrity, ‘White Queensland’, p. 8. 
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Islander labour. However this was a structure designed to guarantee that 
Islander labour would be a small minority in the north. Gone were the dreams 
of vast plantations and agricultural industries staffed by large numbers of 
indentured Indian labourers, ruled by a tiny number of rich whites.   
The majority of the ruling class in Queensland had determined on an almost-
White Queensland in a White Australia. For all the noise and bluster, the 
change wrought by federation was at the margins—unless you were an 
Islander. 
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Chapter 8 
Capital vs labour? 
The class logic of anti-Chinese racism 
ONE OF THE GREAT MYTHS about the anti-Chinese movements in colonial 
Australia is that they had some kind of anti-employer, or anti-capitalist 
dynamic. The myth is partly embodied in the idea, dominant for much of the 
twentieth century, that the White Australia Policy had not been racist, but had 
been enacted to protect workers’ living standards,1 the implication being that it 
was employers who sought to undermine those living standards. The myth was 
reinforced by the idea that the agenda of the dominant employers in colonial 
Australia, and especially the pastoralists, was one of importing large numbers 
of Chinese (or other “coloured”) people to replace more expensive and less 
obedient white workers—hence the notion that the struggle against Chinese 
 
1 Verity Burgmann has provided an important historiographical survey of this mythology, 
along with a potent critique of it, in “Writing racism out of history”, Arena, no. 67, 1984, pp. 85-
91. Its most recent exponent is Keith Windschuttle, The White Australia policy, Macleay Press, 
Sydney, 2004. 
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immigration was inherently a struggle against the squatters’ agenda.2 It was 
also reflected in the idea that the labour movement’s struggle against Chinese 
immigration had forced employers to abandon hopes of using Chinese labour,3 
and that anti-Chinese organising had been central to the rise of the labour 
movement.4
One device historians have used to sustain this myth has been to focus much of 
their history around points of racial conflict—between European and Chinese 
diggers on the gold fields, or between unions and employers where Chinese 
workers were used as strike-breakers, such as the Clunes (Vic) strike of 1873 
and the (in)famous seamen’s strike of 1878-9.5 Such an emphasis means that the 
debates and conflict within the ruling class, and the competing agendas that 
developed, have been glossed over. Racial conflict inherently involves the 
working and plebeian classes on both sides, therefore a decision to focus on 
such situations reflects an a priori explanation of the racism involved—unless a 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Ann Curthoys, “Race and ethnicity: A study of the response of British 
colonists to Aborigines, Chinese and non-British Europeans in New South Wales, 1856-1881“, 
PhD thesis, Macquarie University, 1973, p. 511: “During the [seamen’s] strike most employers 
were forced to agree that their immediate economic interests [supposedly “cheap coloured 
labour”] and the interests of the community as a whole were in conflict…”; Ray Markey argues 
that the Chinese Immigration Regulation Bill 1879, “had been heavily defeated in the upper house, 
where pastoralists and others who may have been interested in cheap coloured labour, 
predominated”, in “Populist politics” in Curthoys, Ann and Andrew Markus (eds), Who are our 
enemies? Racism and the Australian working class, Hale and Iremonger in association with the 
Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Neutral Bay (NSW), 1978, p. 67. 
3 See, for instance Curthoys, Race and ethnicity, p. 590: “Employers were not longer able to 
argue for cheap Chinese labour or to implement its use after the events of the Seamen’s 
Strike…” She also argues that “pastoralists had long since found that Chinese were not 
particularly useful to them.” 
4 See Markey, Populist politics, p. 68; this is also the argument of Richard Fletcher, “The role of 
the immigration question in gaining for the labour movement recognition by society in the 
period 1877 to 1890 in New South Wales“, MA thesis, University of Sydney, 1964. 
5 On Clunes, see Jerome Small, “Reconsidering White Australia: Class and anti-Chinese racism 
in the 1873 Clunes riot“, BA (Hons) thesis, La Trobe University, 1997. 
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searching examination is also made of the wider structures, ideas and reasons 
which led to confrontation, such as those discussed in earlier chapters of this 
thesis. This does not mean that high points of racial conflict were unimportant, 
but that their importance has been overstated, with the effect that the real 
dynamics behind exclusion have been mystified. An almost one-dimensional 
use of the Sydney Morning Herald and The Bulletin as sources representative of 
capital and labour respectively has provided documentary evidence to suit the 
view of racial conflict as an element in the class struggle. 
The argument that the anti-Chinese movement was a movement of labour 
against capital has gained perhaps its greatest legitimacy from the seamen’s 
strike of 1878-9, and an analysis of the ruling class politics of the strike will be 
the primary focus of this chapter. The seamen’s strike was truly a major, even 
cathartic, event.6 The broader dispute began in July 1878, when the Australasian 
Steam Navigation Company (ASN), the largest shipping line in Australia and 
the largest private employer in Sydney, replaced 180 European sailors with 
Chinese workers. It developed into an all-out strike on 18 November 1878, 
when hundreds more European sailors were sacked. Most of ASN’s remaining 
sailors walked off the job when their ships arrived in port, and they were joined 
by wharf labourers who refused to load and unload ASN ships. As the dispute 
escalated, coal miners in the Hunter and Illawarra refused to cut coal for ASN 
                                                 
6 The strike has been discussed in every major book treatment of the White Australia policy. 
Other significant treatments are: Ann Curthoys, “Conflict and consensus: The seamen’s strike of 
1878” in Curthoys and Markus (eds), Who are our enemies?, pp. 48-65; Mother Pauline Kneipp, 
“The seamen’s strike–1878-1879: Its relation to the White Australia policy”, ANU Historical 
Journal, vol. 1, no. 2, 1965-6, pp. 14-18; Charles Jonathon McNeill Hayes, “The seamen’s strike 
1878-79“, BA (Hons) thesis, History, Macquarie University, 1970; Fletcher, The role of the 
immigration question, pp. 106-66. 
Page 352   Chapter 8: The class logic of anti-Chinese racism 
steamers, paralysing most of the fleet. ASN responded by attempting to recruit 
hundreds more strike breakers from Hong Kong.  
From the beginning, the Seamen’s Union and the Sydney Trades and Labour 
Council ran the strike as both a normal industrial dispute and a struggle against 
Chinese immigration. Within days of the strike beginning, populist and 
mainstream political organisations were organising a vast anti-Chinese 
movement in support of the strikers. There were anti-Chinese riots in Sydney, 
Bathurst, Tamworth, Rockhampton and other regional centres. ASN was finally 
defeated when the SS Mecca, bringing 350 Chinese workers, upon whom it was 
relying to restart operations, sank in Torres Strait, and the Queensland 
government stripped the company of its lucrative mail contract. Negotiations 
settled the strike on 3 January 1879, with a compromise that allowed the 
company to keep a proportion of its Chinese sailors. Despite this, ASN 
gradually got rid of them, but the strike so damaged the company that it was 
sold in the mid-1880s. This was by far the most significant industrial dispute in 
colonial Australia before the great strikes of the early 1890s. 
For the ruling class, the seamen’s strike presented a sharp dilemma. They were, 
naturally, against strikes, but this one was different because it involved actions 
by one major business that threatened their broader strategic and national 
development goals. It was different, too, because one of the main principles the 
workers were fighting for was theirs—the defence of the Australian colonies as 
“white”, and based on British institutions. The willingness of the majority of 
mainstream newspapers to support the strike speaks eloquently for the 
commitment of the majority of the ruling class to the exclusion of Chinese 
immigrants. Historians who see capital and capitalism as purely matters of 
trade and production, who adopt an “economist” understanding and exclude 
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the state and the dominant ideology from discussions of class and class 
structure, intrinsically adopt a perspective which “naturalises” these 
institutions. The business of entrenching the British empire on the Australian 
continent was both an economic and strategic question for both the British and 
Australian colonial states, and for British and local capital.7
It is also important to situate the ruling class debate over the seamen’s strike in 
its broader context, one in which “social legislation” had become more and 
more important, a development that was hotly debated at the time. As Karl 
Polanyi has pointed out, from the 1860s onwards, legislation began to restrict, 
in modest ways, the rights of capital, whether it be through laws against impure 
food, laws regulating the loading of ships and safety at sea, or laws imposing an 
obligation on employers to provide a workplace that was not inherently 
dangerous. This social legislation was a feature of almost all European 
countries, whatever their political structure and ideologies. In liberal Britain, 
these laws were seen as exceptional and pragmatic, and overwhelmingly 
passed by Liberals committed to the economic freedom of capital and a minimal 
state.8 The dire consequences of unfettered capitalism were also leading to an 
agonised rethinking of social philosophy in Britain, by ruling class thinkers 
such as Matthew Arnold, TH Green, and many others. 
The vast majority of ruling class newspapers believed that ASN had to be 
restrained—in perhaps the same way as a noxious industry. However they did 
                                                 
7 Luke Trainor, British imperialism and Australian nationalism : manipulation, conflict, and 
compromise in the late nineteenth century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York, 
1994. 
8 Karl Polanyi, Origins of our time: The great transformation, V Gollancz, London, 1945, esp pp. 
145-6. 
Page 354   Chapter 8: The class logic of anti-Chinese racism 
not like the strike; indeed they were already anxious because class tensions had 
been rising in the Australian colonies. In Britain, France, the United States and 
Germany there had been massive strikes and class confrontations during the 
1870s that had threatened social stability, and ruling class thinkers in Australia 
sought ways of avoiding such disasters. Through the 1880s, reconciling labour 
and capital would become a major topic of discussion. 
In this chapter I examine newspaper responses to the seamen’s strike and, in 
particular, how they saw the class logic of the strike. The vast majority of 
newspapers in New South Wales and Queensland supported the strike. This 
does not imply that a similar proportion of capitalists supported the strike—we 
simply cannot know this one way or the other. In part the problem is 
evidentiary; we have excellent archival collections of colonial newspapers, and 
very few records which tell us what businesspeople and investors thought. 
Newspapers, however, did not simply reflect local bourgeois opinion. They 
played a particular role in class society—as key actors in constructing and 
rationalising the hegemony of capital and the British empire, and as forums for 
the discussion of bourgeois strategy in nation-building and social development. 
I begin with a discussion of the position taken by the Sydney Morning Herald. 
The Herald is widely taken to reflect bourgeois thought in the colonies, yet on 
the ASN dispute, it was isolated. The paper’s position has also been radically 
misrepresented. It opposed the strike for class reasons, but this did not reflect 
support for Chinese immigration. I then consider the stance of Sydney’s Evening 
News, the largest circulation newspaper in New South Wales, and the approach 
taken by Queensland’s major regional conservative newspapers, all of whom 
supported the seafarers. The chapter concludes with some suggestions 
Chapter 8: The class logic of anti-Chinese racism Page 355 
regarding the way anti-Chinese racism allowed Sir Henry Parkes to contain 
plebeian discontent with his right wing politics. 
A month after the end of the strike, the Sydney Morning Herald lamented the lack 
of support that ASN had received during the dispute, commenting that whereas 
thousands of pounds had been raised for the seafarers, “no sympathizing 
public” had come forward to relieve the company of the £13,000 it had lost in 
the dispute.9 This was an illustration of the distance between the company and 
the broader, politically active elements in the ruling class. The ASN dispute has 
been remembered as a struggle of labour against capital; it was just as much a 
struggle of capital against capital, as the broader ruling class—along with large 
numbers from the middle class—sought to discipline one of their own. Indeed, 
newspapers like the Evening News, regional papers like the Newcastle Morning 
Herald and the Queensland conservative press, all played a major role in 
legitimising the strike, and in shaping and promoting many of the arguments of 
the anti-Chinese movement. 
This is not to dismiss the importance of the activism and organisation of the 
labour movement in the dispute. I doubt very much whether the ruling class 
anti-Chinese politicians in New South Wales could have won their new anti-
Chinese laws of 1881 without mass working-class resistance to the ASN 
sackings and the mass anti-Chinese movement that was built around the strike. 
The strike made the issue of Chinese immigration seem urgent and dangerous, 
a warning of what might happen again if legislation were not passed. Along 
with the memory of the gold-rush anti-Chinese riots, it added a sense of menace 
                                                 
9 SMH editorial, 6 February 1879. 
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to subsequent anti-Chinese protests. However, important it was, this 
mobilisation was secondary. Whatever class they came from, the anti-Chinese 
protestors and petitioners were campaigning for one of the central strategic 
desires of their bourgeois rulers. They did not need to force anti-Chinese laws 
on the ruling class; they were helping the majority of the ruling class coerce the 
minority who resisted them, and they provided the ruling class as a whole with 
an alibi when they had to justify their anti-Chinese laws to the Colonial Office 
and their peers in Britain—these barbaric laws could be attributed to the great, 
unreasoning mob. Such a manoeuvre is not unknown in modern political 
history. 
The Sydney Morning Herald, the seamen’s strike, and 
Chinese immigration 
The idea that the anti-Chinese movement was anti-capitalist rests in 
considerable part on an assumption that a significant section of the ruling class 
in Sydney, and the Sydney Morning Herald in particular, were “pro-cheap 
labour” and hence “pro-Chinese immigration” in the late colonial period. This 
is not supported by the evidence. 
In the years before the seamen’s strike, the Sydney Morning Herald had run 
occasional features alleging that Chinese people were immoral and unclean. On 
the questions of Chinese immigration and “cheap labour” as it was understood 
at the time, the position of the Sydney Morning Herald was unambiguous. It 
opposed any racialised division of labour, and at every single point, it 
expressed its opposition to any significant influx of Chinese people, repeatedly 
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putting this position during the seamen’s strike. Perhaps the most salient 
testimony to the paper’s sustained, anti-Chinese position came from Thomas 
White, President of the Seamen’s Union and one of Sydney’s leading anti-
Chinese agitators, just a few months before the strike: 
He could not say that the Press of the colony were in the habit of 
advocating the cause of the working men, but he must say that the 
Sydney Morning Herald had done all it could to show what the colony 
would suffer if the “yellow agony” were admitted into it.10
For the first half of 1878, there was no real anti-Chinese movement, and little 
discussion of the issue. In June 1878, in an editorial on new amendments to 
Queensland’s goldfields legislation, the Herald commented that, “Under the 
circumstances in which Queensland was placed [in 1876], there were very few 
in the colonies who disputed that some form of prohibitory legislation [against 
Chinese immigration] was indispensable.”11 In early July, in its regular report 
from Deniliquin, the paper condemned “the contaminating effect of association 
with Chinese by young people of either sex.”12
By July 1878, ASN had replaced 180 white sailors with Chinese on both Pacific 
and intercolonial routes, and the Seamen’s Union believed that more Chinese 
sailors were on their way to Sydney to take more of their jobs. In support of the 
seamen, the Trades and Labour Council called a large public meeting to agitate 
against both the company and Chinese immigration.13 A week later, Sir Henry 
                                                 
10 SMH 24 July 1878, p. 3 col. 6. 
11 SMH 29 June 1878, p. 4 cols. 6-7. 
12 SMH 3 July 1878, p. 5, col. 4. 
13 SMH 12 July 1878, p. 6 col. 7 and 24 July, p. 3 cols. 6-7. 
Page 358   Chapter 8: The class logic of anti-Chinese racism 
Parkes picked up the issue in a speech to the “working men” of Mudgee. The 
Herald excoriated the arguments of the Trades and Labour Council, but 
endorsed the line taken by Parkes, and in the process gave perhaps its most 
considered exposition of the issue. 
The reasons given by Sir Henry Parkes for limiting the influx of the 
Chinese are practically two; first, because we are entitled—this being a 
British possession—to maintain it distinctively British, and in doing so 
we are protecting our own interests, protecting the interests of the 
Empire, and probably, in the long-run, protecting the interests of the 
world at large…and we are as much justified in doing that as we 
originally were in claiming and occupying the country. In the second 
place, it is desirable, as far as possible, to prevent the establishment in the 
same country of races which cannot commingle. Where such a state of 
things exists, even though slavery may not exist in form, there is always 
a tendency to it in substance. There is a superior race, and a degraded 
race, and in such cases the degraded race generally succeeds in pulling 
down, morally, intellectually, and even physically, its lord and master.14
The paper was committed to the bourgeois colonisation and “anti-slavery” 
agendas discussed earlier in this thesis. Two weeks before the ASN strike 
began, and with no apparent foreknowledge of the upheaval to come, the 
Herald published an editorial criticising two British writers, Sir Walter 
Medhurst and WR Greg, for recent articles that displayed an ignorance of the 
nature and significance of the Chinese issue in Australia: 
The colony of Queensland simply asked the Home Government to be 
able to protect itself against a Celestial invasion, and especially to 
                                                 
14 SMH 8 August 1878, p. 4, cols. 5-6. The TLC’s public meeting was on Tuesday 23 July 1878, 
and covered in SMH 24 July, p. 3 cols. 6-7. Parkes’ speech at Mudgee was on Tuesday 30 July 
1878, reported in SMH 2 August, p. 3, cols. 3-5. 
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prevent her gold-fields being inundated by hordes of Chinese of the 
lowest order. This is the request which Mr. W. R. Greg says can scarcely 
be called decent.15
The Herald was bitterly opposed to the seamen’s strike, but this did not in the 
slightest reflect any support for Chinese immigration. Its opposition to the 
seamen was firstly on a class basis; they had broken their contracts, and hence 
broken the law. Was the word of the seamen not to be trusted? it asked, in its 
first editorial on the strike.16 The paper was also concerned for the future of 
Sydney as a great trading and commercial port and for the ASN Company 
itself, the largest private employer in the colony, representing a vast capital put 
in danger by the dispute. Over the next fortnight, the Herald would publish 
three more major editorials on the strike and the “Chinese question”. On 27 
November, the paper set out to counter the tide of support for the seamen, 
arguing that the fundamental issue was not Chinese immigration, but the 
inviolability of contracts: 
Society could scarcely exist in its present form without a general faith in 
the keeping of agreements; and, Chinese or no Chinese, the doctrine that 
people who have deliberately entered into contracts may as deliberately 
violate them without the consent of the other parties to the transaction, is 
the last that should receive any sanction in a city which depends for its 
prosperity upon the uninterrupted development of trade and 
commerce.17
                                                 
15 SMH 4 November, 1878, p. 4 col. 6 to p. 5 col. 1. 
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This was undoubtedly the Herald’s most potent argument and was carefully and 
repeatedly replied to by public speakers and editorialists who supported the 
strike. Some people who supported the seamen, did so despite concern that 
they had supposedly “broken the law”. 
Twelve days into the strike, the Sydney Morning Herald decided to make it clear 
that it did not approve of the company’s stance. It admonished both ASN and 
the Sydney Chamber of Commerce for taking “a mercantile view” of the strike: 
…it is in the highest degree undesirable to have the colonial marine 
manned by foreigners; still more so to have it manned by an inferior 
race…there was never yet a nation that was distinguished for maritime 
or naval greatness which depended for the service of its vessels on crews 
of an inferior race; nor is there any reason to believe that the rule for the 
future will be different, and that maritime greatness will be able 
hereafter to repose on such a basis.18
By early December, a series of attempts at negotiation and mediation had failed. 
Coal miners had joined the industrial action, paralysing ASN’s attempts to keep 
its steamers sailing, and the anti-Chinese movement had become both deeply 
bitter, and of massive proportions. The Herald now began to search for ways to 
settle both the strike, and the Chinese question more broadly, and it began 
discussing possible legislative action. It rejected calls for the prohibition of 
Chinese immigration—“ No community has yet proceeded to this extreme”—
and argued instead that the numbers arriving could be limited and a poll tax 
could be imposed—exactly the measures ultimately adopted in 1881. However 
these measures would not necessarily help in a situation like the present; they 
                                                 
18 SMH 30 November 1878, p. 4, cols. 5-6. 
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“would leave it possible for a public company to employ Chinese to even a 
greater extent than the A. S. N. Company’s Board of Directors now propose to 
employ them.”19 In December 1878, when Sir Henry Parkes returned to power 
as Premier, he promised a bill to restrict Chinese immigration. The Herald 
commented that while the anti-Chinese agitators would applaud, “it is not 
likely to be objected to by any other” section of the population: “we have 
always held not only that it is undesirable that these colonies should possess 
Chinese in large numbers, but also that we ought to protect ourselves against 
such a possibility.”20
The seamen’s strike was settled on 2 January 1879, but the Sydney Morning 
Herald remained fixated on the class dimensions of the struggle, rather than its 
racial politics. The issue now was not Chinese immigration—“No one will care 
to argue that a country like this should be thrown open to Mongolians”—but 
the moral degeneration of a people looking to the government for protection.21 
“Our trade unions want the Government to be a buffer between the Europeans 
and the Chinese,” it thundered. While admitting the importance of the Chinese 
issue, it warned that: 
there is no more dangerous tendency than the one which makes one class 
of men go to the Government…for the means of enabling one section of 
the community to dictate to the other. Nothing more effectively destroys 
the personal independence and the civil liberty which have been the 
special boast of Britons than this, and nothing is more persistently 
encouraged by the Communistic tendencies of these times. 
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It was the supposed inability of the white worker to compete with the Chinese, 
so loudly declared by the anti-Chinese movement, and the need for state 
protection from Chinese competition, that raised the hackles of the Herald. This 
was not their anti-Chinese agenda. It warned the workers that in the end, there 
would be no evading this competition. State paternalism in one area would 
soon spread to others, and the cry for protection was one step along the road to 
communism.22
And so the attitude of the paper shifted on whether or not New South Wales 
needed legislative protection from the “danger” of Chinese immigration. When 
the new Parkes government introduced its Chinese Immigration Bill into 
parliament, the Herald noted that it would not prevent “coolie immigration”, 
nor would it have prevented the ASN dispute. So far as the working class was 
concerned, the whole complaint was an “economic one”. The paper would not 
be unhappy “if the whole question were allowed to stop where it is.”23 The 
paper rejected the measures in Parkes’ bill, and when the Legislative Council 
finally voted down the 1879 bill, the Sydney Morning Herald expressed its 
satisfaction, and in doing so made it clear that its real grievance with the bill 
was “the circumstances of its appearance before Parliament” which were 
“discreditable”. 
                                                 
22 The Herald had been alarmed for some time about the growth of communism in Europe and 
America. During 1878, it reported the congresses and personalities of French and German 
socialism, and in late July 1878, devoted three columns and thousands of words to a summary 
of “The literature of German socialism”. This report attributed the alarming growth of socialism 
in Germany to the shift from charity to “approbation of all the wildest schemes brought 
forward in the interest of the poor.” See, for instance, item on German socialists, 20 July 1878, p. 
7, col. 4; article on the socialist, Dr Nobiling, 22 July, p. 3 col. 4; report on American 
communism, 13 August, p. 7, col. 4; reports on the Socialist Congress in Paris and Germany’s 
Anti-Socialist Bill, 29 October, p. 8, col. 5 to p. 9, col. 1; for “The Literature of German 
Socialism”, 31 July 1878, p. 7, cols. 1-3, reprinted from The Times (London). 
23 SMH 1 February 1879, p. 4, col. 6 – p. 5, col. 1. 
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The bill had its origin in a breach of the law and a defiance of the 
principle that lawful contracts should be fulfilled by the parties who 
enter into them. The bill virtually grew out of the strike of the A. S. N. 
Company’s seamen…24
The paper was not just angry about the strike, but also “the sympathy shown by 
many members of the most numerous class with that strike and the defiance of 
law involved in it”. The paper again made it clear that it was not opposed to 
legislation to restrict Chinese immigration. The key issue was that any changes 
should be dictated by ruling class agendas, and not allow the enemies of sound 
commercial principles any sense of achievement.: 
Let Parliament legislate, if it will, for the exclusion of the Chinese; but let 
it act upon its own sense of what the public interest requires, and not in a 
panic or under the press of class dictation, or for fear lest the peace 
should be broken and the State should be unable to maintain its 
authority against law-breakers.25
The somewhat exceptional nature of the Herald’s position during the seamen’s 
strike, can be seen most elegantly in the position taken by the Rev James Jefferis. 
Jefferis is unknown today, but was one of the major religious figures in colonial 
Australia. When the seamen’s strike began, he was relatively new to Sydney, 
having moved from Adelaide where he had enjoyed a glittering career as 
perhaps the city’s most celebrated priest. His public lectures there had been 
patronised by the cream of society, including the South Australian Governor. In 
1877 he had been personally recruited by the Fairfaxes to move to Sydney on 
the colossal salary of £1000 a year to lead the Congregational Church to which 
                                                 
24 SMH 24 April 1879, p. 5, col. 1. 
25 SMH 24 April 1879, p. 5, col. 1. 
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they belonged.26 Jefferis’ sermons suggest that the Fairfaxes had chosen a man 
with whom they felt a deep religious and political affinity. He warned of the 
“dangers into which the ultra-democratic principle may lead us”; attacked 
Victoria for its protectionism and hoped “New South Wales will never abandon 
the principles of free trade”; lamented the alienation of the working classes 
from Christianity and condemned “want of thrift and love of strong drink”.27
On 8 December 1878, with the controversy over the seamen’s strike at fever 
pitch, Jefferis gave a lecture on “The Chinese and the seamen’s strike” at his Pitt 
St Church, and it was then published as a pamphlet, as so many of his speeches 
were, by Foster and Fairfax, Sydney.28 He began by declaring that he would not 
support either side in the dispute; “I am no judge, no arbitrator, no partisan.”29 
Nevertheless he contradicted the basis of the position taken by his benefactors 
at the Herald: 
The controversy is not really between a certain number of seamen and 
their employers. It is between Englishmen as a race and the Chinese as a 
race, between Europeans and Asiatics. It is the battle between the West 
and the East, the same which of old was fought out at Marathon and 
Salamis, and which has been waging ever since.30
                                                 
26 Walter Phillips, “Jefferis, James (1833 - 1917)” in Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 4, pp. 
473-5. His salary was perhaps eight times that of an average tradesperson, and possibly 
equivalent to $300,000 in 2006 values. 
27 Rev Jas Jefferis, The enfranchisement of labour: A lecture delivered under the auspices of the Young 
Men's Christian Association of New South Wales, on Tuesday, June 18th, 1878, by the Rev. Jas. Jefferis, 
LL.B, Foster and Fairfax, Sydney, 1878, pp. 17-22. 
28 Rev J Jefferis, The Chinese and the seamen’s strike: a lecture, Foster and Fairfax, Sydney; Gordon 
and Gotch, Brisbane, 1878. 
29 Jefferis, The Chinese, p. 4. 
30 Jefferis, The Chinese, p. 4. 
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At issue was the colonisation of Australia, which was part of Britain’s divine 
mission. Yet Australia was in peril: 
The Chinese are sure to come, if allowed to come, in such vast numbers 
that Australia will be more Asiatic than European. As they come now, to 
live for a time but not to settle, their labour is no profit to the community. 
Since they are able to subsist on a pittance that would not supply an 
Englishman with food, to say nothing of his home and family, they 
undersell all European labour, and will eventually drive it from the 
market. 
When Jefferis looked at the Chinese, he found: 
There are many things I do not like. The physique of the Chinaman is 
unpleasant to an Englishman. The sallow complexion, high cheek bones, 
oblique eyes, hairless chin, and generally retreating forehead…are… 
contrary to our standard of beauty… As to their habits, they differ from 
our own, and in many respects are unpleasant.31
Jefferis believed that Chinese labourers would be needed by Australian 
capitalists, to work in the tropical north. But if they came too soon, Anglo-
Australia could be threatened: 
We want English civilization, English institutions, English social life, 
dominant and predominant in Australia. If they come to us in great 
numbers while these are in their formative stage, it will be with results 
most unhappy to our future.32
                                                 
31 Jefferis, The Chinese, p. 9. 
32 Jefferis, The Chinese, p. 11. 
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A practical man, he proposed measures the government might take to limit the 
migration of Chinese people, including measures to increase the cost of 
passage—which is essentially what the poll tax did—and enforce sanitary 
provisions on common lodging houses. 
Jefferis’ view of the strike reflected a much wider ruling class view of the issues, 
one more thoroughly represented in the pages of Sydney’s most successful 
newspaper, the Evening News. 
Duty to nation and ‘race’: The seamen’s strike in the 
Evening News 
The Evening News was Sydney’s largest circulation newspaper for several 
decades, and for the entire period covered by this thesis. It was run by the 
highly successful Samuel Bennett, who also published the Town and Country 
Journal, which was the largest-circulation weekly journal in the Australian 
colonies from around 1875 and into the 1890s—outselling the better-
remembered Bulletin.33 The Evening News is important in this discussion 
because of its wide circulation and because it supported the seamen’s strike 
from a thoroughly mainstream, conservative-bourgeois standpoint.34 At the 
                                                 
33 RB Walker, The newspaper press in New South Wales, 1803-1920, Sydney University Press, 
Sydney, 1976, pp. 76-8, 82-3. 
34 Fletcher, The role of the immigration question, describes the Evening News as “very 
conservative in outlook”, saying it “criticized trade union activities on most matters apart from 
those concerned with immigration”, and he concluded, “its appeal was directed to the urban 
middle class”; p. 63. 
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very minimum, the position taken by the Evening News radically undermines 
the conventional view that the Sydney Morning Herald represented the opinions 
of the business elite in New South Wales. More importantly, a study of the 
Evening News in 1878 gives an insight into the origins of the bourgeois 
hegemony of later decades. 
The paper did not approve of strikes, but saw Chinese immigration as a threat 
to the future of the British-Australian nation.35 On the first day of the strike, it 
argued: 
This is a British colony, discovered, founded, and settled by British 
energy, and it is no extraordinary selfishness which makes us wish to 
maintain its essentially British character as the best heritage we can hand 
down to our children.36
Like many others in the ruling class, the paper took a super-imperial view of 
the issue of Chinese immigration, seeing in it a struggle for control of the 
Australian continent: “All local questions sink into insignificance beside the 
great competition between the white and the yellow races.”37 In this, the 
seamen’s strike was a continuation of the earlier movement against 
transportation. Since those days: 
nothing has so vitally affected the future of the colony as this threatened 
introduction of an inferior and alien population. The citizens of Sydney, 
regardless of the guns of government-house which were turned upon 
them, demanded that the scum of Great Britain should not be turned 
                                                 
35 Indeed, it often headlined its news items on the conflict, “Anti-Chinese strike”. 
36 Evening News 19 Nov 1878, p. 2, col. 2. 
37 Evening News 30 November 1878, p. 4, col. 3. 
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loose on our shores, and it is not likely that we shall accept the dregs of 
China, even at the hands of the A.S.N. Co.’s directors.38
The position the Evening News took on Chinese immigration and the seamen’s 
strike reflected its view of government and society. Where the Sydney Morning 
Herald regarded the protection of property and the rights of capital as 
paramount, the Evening News emphasised the strength of the state; and for this, 
it was necessary to inculcate a sense of national duty.39 In an editorial on the 
problems facing the United States of America, it attacked the modern attitude of 
“Each for himself and the Devil take the hindmost”, arguing: 
It was not by the application of principles such as these that any state has 
become or remained permanently great or prosperous. It is by the 
fulfilment of “duties” rather than by claiming “rights” that a solid 
foundation of social prosperity and political strength can be laid.40
Thus there was a political limit to the application of liberal economic principles. 
In this, and in its general view of the nature of society, the paper echoed the 
organicist view of society held by conservatives like Thomas Carlyle as 
discussed in chapter 5, and faintly echoed Carlyle’s biting denunciations of 
capitalists who endangered society as a whole with their overwhelming greed 
and indifference to its consequences.41 Thus the Evening News recognised that 
the hiring of Chinese workers to meet competition from another shipping line 
which also employed them reflected the laws of modern commerce, but insisted 
                                                 
38 Evening News 30 November 1878, p. 4, col. 3. 
39 See in particular the paper’s New Year’s message for 1879 which was the platform for a 
restatement of its broad approach to politics, Evening News 1 Jan 1879, p. 2, col. 2. 
40 Evening News 18 December 1878, p. 2, cols. 2-3. 
41 For example, in Past and Present, second edition, Chapman and Hall, London, 1845, which was 
widely read by colonial liberals and radicals. 
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“that there are other considerations, besides those of the immediate expenditure 
of pounds, shillings, and pence.” 
The position of England and her colonies so entirely depends upon the 
command of the sea possessed by the race, a command resulting as much 
from her mercantile supremacy as from her ironclad fleets, that it is a 
matter of grave political importance, that even in the colonies 
seamanship should be encouraged. We should view with real alarm for 
the future of the Australian colonies anything like a general employment 
of Chinese in our mercantile marine…42
“If,” the paper argued, “competition between rival companies is driving 
Australian sailors out of the ships, it is high time that competition should be 
checked.”43 Likewise, it rejected the argument from the Herald that the law was 
with the company: “If people were to do everything objectionable which there 
is no law to prevent them doing, existence would not be tolerated for a single 
day”.44  
For Sydney’s Evening News, duty was owed—by capitalists as well as workers—
to the nation and the race, and it was on these grounds that it attacked the ASN 
Company, and supported the attempt by the union to restrict Chinese 
immigration and the employment of Chinese workers. It was: 
deeply grieved to find any of our fellow countrymen, who are so far 
willing to act the part of traitors to their race and country… It is bad 
enough that we are in danger of a Mongolian invasion, it is infinitely 
worse that we have a number of men, without a spark of patriotism, who 
                                                 
42 Evening News 19 Nov 1878, p. 2, cols. 2-3. 
43 Evening News 19 Nov 1878, p. 2, cols. 2-3. 
44 Evening News 9 Dec 1878, editorial, p. 2, cols. 2-3. 
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weigh all things in heaven and earth by the standard of pounds, 
shillings, and pence.45
This was the position of Sir Henry Parkes, himself a disciple of Carlyle’s: “By a 
little comprehensive consideration of the whole question, of what is due to our 
race, as well as what is due to immediate dividends, the matter might have been 
settled long ago.”46
There were severe limits to the support offered by the Evening News. As 
tensions rose in late December 1878, with the expected arrival in Sydney of the 
SS Mecca with over 300 Chinese workers hired by the ASN Company, there 
were widespread fears of riot, rebellion, and confrontation between strike 
supporters and the military. The union warned its members against violence 
and any reckless adventurism; and the Evening News also added that the 
military “would, of course, obey the orders of their commanders, if they are 
worth their salt, and are quite capable of clearing the streets of any 
assemblage.”47 As much as the paper supported the anti-Chinese strike, its 
support for the military was fundamental, and in any conflict with the forces of 
order, it would abandon the seafarers. 
                                                 
45 Evening News 26 December 1878, p. 2, col. 2. 
46 Parkes quoted in Evening News 30 December 1878, p. 2, col. 2. Parkes’ relationship with 
Thomas Carlyle is one of the great, unresearched elements of his life and politics. Parkes sent 
Carlyle letters and information about NSW politics, and his own career, visited him in London, 
and frequently cited Carlyle’s views in his speeches. Parkes’ public relationship with Carlyle 
was raised by NSW Premier, James Squire Farnell, at a banquet in his electorate in September 
1878, responding to attacks Parkes had made on him: “Some previous Ministers in this country 
have communications with great minds in England. We can not boast that. I have no 
correspondence with that great, giant intellect, Thomas Carlyle.” SMH 9 September 1878, p. 6, 
col. 4. 
47 Evening News 28 December 1878, p. 4, col. 3. 
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Throughout the strike, the paper argued for compromise by both sides, and 
read stern lectures to the workers on the dangers of violence and the need for 
order. Like the Herald, it worried about the growth of socialist ideas, but chose 
not to deliver fierce lectures on the rights of property and employers, preferring 
to campaign for reconciliation between the classes.48
One obstacle to such a conciliation was indifference amongst many of the rich 
towards what the paper saw as their public duties. In this, its viewpoint also 
reflected Carlyle. It occasionally lampooned the incompetent among the 
privileged in order to lionise “true statesmen”. Thus, when Parkes appointed as 
his Treasurer, the hated anti-union James Watson, Vice-President of the Sydney 
Chamber of Commerce and one of the few who had publicly supported ASN 
against the seamen, the paper declared: 
We have every reason to believe Mr. Watson will be a good treasurer. 
Private success is the best indication of his fitness for the post, and we 
regret very much that the anti-Chinese agitators have hastily tried to 
throw odium upon him because he was manly in his avowal of his 
sympathy rather with the A. S. N. Co. than with the men. It would be 
well to find out what his views are on the broader question of Chinese 
immigration before dubbing him “Chinaman Watson”.49
While there were major differences between the philosophical approaches of the 
Evening News and the Sydney Morning Herald, the political positions taken by the 
                                                 
48 See eg, Evening News 11 March 1870, p. 3, cols. 3-4, which reprints an article by Wendell 
Phillips, including this: “[W]e must have the Vanderbilts. We cannot do without the money 
kings, and we cannot do without individual independence,” and; “the statesmanship of today is 
to marry and reconcile these two indispensable elements of the future,”—labour and capital. 
49 Evening News, 20 December 1878, p. 2, col. 2. 
Page 372   Chapter 8: The class logic of anti-Chinese racism 
two were in many respects identical.50 The News was Protestant, militantly free 
trade, moralistic, pro-empire, and pro-law and order, reflecting a wider ruling 
class consensus. There was little in the paper’s politics to give comfort to the 
labour movement, or to plebeian, middle-class agitators of the time. The paper 
was contemptuous of poor people, it ridiculed trade unionists, opposed 
payment for members of parliament, glorified in large scale immigration, and 
when Victorian Premier, Graham Berry, proposed to set up a national bank to 
lend money to selectors at low rates of interest, the paper denounced this as 
“the adoption of Communism as the basis of social life.”51 It is arguable, 
therefore, that the difference between the two papers on the class logic of the 
seamen’s strike and the anti-Chinese movement reflected a difference in 
approaches to social discipline between publishers whose broader class 
identification was very similar. 
Some writers have argued that anti-Chinese organising played a major role in 
the building of the labour movement in the 1880s.52 For Ray Markey, “the anti-
Chinese campaign had been the most sustained organisational experience for 
the working class in the 1880s.”53 This raises the question: did the Evening News 
strengthen trade unionism and radicalism in colonial NSW? Certainly, the 
Seamen’s Union and other trade unions were strengthened in an immediate 
                                                 
50 This discussion of the politics of the Evening News is based on a specific project in which I 
closely read each edition of the paper published in March of 1870, 1872, 1874, 1876 and 1878. 
51 The paper attacked trade union arguments against assisted immigration in February 1878 as 
“fictitious” and “alarmist”, Fletcher, The immigration question, p. 64 (citing Evening News 12 
February 1878); on Berry, Evening News 13 March 1878, p. 2, col. 2. 
52 This is the argument of Fletcher, The immigration question, see p. 5, also p. 109. 
53 Markey, Populist politics, p. 68. It is my strong impression that the campaign against assisted 
immigration was a far more sustained campaign, and far more central in the ongoing work of 
the Sydney Trades and Labour Council for a long period of time, than the episodic, if 
occasionally large, mobilisations against Chinese immigration. 
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sense by their successful resistance to ASN’s attempt to de-unionise its fleet, 
and some new unions were formed.54 But in a wider sense, the ideological 
framework within which the strike was legitimised—a framework in which an 
individual’s first loyalties were to nation and race—was a framework inimical 
to the full development of working class consciousness. The importance of 
nationalism in undermining class solidarity was well understood by ruling class 
thinkers. One of the most sophisticated was Charles Henry Pearson, a minister 
in Victorian Liberal and coalition governments in 1880-81 and 1886-90, and 
described by his biographer as “the outstanding intellectual of the Australian 
colonies”.55 In his classic work, National Life and Character, he argued—like 
Mill—that nationalism was essential to sustaining the existing body politic. He 
                                                 
54 Fletcher, The immigration question, lists the Northern Miners Union and the Coal Lumpers 
Union, p. 109. His assertion regarding the Northern Miners is contradicted by Robin Gollan, The 
coalminers of New South Wales: A history of the union, 1860-1960, Melbourne University Press in 
association with the Australian National University, Parkville (Vic), 1963, pp, 45-64, which does 
not even mention the ASN dispute in his chapter on the rebuilding of the union and the gaining 
of their first agreement, 1872-81. Representatives of Sydney wharf labourers were prominent in 
the newly formed Sydney Trades and Labour Council, from 1874 onwards, initially organised 
as the No 1 Labouring Men’s Association and the No 2 Labouring Men’s Association, see for 
example Minutes of Sydney Trades and Labour Council, 18 August 1874, 30 September 1874, in 
Mitchell Library, A3828. It is clear, also, from the minutes of 11 November 1875, that the 
Labouring Men’s Association was important on the wharves. Unfortunately, the minutes for 
1876-80 are missing. Three days into the strike, SMH 22 November reported that ASN faced a 
new crisis as union men refused to coal the steamers. Union leaders said it was not a union 
decision, but one by the men themselves, suggesting both that the union strategy at that stage 
was not to widen the dispute, and that the coal lumpers had recognised leaders and 
organisation, and the ability to act independently of it. It is hard to believe that this is a union 
formed as a result of the dispute. 
55 John M Tregenza, “Pearson, Charles Henry (1830 - 1894)” in Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
[online] http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A050471b.htm [accessed 1 December 2006]. 
Tregenza and others have painted Pearson as a friend of labour, but Pearson showed little more 
than vicious contempt for the poor and the working class. See for example Pearson, “The 
Education Question”, Victorian Review, vol. 3, no. 14, Dec 1880, pp. 141-55; Charles H Pearson, 
National life and character: A forecast, Macmillan and Co, London and New York, 1894, pp. 147, 
228-9. Tregenza also wrote that: “Pearson made much of Australia's potential as an ally of 
Britain in any future war, prophesying that Australia could raise 400,000 to 560,000 men and 
would be prepared to send a significant proportion overseas.” Tregenza, Pearson entry, 
Australian Dictionary of Biography; also Pearson, National life, p. 235. 
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saw the greatest challenge to nationalism and the existing state as coming from 
citizens “more interested in industrial organisations stretching over the whole 
earth”. But this was containable; most especially by the “great and not 
unreasonable jealousy among the workmen of every country less they should 
be swamped by the immigration of competitors.”56 The value of nationalism 
and racism in containing trade unionism was illustrated within a few months of 
the end of the seamen’s strike, when the Evening News attacked carpenters 
working on the building for Sydney’s International Exhibition. They had gone 
on strike over their wages on what had become a dangerous job. Every 
argument the Evening News had used against ASN was now trotted out against 
the carpenters: 
At a time when…every patriotic son and daughter of Australia is 
intensely anxious that our first International Exhibition should be a 
complete success, the carpenters have imperilled that success, and have 
acted with intense selfishness and consummate folly. They have thought 
to use the pressure of time as a lever by which to obtain an addition to 
their wages, and the fire-eaters among them have not scrupled to use 
intimidation against those who prefer duty and honour to the chance of 
ill-gotten gains.57
                                                 
56 Pearson, National life, pp. 232-4. 
57 Evening News, 25 April 1879, p. 2, col. 2. 
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The seamen’s strike in Queensland’s conservative 
newspapers 
The seamen’s strike was inter-colonial, with seamen striking, picketing and 
raising support in ports around Australia. One of the most significant features 
of the strike in Queensland was the vigorous support given to it by many of the 
colony’s leading conservative newspapers and politicians, including the 
Brisbane Courier, the colony’s leading newspaper and the one most closely 
associated with business and the McIlwraith Conservatives. For Queensland’s 
conservatives, the anti-Chinese dimension in the campaign against ASN was 
not a conflict between labour and capital, but a struggle to save British 
Australia, a national struggle in which a trade union had been forced to take the 
lead.  
In chapters 5 and 6, the editorial position of the Brisbane Courier regarding a 
range of “coloured labour” issues was discussed. In this section, I look at the 
agitation of the leading conservative newspapers from four of Queensland’s 
largest towns: the Queensland Times (Ipswich), Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, 
Maryborough Chronicle and Townsville Herald. These newspapers are worth 
studying in their own right, but their significance here is that they reinforce the 
central role in the anti-Chinese “movement” played by elite conservatives in 
Queensland, and how broadly the approach of the Evening News was adopted 
by the political ruling class. 
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In the 1870s, the Queensland Times, edited by John Irwin, had a reputation as one 
of Queensland’s most conservative, pro-squatter newspapers.58 The paper 
assiduously promoted the political virtues of Ipswich MLA, John Malbon 
Thompson, a particularly rigid member of the pro-squatter “sub-section”, 
which was later to cause Conservative leader Sir Thomas McIlwraith so much 
grief. As soon as the seamen’s strike broke out, the Queensland Times moved to 
support it. The issue for the paper was the threat posed by Chinese immigration 
to British and European colonisation of Queensland: 
Already in Sydney and in Brisbane they have nearly monopolised 
cabinet-making, and have driven the white men engaged in that trade 
either to seek work at other occupations, or to leave both colonies. Unless 
some check is placed upon them, Chinamen will ultimately monopolise 
most of our industrial occupations, and thousands of our fellow-
countrymen will be shoved out of the land which they have adopted as 
the home of themselves and their children.59
The paper believed that as the struggle grew, “repressive legislation against the 
Chinese” would be needed in both Queensland and New South Wales.60 On 3 
December 1878, the paper demanded that the Liberal government of John 
Douglas “terminate the strike in favour of the men…by giving six months’ 
notice of the termination of all mail contracts”, which the government did, in an 
act which largely contributed to the company’s defeat. In that defeat, the paper 
rejoiced.61
                                                 
58 See Denis Cryle, The press in colonial Queensland: A social and political history 1845-1875, 
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1989, esp. pp. 122-4; on p. 127 describes the 
paper in 1871 as a “rabid” supporter of the Conservative Palmer. 
59 QT 26 November 1878. 
60 QT 26 November 1878. 
61 QT 4 January 1879. 
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The paper played a major role in organising a public meeting of support for the 
striking seafarers. The meeting was initiated when the Brisbane organising 
committee wrote to William Ginn, a prominent Ipswich merchant, company 
director and municipal councillor, asking him to take action in support of the 
seafarers. Ginn’s own attitude to trade unions may be gathered by comments he 
made at the public meeting: 
Personally he (Mr. Ginn) was not in favour of strikes like those which he 
had frequently seen take place in the old country. They were injurious to 
the men themselves, to their employers, and to trade and their pernicious 
influences extended far beyond the immediate places in which they took 
place.62
But this was a struggle for life, for the future of the British seaman. By his own 
account, Ginn was unsure how to raise support for something as distasteful as a 
strike, and so approached the Queensland Times. In order to whip up support for 
the public meeting, the paper ran a fiery editorial. The ASN Company was 
threatening 
to deprive us of the possibility of rearing a hardy race of Australian 
seamen—without whom we could scarcely hope in the future to take our 
place among the Anglo-Saxon communities predestined, from 
appearances, to be the ruling powers of the world… The company seem 
to have forgotten that if capital has its rights, it also has its duties.63
The paper nervously appealed to its right wing audience: “There is a vast 
difference between the present and ordinary strikes. The latter are commonly 
                                                 
62 QT 19 December 1878. 
63 Editorial, QT 17 December 1878. 
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for increased wages or shorter hours; the one now in existence is for a principle 
in which every working man in the colony is more or less interested.” Thus, 
“there should be no scruple in the mind of any opposer of strikes which would 
prevent him from contributing towards the support of the seamen”.64 At the 
public meeting that night, the motions were moved and seconded by 
Conservatives and Liberals who had just finished waging a bitter electoral 
campaign against each other. It is doubtful that the paper’s appeal had much 
impact; there was no mention of the size of the meeting, suggesting it was not 
encouraging; a modest £9 was raised—of which £5 came from one obviously 
well-to-do individual—and there was no record of local trade unionists or 
miners getting involved.65
There was, eventually, a meeting called on the issue for Ipswich’s many coal 
miners. Rather than the town hall, the venue was “a green near the Immigration 
Depot”. The anxiety of the miners was palpable; they agreed only to invite the 
Brisbane seamen to send a speaker to inform them of the facts of the matter, and 
while some feared destitution if they took industrial action in support of the 
seamen, the braver of them argued that if they did take action, the local strike 
support committee, run by the town bourgeoisie, should support them on the 
same basis as the seamen.66 These issues were further discussed a few days later 
in a letter by an erstwhile coal miner. In his view, many of the miners feared 
that action against ASN would end in failure; that mines which refused coal to 
                                                 
64 Editorial, QT 17 December 1878. 
65 QT 19 December 1878. 
66 Report in QT 21 December 1878. 
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ASN would be undermined by other local mines which would step in to supply 
the company.67
It is clear from the unusual silences in the paper that its stand was far from 
universally supported by the local ruling class. Its political pin-up, John Malbon 
Thompson, was strangely absent from all the paper’s reporting of the ASN 
dispute. It was admitted that contributions for the strikers were weaker than in 
other centres, and the paper was forced to mention the efforts of Liberals the 
paper hated.68 Equally, there were no letters published protesting against the 
paper’s position. 
In Maryborough, the conservative Chronicle also came out in favour of the 
strike, arguing that the action of the ASN Company, in employing Chinese 
seafarers for their Queensland routes, represented a threat to the anti-Chinese 
legislative barrier erected in 1877 by the government: 
If our mercantile marine is to be made up of Chinese sailors, firemen, 
lumpers, &c.,—and this, eventually, it would come to,—all attempts to 
keep their numbers within controllable limits in the colony would be in 
vain, and we should have the spectacle of a private company riding 
rough-shod over the sentiments, the wishes, and the interests of a whole 
people.69
                                                 
67 QT 24 December 1878. 
68 QT 21 December 1878. 
69 Maryborough Chronicle, 30 November 1878. The Chronicle’s conservatism is demonstrated by its 
support for squatters and sugar planters against Liberals, and its support of anti-Douglas 
candidates in the 1878 election. 
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Unlike Ipswich, the ruling class of Maryborough acted independently of the 
paper, and petitioned the Mayor to call a public meeting on the issue. The 
requisition was signed by the unsuccessful conservative candidate for Wide 
Bay, Edward Booker, and prominent supporters of both Liberal and 
Conservative candidates for Wide Bay and Maryborough at the recent 
election.70 As in Ipswich, the paper ran a strident anti-Chinese editorial on the 
day of the public meeting, defending the action of the strikers in breaking their 
contracts, their greatest crime in the eyes of men of capital. This “was 
unavoidable…for the protest against the action of the Company to be effective”. 
Had the seamen waited for their contracts to run out, “their protest as 
individuals or in isolated groups would have been without weight or influence. 
Indeed, they would have been playing into the hands of the company” by 
allowing their places to be gradually and quietly filled by Chinese.71 These were 
words to send a chill down any bourgeois spine. 
Despite (or because of) this elite support, there were few present in the town 
hall at the nominated starting time, so the Mayor started the meeting half an 
hour late. Clearly, the conservative newspapers were not going along with 
some wildly popular cause in order to maintain their authority; they were 
attempting to make the running on the Chinese issue. The failed Conservative, 
Booker, moved the first motion, warning that, “If they allowed the invasion of 
this race, who were worse than locusts, what would become of their children in 
                                                 
70 Petition in Maryborough Chronicle, 5 December 1878. BB Moreton, a wealthy squatter of 
aristocratic lineage, was the (unsuccessful) Conservative candidate for the Maryborough seat. 
Among those who requisitioned his candidacy, George Stuart, John Graham, SC Davy, James 
Graham, John Hirst, James Cunningham, JE Noakes, GW Gaynor and TT Woodrow are listed in 
the petition for the anti-Chinese meeting. The requisition for Moreton to stand for Maryborough 
was published in the Chronicle on 3 October 1878. 
71 Maryborough Chronicle 5 December 1878. 
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time to come”. Booker drew strength—as did Conservatives generally—from 
the words of former New South Wales Premier, Sir James Martin, who urged 
his own parliament to resist what he claimed was a Chinese “invasion” in 1861. 
“Our shores are close to China, and in a few years they will land millions of 
them in the colony”, he claimed. He denied any radical content to the struggle: 
“It was not a fight of labor against capital, but a fight of labor against a pest”.72
In Maryborough, as in other sugar towns along the coast, the issue of Chinese 
immigration invariably raised the most potent question of Islander labour in the 
plantations. For the Conservative Booker, “the Polynesian was not in any way 
so obnoxious as this race”. For the Liberal Lowry, the action of ASN set a 
disturbing precedent: “If the Company had a right to employ this kind of labor, 
so also had the planters and storekeepers”. EJ Hobson reminded his small 
audience that he had denounced cheap labour from the political platforms of 
Maryborough, and “had then told them what would be the result, and he was 
sorry to see it being realised.” His solution was to boycott Chinese goods.  
But Hobson’s concerns were secondary in the Queensland agitation against 
ASN in 1878. For the ruling class generally, and the conservative newspapers 
and politicians in particular, the major issue was the competition between 
Britain and China to colonise the Australian continent, and this provided the 
context for all the disingenuous talk about Chinese competition pushing out 
European labour. The Maryborough Chronicle summed this up in an editorial in 
the middle of the strike: 
                                                 
72 Maryborough Chronicle 7 December 1878. 
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We believe we have no one to convert when we state that should the 
laboring and middle classes, the working and trading population of the 
colony become, ultimately, Chinese, the work of colonization, as at 
present understood and fostered by the British race, would come to an 
end.73
In Rockhampton, the Conservative agitation was relatively weaker, and was 
partly overshadowed by a late election, won by the Liberals, and a militant 
picket of the wharf when a crowd tried to stop the ASN ship, the Boomerang, 
from docking.74 The conservative Rockhampton Morning Bulletin was hostile to 
the ASN action, and opposed to significant Chinese immigration, but was 
hesitant to support the strike. It saw Chinese people as inured to poverty and 
deprivation, and capable of out-competing Europeans and threatening British 
colonisation; thus “when their immense numbers are taken into account, it 
becomes evident that unless precaution is taken there is some danger of these 
colonies being overrun by Chinese to an alarming extent.”75 The initiative for a 
public meeting against ASN was not in the paper’s hands; nevertheless, it was a 
bipartisan affair as elsewhere, with Conservatives as well as Liberals 
introducing the motions. The most racist offering of the evening came from the 
prominent Conservative, Albrecht Feez, a close friend of Sir Arthur Palmer and 
a Rockhampton Alderman, soon to be MLA for Leichhardt—who raised the 
spectre of European colonisation under threat from Chinese numbers and 
Chinese debauchery: 
                                                 
73 Maryborough Chronicle 12 December 1878. 
74 The crowd was led by a local publican, James Manly, who was charged with attempting to 
incite a riot. Manly was clearly present in a leading role, reflecting again that where there was 
plebeian agitation against Chinese people, it was so often led by storekeepers and publicans. 
Manly was acquitted. See Rockhampton Morning Bulletin 28 November 1878. 
75 Rockhampton Morning Bulletin 27 November, 1878. 
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We have to deal with the fact of a country with 500,000,000 of people, 
being within only a few days’ sail of our shores, needy to send its 
teaming [sic] and needy population amongst us…there was one 
objection to their extensive introduction far more serious, and that was, 
on the ground of morality. (Cheers.) There was one house in San 
Francisco which contained 1700 Chinamen—a house not having room 
enough for seventy Europeans—and the immoralities that existed in that 
house must be something fearful.76
One of the aims of the Conservative party and conservative press was to keep 
the issues of Chinese immigration and Pacific Island labour separate. 
Rockhampton was one place that saw a meeting held to establish an anti-
Chinese and anti-Kanaka League. The composition of the speaking list was far 
removed from that of the anti-Chinese public meeting, being far less elevated 
and more narrowly Liberal.77
In Townsville, the strike began during the election campaign, and candidates 
were challenged on their approach to the dispute. In a closely fought election, 
the successful Conservative candidate, John Deane, supported both the ASN 
strikers and the importation of Pacific Islanders for the sugar industry.78 With 
the election out of the way, the conservative Townsville Herald began a strident 
agitation against the ASN Company and its use of Chinese labour.79 It regarded 
most strikes as something to be “deprecated”, but there was a higher principle 
at work here—race: 
                                                 
76 Rockhampton Morning Bulletin 29 November 1878. For Feez and Palmer, see Bill Thorpe, 
Colonial Queensland: Perspectives on a frontier society, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia 
(Qld), 1996, p. 156-63. 
77 Rockhampton Morning Bulletin 12 December 1878. 
78 Townsville Herald 27 November 1878; this was the day of the election. 
79 The paper explicitly identified itself with the politics of John Murtagh Macrossan, see 
Townsville Herald 23 October 1878. 
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The resistance of the seamen is founded not only on self interest, but on a 
social principle which is shared by all classes, whether employers or 
employed. The antipathies of race are inborn and not easily overcome, 
even by continued contact between opposite breeds. But when that 
contact is forced upon a civilised community to their detriment and 
positive loss it is only natural that the most christianlike spirit should 
rebel…80
As with its southern contemporaries, the main thrust of the Townsville Herald’s 
opposition to Chinese immigrants was that they potentially threatened 
European colonisation. It reprinted the Queensland Times editorial discussed 
above,81 and, in its own major editorial, argued that “we may find that by force 
of numbers and by equality of privileges they shall attain to the position of a 
dominating party, and upset the whole scheme of European society, as it 
obtains with us.” To this end, the paper approved a major letter from “Anglo 
Saxon”, who rejected the common argument that the Chinese merely came to 
Australia to get gold and take home their wealth: “the fact is that whatever land 
‘John’ imigrates [sic] to, he trys [sic] to become a resident, and there is no 
country in the world that offers such inducements to him as Australia.” In his 
view, Chinese people had the capacity to take over: her merchants “are already 
ousting European and American merchants from the tea ports of China, they 
have possession of the greater part of the trade in Singapore and they have a 
line of steamers on the coast of China and eastern India competing successfully 
with British shipping”. If they are not stopped, they will push “the white men 
out of the road until Australia becomes a vast Chinese nation”. Thus the 
                                                 
80 Townsville Herald 30 November 1878. 
81 Townsville Herald 7 December 1878. 
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seamen’s strike “is not a question of class against class, but a question of race 
against race”.82
The Herald could tolerate Chinese people growing cabbages, or engaging in the 
“effeminate” work of domestic labour so “below the dignity of male European 
labour”, but not the replacement of good British sailors by “a cheap draft of 
sickly, feint-hearted Mongolians” simply to swell “the dividends of an already 
prosperous company”.83 While the paper was proudly racist, it would not 
countenance what it saw as unreasonable slurs against the Chinese, and chided 
the Brisbane Courier when the latter blamed Chinese immigrants for small pox.84 
And unlike the Queensland Times, the Herald found complications in the issue; 
the sensibilities of those in mining towns, of storekeepers who made a profit 
from the Chinese, and the need for “keeping up of communication with the 
South”. After all, the strike was disrupting trade and business.85 But this in no 
way softened its attitude towards ASN; when the company was finally 
defeated, it commented that, “Outside the Board of Directors there are very few 
indeed who do not regard this attempt to flood our ports and vessels with 
Chinese seamen, as a most unjust and dangerous project.”86 Once the election 
was decided, the town leadership held a public meeting, chaired by the newly-
elected John Deane. Speaking honours were shared between Deane’s 
supporters, and the defeated Liberal, Davey, and his supporters. 
                                                 
82 Townsville Herald 11 December 1878. 
83 Townsville Herald 30 November 1878. 
84 Townsville Herald 21 December 1878. 
85 Townsville Herald 30 November 1878. 
86 Townsville Herald 4 January 1879. 
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The liberal Brisbane paper, The Week, opposed the strike, and took a position 
very similar to that of the Sydney Morning Herald. It described the strike as 
“mutinous behaviour” and compared the strikers with machine-breakers.87 An 
article by “an old trade-unionist” affirmed the right to strike, but condemned 
the strike itself. “I don’t want to see Chinese replacing English tars, but I’m sad 
the sailors have taken the wrong and illegal course. Public opinion will not be 
enough.”88 Its Sydney Telegram that day saw only defeat for the seafarers: 
“Fifty Europeans and about a hundred Chinese are now at work on the A.S.N. 
Company’s wharves. It is considered that the men had better accept the terms 
offered by the Company at once, for public opinion is beginning to shift round 
to the Company's point of view.”89 This was sheer fantasy. 
It is quite clear that the liberal paper saw, in the Courier’s support for the strike, 
an abandonment of some of the fundamentals of bourgeois order. The coverage 
of the anti-Chinese riot in Sydney on 4 December 1878 in The Week was entirely 
unsympathetic, and it accused the Courier of suppressing news of the riot. It 
therefore covered the riot extensively on the first opportunity, and kept 
covering it in the following issue, publishing reports from the Sydney Evening 
News and the Sydney Morning Herald, presumably intending to make Courier 
readers uncomfortable. 90 Ominously it warned: 
An editor [of the Courier] who has recently indulged in the language of 
revolution and anarchy could hardly be expected to enjoy reading 
articles [in the Sydney Morning Herald], the burden of which is the 
                                                 
87 The Week (Brisbane) 23 Nov 1878, p. 724 (editorial). 
88 The Week 30 November 1878, p. 751. 
89 The Week 30 Nov, p. 760. 
90 The Week 7 Dec, pp. 787, 792, 788; 14 Dec, pp. 818-9. 
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maintenance of law and order, and the advantages of observing civil 
contracts.91
Once the new NSW Government of Sir Henry Parkes had made it clear it 
intended introducing legislation to restrict Chinese immigration, The Week 
supported it, arguing that without NSW legislation, the Queensland anti-
Chinese laws would be less effective.92
Containing discontent 
For the majority of mainstream colonial newspapers, the primary logic of the 
seamen’s strike was not to strengthen trade unionism or working class 
consciousness, but to increase popular and elite support for British colonisation, 
as against employers who pursued their own narrow interests without 
consideration for the wider interests of the ruling class. This logic is apparent in 
the way that anti-Chinese campaigning contained working class discontent over 
assisted immigration, and more generally over the anti-labour politics of 
leaders such as Sir Henry Parkes and Sir Thomas McIlwraith. 
Assisted immigration was the system whereby state revenue was used to bring 
migrants from Britain in large numbers. The labour movement saw assisted 
immigration as an attempt to flood the labour market, undermine the 
bargaining position of workers and force down wages. From 1876, there was 
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92 The Week 28 Dec 78, p. 884. 
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growing opposition to it in New South Wales, and from May 1877, a full-
blooded campaign to force an end to it.93 Unlike the anti-Chinese movement, 
the movement against assisted immigration won little support outside the 
labour movement and its politics and base were far more proletarian than the 
anti-Chinese movement.94 Neither was it hostile to the individuals who 
migrated, despite their occasional recruitment as strike-breakers. The first 
public meeting, called by the Trades and Labour Council on 29 May 1877, was 
described as “one of the largest public meetings of the Working Classes, held at 
the Masonic Hall...at which hundreds were unable to gain admission”. Shortly 
after, a Working Men’s Defence Association (WMDA) was formed, involving 
leading trade unionists and other radical plebeian and middle class elements; 
this movement called mass public meetings of thousands, and stimulated 
protest meetings and petitions from around NSW. 
For their part, the rich and powerful were profoundly attached to assisted 
immigration. It deepened British colonisation of the Australian continent, 
strengthened the strategic position of the Anglo-Australian state, and 
accelerated capitalist expansion in the colonies. In all these senses, it was the 
positive, mirror-image of the exclusionary elements in the White Australia 
policy, and needs to be analysed as one element of White Australia rather than 
something separate. The evidence of businesspeople to the NSW Select 
                                                 
93 Albert A Hayden, “The anti-immigration movement, 1877-1893”, Journal & Proceedings (Royal 
Australian Historical Society), vol. 48, pt. 1, March 1962, pp. 25-43. The Parliamentary Papers of 
NSW record twelve petitions or public meetings which sent petitions, in the nine months from 
May 1877 to February 1878. NSWLA V&P 1876-77, vol. 3, pp. 159-171; NSWLA V&P 1877-78, 
vol. 2, pp. 819-25. 
94 Fletcher, The immigration question, both illustrates and argues this point. I do not agree that 
the campaign against assisted immigration reflected the real class needs of workers, but it 
certainly challenged the class desires of employers. 
Chapter 8: The class logic of anti-Chinese racism Page 389 
Committee on Assisted Immigration in 1880-81 was in stark contrast to that of 
trade unionists and workers.95 In the private correspondence of leading political 
figures, such as Sir Henry Parkes, bitter reproaches were directed to Australian 
colonial governments who failed to drive up their populations. David Lanarch, 
the London representative of the Bank of New South Wales, wrote: 
You will find that, while you in Australia are shutting your doors agt 
immigration, America and Canada are doing every thing possible to 
attract them I know that, at least, you are of my opinion, viz that a fresh 
stream of immigrants is the life blood of a new country; but, 
unfortunately, universal suffrage will not permit you to bring your views 
into effect.96
Parkes himself was an implacable supporter of assisted immigration. In 1876, as 
Leader of the Opposition, Parkes moved that “not less than £150,000 per annum 
ought to be expended without unnecessary delay in promoting immigration 
from Great Britain and Ireland”.97 This was a colossal sum—perhaps $45 
million in today’s values—and would have paid for at least 10,000 extra 
immigrants.98 Parkes’ extreme attitude earned him the enmity of the labour 
movement with Seamen’s Union President, Thomas White, declaring that 
Parkes would listen to the Chamber of Commerce, but that neither the 
                                                 
95 “Progress report from the Select Committee on Assisted Immigration; together with the 
proceedings of the Committee, minutes of evidence, and Appendix”, NSW LA V&P 1879-80, 
vol. 5, pp. 719-813; also “Second progress report from the Select Committee on Assisted 
Immigration: Together with the proceedings of the Committee, minutes of evidence, and 
Appendix”, NSW LA, V&P 1880-81, vol. 3, pp. 275-94. 
96 Letter to Parkes 20 November 1879 in Parkes Corresp, Mitchell Library, A892, p. 276. See also 
letter from Sir Daniel Cooper, temporary NSW Agent-General in London, to Parkes, 2 July 1880, 
Parkes corresp, A920, p. 33. 
97 Coghlan, Labour and industry, vol. III, p. 1284. 
98 From 1871-1880, the NSW government spent £331,981 on 24,412 immigrants, an average of 
£13.6 per head; Fletcher, The immigration question, p. 50. 
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government nor the press would listen to the workers.99 In February 1876, the 
Evening News painted Parkes as the colony’s conservative leader, one “leaning 
towards political finality, if not towards political retrogression.”100 While that is 
perhaps an exaggeration, Parkes was a fanatic for free trade, an opponent of 
state provision of welfare, hostile to the movement of free selectors and to 
effective trade unionism. A serial bankrupt, Parkes lived in relative luxury 
thanks to massive loans advanced by the banks and wealthy benefactors in the 
colony. 
In October 1877, the WMDA was transformed into the Political Reform League 
(PRL), and campaigned vigorously against both Sir John Robertson (as Premier) 
and Sir Henry Parkes (as Leader of the Opposition) in the general election of 
October 1877, playing a significant role in their shock defeats.101 Contemporary 
observer, Timothy Coghlan, later wrote, “Parkes made a determined stand for 
immigration and lost his seat in East Sydney largely for that reason”.102 Parkes 
and Robertson retreated to the countryside to get back into the Assembly.103
                                                 
99 Hayden, The anti-immigration movement, p. 27. 
100 The Evening News, editorial, 24 Feb 1876, p. 2, col. 2. I do not necessarily accept this 
description. Parkes was both more contradictory and subtle than this suggests. But he had 
proven unwilling to disturb a series of political compromises—eg over land legislation and state 
aid to church schools—despite a growing bourgeois discontent with them. Parkes had a few 
liberal followers, most notably David Buchanan, and there were conservatives and liberals 
ranged behind his long-time opponent, Sir John Robertson. Indeed, a month earlier, the paper 
had argued that there were no parties in NSW politics, 24 Jan 1876, p. 2, col. 2. But the very fact 
that the News could make this assertion of conservatism says a great deal about Parkes’ politics. 
101 The WMDA split in around August/September 1877, with a group around Martin Guest 
expelled. The WMDA then set up a broader Political Reform League involving artisans, small 
business people and selectors, as well as trade unionists. The PRL held its founding conference 
in October 1877, during the election campaign, and at the same time as a conference of free 
selectors. It does not seem to have held the allegiance of the free selectors. See SMH 16 Oct 77, p. 
1 (meeting notice); 16 October 1877, p. 5, col. 7; 17 Oct 1877, p. 5, cols. 2-3; 18 Oct 1877, p. 7, cols. 
3-4. 
102 Coghlan, Labour and industry, vol. III, pp. 1285-6. For its part, the PRL did well in the 
election. While none of its candidates were elected, Thomas White gained 1602 votes in West 
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Out of office and having lost much of his parliamentary following, Parkes 
moved to contain the damage caused by his support for assisted immigration. 
In a major speech he gave in July 1878 to the “working men” of Mudgee, Parkes 
put the issue of British immigration in the context of the supposed danger 
represented by the Chinese, and hence the need to “preserve the elements of the 
British character in this new land”. Parkes warned of the immense population 
of China, and its potential military power, and went on to explain that, 
he believed the Chinese belonged to a nation too numerous for us to 
sanction a wholesale immigration from, because we were not to admit a 
people who were aliens to us in language, blood, and faith…[But] he 
should not like any person to go away from that large meeting under any 
impression that he was against the introduction of people from our own 
country. He was not. (Cheers.) He utterly dissented from this doctrine 
that we had enough people in this country. (Hear, hear.) He utterly 
dissented from the doctrine that we—into whose hands the princely 
heritage of our public lands was given—were doing anything at variance 
with true national morality in spending a portion of that great land 
revenue in introducing our brothers and sisters from the mother country. 
(Cheers.) Therefore, he was anxious for the progress of this country in 
numbers.104
                                                                                                                                               
Sydney, not far behind the defeated Premier on 1891, while the four successful candidates 
polled from 2117 to 2929 votes; see SMH 26 Oct 1877, p. 4, col. 8. They did less well in East 
Sydney, where another prominent union leader, Frank Dixon, won 1302 votes, compared with 
2843 for Parkes who was narrowly defeated, with the four successful candidates gaining 2930-
4112 votes.; see SMH 25 Oct 1877, p. 4, col. 8. After the election, the Sydney Morning Herald 
acknowledged the success of the PRL campaign by editorialising on the question of assisted 
immigration, while ridiculing the efforts of working men to get class representatives elected to 
parliament; see SMH 27 Oct 1877, p. 4, cols. 3-4; 27 Oct 1877, p. 4, cols. 4-5 (on immigration). 
103 Elections were held over several weeks, the major Sydney electorates voting first. Parkes was 
returned for Canterbury—then a rural electorate—and Robertson for Mudgee. 
104 Speech given Tuesday 30 July 1878, reported in SMH 2 August 1878, p. 3, cols. 3-5. A week 
earlier, the Trades and Labour Council had held a mass public meeting in Sydney to protest 
against the hiring of Chinese seafarers by the ASN company; this provided some context for his 
remarks. Parkes considered his comments sufficiently important to send the cutting of this 
speech to WE Gladstone; see letter to Gladstone, August 13 1878, Parkes corresp A931. p. 436ff. 
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By assisting in the immigration of British labourers, the government was 
therefore “protecting” the people from the supposed dangers of a Chinese 
takeover; those who thought NSW had enough people were putting the country 
at risk from a possible Chinese invasion. 
In December 1878, the defeat of the Farnell government opened the way for 
Parkes to return to power at the head of a coalition with his long-time rival, Sir 
John Robertson.105 Having been appointed Premier by the Governor, Parkes 
and his ministers were required to stand for re-election to Parliament. Now, in 
the midst of the seamen’s strike, there was none of the well-organised or bitter 
opposition he had faced a year earlier, and no campaign against him over 
assisted immigration—despite the supposedly stronger position of the union 
movement as a result of the strike. Indeed, there were now new reasons to 
campaign against Parkes. In voting against Farnell’s land bill—the issue which 
brought the government down—Parkes had been protecting the interests of 
squatters over selectors. Furthermore, Parkes had nominated James Watson as 
                                                                                                                                               
The major reason for this was undoubtedly his attack on a movement of support for the foreign 
policy of the Tory Prime Minister, Beaconsfield, in the conflict with Russia over its invasion of 
Turkey. However, Parkes also referred to his Mudgee speech later in the year, when seeking re-
election to parliament after being appointed Premier. In his speech, Parkes was responding to a 
deputation and presentation, allegedly from the working men of Mudgee. One needs to be very 
careful interpreting the phrase “working men” in this context; the presentation said nothing 
about parliament considering assisted immigration, one of the most contentious issues it faced, 
and one on which Parkes was unpopular. 
105 After the defeat of the Farnell government on its Land Bill on 5 December 1878, there was a 
two-week political crisis, during which Sir John Robertson, as leader of the opposition, was 
offered a commission to form a government. When he failed to do this, he resigned from 
Parliament and the Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson, asked Farnell’s minister to remain in 
office. For doing so they were condemned by many. In the meantime, Parkes had emerged as 
leader of a united opposition of his own and Robertson’s supporters, and a number who had 
been supporters of Farnell. From this position of strength, Parkes moved a motion of no 
confidence in the Legislative Assembly, and once this was carried, on 20 December 1878, he 
emerged as Premier at the head of a new, coalition government in which portfolios were 
equally shared between his and Robertson’s supporters. 
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his Treasurer. As Vice-President of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce, Watson 
had publicly supported ASN in the strike. 
There were moves to challenge the re-election of the new ministers, but mostly 
these revolved around the notion that Parkes was not reliable on the Chinese 
issue, given his appointment of Watson.106 But in almost every case this 
opposition was deflected by a commitment given by Parkes to introduce anti-
Chinese legislation as soon as parliament was recalled in the new year. On 25 
December 1878, the rump Working Men’s Defence Association announced its 
intention to nominate JB Douglas as their candidate to challenge Parkes in 
Canterbury.107 There was no follow-up notice for the next two days, but on 
Saturday 28th, the WMDA announced: “Canterbury election.—Newspaper 
Report.—Sir Henry Parkes will levy heavy poll-tax on Chinese.  Mr. Douglas, 
anti-Chinese candidate, will withdraw.” It was left to the ageing anti-Chinese 
zealot, Aaron Wheeler, to force a challenge, and he gained 105 votes to Parkes’ 
1048.108 In Bathurst, the right wing squatter and Minister of Justice and Public 
Instruction, FB Suttor, was left unchallenged. According to the Sydney Morning 
Herald, “Mr David Campbell Williamson, a local candidate, nominated himself, 
but intimated his intention to withdraw from the contest if satisfied with Mr. 
                                                 
106 See, for instance, deputation to Parkes on 26 December 1878, reported in SMH, 28 December 
1878, p. 7, col. 4. Maclean supposedly said: “The citizens and the people at large viewed with 
alarm the presence of a certain gentleman in his Ministry on account of his recent actions at the 
Chamber of Commerce against the seamen.” Parkes that day denied the truth of some of this, 
pointing out there had been no reporters present, and that the report had come from the 
delegation; see SMH 30 December 1878, p. 7, col. 5. 
107 SMH 25 December 1878, p. 1. This WMDA was the rump of radicals, expelled from the 
WMDA in 1877 when it had joined with others to form the Political Reform League. 
108 SMH 1 January 1879, p. 5, col. 3. 
Page 394   Chapter 8: The class logic of anti-Chinese racism 
Suttor's utterances on the Chinese question.” Suttor spoke of the Chinese as an 
unmitigated evil and Williamson withdrew his nomination.109
The potential for a plebeian and democratic campaign to galvanise opposition 
to the Parkes government could be seen in the one significant challenge that did 
take place, to the new Treasurer, James Watson, in The Lachlan. The Political 
Reform Union’s GR Maclean travelled from Sydney to stand against Watson, 
supported by Jack McElhone MLA. Maclean stood on two bases: support for the 
demands of the free selectors and against Watson and the new Parkes 
government because they had worked to destroy Farnell’s land bill, and that 
Watson had supported the ASN Company against the seamen. Maclean did 
surprisingly well against the long-standing incumbent, despite his campaign 
being undermined by erstwhile friends. McElhone nominated Maclean on the 
basis of his hostility to the government over its destruction of the land bill, 
declared that he had no other objection to Watson, and then abandoned and 
attacked Maclean when he learned that he had applied for a job as a police 
magistrate.110 For their part, the Political Reform Union also abandoned 
Maclean, on the grounds that Parkes had promised to restrict Chinese 
immigration. They sent Watson a letter, declaring that “Mr. G. R. Maclean, J.P. 
is not put forward by the Political Reform Union, or the Anti-Chinese League, 
                                                 
109 SMH 1 January 1879, p. 5, cols. 4-5. See also letter from Suttor to Parkes, 31 December 1878, 
Parkes corresp, Mitchell Library, A928, pp. 435-7. 
110 SMH 6 January 1879, p. 3, col. 5. By the Tuesday, McElhone had shifted his ground, arguing 
that while he was still “grievously disappointed” in Maclean for not telling him about applying 
for a police magistracy, “the electors must take a broader view of the matter, for if Mr. Maclean 
were returned it would prove that the electors had no faith in the present Government, because 
Mr. Watson was the only man in the House capable of filling the position of Treasurer, and 
consequently if he were defeated the Ministry could not stand.” And this is what McElhone 
wished; see SMH Wed 8 January, p. 5, col. 5. However outside that meeting, “party feeling ran 
high. Mr. McElhone was accused of turning traitor to Mr. Maclean, and a free fight ensued, in 
which many prominent partizans of each side were conspicuous.” 
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although we at first intended. But having gained all we wanted from the 
Ministry in the promised legislation on the Chinese question we have 
withdrawn all opposition.”111 After Watson’s modest victory, even the Sydney 
Morning Herald had to admit that “the number of votes polled by his opponent 
was sufficient to show that there was some reality in the contest”, and that after 
the end of voting, Maclean had addressed “an immense crowd” at Young.112
With elections due in November-December 1880, Parkes had every reason to 
fear a new labour movement campaign against him. In September 1879, his 
government had sent 200 soldiers with four field guns to the Hunter Valley to 
suppress picketing by coal miners.113 The labour movement campaign against 
assisted immigration was revived in 1879, and once again assumed 
considerable proportions from December to March 1880, a time of significant 
unemployment. However Parkes was again successful in containing the 
movement. He set up a select committee to inquire into complaints about the 
system, an inquiry whose report was diligently and successfully ignored by the 
government. Parkes also made a few modest concessions to the prevailing 
unemployment, cutting the assisted immigration budget by £10,000 and 
instructing the Agent-General in London to discourage the emigration of iron 
trades workers.  
                                                 
111 SMH 7 January 1879, p. 6, col. 5. 
112 SMH 13 January 1879, editorial p. 4, col. 5; also p. 5 col. 2. 
113 SMH 22 September 1879, p. 5, col. 2; Robin Gollan, The coalminers of New South Wales: A 
history of the union, 1860-1960, Melbourne University Press in association with the Australian 
National University, Parkville (Vic), 1963, p. 60. The SMH covered the dispute almost daily 
from 19 August and into late October 1879, and it revived again in 1880. There was also a 
controversy between Parkes and Loftus on the scale of the military operation; Parkes argued it 
had been too large. See Parkes to Loftus, 22 September 1879, Parkes corresp, Mitchell Library, 
A915, pp.667ff; Loftus to Parkes, 22 September, in A974 (no page numbers);  Parkes to Loftus, 22 
September 1879, A915, pp 660-3; Parkes to Loftus, 22 December 1879, A915, pp. 650-3. 
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Then in 1880, Parkes encouraged a new round of anti-Chinese mobilising by 
promising to contact the other colonies about calling an intercolonial conference 
on the issue, and by campaigning on Chinese immigration during the 
November-December 1880 elections. It took Parkes until late 1881 to push his 
new Chinese Immigration Restriction Act through Parliament by which time the 
recession of the early 1880s had ended, and with the economy booming, 
assisted immigration was dramatically increased.114
The Parkes government was defeated at elections in December 1882, but Parkes 
returned to office in January 1887, to grapple with a major recession, massive 
deficit and the collapse of land sales revenue. Parliament had ended assisted 
immigration and there was a mass movement of the unemployed demanding a 
guaranteed wage for accepting relief work. Parkes won the ensuing general 
election in February 1887 on a platform of free trade and cuts in public 
spending. Amidst rising unemployment, Parkes cut rations to all but the most 
destitute, and used the police to disperse protest demonstrations. As 
unemployment rose, he told deputations from the unemployed that there were 
jobs in the countryside, he did not believe their stories of widespread 
destitution, and that he intended to get rid of the relief system. “The 
unemployed must look out for themselves. In other countries of the world the 
Government was not expected and did not find employment for the people”, he 
told them.115 During the rolling wave of shearers’ strikes in NSW that year, the 
                                                 
114 This history is repetitively discussed across parts of several chapters in Fletcher, The 
immigration question, section B. 
115 Coghlan, Labour and industry, pp. 1444-49; SMH 9 August, 1887, p. 4, col. 6. 
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government was accused of sending the unemployed into the countryside to 
places where shearers were on strike.116  
In 1888, Parkes responded to a crisis around the question of Chinese 
immigration by ramming severe new restrictions through Parliament. The 
labour movement’s belief that Chinese immigration was a threat to workers led 
the movement’s leaders to praise Parkes. The NSW Branch of the Federated 
Seamen’s Union of Australasia passed a resolution assuring Parkes “of his 
having earned the well wishes and admiration of the Ten Thousand Seamen 
composing this body.” 117 Robert Boxall, Secretary of the Sydney Trades and 
Labour Council, told Parkes that “it behoves us to support them who support 
us”.118 There was no sense in which Parkes was a supporter of organised labour; 
just months after Sydney’s trade union leaders had heaped praise on Parkes for 
supposedly supporting them, he again sent the military to the Hunter Valley to 
contain another miners strike.119
It was in Queensland that the value of the anti-Chinese issue as a device to 
contain working class and plebeian discontent was best understood by the 
conservatives. In the lead-up to the 1883 general election which the 
conservatives under McIlwraith lost, his deputy John Murtagh Macrossan 
wrote to him: 
                                                 
116 SMH 26 August 1887, p. 4, col. 2 (TLC report). 
117 Letter from Davies to Parkes, 23 May 1888, NSW State Records, Colonial Secretary’s Special 
Bundles, 4/884.1. 
118 Letter 24 May 1888 to Parkes from Robert Boxall, Secretary Sydney Trades and Labour 
Council, Parkes corresp, Mitchell Library, A873, p. 485. 
119 Gollan, The coalminers, p. 75. 
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The Coolies will be a great thorn in our side but if properly handled 
between this and the election the Chinese can be made a still greater 
thorn in Sam's side. Don't you forget that at Roma [where McIlwraith 
was due to speak as the local MP] The Chinaman is a more dangerous 
competitor than the Coolie to the working man.120
In the 1888 election, both the Liberal Griffith and the Conservative McIlwraith 
used fear of Chinese immigration to deflect attention from unpopular policies 
and their own records in government. Griffith’s government had been 
imploding as a recession and drop in revenue had created a crisis for the 
government, a crisis which saw his Treasurer, Dickson, and Postmaster General 
resign from the cabinet. So Griffith used his election manifesto to “warn” about 
the supposed danger from Chinese who would “pour at will over the rest of the 
country from the NT… There is not room in the same country for the European 
and Asiatic civilizations to exist side by side.”121
But McIlwraith’s party was also distrusted by working class people, for its class 
politics, and its support for indentured Indian and Pacific Islander labour. 
McIlwraith dealt with this problem by launching a dishonest and hysterical 
attack on Griffith for being soft on the Chinese, for only wanting to get rid of 
them gradually. The conservative Queensland Figaro magazine published a 
cartoon showing a future Brisbane under Griffith’s rule, with Chinese 
rampaging the streets and torching buildings as traumatized whites huddled in 
the gutters. McIlwraith was depicted flogging fleeing Chinese with a stockwhip 
from horseback, and unleashing a savage dog on Chinese in order to save fair 
                                                 
120 Letter to McIlwraith, 25 May 1883, in McIlwraith papers, Oxley Library, OM64-19/20. 
121 Manifesto issued 8 March 1888, clipping found in Drake papers, Fryer Library (University of 
Queensland), 96/144. 
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Queensland’s honour. The whole atmosphere had been inflamed the strident 
anti-Chinese rhetoric of the Intercolonial Trade Union Conference which had 
been held in Brisbane in March, by hysterical articles in all the Brisbane press, 
from the conservative and liberal to the populist, and by William Lane’s 
infamous serial, “White or Yellow? A story of the race war of A.D. 1908”, 
serialised in the Boomerang from 18 February to 5 May 1888, finishing on the day 
of the election. This led to the famous incident on election day in Brisbane when 
wagons rolled down Adelaide St bearing “Vote for Griffith” signs and carrying 
Chinese market gardeners from Enoggera and Breakfast Creek who had been 
inveigled into this stunt by a McIlwraith candidate. When Griffith emerged 
from his campaign office onto the street, he was surrounded by an enraged 
mob, chased into a yard, his physical safety clearly threatened. After 
McIlwraith’s victory was announced in the early evening, the mob rampaged 
through Chinatown smashing windows and beating up Chinese people, and 
people who were mistaken for being Chinese.122
In Rockhampton, the McIlwraith candidate for North Rockhampton, RR Jones, 
declared at one public meeting, “the only hope of saving the country from ruin 
was to send the Chinkies & Griffith off by Special Train to Hong Kong.”123 The 
Liberal candidate, squatter PF MacDonald, told one of his managers to employ 
Chinese shearers rather than unionists, whom he cordially hated.124 Needless to 
                                                 
122 Raymond Evans, Fighting words: Writing about race, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 
1999, pp. 79-94;  Harrison Bryan, “The political career of John Murtagh Macrossan“, MA thesis, 
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123 Letter from PF MacDonald (the Liberal candidate) to JG Browne, Argus Office, 22 April 1888, 
in PF MacDonald papers, Fryer Library, University of Queensland, collection UQFL204, letter 
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say, this information was soon public, and MacDonald ruefully described the 
result to one of his managers: 
Vans were driven about with PF Chinamen shearers as large as real 
Chinamen & seemed to make a strong impression upon the half tipsy 
voters. The same tactics were adopted at every polling place and even at 
Yaamba told against me.125
The end result was that working class people voted for a government that, two 
years later, would round up striking shearers and send them in chains to an 
island prison. 
Conclusion 
The argument that the anti-Chinese movement possessed some anti-employer 
or anti-capitalist dynamic is profoundly mistaken. It rests in part on identifying 
the Sydney Morning Herald as the voice of business, whereas on this issue, the 
Fairfax papers were isolated from the rest of the pro-business and conservative 
press. It rests on presenting the Herald as supporting Chinese immigration (or as 
opposed to restricting it), where the paper’s real position was one of hostility to 
Chinese immigration, but hostility also to the introduction of legislation at 
times of labour movement mobilisation. The myth of anti-capitalism also rests 
on the idea that the anti-Chinese movement promoted some kind of radicalism, 
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whereas it served in practice to give a radical veneer to ruling class politicians 
such as Sir Henry Parkes and Sir Thomas McIlwraith, and to demobilise 
working class opposition to them. 
By promoting the idea that working class people should identify as “white”, 
and as part of the British empire, the anti-Chinese movement served to limit 
and contain the development of class consciousness in Australia—which is one 
reason that the conservative press of the time was happy to promote this 
racism, and to support the most significant mass struggle in support of it—the 
seamen’s strike of 1878. 
Later, at a time of economic crisis, mass unrest and radicalisation, a time of the 
first mass union drives in Australian history and a growing rejection of the 
British empire, the hegemony of anti-Chinese racism enabled the ruling class to 
deflect working class and plebeian militants from a thorough-going critique of 
Anglo-Australian capitalism and a more determined mobilisation against the 
system.126 It also enabled key ruling class leaders to construct a new hegemonic 
ideology of Australian nationalism that was white rather than English, and 
ultimately loyal to the British empire. Indeed, as numerous writers have 
observed, the idea of a “white Australia” was central to the Australian 
nationalism that emerged from the crucible of the 1890s and Federation, and it 
was this racial nationalism that Fisher and Hughes mobilised in winning 
support for Australian involvement in the bloodbath of 1914-18. Francis Adams, 
a radical writer, expressed this logic well in 1893: 
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People call McIlwraith a Tory, but when he deliberately commits himself 
to the exclusion from Australia of Chinese and other servile races…I feel 
that he has [given] some true idea of the meaning of loving the nation, 
and the race to which he belongs, and his Toryism troubles me not.127
Most remarkably, he wrote this in the aftermath of McIlwraith’s brutal 
destruction of the shearers’ strike. In 1909, the iconic union organiser, WG 
Spence, also summed this dynamic up in his classic book, Australia’s Awakening. 
He lauded the “noticeable change of thought in regard to what may be termed 
Empire matters” brought about by Labor’s rise in national politics. Where once 
republicanism had been a force: 
The practical independence of government granted under the Australian 
Constitution, with the manifest advantages of being part of a big Empire 
and under its protection if need arose, together with the growth of the 
national spirit of a “White Australia” and the broad humanitarianism 
taught by the Labor Party, have developed a feeling of loyalty to race 
rather than to governments, but have abolished any talk of either 
republicanism or of independence.128
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Chapter 9 
Towards the Chinese immigration 
crisis of 1888 
IN JUNE 1888, representatives of the six Australian colonial governments met 
at a conference in Sydney and all except Tasmania agreed, for the first time, on 
a national policy of racial exclusion. This was a response to what they saw as a 
major crisis surrounding the issue of Chinese immigration. 
There were five key ingredients to this crisis. The first was the impression that 
China was becoming a major military power. To leading figures in the ruling 
class, this meant that the unwanted immigrants in the north might represent a 
more serious Chinese beach-head on the Australian continent, and might have a 
powerful protector should future Australian governments attempt to restrict 
Chinese entry or pass discriminatory laws against them. 
The second was a growing distrust of Britain as Australia’s protector. The 1884 
crisis over the annexation of New Guinea suggested that imperial power plays 
were more important for London than protecting Australian interests, an 
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impression reinforced by London’s perceived indifference to French expansion 
in the Pacific. There was a widespread belief that Britain was courting China as 
an ally against Russia, in which case the colonies might find that Britain itself 
would assist China in keeping the door open to Chinese immigration. 
The third element was the refusal of the South Australian parliament to pass 
laws restricting Chinese immigration into the Northern Territory. The result 
was that by 1887, Chinese people were the dominant immigrant nationality in 
the Territory, and politicians from the four eastern colonies became alarmed at 
the prospect of a Chinese-dominated north. 
The fourth element was the mission sent to Australia by the increasingly 
confident Chinese empire, to investigate the condition of Chinese people living 
here. This introduced an entirely new dynamic into the Chinese immigration 
issue in Australia, the involvement of China itself. 
The final element serving to create the Chinese immigration crisis of 1887-88 
was Britain’s support for the complaint made by the Chinese empire about the 
treatment of its subjects in the colonies, and London’s demand that the colonies 
explain the reasons for this discriminatory treatment. 
In a very real sense, this was a crisis none of the colonial governments expected, 
and yet they also helped create it. In 1881 an intercolonial conference had 
agreed that the colonies would pass laws to restrict—not prevent—Chinese 
immigration. All the politicians present were opposed to allowing any 
significant Chinese influx because of their adherence to one or more of the 
major ruling class agendas already discussed. They had seen two major crises 
involving Chinese immigrants in the preceding five years—the influx into Far 
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North Queensland, and the ASN dispute, centred on Sydney—and they saw 
themselves acting to pre-empt a future one. Yet the measures they adopted 
contributed significantly to the crisis of 1887-8. 
In this chapter, I outline the adoption of anti-Chinese laws in 1881, and then 
examine the factors that led to the development of the crisis of 1888.  In chapter 
10, I discuss the crisis itself, and its resolution. 
The anti-Chinese laws of 1881 
The year 1881 represents a significant moment in the move towards White 
Australia. In January of that year, an intercolonial conference of seven 
Australasian colonial governments met in Sydney and agreed to pass model 
legislation to restrict Chinese immigration.1 Laws restricting Chinese 
immigration were subsequently passed in Victoria, New South Wales, South 
Australia and New Zealand, adding to the restrictions already in force in 
Queensland. Only the remote and lightly populated Tasmania and Western 
Australia stood apart.2 When the conference discovered that Western 
                                                 
1 “Minutes of proceedings of the intercolonial conference held at Melbourne, November and 
December 1880”, NSW LA V&P, 1880-81, vol. 1, pp. 327-35. All Australian colonies were 
represented, although Western Australia attended merely in an observer capacity because it 
was a Crown Colony. The New Zealand representative, William Dick, arrived sometime on 
Wednesday 19th—he speaks at the banquet that evening—and was not reported as taking his 
seat at the conference on Thursday 20th, SMH 20 January 1881, p. 6, cols. 4-5; 21 January 1881, p. 
5, col. 2. 
2 Both the NSW Chinese Restriction Act and the Victorian Chinese Influx Restriction Act restricted 
ships to bringing one Chinese passenger for every hundred tons of their tare, and imposed a £10 
poll (entry) tax; South Australia’s law covered only the colony proper, and not its Northern 
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Australia—still a Crown Colony—was assisting employers by importing 
Chinese labourers, the other six colonial delegations united in a joint protest to 
London, warning that a persistence in this 
is almost certain to lead to the enactment of laws imposing restrictions 
on communication between her ports and the other Australasian ports. It 
cannot be expected that the people who object to receiving Chinese 
immigrants direct from China will submit to their arrival by way of 
Western Australia.3  
Thus 1881 represents the point at which a growing concern about Chinese 
immigration, and the presence of Chinese people in Australia, led to co-
ordinated legislative action. Moreover, this was legislation that was never 
challenged, that never faced a move to soften or repeal it, but was strengthened 
in the years following. The concerns driving that legislation were substantial, 
hegemonic and enduring. 
A reconsideration of the specific reasons for the agreement reached at the 
Intercolonial Conference, and for the passage of subsequent legislation, would 
be a valuable exercise. It is a task this thesis has not undertaken because of the 
need to focus on other, more central issues. 
Unlike the Queensland anti-Chinese legislation of 1876 and 1877, the various 
Queensland “coloured labour” laws, or the Intercolonial Conference of June 
                                                                                                                                               
Territory and followed Queensland in imposing a limit of one Chinese passenger for every ten 
tons of a ship’s tare, plus a £10 poll (entry) tax; Queensland declared its existing 1877 law 
restrictive enough; while Tasmania and the Crown Colony of Western Australia decided there 
was no danger to them (or from them), and no reason to follow the others. 
3 Letter from Colonial Secretary’s Office, Sydney, 25 January 1881, to Earl Kimberley, NSW State 
Records, Col Sec special bundles, 4/829.1. 
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1888, there was no immediate sense of crisis driving the decision of the 1881 
conference to pass Chinese immigration laws. There was no mention of Chinese 
immigration in the speeches given by delegates at a banquet in their honour six 
days after the conference started.4 Neither did the two Sydney Morning Herald 
editorials during the conference that were substantially on the Chinese question 
describe or convey any sense of crisis, urgency or agitation.5 The major agenda 
of the conference was moving the colonies towards federation.6 This was, for 
the Herald, the relevance of the proposal for coordinated anti-Chinese 
legislation; “an advance towards federal action” on an issue which “would have 
furnished a good subject for joint arrangements, and even for effective 
representations to the Imperial Government proceeding from Australia as a 
whole.”7
The move towards legislation in 1879-81 therefore reflected a rising, general 
concern over Chinese immigration in the ruling class, alongside issues specific 
to individual colonies. In the United States, there were serious moves within 
elite politics to impose restrictions on Chinese immigration. A congressional 
joint committee report attacking Chinese communities and recommending 
restriction had been released in February 1877. In February 1879, Congress 
passed a bill limiting Chinese immigration to fifteen passengers per ship, and 
                                                 
4 SMH, 20 January 1881, p. 6, cols. 2-5; nor at the speeches at the Mayor’s picnic on Anniversary 
Day, reported in SMH 27 January 1881, p. 6, cols. 1-3. 
5 SMH 19 January 1881, p. 5, cols. 1-2; 28 January, p. 5, col. 1; nor did the brief mention of 
Chinese immigration in the following day’s editorial, Sat 29 January, p. 5, col. 1. 
6 This, for instance, is not only the substance of the banquet speeches during the conference, see 
SMH, 20 January 1881, p. 6, cols. 2-5, but also of the review of the conference published in the 
Victorian Review: “The intercolonial conference and the federation of the Australias”, vol. 3, no. 
17, March 1881, pp. 623-38. 
7 SMH 19 January 1881, p. 5, col. 1. 
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while it was vetoed by President Hayes, it suggested the direction of American 
policy. By mid-1880, Chinese immigration restriction was part of the platform 
of both Republican and Democrat presidential candidates.8 America’s move 
towards restriction tended to both legitimise the fears of Australian politicians, 
and raise the prospect that Chinese emigrants who had intended going to 
America would turn to Australia instead.  
The arrival of 17,000 Chinese immigrants into Far North Queensland from 1874-
77 had raised concern in the southern colonies at the time, and this was 
expressed in support for Queensland’s attempts at restriction. There was a 
general concern that while Chinese immigrants could easily be regulated at the 
ports, overland migration was uncontrollable. Furthermore, the ASN dispute 
had shown that private businesses could suddenly choose to recruit large 
numbers of Chinese workers, undermining British colonisation and threatening 
social order. 
In all colonies, there was concern about Chinese settlement in South Australia’s 
Northern Territory, with 3000 arriving between 1878 and 1881. The politics of 
Chinese immigration within South Australia will be discussed later in this 
chapter, and in chapter 10, but it is probable that pressing South Australia to 
impose restrictions was one of the unstated agendas of the 1881 Intercolonial 
Conference. The business-dominated Anti-Chinese Committee in Brisbane 
wrote to South Australia in 1880 appealing for restrictive legislation, and their 
efforts were backed by the Brisbane Courier, which thought “the southern 
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colonies were faced with an expanding Chinese threat, and…the problem was 
made more dangerous by the encouragement previously given to Chinese 
people to settle in the Northern Territory.”9 The Sydney Morning Herald had 
expected South Australia to resist the push for intercolonial legislation against 
Chinese immigration; while Charles Henry Pearson warned the Victorian 
parliament, “As to South Australia favoring lighter restrictions than the Bill 
proposed, that was exactly what had to be guarded against.”10 When it came to 
legislating, the supposed danger to British colonisation was strongly 
emphasised. 
The original impetus clearly belonged to Sir Henry Parkes and New South 
Wales. Parkes was angry at the refusal of the Legislative Council to pass his 
anti-Chinese bill in 1879, which had been driven by concern to prevent a future 
ASN dispute, as well as a belief that Chinese immigration was increasing. In 
May 1880, Parkes promised a deputation he would approach the other colonies 
to see if they could agree on an intercolonial approach to restricting Chinese 
immigration.11 Parkes faced a general election in November 1880 and 
conservatives and Catholics were mobilising against his education act (which 
cut funding to denominational schools), while the unions and 
plebeian/democratic movement were mobilising against assisted immigration. 
A failure to take up the anti-Chinese issue again would add to the complaints 
against him, while the promise of an anti-Chinese bill would work to soften 
some of this discontent.  
                                                 
9  The Anti-Chinese Committee met at the Chamber of Commerce, Brisbane Courier 30 April 
1880, p. 3, col. 1; editorial, p. 2, cols 3-4. 
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11 SMH 29 May 1880, p. 3, col. 3. 
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On 11 June 1880, Parkes wrote to the other premiers suggesting either 
correspondence to agree on a common measure, or a conference to discuss the 
issue. He raised the unfreedom of Chinese labourers, the “many social mischiefs 
[that] attend their introduction”, and the dangers to British colonisation, as the 
means of “communication between China and Australasia are daily increasing 
and at the same time restrictive legislation and social obstacles are likely to 
drive the Chinese from the Pacific states of America and from other 
countries.”12 Alongside the official support from Victoria and South Australia, 
anti-Chinese bills were introduced into their parliaments as unofficial 
measures.13 With Queensland rejecting participation, Parkes was able to expand 
the agenda of the conference, held in Melbourne in November 1880, to include 
discussions of tariffs and possible moves towards unity of the three colonies 
attending (as discussed briefly in chapter 4). The November/December 1880 
conference seems to have been productive, but participants soon decided that 
effective measures would necessarily involve all the other colonies, and it was 
the larger conference, convened in Sydney on Thursday 13 January 1881, which 
decided on common action against Chinese immigration. 
At the 1881 conference, Parkes proposed a model bill embodying a limitation of 
one Chinese immigrant per hundred tons of a ship’s tare, along with a poll 
(entry) tax of £10, a significantly harsher measure than his 1879 bill. Victoria 
supported this, while “The other colonies objected that it went too far,” and 
                                                 
12 Letter from Col Sec NSW (Parkes) to Col Sec Qld (Palmer), 11 June 1880, found in NSW State 
Archives, Colonial Secretary’s correspondence, special bundles, 4/829.1. 
13 I will discuss the bills moved by Bray and Morgan in SA later this chapter; see also Chinese 
Voters Bill 1880, moved 8 September 1880 by Quick, see VPD 1880-81, vol. XXXIV-XXXVI pp. 
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South Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand met with Queensland to discuss a 
model bill based on its legislation.14 The Sydney Morning Herald saw the 
difference as reflecting the needs of tropical agriculture in South Australia and 
Queensland: 
Both these colonies have to face the question what is to be done with 
their agricultural lands in their tropical climate. Europeans cannot stand 
the work. We can occupy the whole of the north country pastorally with 
Europeans; but when we come to the severer labour of tillage, the 
complexion of the case is altered. The southern colonies are prepared to 
say, “we can do without Chinamen; let us keep them out for ever, as 
there is no industry suited to our soil for which the European race is not 
competent.” The two colonies with a tropical territory hesitate so 
absolutely to foreclose their future, and, while anxious to restrict Chinese 
immigration, are not prepared to go so far as practically to prohibit it.15
In the end, South Australia’s Legislative Council refused to allow any restriction 
of Chinese immigration into the Northern Territory, as discussed below, and 
the new law only covered South Australia proper. Tasmania’s parliament 
rejected its bill as unnecessary. 
Despite being armed with a resolution of the Intercolonial Conference, Parkes 
hesitated to introduce a new Chinese immigration bill. He was clearly waiting 
for circumstances to suit him, and by April, they did. A large number of 
Chinese people—some 2000—arrived at Sydney in 17 days, and despite 500 
leaving immediately, an entirely new hysteria was whipped up. Even the 
                                                 
14 SMH 26 January 1881, p. 6, col. 2. 
15 SMH 29 January 1881, p. 5, col. 1. 
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Governor, Lord Augustus Loftus, was in favour of strident measures to stop 
Chinese people landing, telling Parkes: 
It is evident that this Chinese invasion must be curbed or we shall be 
inundated by the Celestials. 
The difficulties arising from Treaty Engagements may be met by indirect 
measures bearing a local character and of a financial nature. 
I see no other means of stopping this Chinese deluge… 
Severe Quarantine Measures therefore might considerably aid in 
preventing the Chinese incursion into this Colony… 
Could not the Governor with Executive Council promulgate Regulations 
of a Fiscal and Provisional character in the absence of Parliament and in 
view of the urgency of the case as is often done in England being 
indemnified by Parliament when it meets?16
Within days of the Governor’s memo to Parkes, the Sydney Morning Herald had 
also decided that the number of Chinese immigrants was now unacceptable. 
Ann Curthoys has noted that the Herald: 
now argued that the Chinese would continue to come and could 
eventually outnumber Europeans. The ratio of Chinese to Europeans, it 
pointed out, had changed from 1 in 83 to 1 in 40 in sixteen months. In the 
Assembly debate of July 1881 only Fitzpatrick insisted that the numbers 
arriving were still small and would continue to remain so.17
                                                 
16 Lord Loftus to Parkes, 22 April 1881, in Parkes Corresp, Mitchell Library, A974, date order, 
emphasis in original. 
17 Ann Curthoys, “Race and ethnicity: A study of the response of British colonists to Aborigines, 
Chinese and non-British Europeans in New South Wales, 1856-1881”, PhD thesis, Macquarie 
University, 1973, pp. 584-5; she cited SMH 28 April 1881. 
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Newspapers and Sydney City aldermen helped build the agitation, and on 24 
May, a Trades and Labour Council rally in the Domain attracted 12-15,000 
people. Parkes also used an outbreak of smallpox in a Chinese child, falsely 
blamed on Chinese immigrants, to create a sense of crisis to force his bill 
through parliament.18 He faced almost no resistance in the Legislative 
Assembly, but even in the conservative Legislative Council, the bill passed its 
second reading without division. The fact that the Assembly had twice voted 
for a Chinese immigration bill, that a proposal to limit Chinese immigration had 
been part of government policy at the late 1880 general election, and that 
restriction was the demand of the people, were the most commonly and 
strongly argued reasons for passing the bill.19 But the Council also debated the 
major themes covered in this thesis. A concern that China could swamp British 
colonisation in New South Wales was the second most significant issue in the 
debate. It featured strongly in the speeches of ministers Sir John Robertson and 
Sir George Innes:20
I do not care whether the time is near or far remote when we are likely to 
be inundated by such hordes as to form a majority of the population; the 
liability to such a disaster renders it a politic and proper measure to limit 
or prohibit Chinese immigration. We are within two or three weeks' sail 
of this great nation of about 400,000,000 people, who are only now 
having their eyes opened to the advantages this country offers.21
                                                 
18 Curthoys, Race and ethnicity, pp. 534-47. The official Colonial Secretary’s file on the 1881 
legislation, 4/829.1, Chinese 1880-81, has a lot of material about this small pox outbreak. 
19 See, for example, the speech of Sir Alfred Stephen, NSWPD 1881, vol. 5, p. 654: “I think that a 
large proportion of the labouring classes of the community desire to exclude Chinamen because 
they undersell them in the labour market. It is impossible for me as an inhabitant of the colony, 
as one whose fortunes have been so long bound up with it, and whose children’s fortunes are 
and ever will be identified with it, not to sympathise with the labouring classes.” 
20 For Robertson, see NSWPD 1881, vol. 5, esp. pp. 629-31 (Wed 17 August). 
21 NSWPD 1881, vol. 5, p. 651. 
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Some MLCs rejected the supposed danger of being swamped; but even some of 
those who opposed the bill thought that the colony should be ready to restrict 
Chinese immigration if it were to increase rapidly.22 Lucas illustrated the 
dominant concern when he replied to those who thought it presumptuous “for 
a mere handful of people…to object to the introduction of Chinese into so large 
a territory. But it is because there are so few people that we object.”23
In Victoria, the broad ruling class agreement on anti-Chinese legislation can be 
seen in the willingness of the new Conservative-backed government to 
introduce the measure negotiated by its predecessors just days after coming to 
office.24 The Premier, Sir Bryan O’Loghlen, emphasised its precautionary 
nature, to “remove all danger of any great influx of Chinese to the colony.”25 
The small number of Conservatives opposed to the bill chose to argue for delay, 
rather than immediate rejection.26 From the opposition benches, CH Pearson 
argued that to press ahead would be to “strengthen the hands of the Lower 
House in New South Wales against the amendments which the Upper Chamber 
of that colony seemed desirous of making”.27 In the Legislative Council, the 
government also stressed the strategic issue. Introducing the bill, the new 
Solicitor-General, FS Dobson, acknowledged that: 
                                                 
22 For example, LF de Salis, NSWPD 1881, vol. 5, pp. 636-40. 
23 NSWPD 1881, vol. 5, p. 686. 
24 The new Premier, Sir Bryan O’Loghlen, had been a Liberal, but had brought down the Liberal 
government of Graham Berry. His government was a mixture of Conservatives and Liberal 
dissidents, and survived only on the basis of Conservative support. See SM Ingham, 
“O’Loghlen, Sir Bryan (1828-1905)”, in Australian Dictionary of Biography [online] 
http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A050419b.htm [accessed 1 December 2006] 
25 VPD 1881, vol. 37, p. 79. 
26 VPD 1881, vol. 37, pp. 218-23. 
27 VPD 1881, vol. 37, p. 220. 
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the risk of any large influx of Chinese into Victoria is not very great at 
the present moment; but we must remember that China is a country 
which has the largest population of any nation in the world…moreover, 
the Chinese are rapidly acquiring the arts of modern warfare and 
civilization.28
In a lacklustre debate, many MLCs professed to oppose the content of the bill 
and rejected any strategic danger, but voted for it to hasten federation and 
hence to fulfil the agreements Victoria had made at the Intercolonial 
Conference.29
But if the legislation of 1881 was designed to avoid any future crisis, it had the 
opposite effect. In the short term, it reduced Chinese immigration for a few 
years and demobilised the plebeian anti-Chinese movement, but within a few 
years the discrimination against Chinese immigrants had created bitterness in 
China itself. The anti-Chinese laws were predicated, implicitly, on continued 
British military and naval hegemony, but the intensified imperialist rivalries of 
the late 1880s created a new dynamic in which Britain was seen to court 
Chinese support in its rivalry with Russia. This gave the Chinese government a 
lever with which to protest against, and possibly act against, Australian 
restrictions, and when the British Government took up China’s complaints, it 
led to a struggle over colonial immigration policy in which the colonies asserted 
their right to decide. 
                                                 
28 Wed 30 November; VPD 1881, vol. 38, p. 931. 
29 See for instance, see N Fitzgerald, VPD 1881, vol. 38, p. 1243; W. Campbell, p. 1243; W Ross, p. 
1245; discussion pp. 1247-8; GH Belcher rejects this argument, p. 1245. TF Hamilton argued that, 
“if we were to reject the Bill, the federation that we are looking forward to would be postponed 
indefinitely.” p. 1246. 
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The second problem for the ruling class was that South Australia’s parliament 
refused to enact the restrictions in full, and in particular for the one part of the 
colony that mattered—the Northern Territory. This led to a crisis of Chinese 
immigration into Darwin in 1887-8 that was only finally resolved with a 
measure of intercolonial coercion. 
Finally, the legislation set up a system to shield existing Chinese residents from 
the new restrictions—a system that would also fuel the crisis of 1887-8. Chinese 
people rushed to seek either British naturalisation, or the new certificates which 
exempted them from the tonnage restrictions and the poll taxes in the 1881 
laws. It was soon realised that these laws could be evaded by either forging 
such certificates, or buying them and using them to allow other Chinese people 
to enter without paying the poll tax. When the southern colonies realised the 
nature and scale of the fraud involved, they began to regulate the entry of 
Chinese people far more stringently and oppressively, and to consider even 
more stringent restrictions. Arguments over the fraudulent use of naturalisation 
and exemption certificates would also allow Victoria to arbitrarily exclude 
Chinese people in April 1888, unleashing the Afghan crisis, discussed in chapter 
10.30
                                                 
30 The only thorough discussion of exemption certificates is to be found in Robert J Lewis, 
“’Strangers within the gates’: Victorian governments and non-Europeans, 1880-1908”, MA 
thesis, University of Melbourne, 1982. 
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The ‘awakening east’: China’s emergence as a military 
power 
Right through the nineteenth century, China’s military weakness was seen as 
temporary. Napoleon Bonaparte’s view was that, with good generals, China 
could conquer the world. The transforming event for British/Australian views 
of China was its strong showing in the undeclared war with France, from 1884-
5. France had been pushing its way into Indo-China for decades, but the conflict 
deepened in 1882, when it moved into Tonkin, north of Hanoi and close to the 
Chinese border. This led to a series of modest military battles and inconclusive 
negotiations. Hostilities escalated sharply in 1884, when France attacked 
Formosa (Taiwan) and bombed the forts of Kelung; however a landing party 
was repulsed. According to Victor Kiernan, this hardened China’s 
determination to fight: “The heroic spirit of 1937 was being born in China,” he 
wrote.31 The French imposed a blockade of Chinese ports, leading the British to 
insist that the rights of neutrals, such as themselves, be respected. Britain, 
France, Russia and China stood on the brink of war. 
If the French government thought that an Indo-Chinese or Formosan colony 
could be easily acquired, they were seriously mistaken. As decrepit as its 
regime was, China’s imperial ministers had responded to their earlier military 
humiliations. Sir George Bowen, the Governor of Hong Kong, wrote to London 
in 1883: 
                                                 
31 EVG Kiernan, British diplomacy in China: 1880 to 1885, Octagon Bookis, New York, 1970 (first 
pub 1939), p. 149. My account and analysis is largely taken from Kiernan. 
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France would find China an enemy very different from what she was in 
the last war. Instead of the rude and ill-equipped militia of former years, 
there is now an army provided with the best modern weapons, and 
drilled by European and American officers. Instead of the clumsy “war 
junks” of a quarter of a century back, there is now a fleet of large 
ironclads, corvettes, sloops, and gunboats, built for the most part in 
Europe, armed with heavy cannon, and commanded by officers, many of 
whom have served an apprenticeship in the English and in other 
European navies. The approaches to the chief cities are now protected by 
strong and heavily-armed forts and batteries, well provided, moreover, 
with torpedoes and submarine mines.32
The conflict with France, and China’s new military capacity, had started raising 
significant concern in the Australian colonies. As early as 1881, the Brisbane 
Courier reported on the new fleet China was building, and expressed a fear that 
the naval power of Russia and China might be turned against Britain.33 In an 
editorial for the Melbourne Age newspaper of 11 September 1883, Charles 
Pearson warned that: 
it seems certain that any great success of China in a war with France 
would lead to a great settlement of Chinese colonists along all the shores 
watered by the Indian Ocean. Our interest undoubtedly is that nothing 
of the sort should take place. Next to England, an unaggressive 
commercial country like Holland is the best neighbour we can have…34
                                                 
32 Despatch dated 5 November 1883 to Earl Derby, in Sir George Bowen, Thirty years of colonial 
government: A selection from the despatches and letters of the Right Hon. Sir George Ferguson Bowen, 
G.C.M.G., etc, Governor successively of Queensland, New Zealand, Victoria, Mauritius and Hong Kong, 
edited by Stanley Lane-Poole, 2 vols, Longmans, Green & Co, London & New York, 1889, vol 2, 
p. 286. 
33 Quoted in Terrence James O’Rourke, “Problems of Queensland defence, 1878-1901”, BA 
(Hons) thesis, History Dept, University of Queensland, 1969, p. 45. 
34 Quoted in John Tregenza, Professor of democracy: The life of Charles Henry Pearson 1830-1894, 
Oxford don and Australian radical, Melbourne University Press, Carlton (Vic), 1968, p. 191. 
Chapter 9: Towards the crisis of 1888  Page 419 
Pearson is not well known today, but like Sir Henry Parkes, he was a key 
political thinker and strategist for liberal capitalist interests in Victoria, and the 
most profound intellectual influence on the young Alfred Deakin.35 In his 
editorial Pearson argued that even in defeat, China could be strengthened: 
When a country has such immense natural resources as China, and is 
governed by such statesmen as China seems to possess at present, she is 
strengthened even by an unsuccessful war. She easily learns to correct 
her own deficiencies of organization, and she takes very accurate 
measure of her antagonist’s weakness. If the Chinese can once establish a 
definite ratio of inequality to the French—can prove, for instance, that 
three or five Chinamen are as good as one Frenchman, the rest is a mere 
question of time.36
In October 1884, Chinese forces drove the French from Tansui, Formosa 
(Taiwan); and then in late March 1885, recaptured Langson, in northern Indo-
China (Vietnam), in an historic victory for the Chinese military. The French 
government collapsed. Rather than declare all-out war, at immense cost to a 
struggling treasury, the new French government turned to negotiations. 
Although China made substantial concessions, the result was seen as a partial 
victory for its military. 
While opponents of Chinese immigration pointed to China’s growing military 
as a reason for excluding its subjects, those opposed to exclusion also pointed to 
its growing military power as a reason to avoid giving offence. Indeed, a 
ridiculously overblown estimate of the Chinese military was widespread. In the 
                                                 
35 JA La Nauze, Alfred Deakin: A biography, Melbourne University Press, Carlton (Vic), 1965, p. 
29; Tregenza, Professor of democracy, pp. 70-71, 102-3, 229-30. 
36 Tregenza, Professor of democracy, p. 192, citing editorial, The Age, 11 September 1883. 
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Queensland Parliament in 1884, WH Walsh warned that, “They could not 
afford to offend China; one day it might send its fleet,”37 while Richard Baker, 
the leader of the Conservative party in the South Australian Legislative 
Council, pointed to: 
the immense influence China was destined to have in deciding the future 
destinies of the world. A few years ago China had no fleet at all, but at 
the present time her Pacific fleet was so powerful that it could blow the 
combined English and French Pacific fleets out of the water.38
Fear of British betrayal 
One of the great concerns of Australia’s politicians in 1887-8 was that Britain 
would betray Australian interests if its imperial needs dictated. A wide section 
of the Anglo-Australian ruling class felt Britain had betrayed it by allowing 
Germany to annexe the northern half of non-Dutch New Guinea, and so 
“betrayal” became an especially potent issue with regards to the “dangers” of 
Chinese immigration. Britain was believed to have a military alliance with 
China against Russia, and to be determined to avoid offending the Chinese 
empire. Australia, it was felt, would be sacrificed. 
Through much of the nineteenth century, much of Britain’s foreign policy had 
been directed towards containing the expansion of the Russian empire. Britain 
                                                 
37 QPD 1884, vol XL, p. 114. 
38 SAPD 1888, col. 156. 
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(and France) had fought Russia in the Crimean War of 1854, and had gone to 
the brink of war in 1877-8 over Russia’s attempt to conquer and colonise the 
Ottoman Empire. Each of these wars and war scares had a profound impact in 
the Australian colonies, leading in each case to a heightened sense of military 
insecurity, and to a rush of defence works and military reorganisation. Colonial 
newspapers and journals obsessively discussed the aims of Russian foreign 
policy, the strength of the British military, and the possible threat to Australian 
cities and trade. Again in early 1885 Britain and Russia were on the brink of war 
over Russia’s incursion into Afghanistan, seen by the British as a direct threat to 
its control of India, “the jewel in the crown”. 
With China’s unexpected resistance to France in 1884-5 came a strong push 
within British diplomatic circles to secure an alliance with China against Russia. 
In his survey of Anglo-Chinese relations in the years 1880-1885, Victor Kiernan 
concluded that, “in the years we have surveyed, informed opinion on the whole 
believed the star of the Chinese Empire to be rising and not setting.”39 In the 
House of Commons, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary said that it had not 
been long ago that people thought China was falling to pieces. “But that day 
was over. The Chinese Empire in the last few years had shown an extraordinary 
recuperative power. It…occupied a position in Asia almost equal to the most 
palmy days of its history.” The government was “fully aware of the great and 
transcendent importance of a good understanding with that country”.40 This 
view of a resurgent China lasted only until the debacle of its war with Japan in 
1894, and has been largely forgotten by Australian historians. 
                                                 
39 Kiernan, British diplomacy, p. 300. 
40 Kiernan, British Diplomacy, p. 301, citing Hansard, 3rd series, 277, 1333ff. 
Page 422   Chapter 9: Towards the crisis of 1888 
Sir George Bowen, then Governor of Hong Kong, summed up the potential of a 
British alliance with China, in a despatch to Lord Kimberley, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, written on 15 August 1885: 
With the help of the ironclads and gunboats of China and Japan, our 
squadron at Hong Kong could easily sweep the Russians from the 
Pacific, and destroy their port and arsenal at Vladivostock; while the 
Chinese could create a powerful diversion in our favour by attacking 
their flank in Central Asia with a numerous army, well equipped with 
German cannon and rifles, and drilled by European and American 
officers; an army which lately held its own in Tong King and Formosa 
against the French. Lord Dufferin [Viceroy of India] agrees with me as to 
the vast importance of extending our intercourse and consolidating our 
relations with China and Japan, with a view not only to the increase of 
trade, but also to possible war with Russia in the future.41
It is entirely probable that Bowen’s opinions were shared at the time with 
leading political figures in both Queensland and Victoria, where he had earlier 
been governor.42
Kiernan has shown that the idea of an alliance with China was discussed with 
the utmost seriousness by the British cabinet, and while no alliance was ever 
concluded, there was a widespread belief that it probably had.43 This belief 
extended to Australia. When 47 Chinese residents of Melbourne wrote to the 
                                                 
41 Bowen, Thirty Years, vol. 2, p. 379. 
42 We can establish, for instance, that Bowen, in retirement, called on Queensland Premier, Sir 
Samuel Griffith, on 27 March 1887 when Griffith was in London for the Colonial Conference. 
See Griffith’s diary for 1887 in Dixson Library MSQ 195. 
43 British Diplomacy, pp. 304-5. The Asiatic Quarterly Review, a major intellectual journal 
covering Central Asia, endlessly discussed Britain’s supposed alliance, or its need for an 
alliance. 
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Chinese Commissioners in 1887, they believed there was an alliance, and 
complained that it had not protected them from ill-treatment.44 That same year, 
when opposing the Naval Agreement between the Australasian colonies and 
Britain, the protectionist politician, EW O’Sullivan, warned that if war broke out 
between Russia and China, and if China was a British ally, “the time may come 
when the ships of war which are subsidised by us may be sent as convoys of 
ships bringing Chinamen to the shores of Australia.”45 In 1888, the wealthy 
New Zealand businessman and politician, Josiah Firth, wrote a long letter to the 
Premiers of the eastern mainland colonies and New Zealand, and to the 
Colonial Secretary in London, arguing for the modification (rather than 
abrogation) of Britain’s treaties with China in order to contain Chinese 
immigration; his reasons including that “in the probable coming struggle 
between England and Russia in these seas and elsewhere, China will be one of 
our most potent Allies”.46 Discussing the issue of self-government for Western 
Australia in 1889, the protectionist newspaper, the Australasian Star, feared that 
portions of Western Australia “might serve as a piece of territory to purchase 
the assistance of China with for some enterprise against Russia in Central Asia,” 
with the result that “the security of our insularity would be gone forever.”47
If China was to be a key British ally against Britain’s most formidable and 
threatening rival, then China would be in a position to make modest demands 
                                                 
44 Letter P87/1869, Premier’s correspondence, PRO Victoria, filed with P88/1160 in 
VPRS1163/P0/141. 
45 Bruce Mansfield, “Australian nationalism in the growth of the labour movement in the 
eighteen-eighties in New South Wales, with reference to Queensland”, MA thesis, University of 
Sydney, 1951, p. 84. 
46 Letter from Firth to Gillies, P88/716 found with P88/1160 in Public Record Office Victoria, 
VPRS1163/P0/141. 
47 Quoted in Mansfield, Australian nationalism, p. 155. 
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on the Empire, a situation that would inevitably be a source of concern for 
colonial politicians who saw China as their greatest long-term threat. That 
concern was magnified by a decline in Britain’s economic and military 
dominance compared with the other great powers, and a belief amongst the 
colonial Australian ruling classes that the British government increasingly 
regarded their special interests as expendable. 
This concern escalated dramatically from 1883, with very tense conflicts over 
British acquiescence in the German seizure of the north eastern portion of New 
Guinea, British reluctance to block French attempts to seize the New Hebrides 
(Vanuatu), French dumping of convicts at New Caledonia, and a conflict over 
London’s demand that it exercise sole control over the proposed Australasian 
squadron of the Royal Navy in times of war. 
The wider context for colonial fears of a British betrayal was the emergence of a 
new system of global rivalry between the great powers; the imperialism Lenin 
famously described as “the highest stage of capitalism”.48 The great and 
emerging powers pushed out into all corners of the globe to find and develop 
colonies for their raw materials, their potential as markets and sites for 
investment, and their strategic significance. One consequence of this global 
rivalry was the carve-up of the non-colonised world, most notoriously of Africa. 
                                                 
48 This was the sub-title to the pamphlet, Lenin (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov), Imperialism, the 
highest stage of capitalism: A popular outline, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1973. This 
understanding of late nineteenth-century imperialism is argued in Eric Hobsbawm, The age of 
empire 1875-1914, Abacus, London, 1994, pp. 34-83; Chris Harman, Explaining the crisis: A 
Marxist re-appraisal, Bookmarks, London, 1984, pp. 35-8, 51-4. 
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But there was also a scramble to carve up the Pacific.49 Where once Australian 
politicians had regarded their physical isolation from Europe as affording a 
natural security, the arrival of the telegraph, the development of steamships, 
and the industrial world’s relentless search for markets, raw materials and 
colonies ended that. 
Another consequence of the global rivalries of the late nineteenth century was 
the end of British naval and industrial supremacy. From the 1880s, the British 
empire was militarily under more and more strain, as London attempted to 
hang onto its pre-eminent position without committing too many extra 
resources. In 1870, faced with a unified German empire, Britain pulled all 
remaining troops out of the Australian colonies, which were henceforth 
expected to provide their own land defences. After the Russian war scare of 
1877, the British government began a thorough review of defence arrangements 
in all its colonies, setting up a Colonial Defence Committee in 1878. Major new 
fortifications were built in the Australian colonies, and the colonial 
governments purchased modern naval vessels, new guns and torpedoes to 
protect their harbours. The Russian war scare also stirred colonial politicians to 
start discussing federation as a means of rationalising their limited military 
capabilities. The Pall Mall Gazette initiated a defence scare in 1884 by publishing 
a series of articles by Hugh Arnold-Forster, alleging that the Royal Navy’s 
                                                 
49 Luke Trainor sees the two as linked, British imperialism and Australian nationalism: manipulation, 
conflict, and compromise in the late nineteenth century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & 
New York, 1994, p. 24. 
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supremacy was a thing of the past.50 Anxious discussions of British military 
power filled the pages of high-brow magazines and journals. 
A third consequence of this new imperialism was repeated collisions between 
the great powers, and a sense that some kind of total European war was 
imminent. Russia’s expansion into Central Asia inspired a series of alarmist 
books and articles arguing that Russia’s aim was to take India. It was certainly 
true that most of the buffer states that had existed between Russia and India, or 
Russia and China, had now been conquered. There was also a growing concern 
in London and Australia over French “aggression” in seizing colonies and 
attempting to exclude British trade from them.51 At the time of the Colonial 
Conference of 1887 in London, attended by representatives from all the 
Australian colonies, British Prime Minister Salisbury was deeply concerned at 
affairs in Europe, and thought there might be war that year especially given 
Britain’s strained relations with France.52 No doubt this fear was taken back to 
the Australian colonies by their representatives. By May 1887, the Sydney 
Morning Herald was talking of “the great war which is now impending in 
Europe”, and seeing in this a change in British policy towards getting the 
colonies to consolidate “their national defences and by that means helping 
England to hold her own…”53 Thus, the 1887-88 debates over Chinese 
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immigration, and the disputes that erupted between Britain and its Australian 
colonies from 1883-1888, took place in a wider environment of intensifying 
strategic tension. 
The most important of these disputes was over Britain’s refusal to annexe the 
eastern, non-Dutch half of New Guinea. On 4 April 1883, the McIlwraith 
government in Queensland declared New Guinea a British possession.54 There 
had long been colonial demands that Britain annexe this territory, but when it 
happened many saw it as an attempt to guarantee indentured labour for the 
profitable Queensland sugar industry. Nevertheless, even those colonial 
politicians and newspapers who vehemently opposed the labour trade 
supported annexation on strategic grounds; they wanted to forestall annexation 
by any other European power and protect a vital shipping route to the east 
coast.55 So there was anger when Britain vetoed the annexation in July 1883; and 
then hysteria in late 1884 when Britain insisted on ignoring mounting evidence 
of German colonisation of the northern New Guinea coast. 
When German annexation was finally announced in the Sydney Daily Telegraph 
on 19 December 1884, colonial ruling class anger surged.56 Victoria’s 
Conservative Premier, James Service, warned Britain that “the bitterness of 
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feeling towards her will not die out in this generation”.57 In Brisbane, Sir 
Thomas McIlwraith told parliament, “it is the grossest piece of treachery on the 
part of the English Government to the colonies that has ever been perpetrated.” 
The Sydney Morning Herald’s Brisbane correspondent reported that, “If 
anything, I think the leading Ministerialists are angrier than the 
M’Ilwraithians”.58 And well they might have been. The Governor, Sir Anthony 
Musgrave, had written to the Premier, Sir Samuel Griffith, on 30 December, 
eleven days after the report in the Daily Telegraph, to vilify Service. 
I trust that you may be able to persuade Mr. Service not to be so 
energetic in making Australia ridiculous in the eyes of the world. The 
manner in which he and the newspapers have got up this German 
annexation scare is very amusing, and will be much laughed at.59  
It was not a letter designed to build confidence in either the Governor or the 
British authorities. The anger was not universal—indeed the New South Wales 
Acting Premier, William Bede Dalley, welcomed the infusion of German capital 
into the region as raising the prospect of increasing trade flows through 
Sydney. He was supported by Premier Sir Alexander Stuart. However, most 
New South Wales politicians and newspapers disagreed, including Sir Henry 
Parkes, who would be Premier when the issue of Chinese immigration once 
more came to a head. There were mass meetings of protest in Sydney and other 
towns, and republicans gained a boost. The Sydney Morning Herald commented 
that Lord Derby “has kept us out [of New Guinea], and he has let them in… 
[He] has done a cruel wrong to Australia.” The Sydney Daily Telegraph warned 
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that “Australian loyalty cannot suffer many [more] such humiliations”.60 In 
Brisbane, McIlwraith raised the spectre of colonial separation from Britain at the 
annual dinner of the Commercial Travellers’ Association where his remarks 
were cheered; and this was a theme taken up by others, including the Brisbane 
Daily Observer.61
With no possibility of reversing their defeat, the colonial ruling class and its 
politicians nursed their bitterness towards Britain over the incident. “We value 
the tie that unites us to the parent country,” wrote the Age. “But if the 
alternative should unhappily lie between a repetition of such criminal folly as 
our interests have so disastrously suffered from at the hands of the Gladstone 
Ministry and separation, we say deliberately that we prefer the latter.”62 Lord 
Rosebery, soon to become British Foreign Secretary, confessed to having feared 
that New Guinea might have “lost” the Australian colonies.63
The second major dispute with Britain came over France’s attempt to take 
control of the islands of the New Hebrides group (now Vanuatu). There had 
been repeated attempts by the arch-expansionists of the Presbyterian Church to 
get the British government to annexe the New Hebrides, but it had declined. 
The crisis began in 1885 when the French offered to exchange the strategic 
island of Rapa, coveted by New Zealand, in exchange for the right to annexe the 
New Hebrides, wanted by French settlers in New Caledonia. Now the islands 
coveted by the Presbyterians were in danger due to British inactivity. There was 
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a storm of outrage, in Victoria and New South Wales, where the French were 
supported by the government of Dalley and Jennings, and opposed by Sir 
Henry Parkes. In the middle of a campaign of public meetings, the Governor of 
New Caledonia, on his own initiative, sent a French warship to the New 
Hebrides with 200 troops and two pieces of artillery. A storm erupted in the 
interested colonies. Just as the agitation died down, the French were found 
building permanent barracks and fortresses on the islands. 
Roger Thompson has commented that, “The continued failure of British 
diplomacy to dislodge the French troops from the New Hebrides inevitably 
built up a sense of frustration within the Victorian government circle, where 
there was a growing feeling that Australians were being left in the dark”; a 
frustration built on that provoked by the New Guinea affair.64 The issue was 
raised with great intensity when colonial politicians ventured to London in 
April 1887 for the Queen’s Jubilee and the Colonial Conference. By August 
1887, a truce had been reached, and the islands were to be under the joint 
“protection” of a British and French naval commission. But in the eyes of 
colonial strategists, France still exercised partial control of islands in a region of 
the Pacific that the British could and should have seized for the benefit of the 
empire and the protection of Australia. 
There were many other frictions with Britain in this period; over who should 
pay for the naval defence of the colonies, and who should control the proposed 
Australian squadron; over the selection of governors and over some of their 
decisions, not least in cases of capital punishment. The emergence of the 
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imperialist system brought an end to notions of unconditional British 
protection, as the British military were stretched by the confrontation with 
Russia and the expansionism of imperial rivals such as Germany and France. 
A sense of the friction between the colonies and London can be gauged from 
Sydney Morning Herald editorials in late 1887. When discussing a trip being 
made by Premier Sir Henry Parkes to Victoria and South Australia, the paper 
emphasised the importance of the colonies showing “a common front” to 
London: 
The anxiety of British statesmen to strengthen the bonds of union 
between the colonies and the mother-country is accompanied by a strong 
disposition to higgle about terms… In illustration of this position it is 
sufficient to point to the question of the mail contracts. The English 
Government has acted with almost contemptuous indifference to the 
interests of the Australian colonies. Their legitimate susceptibilities have 
been ignored. It is, therefore, necessary that there should be neither 
weakness nor variation of tone in the communications sent from this 
side…65
While emphasising the loyalty of the colonies to the empire, it warned that, 
“The fidelity of the colonies has occasionally been very much tried, not only by 
the indifference which has been shown by the English people and English 
Governments to Australian affairs, but by the neglect with which Australian 
interests have been treated,” citing New Guinea and the New Hebrides 
specifically.66 When even the Sydney Morning Herald could write in this tone, it 
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is not surprising that in a crisis, all but the most obsessively loyal in the ruling 
class would fear leaving matters in the hands of the Colonial Office. 
The danger of the open door at Darwin 
The immediate cause of the crisis over Chinese immigration into the Northern 
Territory lay in the determination of a section of South Australia’s ruling class 
to have indentured labour systems for plantation agriculture established in the 
Territory. When the Territory was annexed to South Australia in 1863, the 
motive was to gain a new source of pastoral land. However, with the discovery 
of gold and the success of the Queensland sugar industry, mining and 
plantation agriculture also came to be seen as keys to the Territory’s future 
development.67 As the Queensland sugar industry was embroiled in 
controversy over indentured Pacific Island labourers, Territory advocates 
promoted it as the future sugar-growing region of Australia,68 prompting the 
government to provide extravagant and ultimately unsuccessful incentives to 
capitalists in the hope they would pioneer a sugar industry.69  
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Practical attempts to develop the Territory were hampered by the extreme 
climate, lack of any winter rain, poor soil, careless decision-making, naïve 
optimism, speculative land trading and administrative blunders. Indeed, by the 
early 1880s, the Territory was alternately described as a land of opportunity and 
South Australia’s “white elephant”.70 The province was costing between £30,000 
and £60,000 a year to administer, with insufficient revenue to offset the cost.71 
Adding to these problems was the distance from South Australia to Darwin; 
travel involved either a long trek overland of more than 2000 kilometres from 
the limit of the South Australian railway, or a sea journey of nearly 7000 
kilometres via the east coast, the only route that was regularly serviced by 
steamers.72 Two solutions in particular were agreed by ruling class leaders; the 
Territory needed a decent transport infrastructure to make large scale mining 
profitable, and it needed indentured “coloured” labourers to do the hard work 
in such a hot and oppressive climate.73  
At first the issue of “coloured labour” seemed unproblematic.  In 1874, the 
South Australian government itself imported 186 Chinese coolies to work in the 
mines. Then from 1878 to 1880, over 3000 Chinese people came to the Territory, 
mainly to work in the newly discovered gold mines. By 1882, when William J 
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Sowden, editor of the establishment newspaper, the Register, visited the 
Northern Territory, Chinese people outnumbered Europeans by more than five 
to one. Palmerston (Darwin) had become a predominantly Chinese town, and 
was thriving. Sowden believed that, “The future population of the Northern 
Territory will be two-thirds Chinese”, and drew on the words of Governor Sir 
William Jervois to illustrate this, saying that when a visitor arrived: 
he will see the boat in which he lands manned by Chinamen; his luggage 
will be taken to the hotel by a Chinaman; when he gets to the hotel he 
will find the cook a Chinaman, the butler a Chinaman; and if there is a 
family he will find the nurse a Chinaman, and every department of life 
filled by this race.74
The late 1870s saw the beginning of opposition to Chinese immigration in South 
Australia and enormous ambivalence within its governments, and ruling class 
circles more generally on the issue. Between 1880 and 1887, the South 
Australian Legislative Assembly voted for five separate bills to restrict Chinese 
immigration to the Northern Territory—twice in 1880, then 1881, 1886 and 
1887—and five times the bills were either amended in the Legislative Council to 
remove clauses restricting Chinese immigration to the Northern Territory, or 
were simply defeated.75 These bills had virtually nothing to do with working 
class agitation in either South Australia proper, or the Northern Territory. In 
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South Australia itself, there were barely a few hundred Chinese people, and the 
only significant agitation had been caused by the employment of a few hundred 
on the Port Augusta to Quorn railway in 1878. In the Northern Territory, there 
were only a few hundred European workers, most either working for the 
government, or scattered amongst distant mining settlements or pastoral 
properties. 
The debates on the five unsuccessful bills revealed enormous ambiguity about 
having a large Chinese population in the Territory. On the one hand, many felt 
a sense of danger as a result of the arrival of a few thousand Chinese people, 
and news of the recent gold discoveries seemed to threaten an even greater 
influx.76 When William Morgan introduced the Northern Territory Chinese 
Immigration Bill into the Legislative Council in October 1880—and this was the 
second attempt that year to restrict Chinese immigration into the Northern 
Territory—he raised the spectre of having to deal with 30,000 Chinese people in 
the Territory. In the three months since Bray’s anti-Chinese private member’s 
bill had been defeated, the Chinese population of the Territory had doubled to 
3715 with more on the way.77 On the other hand, the policy of all governments 
had been to try to introduce “coloured labour” into the Territory, and now that 
a thousand Chinese people had come, they were getting the kind of labour force 
that most of their class had long believed the Territory needed.78 Some, like 
Glyde, saw no problem in South Australia proper, and welcomed the arrival of 
Chinese people in the Territory—“the Chinese were extremely useful indeed in 
                                                 
76 Speeches of Ramsay, SAPD 1880, col. 523; Coghlin and Glyde, col. 524; Landseer, col. 525; 
King, col. 530. 
77 SAPD 1880, col. 1652. 
78 Speeches of Rees, SAPD 1880, cols. 529, 592; Ross, col. 670; Glyde, col. 670; Sandover (MLC), 
col. 761; Scott, col. 915ff. 
Page 436   Chapter 9: Towards the crisis of 1888 
carrying on menial occupations, and they might be of service to us in that 
respect”—but wanted to prevent the Territory being “swamped”.79 Others, like 
Ross and Sandover, had the opposite opinion, arguing that Chinese labour was 
necessary for profitable development in the Northern Territory and that the 
only danger was Chinese immigration into South Australia proper.80 Richard 
Chaffey “Bully” Baker, who was on his way to becoming South Australia’s 
leading Conservative, also supported legislation to restrict Chinese immigration 
into South Australia proper, but with no restriction into the Northern 
Territory.81
Amidst the fog of conflicting and confused opinion, a few themes were clear. 
Almost all members of parliament saw economic development in the Territory 
as depending on the use of “coloured labour”, and most saw it as needing to be 
cheap, indentured and unfree, and this applied to Liberals as much as 
Conservatives.82 Baker argued that “they must either abandon it [the Northern 
Territory] altogether or people it by Asiatics.” That did not imply an acceptance 
of unlimited Chinese immigration: “If there was any danger of the place being 
flooded with Celestials it would be another matter. There is no danger of the 
kind”.83 Indeed, “the more Chinese they got to the Northern Territory the 
better. Singapore and Java had grown rich and prosperous by the aid of it.”84 
Almost all those who wanted to limit future Chinese immigration argued for 
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other “coloured labour”—and the preferred option was Indian labourers.85 An 
Indian Immigration Bill was passed in 1879, though not signed into law, to 
facilitate the recruitment of Indian labourers for sugar plantations. An amended 
law was passed in 1882, and a Major Fergusson sent to India to negotiate for 
labourers, but the Indian government insisted that 40 per cent of immigrants be 
women, and that special provisions be made for food and housing. The plan 
was deferred.86
A sense of confusion is also apparent when the debates over Chinese 
immigration are read alongside the almost concurrent debate over the Northern 
Territory Sugar Cultivation Bill of 1880. This authorised massive land grants and 
cash incentives to capitalists who succeeded in growing and crushing 500 tons 
of sugar. Underpinning the debate was the assumption that the sugar industry 
that they all desired would be organised on the back of “coloured labour”. 
Many assumed that the labour would be Chinese; so much so that West-
Erskine, who voted for the bills to restrict Chinese immigration into the 
Northern Territory, argued that one of the potential sugar syndicates, led by 
Delissa, was serious because he had engaged 100 Chinese labourers.87
In 1882, John Langdon Parsons, Minister responsible for the Northern Territory 
in JC Bray’s government, 1881-84, led a parliamentary delegation to the 
Territory to investigate its needs. He came back convinced that as well as 
“coloured labour”, the Territory desperately needed a railway. A local railway 
from Port Darwin to Pine Creek, 250km to the south, was urgently needed for 
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local reasons: to cut the prohibitive cost of freighting supplies and equipment 
into the gold and other mines between Palmerston (Darwin) and Pine Creek. 
The cost of provisions meant that wages were astronomical—on average £5 per 
week for European and £2 10s a week for Chinese labourers: 
It was, therefore, impossible to work these rich claims at the price which 
had to be paid for provisions and labour; and he might add that what 
was true of the provisions and labour was also true with regard to 
everything else—that if a horse was to be shod or a piece of machinery 
repaired it cost 300 or 400 per cent. more than at any other gold-field in 
Australia. Therefore this railway was necessary in order to make these 
surprisingly rich claims pay.88
In his book on the parliamentarians’ trip, Register editor Sowden made the same 
points, arguing that the Northern Territory could never really attract 
population without a railway.89 But boosting the mining industry was only part 
of the government’s scheme; in their eyes it was to eventually become 
Australia’s transcontinental railway. On his trip to the Territory, Parsons had 
promised to agitate in Adelaide for a decision to build a railway overland to 
Adelaide.90 At that time, Queensland had been convulsed with a bitter conflict 
over a transcontinental railway proposal being pushed through parliament by 
Sir Thomas McIlwraith. The idea had been to both open up new land, and cut 
the cost of freight and the time taken for freight and passengers to reach Asia 
and Europe by linking Queensland, and eastern Australia’s railway systems to 
a line that ran to a new, major port at Port Parker on the Gulf of Carpentaria. 
While many were excited by this bold idea, the proposal was destroyed in 1883, 
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by squatters, normally McIlwraith supporters, who opposed handing over vast 
areas of land to a private syndicate in return for building the railway. 
Seventeen months after he left Palmerston, with the Queensland 
transcontinental railway proposal dead, Parsons moved a bill in parliament to 
construct the Pine Creek railway. For him, it was the first stage of a 
transcontinental line, a work that would transform Darwin into a major city, a 
vision that implied enormous profit for both government and those who 
invested in its future. But it was a vision with a twist that many in the 
Australian colonial ruling classes would find disturbing: a vision centred on 
Asia: 
The first of these reasons for constructing this line was that we had a city 
laid out at the northern terminus of the line which just fronted the 
Eastern Archipelago [Indonesia] and the thickly populated cities of 
Eastern Asia. Every one would see who took a glance at the map that this 
city was destined to become the great entrepôt of commerce, the great 
port of import from the East and of export for Australian products. He 
believed there were two ports in Australia which were bound to be two 
of the greatest ports in Australia—Port Darwin in the North and Port 
Augusta in the South. 
The government would let tenders, and it would be up to the contractor to 
decide what labour they used. India had approved the recruitment of “coolies” 
for such a project, and again, he saw this as leverage for solving the future 
labour needs of the Territory: 
the Government had access to that class of labour by which fortunes had 
been made in all parts of the world—a class of labour most suited for the 
growth of tropical products—the Indian coolies. Colossal fortunes had 
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been made both in the West and East Indies by planters who had 
employed coolie labour.91
It would be another two and a half years before contracts were signed for 
construction to begin. In some ways, the remarkable thing is that the project 
was ever started. The 1880s in South Australia were a decade of economic crisis 
and stagnation, caused by the collapse of northern wheat-growing as a result of 
over-expansion, and the collapse of a land-boom in mid-1883. By 1884 the 
colony was in a depression so serious that it led to extensive emigration from 
the colony and by 1886, the extreme of depopulation. At a time when workers 
in other colonies were taking industrial action to improve conditions, the South 
Australian government reduced public service salaries by 20 per cent and 
bootmaking employers in Adelaide tried to cut their workers’ wages by 30 per 
cent, sparking one of the few strikes of the period.92 Parsons’ bill to spend 
nearly a million pounds on the Pine Creek railway came just weeks after 
parliament heard that the government was £140,000 worse off than in 1882, and 
that a deficit of £255,000 was expected in the next financial year.93 The political 
history of the next four years would entail bitter wrangles over raising taxes 
and cutting expenditure.94 The first tender for the railway failed because the 
price was too high; and the successful tenderers, Millar Bros, offered to build 
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the railway for £80,000 less if they were allowed to recruit Chinese labour. In a 
climate of austerity, this offer seemed irresistible. 
The decision to allow the use of Chinese labour on the railway was openly and 
unashamedly supported by the opposition, led by Thomas Playford, despite his 
prior commitment in 1880 to never again using Chinese labour on public 
works.95 Only Coghlin dissented. But with over 4000 Chinese people in the 
Territory, the Downer government also wanted to prevent the railway 
becoming the means by which more Chinese would arrive, so the contractors 
agreed that they would pay a quasi-poll tax of £10 for every Chinese labourer 
they brought into the Territory and this would be refunded when the labourer 
was sent home. The start of the railway would give a new impetus to gold 
mining, which would also potentially attract Chinese miners, so in June 1886, 
the Conservative Downer government introduced a bill to extend the 
provisions of the Chinese Immigration Act of 1881 to the Northern Territory. 
Once again, the vast majority in the South Australian House of Assembly 
wanted the advantages of employing Chinese (or other Asian) workers on low 
pay, without admitting them into the community. In introducing the bill to 
parliament, the Minister responsible for the Northern Territory, JA Cockburn, 
described it as “the natural consequence and corollary” of the Pine Creek 
railway tender. They “were anxious to avoid any disastrous incursion of 
Chinese consequent on the acceptance of that tender.” Port Darwin’s proximity 
to Asia, such a source of inspiration in 1883, was now seen as a source of 
danger: 
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it was confidently expected that the construction of the Palmerston and 
Pine Creek railway, in the Northern Territory, would give a great 
impetus to the development of that part of the province; and as Port 
Darwin was within about 11 days’ steaming from Hongkong, it was 
feared that a large rush of Chinese might take place to Port Darwin, in 
order to share in the accession of prosperity caused by the railway 
construction. 
Indeed, with Chinese people outnumbering Europeans by seven to one: 
there was a danger that unless this immigration was regulated an 
overwhelming number of Chinese would take possession of the 
Northern Terrritory, and there would be a possibility of the Northern 
Territory becoming a Chinese colony. 96
In anticipation of parliament passing the legislation, the government had sent a 
telegram to the Governor of Hong Kong warning that in future, Chinese people 
arriving in the Northern Territory would be forced to pay a £10 poll tax. 
Unfortunately for the government, the Legislative Council once again proved 
intransigent. The government’s case was not helped by the fact that its minister 
in the upper house, JB Spence, had led the move to exclude the Northern 
Territory from the provisions of the Chinese Immigration Act of 1881. His speech 
introducing the legislation was short and desultory; the only significant feature 
of the debate was the way his (alleged) discomfort at this change of tune was so 
repeatedly and relentlessly commented on. The centrality of Chinese labour to 
the Territory economy was the main point made by members, such as Henry 
Scott: 
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It was only by Chinese work, and by the improvement of the country by 
Chinese labor, that the Northern Territory could be cultivated, and there 
were only four or five hundred Europeans who would travel by the Pine 
Creek railway, and it was surely not for their benefit that it was being 
made.97
Bright thought the Territory would have collapsed long ago without the 
Chinese; Baker asked why they were being asked to shut out the only people 
who had been able to profitably settle in the Territory; Rankine thought the 
Chinese should be thanked for saving them £80,000 on the cost of the railway; 
Glyde thought that sugar could only be grown using Chinese labour; and 
Wadham finished by sympathising with Spence in his task and referred again 
to the force of his arguments in 1881. The bill was defeated 14-6 with the 
chamber’s most capable anti-Chinese advocate, Ramsay, failing to participate in 
the debate.98 In the wake of this debacle, the Downer government pushed 
through legislation to increase import duties on items used mainly by Chinese 
people, such as opium, rice and Chinese oil;99 and amended the Goldfields Act to 
deny “Asiatic aliens” the right to dig on “new” fields, defined as less than two 
years old.100
Thus, by the end of 1886, the South Australian parliament remained at an 
impasse in terms of developing the Northern Territory. They had tried to 
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promote sugar plantations, and these had failed. They believed that fortunes 
could be made there using Indian labourers, but the Indian government had 
imposed onerous conditions on recruitment and there were no capitalists 
seeking to employ them, and so the government did nothing to actually 
organise a structure of recruitment from India. Four thousand Chinese 
immigrants were the only group to have made some kind of successful 
settlement of the Territory. Despite—or because of—this the majority in the 
lower house were against Chinese immigration, and the majority in the upper 
house in favour of it. The government had decided to start building a 
transcontinental railway, to make something out of Darwin’s fine harbour and 
its proximity to Asia. Despite its opposition to Chinese immigration, it knew the 
railway would attract Chinese immigrants to the mines which the railway 
would make more profitable, and it wanted the railway built with Chinese 
labour in order to save money. 
A challenge to colonial control: The Chinese 
Commissioners’ mission of 1887 
In May 1886, the Chinese Minister in London informed the British Foreign 
Office that the Emperor planned to send a special commission to investigate the 
various social relations and trade of Chinese people living in the various 
European colonies.101 This came at a time when Britain was still engaged in a 
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stand-off with Russia over Britain’s occupation of Port Hamilton on the Korean 
Peninsula, and at a time when China was assumed by many to be in alliance 
with Britain. The spectre was raised of China demanding an end to the colonies’ 
anti-Chinese laws, and of Britain imposing their demands on the colonies. 
This impression was reinforced by a major statement of China’s position by the 
Marquis Tseng, in an article for The Asiatic Quarterly Review of January 1887. He 
reassured the European powers that China wanted nothing more than its 
rightful place in the world, rather than revenge for past injustices, and that it 
wanted only to get unjust treaties revised. But in the imagination of colonial 
politicians, the words of the Marquis were ominous. After demanding the 
moral high ground—“China has none of that land-hungering so characteristic 
of some other nations—hungering for land they do not and cannot make use 
of”—he warned that China’s foreign policy would also focus on “the 
amelioration of the condition of her subjects residing in foreign parts”: 
The outrageous treatment to which Chinese subjects residing in some 
foreign countries have been subjected has been as disgraceful to the 
Governments in whose jurisdiction it was perpetrated as to the 
Government whose indifference to the sufferings of its subjects residing 
abroad invited it.  
He announced the appointment of the Commission “to visit and report on the 
condition of Chinese subjects in foreign countries”, and hoped that: 
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this proof of the interest which the Imperial Government has 
commenced to take in the welfare of its foreign-going subjects will 
suffice to ensure their receiving in the future the treatment which by the 
law of nations and the dictates of humanity is due from civilized nations 
to the stranger living within their gates.102
The Chinese Commissioners visited the Australian colonies from 25 April to 3 
August 1887, visiting Darwin, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, a number of 
Victorian towns, Newcastle, Brisbane, Townsville, Cairns and Cooktown.103 
They were received with formal politeness by most colonial governments, 
however the suggestion was immediately raised that they may be liable for the 
poll-tax levied on Chinese immigrants. While Parkes reassured a Chinese 
community leader that he would not subject them to this indignity, he privately 
telegraphed Brisbane to ask Sir Samuel Griffith “if there is any restriction on 
Chinese Commissioners & suite who are about to visit your Colony”.104
In the colonial media, their visit provoked alarm. They became a magnet for the 
grievances of Chinese people in Australia, especially the imposition of the 
colonial poll-tax. Colonial newspapers speculated that their visit might lead to a 
formal complaint from China to the British government.105 The length of their 
visit and their extensive travels in Australia were used by newspapers to 
inflame public opinion. In Brisbane, the Premier, Sir Samuel Griffith, spoke 
bluntly to the Commissioners about the hostility of the colonies to Chinese 
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immigration, a conversation that offended Commissioner Wong, and they faced 
anti-Chinese deputations as they sailed up the Queensland coast.106  
On the day the Commissioners departed, the Sydney Morning Herald suggested 
that the Commissioners had come “to discover how wide a field the Australian 
colonies presented for the employment of Chinese labour” and “with the object 
of paving the way for the arrival of others.”107 It also warned that in the event of 
an official complaint about Australia’s treatment of Chinese immigrants: 
the British Government would be in a difficulty. Satisfaction could not be 
given to China without interfering in some way with what we should 
regard as our domestic affairs; and if China were persistent, trouble 
might arise out of the business. Whatever happened, the Australian 
colonies could not give way upon such a question as this. The restrictions 
which have been placed upon Chinese immigration have been adopted 
deliberately, and with the determination that Australia shall be 
essentially a European community. We have made up our minds not to 
be overrun by the Chinese or any other inferior race, and no proposal to 
relax the precautions which serve to keep back the threatened Chinese 
invasion would be listened to for a moment. 
However, China was becoming more powerful, and a force in world politics; “if 
circumstances led her to form an alliance with Russia, she would become a very 
awkward antagonist for Great Britain, whose possessions in India, Burmah, and 
the Straits would be threatened.” Britain could be put in a position where it 
“had to choose between a Chinese war and a quarrel with her Australian 
colonies”.108 The paper was not sanguine; three months later, it reported 
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second-hand accounts of the Commissioners’ conclusions, and judged them 
“premonitory of future trouble” between China, Britain and the colonies.109
In Victoria, the Naval and Military Gazette, a semi-official journal for the 
volunteer militia, expressed a sense of imminent danger. Before August 1887, it 
had barely discussed the “Chinese question”, but for nearly a year after the 
Commissioners left, their visit, China’s supposed military power and the 
dangers of Chinese immigration would be constant points of alarm in the 
paper. Its fear of China and racist hatred towards Chinese people were 
grounded in its support for Imperial Federation—a major 
conservative/imperialist current in Britain and the colonies that argued for 
closer ties within the British empire, with a supreme imperial parliament in 
London ruling the whole. In the same month the Commissioners departed, the 
paper expressed alarm over about China’s military capacity: 
Her fleets and armies are organised on the European model, provided 
with the very best of arms, and drilled by European and American 
officers, and it may be a matter of importance to England, in view of 
possible complications in Asia, to be on good terms with her, if therefore 
the Chinese press their claim to be allowed to settle in Australia, and the 
Australians positively refuse to consent, trouble may arise.110
It was this impression of growing military power that gave the visit of the 
Chinese Commissioners a sense of menace for the paper. It reported, in October 
1887, that many local Chinese residents “have reported to the officials in their 
                                                 
109 SMH editorial, 15 October, 1887, p. 13, col. 2. 
110 Australasian Naval & Military Gazette, vol. 1, no. 7, 31 August 1887, p. 142; see also vol. 1, no. 
9, 31 October 1887, p. 196. 
Chapter 9: Towards the crisis of 1888  Page 449 
native country that Australasia is a most eligible field for the transference of 
surplus Chinese labour; and it is understood that, although a marked restraint 
was placed upon their public utterances, the visitors [Chinese Commissioners] 
did not fail to make a full note of every detail which presented itself.”111 When 
“An Imperial Officer” wrote to the South Australian Register to argue that 
imperial officials had no difficulty in ruling large numbers of Chinese people in 
Singapore and Hong Kong, the Naval and Military Gazette disagreed: 
[W]ill the men who have founded a great English-speaking nation in the 
southern seas…allow an alien race to settle on the land, and look 
forward to a mongrel breed, half European and half Asiatic, as the future 
Australian People? or to their remaining a separate foreign and isolated 
tribe settled in our country, a constant source of danger and 
annoyance?112
The idea that Britain would veto Australian attempts to keep the Chinese out 
was unthinkable, “and it would be a very dangerous experiment [for it] to 
attempt to do so.” 
From another side of mainstream Victorian politics came a similar political 
shift.113 The relentlessly middle-class Australian Natives Association (ANA) 
also embraced the cause of excluding Chinese immigrants at the time of the 
Commissioners’ visit. One leading member of the supposedly non-political 
ANA, the lawyer, Field Barret, had raised the issue in 1885 and 1886 to no 
effect, and an anti-Chinese article published in the ANA’s paper, the National 
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Australian, in June 1887 had elicited criticism on “’pure Conservative’ 
principles”. The historian of the ANA, Marian Aveling, noted that: 
despite the opposition in the journal, Barret’s argument seems to have 
won immediate support in many of the branches. In August and 
September [1887] there were many branch debates on the subject, and 
almost every audience accepted both the reality of the danger he 
postulated, and the sectional grounds on which he argued. Richmond, 
home branch to two of his journal opponents, passed “without a 
dissentient” a motion “affirming that the only effective method of 
dealing with the difficulty was to introduce new legislation to prevent 
any further influx. International and other difficulties were mentioned, 
but the members were unanimously agreed that these would have to 
give way to the interests of Australia.”114
There were many more such resolutions. Despite some conservative resistance, 
this upsurge of concern led the ANA to participate in a conference on the 
Chinese question called by the Trades Hall Council, and to begin a life-long 
agitation for White Australia. Two months after the Chinese Commissioners 
had left Australia, the Sydney Morning Herald commented that: 
There can be little doubt, that the intense public feeling which has been 
manifested on the subject of late, is traceable to the recent visit of the 
Chinese Commissioners and the belief that the report upon what they 
have seen, is likely to be followed by a Chinese invasion of Australia.115
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South Australia refuses to close Darwin to Chinese 
immigration 
In June 1887, a general election in South Australia saw a majority returned for 
the larger-than-life Liberal leader, Tom Playford. Eight days after the Chinese 
Commissioners sailed from Cooktown, never to return, the new Playford 
government made the fifth move to introduce legislation to restrict the entry of 
Chinese into the Northern Territory. The parliamentary debate brought out, 
once again, all the ambiguity in the positions adopted by South Australia’s 
leading politicians. In moving the bill, on 18 August 1887, the Minister for 
Education, JCF Johnson, argued three different sides of the indentured labour 
argument; firstly, that: 
It was undeniable that wherever a lower race was present to do the 
menial work for a higher race it was found a curse and not a blessing. 
This truth had been illustrated in America, North and South, and also in 
the colonies of South Africa. 
Then, he argued, that a certain number of Chinese labourers would be good for 
agriculture in the Northern Territory, and finally—somewhat contradictorily—
that Chinese people were no good for plantations because they were unwilling 
to work for masters.116 He was more consistent on the strategic question: “we 
must always remember the pent-up torrent of humanity in China, where a 
small leak once allowed might become a vast stream capable of submerging 
Anglo-Saxondom in Australia.” Finally, he played the federation card: 
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The whole of the other colonies had passed similar measures, and 
Queensland had made the tax £30, and considering this, hon. members 
would agree with him that it would be very unneighborly on the part of 
South Australia if we allowed our northern country to remain open to 
Chinese, who might stream over the Queensland border. Queensland 
had again asked us to pass a measure to prevent the free entry of 
Chinamen, and we ought certain to do so. Surely the friendship of 
Queensland was worth more to us than that of the celestial empire.117
Speaking on behalf of the Opposition, JA Cockburn strongly supported the 
argument that South Australia had a responsibility to the other Australian 
colonies: 
Last session the Northern Territory was not the only part of the 
Australias where a tax was not imposed upon Chinamen. Western 
Australia was then with us. Now, however, we stand absolutely alone in 
the matter, for Western Australia, which it should be borne in mind was 
a Crown colony, had seen the necessity of imposing a tax upon celestials 
arriving, and the Northern Territory was the only part where Chinamen 
were exempt from the tax. The fact of this country being free would 
facilitate Chinamen entering Queensland or it might be Western 
Australia… It was not so much a question of whether Chinese were 
desirable colonists as of intercolonial courtesy, and it would not be 
denied that Queensland had got reason to complain of us.118
Bagster supported the bill. He thought Chinese labour was needed in the 
Northern Territory and deplored the fact that “coolies” had not been 
introduced there: “notwithstanding this he believed if we did not legislate in 
the matter Chinese would soon overrun the place.”119
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Caldwell made an anti-racist argument: “The stage had been reached in the 
progress of civilisation when distinctions in connection with the human family 
should cease to be recognised.”120 Homburg was also against the bill, his “anti-
racism” reinforced by a belief that, “In the Northern Territory Chinese were the 
most useful people they could have, and he was convinced that the Territory 
could not be properly developed unless the Chinese were allowed to work 
there.” But he would vote for the bill because the (white) people of the 
Northern Territory had asked for it.121 For Scherk, federation was the key issue: 
“A great deal had been said about federation, and when the other colonies were 
taking steps to prevent Chinese immigration we should go hand in hand with 
them, and not stand apart.”122 Cohen raised the proximity of the Northern 
Territory to Hong Kong, and the danger that so many Chinese would arrive 
that the government would be powerless to stop them.123 Landseer raised the 
spectre of a Chinese goldfields revolt, before again coming in behind the 
argument for federation: “It was our duty to aid Queensland… We should do 
all in our power to promote the spirit of federation by joint action with the rest 
of Australia.”124 In reply, the Minister rejected humanitarian concerns, arguing 
that it was the Chinese who did not respect human life, and reiterated South 
Australia’s isolation on the issue: 
The strongest argument in favor of the Bill was the fact that the Northern 
Territory was now the only portion of Australia where such an Act as 
this one was not in force, and it was owing to this fact that our friend and 
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neighbor Queensland had asked us to pass this legislation so as to 
prevent that colony from being inundated by Chinese that passed over 
our border.125
While the debate was brief and desultory, the mood of the House was 
determined. It resisted attempts to strengthen the bill, with speakers insisting 
that they wanted to make it as hard as possible for the Legislative Council to 
reject it.126
However, the Legislative Council simply wasn’t listening. When the Chief 
Secretary, JG Ramsay, introduced the bill into the Council, he pointed out that 
their longstanding desire for Chinese labour to develop agriculture in the 
Territory had essentially failed. Over the last seven years, “It had been 
proved…that Chinese labor for that purpose was not particularly reliable. The 
Chinese like to be their own masters, and in a country like the Northern 
Territory where there was so much alluvial land they liked to leave their 
employers and go and fossick for gold on some field that had been discovered 
by Europeans.”127 H Scott again led the opposition to restriction, turning the 
argument of failure against successive governments: 
The Chief Secretary said that source was Indian coolie labour. They had 
heard of the coolies every year. Why did not the Government introduce 
them, or give others a special inducement to bring them in? It seemed to 
him that the people who were working the Northern Territory had some 
doubt as to the desirableness of bringing in coolies, otherwise he would 
have thought that some of the companies would have endeavored to get 
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them from India. Personally he would prefer to see Indian coolies 
introduced into the Territory, and he would like to see arrangements 
made with the Indian Government to that effect rather than legislate to 
prevent other people who were able and willing from going there.128
West-Erskine, a large landholder in the Territory, supported the bill because the 
Chinese had proven themselves a “nuisance” in the United States, and he 
remained optimistic about Indian labour: 
He granted that it was impossible for Europeans to work as laborers in 
the cane fields, and at that we must have colored labor of some sort. 
Some years ago he was in India, and he had a long conversation with Sir 
Philip Woodhouse, Governor of Bombay Presidency at that time, on the 
question of coolie labor. That gentleman spoke most highly of the coolie 
in connection with labor in Australia, but at that time there was no 
legislation in existence providing for the introduction of coolies into 
Australia. Since that time an Act had been passed which had received the 
assent of the Governor-General of India, and coolies could be introduced 
so soon as our Government made a move in the matter... they were a 
race who could be very easily managed.129
For Dunn, it was legislation of this kind that had led to the movement for 
separation between north and south Queensland.130
As the government lost the debate over labour for the Northern Territory, so it 
was also challenged in its use of the strategic question. In moving the bill, the 
Minister, Johnson, had warned of the danger of the Territory being overrun by 
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Chinese, and of the possibility that South Australia might be turned out of it.131 
Scott simply rejected this; he would support restriction if it were a real danger, 
but in his view it was not. In referring to Hong Kong, he argued, “the 
experience of older countries than this was that they could be very easily 
managed.”132 Tarlton turned the strategic argument against the government: 
The threat held out the other day by the Chinese Commissioners was no 
empty one. Professor Martin, an American, who was the head of the 
Pekin College, in a book published by him disclosed the enormous 
strides made in China in western arts, sciences, and mechanics. The 
French had lately got into a war with the Chinese which they were very 
glad to get out of, and he predicted that there were men now living who 
before they died would see that if we did a political wrong to China she 
would make it very troublesome for Australia. And very justly so.133
For Ramsay, in reply, this was a good reason to restrict their entry: “if the 
Chinese were going to be such an aggressive race it would be very impolitic to 
allow them to get a firm footing in our territory, and therefore we ought to be 
more cautious to prevent them from coming in in overwhelming numbers.”134 
But his efforts were to no avail; on Wednesday 7 September 1887, the attempt to 
restrict Chinese immigration into the Northern Territory was again defeated in 
the Legislative Council, by 14 votes to 6.135 Within the next few months, the 
Government Resident in Darwin would report one thousand more Chinese 
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people arriving in Darwin, and this would help fuel a new sense of crisis in the 
eastern colonies. 
Table 9.1: Population numbers by ethnicity in the Northern Territory136
Year 
European 
population 
Chinese 
population 
Other non-
indigenous 
ethnicities 
1878  208  
1879  1176  
1880  2154/4254137  
1881 660 3690 30 Malays 
1882 500 3585 25 Malays 
1883 517 3725 20 Malays 
1884 519 3703  
1885 603 4162  
1886 2000138 4264  
1887  6388  
1888  6750  
1889  6200  
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Chapter 10 
The making of the first 
White Australia policy 
IN 1888, the political leaders of the four major Australian colonies created the 
first White Australia policy. They did this in response to the crisis they faced 
from March 1888 over Chinese immigration. To resolve it on their terms, they 
made four crucial decisions: to move their anti-Chinese policies from restriction 
to effective exclusion; to assert Australian control over immigration policy; to 
regard Chinese people racially—ignoring British citizenship; and to pressure 
South Australia into closing Darwin to Chinese immigration. Federation, when 
it came, would be racial and Australia would be “white”. These decisions were 
accepted by Britain, and a major legal challenge to the exclusion of Chinese 
people was dismissed by the Privy Council. 
As noted previously, the Chinese empire had sent a mission to Australia in 1887 
to investigate the conditions facing Chinese people here. Such interference from 
China—a China growing more powerful—was completely unacceptable to the 
colonial ruling class; but it was made far worse when the British government 
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facilitated the interference, rather than resisting it. A rapid increase in Chinese 
numbers in the Northern Territory and the refusal of the South Australian 
parliament to restrict Chinese immigration saw a doubling of the Chinese 
population of the Northern Territory. From Darwin, Hong Kong and London, 
the ruling class agendas for shaping the Australian population were being 
challenged, and colonial governments started discussing ways to stop Chinese 
immigration once and for all. 
If there was one single event that transformed a growing, ruling class 
determination into a true crisis requiring a decisive response, it was Britain’s 
demand that the Australian colonies justify their anti-Chinese policies. After the 
Chinese Commissioners had reported to their government, the Chinese 
Minister in London had sent a formal complaint to the Foreign Office about the 
treatment of Chinese people in the colonies. The Foreign Office asked the 
Colonial Office to answer this complaint, and thus, on 23 January 1888, Sir 
Henry Holland, the British Colonial Secretary (soon to be Lord Knutsford), sent 
a circular to all colonial governors. The circular arrived in mid-March 1888, and 
it sharply radicalised all the colonial governments.1 The “Please explain” letter 
moved them to the intransigence that saw the Afghan and a number of other 
ships prevented from landing Chinese passengers at Sydney and Melbourne, 
amidst a wave of newspaper hysteria and mass demonstrations. In Sydney, Sir 
Henry Parkes rushed new anti-Chinese legislation through the Assembly, and 
an Intercolonial Conference was convened in Sydney in June to come to a 
common position on the question of Chinese immigration. The result was 
                                                 
1 NSW LA V&P 1887-8, vol. 2, p. 221. The Chinese complaint was published in The Age, 17 
March 1888; the SMH had to rely on a telegram from Melbourne for a summary of the Chinese 
letter, 17 March 1888, p. 14, col. 3. 
Chapter 10: The making of White Australia Page 461 
agreement amongst all colonies except Tasmania to pass new laws that would 
essentially exclude Chinese immigrants. 
But the real test of this national consensus would come in South Australia, 
where the Legislative Council had five times rejected attempts to restrict 
Chinese immigration into Darwin. It would now be asked, not to pass 
moderately restrictive laws as in the past, but laws that would terminate 
Chinese immigration and end the Chinese-driven development in the Territory. 
This battle in the South Australian parliament—a debate of major proportions—
would be the decisive moment in which South Australia decided its future. 
Would it be part of the hoped-for federated, “white” Australia? Or would it 
stake its future as an independent entity, promoting economic development on 
the basis of either Chinese immigration or indentured “coloured labour” in its 
own tropical colony? It was a debate that tore at the heart of ruling class 
Adelaide. 
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of established historical accounts is the 
emptiness of their treatment of this pivotal period. All agree that 1888 was a 
year of crisis over Chinese immigration, but struggle to explain why there was a 
crisis and give no sense of the issues involved, or the depth of disagreement. 
None seem aware of the colonies’ virtual agreement to act by September 1887 
and their attempts to come together to agree on a measure, nor of Parkes’ 
moves to legislate independently in November 1887. None shows any 
awareness of the depth of the dilemma facing South Australia’s politicians, the 
agony involved in choosing between the Northern Territory and federation.2 
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While forced to mention the rift between some colonists and the British Colonial 
Office, Willard is at pains to deprive it of any significance, much less discuss the 
central position it had in the crisis, possibly reflecting the deep tensions over the 
imperial relationship in the immediate post-war period when she was writing.3 
The result is bewilderment. Willard confessed that, “The reason for this third 
movement against Chinese immigration is at first not easy to understand,” 
while Price saw events that year as “highly complicated and somewhat 
bewildering”. Nevertheless, this period produced extreme measures. The only 
authors to have given a substantial treatment of the Afghan crisis are those who 
have written histories of Chinese people—Eric Rolls and Robert Travers—and 
while valuable, have little of the material discussed in this chapter.4
It is in 1888 that the established historical explanation, that sees labour 
movement agitation as the driving force for anti-Chinese legislation, most 
comes unstuck. There was a profound crisis within the ruling class, and indeed, 
within both Liberal and Conservative politics, and not just in South Australia. 
Almost all wanted a strong British empire, and were torn between the strategic 
logic of a British alliance with China against Russia, and the dangers of that 
strategy for Australia. Conservatives who supported “coloured labour” in the 
north feared the consequences if the labour was Chinese. Liberals opposed to 
indentured and unfree labour, who valued the politics of free trade and the free 
movement of people, found themselves legislating against the free movement of 
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Chinese people who supposedly embodied the danger of a semi-slave system in 
the north. They were committed to restraining government from taking 
arbitrary action, and yet it was only arbitrary exclusion in the Afghan crisis that 
forced Britain to accept their Chinese policy. Conservatives wanted a British-
Australian nationalism, but were alarmed when white Australia nationalism 
became the vehicle to mobilise plebeian and working class elements. There was 
nothing in the timing or nature of labour movement or plebeian protests over 
Chinese immigration to create a crisis for colonial governments at this time; 
their primary effect was to provide mass backing for an exclusionist push 
already in motion. 
After 1888, there was continuing opposition from within the ruling class to the 
decisions to exclude Chinese people, and later other “coloured labour”, but it 
was a very modest minority. The decisions made in 1888—and the principles 
adopted—were extended through the 1890s and in 1901, they were expanded 
into the twentieth century White Australia policy. But it was in this year, 1888, 
that Australia first became “white”. 
A determination to legislate 
In September 1887, just days after the SA Legislative Council had refused to 
restrict Chinese immigration to Darwin, Sir Henry Parkes set out for Adelaide 
to visit its Exhibition. On his way, he spent a couple of days in Melbourne 
discussing a range of national issues—defence, rabbits, Chinese immigration, 
military federation, New Guinea and French criminals from New Caledonia—
with Duncan Gillies, the Victorian Premier; his Chief Secretary, Alfred Deakin; 
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and Defence Minister, Sir James Lorimer, a partner in the major shipping line 
Lorimer Rome & Co. According to the Sydney Morning Herald: 
the Governments of Victoria and New South Wales were virtually in 
favour of prohibition, or rather in favour of steps which would amount 
to a virtual prohibition. What South Australia may be disposed to do in 
the matter has yet to be seen, but it is expected that that colony will fall 
in with the course agreed upon by New South Wales and Victoria. 
Queensland is known to be in favour of the adoption of the most 
stringent measures for the restriction of the Chinese.5
We have no reliable knowledge of what was said between Parkes and the South 
Australian ministers he met in Adelaide, least of all on the issue of Chinese 
immigration. According to the Adelaide Advertiser, the discussion revolved 
around the problems of naturalisation certificates; with the Sydney Morning 
Herald reporting that while the South Australian ministers were in favour of 
virtual prohibition, when it came to the Northern Territory, “Mr. Playford 
thought the Chinese will have to be allowed to come in there, provided they 
brought their wives and families.”6 Back in Melbourne, Parkes avoided any hint 
of difference, telling a deputation from that city’s Anti-Chinese Conference that 
“the Governments of the various colonies were entirely in accord in the matter,” 
and that they would “unite in protecting Australia against any large influx of 
Chinese,” and in parliament he repeated that the colonies would probably act 
together.7
                                                 
5 SMH 12 September 1887, p. 8, col. 2; see also p. 7, col. 3. 
6 Advertiser 16 September 1887, p. 5, col. 7; SMH 16 September 1887, p. 8, col. 3. 
7 NSWPD, vol. 28, p. 79 (27 September). 
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In Queensland, October 1887 saw a scare caused by a rumour that about 500 
Chinese people supposedly heading towards the Croydon goldfield. Premier 
Griffith assured parliament there had been no such “influx”, but made it clear 
that “this House probably will be asked to deal with the Chinese question in a 
very radical manner”.8 Referring to an editorial from the Sydney Morning Herald 
on the Chinese Commissioners’ visit, Conservative Opposition leader, Boyd 
Morehead called on Griffith to 
take the earliest opportunity—as I am sure he will—of informing the 
Imperial authorities that if they insist upon keeping friends with China 
on the terms suggested in that article, they had better make up their 
minds to part with us. If the Chinese, or rather the Chinese trade, is of 
more importance to the Empire than the Australian colonies are, let us 
understand it, and then we shall know what to do.9
A week later the issue was still alive, and the Liberal, Isambert, fulminated: 
If we do not enact some cast-iron law we shall be overwhelmed by 
Chinese, not coming so much by sea as from the Northern Territory of 
South Australia; and the Government ought to bring as much pressure 
on the South Australian Government to take the Chinese question in 
hand as they possibly can. The Government there are willing to deal with 
it, but the Upper House, representing the capitalists who have grabbed 
the Northern Territory, are in favour of Chinese importation to such an 
extent that they have passed measures through the Legislature there 
permitting the importation of Chinese to the Northern Territory…both 
Opposition and Government supporters, [in Queensland] are all in 
favour of this question being dealt with, and properly dealt with.10
                                                 
8 ORDLA Qld, vol. LII, p. 1089 (18 October 1887). 
9 ORDLA Qld, vol. LII, p. 1091 (18 October 1887). 
10 ORDLA Qld, vol. LIII, p. 1239 (Wed 26 October 1887). 
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Thus it seems certain by September 1887—long before any significant revival of 
public anti-Chinese agitation in the three south-eastern colonies—that the four 
major colonial governments shared an in-principle agreement that more 
stringent laws would be pursued. This impression is reinforced by telegrams 
between the colonial premiers in early November 1887. Duncan Gillies asked 
Parkes if he intended to legislate that session, and hoped that they could agree 
on proposals;11 this prompted a circular from Parkes to all the colonies 
proposing new measures and asking the other colonies for their opinions: 
it would be a great advantage if all the Colonies could agree upon a 
measure of restriction, or perhaps, more correctly speaking, of practical 
prohibition which should be framed in the same terms & impose the 
same conditions. Although in the vast extent of Australian territory, 
questions of climate & of the suitability of our soil for special industries 
must necessarily raise difficulties in the application of labour to 
productive capabilities much greater in some parts than in others, still 
the main subject cannot, I apprehend, be safely put aside by any 
Australian Government.12
In Queensland the government was disintegrating and a general election was 
due; they were not able to legislate in the short term. But both Griffith and 
Tasmanian Premier, PO Fysh, told Parkes that they would be happy to discuss 
the issue at the meeting of the Federal Council scheduled for January.13 This 
                                                 
11 Letter from Duncan Gillies, Premier Victoria to Parkes, 3 November 1887,  NSW State 
Records, 4/884.1 (Colonial Secretary’s special bundles). 
12 Letter from Parkes to Gillies, 4 November 1887,  NSW State Records, 4/884.1 (Colonial 
Secretary’s special bundles); letters to the other premiers dated 8 November. 
13 Letter from Premier Qld Griffith to Premier, Vic, 4 November 1887, Public Records Office, Vic, 
Premier’s correspondence, letter no. P87/3402, found at 1888/1160, VPRS 1163/P0/141; Letter 
from Premier Tasmania (Fysh) to Premier NSW (Parkes), 25 November 1887, NSW State 
Records, 4/884.1 (Colonial Secretary’s special bundles). 
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was a provocative response; the Federal Council as an institution was deeply 
divisive for the colonies—NSW being firmly resolved against any involvement 
in it. For its part, the Playford government was not about to submit prohibitive 
legislation when it had just failed to pass mildly restrictive legislation,14 though 
Playford did subsequently promise anti-Chinese petitioners that, “Efforts will 
be made to secure joint action amongst the Australian colonies in all matters 
relating to the Chinese question”.15 Duncan Gillies concluded that immediate 
legislation was not practical, and that some kind of conference would be 
necessary.16 In the meantime, intercolonial cooperation was set back by a 
sudden, raging controversy around Parkes’ proposal to rename New South 
Wales, “Australia”.  
On 28 November 1887, Parkes telegraphed the other Premiers, urgently 
requesting clarification of their views; he was now about to introduce his own 
anti-Chinese bill.17 From New Zealand came the reply that they had “Not yet 
had time to consider question Chinese Immigration but should be willing to 
                                                 
14 Letter from Premier SA Playford to Premier, Vic, 4 November 1887, Public Records Office Vic, 
Premier’s correspondence, letter no. P87/3405, found at 1888/1160, VPRS 1163/P0/141. 
15 Playford’s note 12 December 87 on letter from RE Rogers to Chief Sec SA, 24 November 1887, 
State Records SA, letter no. 87/1933, GRG 24/6, box 396. 
16 Letter from Premier Vic (Gillies) to Colonial Secretary NSW (Parkes), 19 November 1887, 
NSW State Records, 4/884.1 (Colonial Secretary’s special bundles). On 30 November 1887, 
Victorian Chief Secretary Alfred Deakin replied to a letter from the Anti-Chinese Association, to 
the effect that, “The other colonies have been communicated with. Their replies are not 
encouraging… It appears doubtful if legislation can be introduced this year as the other colonies 
require to act simultaneously to make action effective.” Deakin’s notes on letter from GR 
Farlow, Secretary, Anti-Chinese Association to Chief Secretary, Vic, 19 November 1887, Public 
Records Office Vic, Premier’s correspondence, letter no. 87/J11155, found at 1888/1160, VPRS 
1163/P0/141. 
17 Letter from Parkes to Colonial Secretaries Victoria, SA, Qld, Tas, NZ, 28 November 1887, 
NSW State Records, 4/884.1 (Colonial Secretary’s special bundles). 
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join in Legislation to prevent any undue Influx of Chinese.”18 Griffith in 
Brisbane suggested the other colonies adopt Queensland’s measures, adding 
“The question of requiring licenses to carry on business with substantial license 
fees and of refusing Miners rights have been under consideration.”19 South 
Australia could do nothing immediate, but its Premier would be “glad to act in 
concert with your Government and the Governments of the other Australian 
Colonies regarding the question.”20 Victoria’s Premier asked Parkes to deal with 
any emergency in as limited way as possible, so that “within the next six 
months the Colonies could determine a common basis for legislation.” He was 
“anxious Colonies should act in concert otherwise the value of any local 
legislation might be reduced to a minimum, and could scarcely be effective”,21 
and pointed to the chaos surrounding naturalisation papers as a means of 
restricting the arrival of Chinese people: 
as there is, undoubtedly, a constant illegal traffic in these papers, I have 
instructed the Collector that unless he is perfectly satisfied as to the 
identity of the person presenting the paper with the person to whom it 
was issued, he must absolutely refuse under Section 5 to allow them to 
land. 
The Collector informs me that it is practically impossible that he can be 
so satisfied, and therefore this instruction will have the effect of 
                                                 
18 HA Atkinson, Premier NZ to Parkes, 29 November 1887, NSW State Records, 4/884.1 
(Colonial Secretary’s special bundles). 
19 Telegram from SW Griffith to Parkes, 30 November 1887, Queensland State Archives, PRV 
7188-1-1. 
20 Letter from Premier SA (Playford) to Premier NSW, 30 November 1887, State Records SA, 
GRG 24/28, book 6 (1887), p. 393. 
21 Letter from Gillies to Parkes, 30 November 1887, NSW State Records, 4/884.1 (Colonial 
Secretary’s special bundles). 
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confining the number to those allowed by Sec. 2 [ie under the limitations 
by tonnage].22
This foreshadowed the tactics that Victoria would use in the Afghan crisis in late 
April/early May 1888. 
The event which led Parkes to take the initiative and restate his proposal for 
new legislation was a rumour in late November 1887 that 200 Chinese were on 
their way to Sydney from New Caledonia. For its part, the Sydney Morning 
Herald was hysterical. “Whatever views may be held on the general question of 
Chinese immigration, there can be no two opinions as to the duty of the 
Government in view of the item of news…that this colony is to be menaced 
with an early influx of no fewer than 200 Chinese coolies at one fell swoop.”23 
Within a week, Parkes had begun the formal procedures to bring in a new 
Chinese immigration bill, declaring that its provisions would be “as nearly as 
possible to prohibition”.24
The rumoured shipload of Chinese did not materialise, and the summer of 
1887-8 saw the colonies distracted by the centenary of British colonisation of 
Australia, with celebrations centred on Sydney. There was celebrity galore, with 
parades, banquets, visiting British dignitaries, and the opening of the new 
                                                 
22 Gillies notes attached to letter from Secretary, Dept Trade & Customs Vic, WF Walker to 
Premier, Vic, 30 November 1887, Public Records Office Vic, letter no. P87/3739, found at 
1888/1160, Premier’s correspondence, VPRS 1163/P0/141, emphasis in original. 
23 SMH editorial, 24 November 1887, p. 7, col. 1. 
24 NSWPD, vol. 29, p. 1700 (Wed 30 Nov 1887); pp. 1787-8 (Thurs 1 Dec). Three weeks later, one 
of the leading anti-Chinese MPs in NSW moved for a Select Committee into the Chinese Influx, 
to investigate the arrival of Chinese, not only into NSW, but also “the neighbouring colonies”; 
NSWPD, vol. 30, pp. 2223-4 (Tues 20 Dec 1887). See also p. 2896, Tues 28 Feb 1888 when leave 
was sought for the select committee to sit during the recess. 
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Trades Hall in Sydney. But a further Chinese “scare” in mid-February put the 
issue dramatically back at the centre of the political agenda. A telegram from 
the South Australian Government Resident in Darwin, John Langdon Parsons,25 
announced that over a thousand Chinese people had arrived in Darwin in the 
past month alone, and that five hundred were soon to leave Darwin for the 
ruby fields in the Macdonnell Ranges. His alarmist telegram warned that: 
Once landed in the centre of Australia they will spread over all the 
colonies. With regard to Hongkong, I am informed on undoubted 
authority that a powerful syndicate of Hongkong and Canton merchants 
exists to pour Chinese into this port so long as it is open. There seems to 
be a general impression in China that access to the East is about to be 
closed, and they are making for Port Darwin in shoals. I am further 
informed that this Chinese syndicate has guaranteed to the existing 
steamship lines full repayment of all quarantine expenses here, and has 
informed the heads of companies that if they will not carry Chinese they 
will lay on steamers loaded with Chinese, and stand all the racket of 
quarantine expenses.26
Parsons’ telegram had a profound effect in the rest of the Australian colonies.27 
For the Sydney Morning Herald, the prospect of a Chinese syndicate bringing 
labourers to Darwin was “dangerous to the best interests of the country.” The 
paper worried about the impact of further restriction on Britain’s global 
strategic position, given its desire for an alliance with China, but even the 
Sydney Morning Herald had its limits: 
                                                 
25 Parsons had been Minister controlling the Northern Territory in the Bray government, from 
June 1881 to June 1884; as Government Resident in the NT, 1884-90, he was a de facto governor. 
26 SMH 20 February 1888, p. 8, col. 2; the telegram was dated 17 February. 
27 There were widespread allegations at the time that the telegram was fraudulent, but Eric 
Rolls argues that there is no doubt it was genuine, Sojourners, p. 460. 
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If it were a choice between English and Australian interests, there could 
be no doubt as to which adherence should be given, but it is a question 
whether prohibition of the Chinese would serve our interests best. On 
one thing there can be no difference of opinion—there should be no very 
large settlement of the Chinese among us. We should have no such thing 
as Chinese settlements.28
The publication of the Parsons telegram also unleashed a wave of pressure from 
the other Australian governments. Sir Samuel Griffith demanded that South 
Australia prevent any increase in Australia’s Chinese population, and wrote to 
Gillies (Victoria), Fysh (Tasmania) and Parkes (New South Wales) asking them 
to pressure South Australia “to take immediate and effectual steps to restrict 
this introduction and if their existing legal authority is insufficient to take the 
earliest possible opportunity of inviting Parliament to give additional 
powers”.29 And so the protests came; from Sir Henry Parkes a private telegram 
to Playford outlining his apocalyptic, strategic view of Chinese immigration 
into the north: 
For a long time I have had serious apprehensions of the growing designs 
of China in relation to Australia, but it would be imprudent to make 
these apprehensions public… 
I cannot but believe that the Chinese Government is at the back of the 
present movement of Chinese to your Northern Territory, and I have 
long thought that they would seek to plant a Chinese settlement in some 
remote part of this continent with the view of ultimately forming a 
Chinese colony.30
                                                 
28 SMH editorial, 21 February 1888, p. 7, col. 2. 
29 Telegram from Premier Qld Griffith to Premier SA, 24 February 1888, Queensland State 
Archives, PRV7188-1-1; also telegram from Griffith to Gillies, 20 February 1888, same location. 
30 Telegram 22 February 1888 Parkes to Playford, Parkes corresp, Mitchell Library, A932, p. 202. 
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In parliament, Parkes described this turn of events as a “very ugly” 
manifestation of the Chinese question, and one “over which this Government or 
this Parliament has no control whatever, and it rests entirely with the 
Government of South Australia to deal with this new phase of the question”.31 
Parkes had his Governor send a complaint about 
the strong feeling in New South Wales caused by the news that a large 
Chinese settlement existed in Port Darwin, and the indignation caused 
by so large an influx of Chinamen having been permitted by the 
Government of South Australia.32  
From the conservative Fysh in Tasmania, came a warning that this was not 
simply a South Australian question, but “a matter of Australasian concern.” He 
expected “to learn that joint legislature has provided or will be asked to provide 
for its restriction within moderate bounds.”33 In response, Playford made it 
clear that he was counting on elections for a third of the Upper House, due in 
April 1888, to shift the political balance towards restriction.34 The Victorian 
Premier expressed his concerns to CC Kingston, the South Australian Attorney-
General, personally.35 Did this intercolonial response create a crisis for the 
South Australian cabinet? It is impossible to know from this distance, but the 
archives record three separate cabinet meetings over just five days, on 23, 24 
                                                 
31 NSWPD vol. 31, p. 3042 (Thursday 1 March 1888). 
32 The words quoted are Carrington’s, reporting back to Parkes, 21 May 1888, Parkes corresp, 
A977 (date order). 
33 Telegram from Colonial Secretary Tasmania to Chief Sec SA, 21 February 1888, State Records 
SA, letter 1888/234, GRG 24/6, box 397.  
34 Telegram from Premier SA (Playford) to Premier Tasmania, 21 February 1888, State Records 
SA, GRG 24/28, vol. 7 (1888), p. 54. Playford also told Parkes privately that he didn’t believe 
that the Chinese government was behind the arrival of Chinese people in Darwin. See letter 3 
March 1888 Playford to Parkes, Parkes corresp, Mitchell Library, A926, p. 580. 
35 Telegram from Gillies to Griffith, 22 February 1888, Queensland State Archives, PRV7188-1-1. 
Chapter 10: The making of White Australia Page 473 
and 27 February.36 The primary South Australian response was to declare that it 
would impose a £10 poll tax on all Chinese entering Darwin after 1 March, ask 
for parliamentary approval for this imposition, and then telegraph Hong Kong 
and Chinese ports warning of this measure. It also declared all Chinese ports 
infected with smallpox, which meant delaying all ships with Chinese 
passengers for Darwin for an extra twenty-one days at great cost to the 
shipping companies, in an attempt to discourage them landing Chinese people 
at Darwin.37 When Tasmania’s Fysh received Playford’s reply, he reported back 
to Griffith—the other colonies were organising to discipline South Australia. 
Please explain 
It was around 17 March 1888, into this environment of growing paranoia and 
determination to legislate to prohibit all Chinese immigration, that a letter 
arrived from the British Colonial Office which profoundly challenged the 
colonial governments and their anti-Chinese policies. The letter contained a 
protest by the Chinese Minister at London against the treatment of Chinese 
subjects by Australia’s colonial governments. In particular, Lew-ta-Jen objected 
to the £10 poll tax, which was not imposed on the subjects of any other power, 
and complained of the Crown’s failure to veto such discriminatory measures. 
The Chinese government therefore called on Britain to inquire into Australia’s 
anti-Chinese laws “with a view to the elimination of any part of them which 
                                                 
36 Letters 88/266 and 88/284, SA State Records, GRG 24/6.  
37 See Playford’s telegram to Gillies, 29 February 1888, State Records SA, letter 1888/295, GRG 
24/6, box 397. 
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may be found to be at variance with Treaty obligations and international 
usage”.38 As if to indicate its willingness to undertake such elimination, the 
Colonial Office demanded an explanation from each of the colonies. The replies 
produced by each of the colonial governments—from which I have drawn 
throughout this thesis—stand as classic statements of the position of the 
governing elites in the colonies. 
There is no doubt that the “Please explain” from London sharply radicalised the 
colonial governments on the question of Chinese immigration. Some months 
later, South Australian Premier, Tom Playford, would say that this action “led 
to the feeling amongst all the colonies that in this matter they should act in 
concert,” and “rendered it necessary to…give forth no uncertain sound, and to 
show what their desires really were.”39
However, at exactly the same time that the “Please explain” letter arrived in 
Australia, so did news that the United States of America had signed a new 
treaty with China, prohibiting the immigration of Chinese labourers for twenty 
years.40 The combination of the two was to create doubts in the mind of the 
                                                 
38 Letter from Chinese Minister in London, Lew-ta-Jen to Foreign Minister, Lord Salisbury, 
London, dated 12 December 1887, and letter from Sec State Colonies London, HT Holland to 
Colonial governors, dated 23 January 1888, NSWLA V&P 1887-8, vol. 2, p. 221; Qld LA V&P 
1888, vol. 3, p. 190. 
39 SAPD 1888, col. 198. 
40 The treaty was news in Australia within days, and discussed (and dismissed) by the SMH in 
its editorial of 24 April 1888, p. 7, col. 1. The text of the treaty was published in the New York 
Tribune on 28 March, see Qld V&P 1888, vol. 3, pp. 201-4, and in the SMH on 9 May 1888, p. 6, 
cols. 2-4. By 22 March the new treaty was featuring in government considerations, see Letter 
from Gillies to Parkes, 22 March 1888, in NSW State Records, 4/884.1 (Colonial Secretary’s 
special bundles). The treaty was discussed at the time in Sir John Pope Hennessy, “The Chinese 
in Australia”, The Nineteenth Century, 1888 (cMay), pp. 617-9, found in volume, “Nineteenth 
century : Australasia [extracts]”, Mitchell Library. 
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Victorian Premier, who promptly wrote to the other premiers, questioning 
whether their existing agreement to pass prohibitory legislation was necessarily 
the best approach. He thought the British government might persuade the 
Chinese emperor to prohibit emigration to Australia, “possibly in exchange for 
some small concession (such as has been recently sought in Burmah)”. By 
contrast, “legislative measures of sufficient stringency to effect our purpose, 
might engender an international bitterness which, sooner or later, might find 
means to express itself.” Gillies was encouraged that the Chinese had seemed 
willing to sign such a treaty with the United States.41 Griffith thought a treaty 
with China would have little effect in preventing the emigration of Chinese 
people to Australia.42 Playford too was unmoved; while in favour of seeking the 
cooperation of the Chinese government, he wanted local legislation: “if joint 
action by all Colonies cannot be secured then each should act alone at the same 
time[;] we purpose so soon as parliament meets taking action for restricting the 
influx of Chinese into Northern Territory.”43
For his part, Parkes clearly saw an opportunity to discipline the Colonial Office, 
and to contain a powerful argument against new legislation from within the 
ruling class—the argument that anti-Chinese laws threatened Britain’s 
international diplomacy. He allowed Britain a brief opportunity to solve the 
“problem” as defined by the Australian ruling class, through renegotiating its 
treaty with China. Where all the other colonies sent their replies by mail, which 
took six weeks to reach London, Parkes telegraphed his six hundred word 
                                                 
41 Letter from Gillies to Parkes, 22 March 1888, NSW State Records, 4/884.1 (Colonial Secretary 
special bundles); Letter from Gillies to Griffith, 23 March 1888, Qld State Archives, PRV7188-1-1. 
42 Griffith to Gillies, 7 April 1888, QSA, PRV7188-1-1. 
43 Telegram from Playford to Gillies, 3 April 1888, Public Records Office Vic, letter no. P88/1078 
found at 88/1160, in VPRS 1163/P0/141. 
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reply, an exercise that must have cost around £300—three times a labourer’s 
annual wages, or around $90,000 in 2006 values. After warning that “owing to 
recent occurrences severer measures are now demanded throughout all the 
colonies”—not a message London was hoping to hear—he moved to complain 
that since 
we have no voice in the making of Treaties it seems only just that our 
interests should be considered and protected by those who exercise that 
power. We learn by public report that the Government of the United 
States has entered into a Treaty with the Government of China by which 
Chinese immigration into America is no longer permitted. We fail to see 
why Australia may not be similarly protected.44
He then requested “that immediate steps be taken to open such negotiations 
with the Emperor of China as will result in permanent security to the Australian 
colonies from the disturbance of Chinese immigration in any form”, and 
warned: 
The matter is too grave and urgent to admit of long delay. However 
desirable it may be to avoid the irritation and conflict of interests which 
may arise from local legislation of a drastic character, if protection cannot 
be afforded as now sought, the Australian Parliaments must act from the 
force of public opinion in devising measures to defend the colonies from 
consequences which they cannot relax in their efforts to avert.45
                                                 
44 Telegram from Parkes to Secretary State Colonies, 31 March 1888, NSW State Records, 4/884.1 
(Colonial Secretary special bundles); published in Qld LA V&P 1888, vol. 3, pp. 193-4. 
45 Telegram from Parkes to Secretary State Colonies, 31 March 1888, NSW State Records, 4/884.1 
(Colonial Secretary special bundles); published in Qld LA V&P 1888, vol. 3, pp. 193-4. 
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Here was the sting in the tail of Parkes’ moderation. For those conservatives 
who advocated reliance on a change in the treaties between China and Britain—
such as the Sydney Morning Herald and Gillies—Parkes delivered London a 
formal request for negotiations. But he also demanded an immediate response, 
an urgency he backed by spending an enormous sum to telegraph his position, 
and warned London that if it did not fall into line quickly, the Australians 
would take matters into their own hands. In the tumult that followed, the 
failure of London to respond adequately, or to understand the warning they 
had been given, was Parkes’ most effective weapon in dealing with 
conservatives who were subsequently outraged by his actions.46 Five days after 
the despatch of the long telegram, he made a major statement to parliament, in 
which he linked the visit of the Chinese Commissioners, the story about 
organised Chinese migration to Darwin, and the complaint from the Chinese 
Minister in London: 
from my observation of the course of events for some months past, I was 
inclined to think that Chinese settlement in Australia was assuming a 
form entirely new. I connected my observation with the visits of the 
Chinese commissioners some months ago, and… I ventured then to 
express the opinion that it appeared a very likely fact that the Chinese 
Government were privy to what was taking place in the Northern 
Territory, and that very probably it might be the design of a considerable 
number of Chinese to form a settlement in some remote part of the 
Australian territory—that is, remote from the European population—
                                                 
46 See, for instance, the letter of the South Australian Chief Justice, Sir Samuel Way, to the 
President of the NSW Legislative Council, Sir Alfred Stephen, 5 June 1888. Way excoriated 
Parkes’ actions in preventing Chinese from landing at Sydney Harbour, and ramming through 
his new, exclusionary, anti-Chinese bill, but also commented: “the Home Govt laid itself open 
to just and severe rebuke for its discourteous & apathetic negligence in sending no reply to the 
Telegram for over six weeks!” Way correspondence, SLSA, PRG 30/8. 
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where they might become strong enough to form, in the course of time, a 
kind of Chinese colony… 47
For Parkes, therefore, the Chinese complaint was no surprise, rather “a link in 
the chain of events” which confirmed his belief that the Chinese were planning 
their own Australian colonies. 
Parkes further prepared the ground for presumptuous action with an 
inflammatory speech given to the citizens of Wagga Wagga on Saturday 7 April 
1888. He pointed to the dangerous world situation, “the extraordinary 
disposition on the part of the largest Powers in the world to array themselves in 
arms”, and the ability of European powers to put 20 million men in the field. As 
if this were not bad enough, “there is a Power, hitherto chiefly known as a 
barbarous Power, which is so rapidly creating armies and a formidable navy”. 
He meant, of course, “the Empire of China”,48 with its new armies and 
formidable navy, and claimed it had agents within Australian society: 
Those amongst us who have only been accustomed to regard the poor 
Chinaman that perhaps struggles through the streets of Wagga with his 
baskets filled with vegetables or fruit, and who have been accustomed to 
look down upon him, will, after I sit down, regard him, I think in a new 
light, because I shall be able to show that he represents here a great 
Power…which has risen up to be one of the most formidable Powers in 
the world. 
In other words, the Chinese in Australia were a strategic threat; by extension, 
every extra Chinese person added to the Australian population was an agent of 
                                                 
47 NSWPD, vol. 31, p. 3788. 
48 All quotes from this speech are from SMH 9 April 1888, p. 3. 
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the Chinese emperor. Parkes outlined the strategic dimension of population, 
pointing out that whilst the total population—and here he meant, of course, the 
total European population— of all the Australasian colonies was just three and 
a half million, the population of China was some 400 million. “That is a fact  
which I desire to impress upon you, so that it may be carried home by you and 
communicated to your acquaintances.” He compared China’s 400 million with 
the 241 million of the great powers of Europe, and the 50 million Americans, to 
show “how incomparably preponderating is the power of China in mere 
population.” 
But China’s power was no longer purely human and Parkes outlined in detail 
China’s military transformation. “She has now some of the finest armour-plated 
ships floating on the sea”, and he went on to list tonnages, the thickness of their 
armour, the speed of the Chinese warships, and all the specifications of their 
massive guns. He described China’s new national army; and how China had 
begun the manufacture of guns, ships of war and all the materials of war. This 
long and detailed exposition was to make clear, “what that power is which 
must presumably protect Chinamen wandering about the colonies.” Parkes 
went on to refer to the complaint made by the Chinese Minister in London, 
“and the clear conception of national rights that pervades it.” In other words, if 
Chinese people settled in Australia in significant numbers, the colonies would 
soon find themselves reckoning with the great military power protecting them. 
He reminded his listeners that barely decades ago, England had used its 
military power to force China to accept the entry of English citizens, and how 
thinly settled the European population was in Australia; and quoted Napoleon 
to the effect that: “if the Chinese nation once learnt the art of shipbuilding and 
the use of European arms, they would be able to conquer the world.” Hence, 
the question of Chinese immigration was not simply a colonial one, but one “in 
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which the interests of the whole [British] Empire will be concerned.” In all this, 
Parkes disdained any intention of whipping up a pogrom against the Chinese; 
he was at pains to ensure that his listeners knew that the Government was on 
the case, and warned against interfering with it. “I trust,” he concluded, “you 
will be content to leave it in the hands of the Government.” 
The Governor, Lord Carrington, took the extraordinary step of publicly 
supporting the position Parkes had taken at the annual Commemoration of the 
University of Sydney. Here was assembled a considerable section of the 
commercial and professional classes of Sydney, watching their privileged 
children graduate. After a very long speech by the Chancellor, Sir William 
Manning, Lord Carrington rose to congratulate the new graduates, and to 
enthuse about the role they would play in the life and development of their 
young colony. This led him to the “Chinese Question”: 
For the first time in the history of this country, I believe, Australia is now 
compelled by force of circumstances to have a foreign policy, and I 
believe in the main that Australia on the Chinese question has come to a 
unanimous decision. (Cheers.) And it is with great pride and satisfaction 
that I have read the memorandum by our own Premier, and the 
memoranda of those two eminent statesmen who are the elected and 
recognised mouthpieces of public opinion in Victoria and Queensland. 
Nothing is more calculated to effect a final and satisfactory settlement of 
a difficult, and what might be a dangerous, question than the dignity and 
resolution of these utterances.49
Carrington described his role as something far beyond that of a mere colonial 
official; his duty was “to transmit and support the national ideas, the national 
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aims and ambitions, and the undoubted national rights of this glorious 
country”. 
In private, Carrington wrote to Knutsford to warn him of the dangers of 
inactivity. On 19 April, with the “loud cheers” of Sydney University still ringing 
in his ears, he warned that “All sorts and conditions of men” agree that the 
Chinese had to be kept out; that it was not “a cry got up for political purposes” 
but “a deeply founded feeling and belief of the vast majority of the Colonists”, 
and emphasised that he was relaying “what I know to be the view taken by the 
leading men of all sections of the community”.50  
On 23 April, the Sydney Morning Herald published a telegram from London 
which purported to summarise Knutsford’s reply to Parkes’ telegram, that “the 
proposal to exclude Chinese from Australia for a period of 20 years, presents a 
serious international difficulty.”51 The paper was infuriated at this response, 
and dredged up a series of British slights against Australian interests, beginning 
with the New Guinea debacle. As far as it was concerned, the issue was not the 
Anglo-Chinese treaty, but “the question of protecting Australia from the 
threatened Mongolian invasion. We looked to the Home Government for help, 
and it is unsatisfactory to find so palpable an indisposition to give us 
assistance.” The paper could not fathom London’s inability to understand the 
clear warning in Parkes’ message:  
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It may be imagined in official circles at home that we have been seized 
with a sudden attack of Chinese fever, which will subside if it is not 
taken too much notice of. Our Government and the Governments of the 
other colonies must make it their business to undeceive the Home 
authorities on this point.52
The Herald advocated immediate legislation: “Parliamentary action would show 
that the Australian people are in earnest, and might even induce the Imperial 
Government to attempt the solution of “a serious international difficulty.’” In 
public, Parkes presented an unflappable front but, behind the scenes, there was 
anxiety over these press reports. Carrington sent Parkes a series of notes on the 
issue; on 22 April he wrote to Parkes:  
Nothing has reached me from Sec of State. If you have no news from 
your Agent General we may I think take it for granted it is only an [sic] 
newspaper sensation. As Ld Knutsford would hardly give any 
information on such a subject to the Press.53  
Four days before the arrival of the Afghan in Melbourne, an even more anxious 
Carrington wrote to London to warn that press reports that the imperial 
government refused to negotiate “have caused great excitement”, emphasising 
“how very strong the feeling is in New South Wales amongst all sorts and 
conditions of men with regard to the influx of Chinese.” He warned Knutsford 
to be careful of the advice he was receiving: “The only man who does not see 
the depth of public feeling is Lord Normanby”, he wrote, referring to the 
previous Victorian Governor, who had been visiting the colonies for the 
centenary celebrations. 
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There is no fear of violence towards the Chinese who are here now; but 
any attempt by a contractor to land 500 of them in Australia would be 
certainly resisted by force. This is not my individual opinion, but every 
important person in every class assures me of it…54
Carrington then left for Norfolk Island, leaving the Afghan crisis to erupt in his 
absence. 
The Afghan crisis 
The Afghan crisis of April/May 1888 is rightly seen as an iconic moment in the 
history of the White Australia policy—indeed, in the history of Australia—the 
moment when colonial governments used their executive power to stop 
Chinese people landing at Melbourne and Sydney—and, indeed, Adelaide as 
well.55 With this action, they ushered in a new era of racial exclusion. Six weeks 
later, all six Australian governments would meet at Sydney and agree on new 
measures to virtually prohibit Chinese immigration, which were then passed 
into law over the next 18 months in all colonial parliaments except Tasmania. 
The crisis began when the Afghan sailed into Port Phillip Bay on Friday 27 April 
1888, with 268 Chinese people on board—67 for Melbourne, 89 for Sydney and 
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105 for New Zealand. Of the 67 bound for Melbourne, 58 presented 
naturalisation papers to customs officials. Acting under instructions from the 
Chief Secretary, customs refused to recognise any papers that the holders could 
not prove were theirs; effectively barring all of them. While it is certain that 
some were fraudulent, a great injustice was inflicted on most of the Chinese 
people who were indeed attempting to return to their Victorian homes. Under 
Victoria’s 1881 law, the Afghan, being 1400 tons tare, was only entitled to bring 
14 Chinese immigrants without valid papers, and these immigrants were then 
liable for a poll (entry) tax of £10 each. Government officials told the captain 
that he had broken the law, and was liable to a possible fine of £5300. They 
offered to waive any prosecution if he took all the Chinese out of Melbourne, an 
offer he accepted after disembarking 100 Chinese people for New Zealand and 
three for Tasmania. Then, on the afternoon of Thursday 3 April, the Afghan 
sailed for Sydney. 
The Victorian government’s action created something of a crisis for the other 
southern colonies; they either had to match Gillies’ action, or they would be 
undermining it. In the meantime, the Colonial Office had telegraphed Sydney, 
insisting that the Chinese on the Afghan be allowed to land.56 With the ship still 
in Melbourne, Parkes resisted this pressure: “I am disposed to take any step 
whatever to prohibit practically the introduction of Chinese into this country.”57 
But given rising tensions in Europe, Parkes also saw the imperial complications 
that might arise from asserting an independent Australian position on 
excluding the Chinese, and warned of possible imperial interference: 
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It is obvious that as a matter of policy Great Britain has the deepest 
interest in cultivating an alliance with China. Any one who looks upon 
the affairs of the world must see that it is of great importance that Great 
Britain should be in alliance with China as against the barbarous power 
of Russia. Hence the self-imposed duty of the Australias to protect 
themselves in this matter will necessarily bring them, I am afraid, into 
conflict with one of the most important features of imperial policy.58
The window of opportunity that Parkes had so generously given Britain to take 
control of the issue and negotiate with China on behalf of the colonies, was 
rapidly closing. The colonies were taking control of immigration policy. 
By this time, news of the extreme Victorian response to a boatload of Chinese 
people had spread, and a mass anti-Chinese meeting was called at Sydney 
Town Hall for the evening of 3 April. Some five thousand people turned up, 
with 2000 crammed into the hall itself, and the remainder holding a protest 
meeting outside. At the conclusion of the outside meeting, it marched up to 
Parliament House to demand the government follow the Victorian example and 
prevent any of the Chinese from landing. Participants in the official meeting 
followed, led by the Mayor and several MLAs. In the excitement, the protestors 
forced their way inside the gates around Parliament House, and even into the 
building itself. In subsequent debates, this attempt at “intimidating” members 
of parliament, and the role of the Mayor in supposedly leading the marchers, 
induced some fine outrage amongst legislative councillors. Sir Henry Parkes too 
was outraged, and refused to meet a deputation from the meeting, but 
eventually sent out a statement that he would prevent the Chinese landing. Just 
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as interestingly the Sydney Morning Herald—unlike members of the Legislative 
Council—signally failed to express outrage at the behaviour of the marchers.59
It is pretty clear that the Parkes government had already decided to follow the 
Victorian lead and prevent Chinese people from landing in Sydney. The 
morning after the rally, the Tsinan arrived in Sydney with 144 Chinese 
passengers, and was forced into quarantine, with a police guard organised to 
stop them disembarking. The Afghan arrived two days later. Parkes had already 
warned the major shipping lines that Chinese passengers would not be allowed 
to land, and they had replied, accepting that they would return all Chinese to 
Hong Kong, provided that the government paid the passage of all the Chinese 
with valid naturalisation and exemption certificates. To this the government 
agreed; so when the Tsinan and Afghan arrived in Sydney, the Collector of 
Customs dutifully inspected the naturalisation and exemption certificates. Five 
passengers from the Afghan who presented “valid” naturalisation papers were 
allowed off the ship; as were three from the Tsinan, while the papers of two 
others were rejected.60 Naturalisation conferred a limited measure of local 
British citizenship, something Parkes took far more seriously than Duncan 
Gillies in Victoria. Of the 75 passengers on the Afghan who presented exemption 
tickets, 48 were judged genuine; as were 8 of the 21 of those from the Tsinan. 
According to the deal done between Parkes and the shipping companies, this 
would mean the government paying for the return of 56, while the shipping 
companies paid for the others. Chinese passengers for New Zealand and 
Queensland were transferred to other ships heading for those destinations. At 
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the start of the crisis in Sydney, the steamship managers were pleased; they felt 
that: 
the action of the Victorian Government in the matter of Chinese has been 
arbitrary and unjust, but they have no complaints to make against the 
New South Wales Government, which they consider has, under the 
circumstances, met them very fairly in the matter.61  
For its part, the Sydney Morning Herald was hopeful that the Chinese passengers 
on the two ships “may be got rid of without any further trouble”, though it 
recognised that administrative action could only deal with problems in the 
short term, and it worried about what might happen if the Chinese refused to 
accept their fate. On Tuesday 8 May, the Herald optimistically declared that: 
it would seem that the Chinese difficulty is temporarily overcome. The 
action taken by the Australian Governments may have strained the law, 
as we believe it has; but it has done something else—it has disgusted the 
steamship companies with the traffic, and they have resolved to bring no 
more Chinese to these colonies until the question has been definitely 
settled.62
In the event, it was the Chinese passengers who brought the government 
undone. They refused to allow themselves to be transferred to a rough hulk, the 
Hero, which lacked any decent accommodation for them; nor would they agree 
to be held at the Quarantine Station so that the ships could unload at the 
wharves. Several appeals by Sydney’s Chinese leader, Mei Quong Tart, failed to 
convince them. It seems that the Chinese passengers had a rather finer sense of 
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the meaning of personal freedom than the ruling class ideologists or politicians 
of the Australian colonies gave them credit for. After several days in which the 
ships were unable to unload, the government decided to mobilise dozens of 
extra police on the wharves to prevent any Chinese person escaping while 
unloading proceeded. The government’s intransigence angered the two 
captains and led to a case for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court on behalf of all 
those with exemption certificates the government had accepted as valid. The 
dishonest and arbitrary action of the Victorian government, in refusing to 
acknowledge the validity of any of the naturalisation or exemption certificates, 
had protected it from such a proceeding. Moreover, its actions were later 
sanctioned by the Privy Council in London. One of the Afghan passengers, 
Chun Teong Toy, successfully sued the Victorian government for refusing to 
allow him to land, but his victory in the Victorian Supreme Court was 
overturned on appeal to the Privy Council, which found that aliens had no right 
to admission into a British colony.63
The government’s inability to get the Afghan and Tsinan unloaded quickly, and 
the harbour cleared of Chinese passengers, and the consequent legal action, 
created a crisis in New South Wales. While this debacle was taking place, two 
more ships arrived with Chinese passengers. The Menmuir with 55 Chinese 
passengers, 27 booked for Sydney, 15 with exemption certificates, had also been 
turned away from Melbourne without any Chinese being allowed to land, 
while the Guthrie arrived with 163 Chinese passengers. The stakes were further 
raised by the arrival of another telegram from Lord Knutsford, transmitting a 
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new complaint from the Chinese Minister in London, and demanding that New 
South Wales telegraph back the numbers refused permission to land, and the 
regulations and laws by which landing was refused.64
This was, in a sense, the moment Parkes had foreseen, and dreaded. If the 
Chinese were to be excluded, the British attempt to discipline Australia had to 
be rebuffed, and the intervention of the courts had to be prevented. He 
immediately warned London that: 
This Government has decided at all hazards to prevent Chinese landing 
in this colony, except such as hold certificates of naturalisation, proved 
after strict examination not to be fraudulent, as many are. Three ships 
now in port; others expected. The Government has the almost 
unanimous support of Parliament and people in this urgent matter.65
He then went into Parliament and gave notice of a draconian new Chinese 
immigration bill. Part of this bill was the effective prohibition Parkes had been 
promising for six months. While the tonnage restriction would be unchanged, 
with one Chinese person admitted for every 100 tons of a ship’s tare—this was 
raised to 300 tons by amendment—the colony would no longer recognise the 
exemption certificates it had issued, and which had been the focus of significant 
fraud. The poll tax would be raised to £100, a year’s salary for an average 
worker, an onerous £20 a year fee imposed for a licence to live in the colony, 
and new Chinese residents would be required to carry passports, register with 
the authorities, and have severe limits imposed on where they could live—
Sydney, Newcastle, and five other places to be gazetted, a reflection of the 
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seven cities in which British people could live in China. The penalty for 
bringing more Chinese to a port than the number allowed would be a 
staggering £500. Parkes was telling both London and Peking that forcing the 
colonies to respect the provisions of the treaty would not necessarily improve 
life for Chinese people in the colonies. Finally, in anticipation of a possible 
defeat in the Supreme Court, operation of the bill was backdated to 1 May and 
the government indemnified for all actions possibly deemed illegal taken to 
limit Chinese immigration since then. In the Legislative Assembly on 
Wednesday 16 May 1888, the bill was pushed through all stages in one night, 
the assembly sitting till 7am the next day. 
Parkes’ speech introducing the bill became one of the most controversial ever 
delivered in an Australian parliament. They had, he said, to deal with a crisis 
not of their own making: 
Can this thing be allowed to go on, this gangrene in the body politic, this 
seed of disturbance in the midst of society? No friend of the social fabric 
in this country can for a moment say that this thing can be permitted to 
go on without danger to the peace, to the law, to the good order and 
stability of society itself.66
To those who attacked him for breaking the law, he was defiant: 
You tell me about obedience to the law; you tell me that because I occupy 
the great place which I am permitted to occupy in this country, that I am 
to set an example of obedience to the law. I say, in reply, that there is one 
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law which overrides all others, and that is the law of preserving the 
peace and welfare of civil society. Would you talk about a technical 
observance of the law if a plague was stalking in our midst—if a 
pestilence was sweeping off our population—if a famine was reducing 
the members of our households to skeletons?67
But of course nothing remotely so serious was happening. Parkes then raised 
the argument that Chinese labour competed unfairly with that of British people. 
This was a new rhetorical tactic for him; for decades he had championed 
assisted immigration which had precisely the effect of introducing competition 
with the labour of colonists, and since the late 1870s, he had fought a movement 
to get rid of assisted immigration. But now that the scheme had ended, this was 
a safe argument, and one that reflected the broader ruling class desire to 
colonise the continent with primarily British workers: 
Can it be surprising to any of us that the mothers of those families, 
during a period of depression such as that which has passed over the 
country of late, look with something like aversion—with even stronger 
antipathy—towards the Chinaman, who is a direct competitor with her 
husband—the father of her children—and with the future of her 
household?68
He drew on the history of the crisis, starting with the Chinese minister’s note to 
the British foreign minister: “he clearly was under the impression that he had 
only to make these representations to have the matters of which he complained 
put right.” It was, he said, “because I believe that China is fast becoming a great 
power…that I do not wish to see the Chinese element increasing in our 
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midst.”69 He retold the story of his long telegram to London, and London’s 
desultory response. It was, he declared, tantamount to negligence. The 
Australian colonies were 
treated as if the wisest course was to let us alone and the excitement 
would die out, and there would be no need for anything to be done at all. 
I venture to say that a few other masterful displays of indifference like 
this on the part of the Secretary of State would do more than much more 
serious occurrences to sap the loyalty of these great countries. We can 
bear remonstrance, we can meet argument, we can make good our case 
against the world; but we cannot patiently stand to be treated with the 
frozen indifference of persons who consider some petty quarrel in a 
petty state of more importance than the gigantic interests of these 
magnificent colonies.70
The arrival of the Afghan, and the fuel this gave to “inflammatory influences” 
forced them to act, and they had no intention now of turning back from 
exclusion: 
Neither for her Majesty’s ships of war, nor for her Majesty’s 
representative on the spot, nor for the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
do we intend to turn aside from our purpose, which is to terminate the 
landing of Chinese on these shores for ever, except under the restrictions 
imposed by the bill, which will amount, and which are intended to 
amount, to practical prohibition.71
Neither, he declared, would the law or the courts prevent them from keeping 
out the Chinese: 
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I cast to the winds your permits of exemption; I care nothing about your 
cobweb of technical law; I am obeying a law far superior to any law 
which issued these permits, namely, the law of the preservation of 
society in New South Wales—so far as I have means, against every 
power that can be brought against me, I will carry out my pledge given 
on that night in writing to the free people of this country, and not allow 
these men to land.72
Right across Australia, conservatives were apoplectic at Parkes’ disloyalty, and 
his “revolutionary” dismissal of the authority of the law. In fact Parkes was 
absolutely loyal to the British empire. When he had received a deputation from 
the Town Hall meeting of 3 May, he had challenged those in the deputation, 
such as the protectionist agitator, John Norton, who thought that Australia 
should separate from Britain: 
if we separated from Great Britain to-morrow, we should be as helpless 
as children in regard to the Chinese… Her inexhaustible numbers, and 
the great advances she was making in the civilised arts, would make her 
a most formidable power, and she could, if she liked, make a Chinese 
settlement in Australia in spite of the colonies. It was a fortunate thing 
for ourselves, in this difficult question, that we were not separated from 
the great British Empire. It was preposterous to talk this way when there 
were only 3,000,000 people scattered over the continent, and the great 
Chinese Empire consisted of upwards of 400,000,000.73
To get their way on Chinese immigration, the colonial governments needed to 
impose their position on the British, and at the same time temper the growing 
tide of republicanism which had been boosted by discontent over the Chinese 
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and other questions. Parkes did it skifully. His one “disloyal” speech made him 
an icon of Australian nationalism, at the same time as he worked assiduously to 
maintain the imperial connection—a connection that was strengthened by the 
fear of China he promoted. 
Given the mythology that surrounds the attitude of the Sydney Morning Herald 
towards Chinese immigration, it is interesting to note its response to these 
developments. “As regards its proposals for the amendment of the Chinese 
Restriction Act, we are with the Government in the main,” the paper declared, 
though it did not like the proposals oppressive of Chinese people already living 
in Australia, and those who might come. While it attacked Parkes’ “wild and 
foolish words”, it was at pains to explain them away: “The Premier was carried 
away by his subject, and used words that his calmer judgment will not 
approve.”74 For his part, Lord Carrington wired London immediately asking 
permission to approve the proposed legislation.75 Despite Australian fears, the 
Foreign Office agreed immediately to Carrington’s request, but he was not 
informed for a week.76
The reaction of the New South Wales Legislative Council to the crisis, Parkes’ 
speech, and the proposed legislation, was also highly discriminating. The 
Council refused to suspend standing orders and push the legislation through in 
a single day; it ended up taking three weeks to debate and amend the 
legislation, and several more weeks would pass before the two houses settled 
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their differences over the bill. Member after member of the Legislative Council 
attacked the Mayor for his “leading” role in the protest of 3 May; as they did 
also the more populist elements of Parkes’ speech. A majority condemned the 
sections of the bill that imposed the licence fee on Chinese people, repudiated 
exemption certificates, limited where they lived, forced them to carry passports, 
and prevented the recent arrivals from suing the government for refusing to 
allow them to land. But on the broad principle of the bill—measures to 
effectively prohibit Chinese immigration—they were almost all with Parkes, 
and supported the clauses which would indemnify members of the government 
and the public service from loss in the case of legal action by Chinese 
passengers. Unlike South Australia, where the new anti-Chinese bill only 
narrowly passed the elected Assembly on its second reading, the unelected 
New South Wales Legislative Council passed it without division. 
The Legislative Council of 1888 was somewhat different in composition to that 
of 1881. Pastoralists were less significant in its composition, while lawyers, 
businesspeople, politicians and even journalists had been appointed to its 
ranks. Its debate was, I believe, more reflective of the politics of the urban-based 
ruling class that had long ago emerged. There was less of the earlier, wild anti-
working-class rhetoric; indeed, one of the distinctive features of the 1888 debate 
was a justification of the bill as one protecting the working class majority from 
competition with Chinese labour. The strategic, anti-slavery and homogeneity 
agendas also featured in the discussion. An early speaker was Andrew Garran, 
who had been editor of the Sydney Morning Herald for twelve years, 1873-85, 
elevated to the Legislative Council in 1887, and described by JA Froude in 1886 
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as “right-minded even to the extent of rigidity”.77 His main reason for 
supporting the bill was: 
the social argument, that is the inexpediency of having any large pariah 
class in the community—a class which never can, and never will, 
amalgamate with the rest of the community. It is an undesirable thing in 
a free country, with manhood suffrage, to have a large number of 
persons who cannot, or should not, be allowed to exercise the suffrage; 
who are, in fact, a sort of slave class. The Americans have gone before us 
in this respect. They are now suffering from the difficulties of having 
7,000,000 negroes, nominally citizens, and yet socially outcasts. It is not 
expedient that we, beginning a new country in a new way, should 
expose ourselves to that evil.78
Garran was not convinced that there was any reason to panic; if the ability of 
Chinese people to sail to Australia was exploited to its maximum, the current 
shipping tonnage coming to Australia would allow only 735 new Chinese 
annually, hardly a major threat. While he would have preferred a more 
moderate measure, he was prepared to vote for more stringent restriction. His 
greatest concern was for Australian unity.79  
The longest-serving member of the Council, Sir William Manning, agreed with 
the need for legislation and the dangers of allowing people to migrate who 
could not amalgamate. For him, racism was an inevitable part of human nature: 
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we all know from experience, coming, alas, too near home, the 
antagonism that exists between races. You cannot get races that are 
totally different from each other, to amalgamate. There will be a strong 
feeling against an alien race, an antagonism which it is impossible to 
suppress.80
Edmund Barton, later to become Australia’s first Prime Minister, argued that 
the Chinese must be kept out to preserve racial homogeneity, but saw the real 
danger as coming, not from ships arriving in Sydney but from the “empty 
north”, and the possibility that Chinese people entering through Darwin would 
then move overland: 
We have on the northern coast of Australia large tracts of territory which 
present exceptional inducements to colonisation by Chinese; we have 
very little means of restricting their advance across the border; and when 
once the idea of colonisation is taken in hand—if it is seriously 
encouraged by the Government of the Chinese empire—there is no 
knowing to what extent the irruption of Chinese across the border might 
prevail unless it was checked.81
RE O’Connor, later to be appointed to Australia’s first High Court, raised a 
common, and rising concern, that Chinese emigrants, having been excluded 
from the US, would now conclude that “the only outlet remaining for them is to 
these colonies.” This danger was greatest through the Northern Territory: 
It must be evident that in a part of the country so remote as the Northern 
Territory from the centres of government an influx of that kind means 
the stamping of that district as a Chinese settlement. Well, if it is possible 
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for China to get her foot, as it were, into the northern part of our territory 
in the insidious way in which this immigration has been accomplished, 
will any one say that there is not a serious danger in reference to the 
thousands of miles of sparsely populated borders separating the 
colonies? It will also be remembered that China herself has begun to 
regard these colonies in quite a new light.82
Cox was the only MLC to defend the Chinese; arguing that in his thirty years 
living on a goldfield, he had only seen Chinese people do a vast amount of 
good.83 He was so isolated his comments went unanswered. 
The final bill was passed on Thursday 5 July 1888, and signed into law by the 
Governor the following Wednesday. New South Wales had effectively shut the 
door to Chinese immigration, and indemnified the government for its arbitrary 
actions during the Afghan crisis. 
The significance of the anti-Chinese movements, 1886-1888 
In the years since, the Afghan crisis has been portrayed as having been driven by 
a popular clamour against Chinese immigration, by pressure from the various 
anti-Chinese movements and in particular by trade union threats of violence 
made to the Victorian government during a deputation on 28 April 1888, and 
the wild protest action in Sydney on 3 May 1888 which invaded parliament.84 
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There can be little doubt that the broad anti-Chinese campaign of 
demonstrations, petitions and meetings reflected a widespread, racist hostility 
to Chinese immigration, and it is clear that these actions also influenced some 
legislators—if in no other sense than they illustrated the extent of public feeling 
with which parliamentarians and governments must ultimately reckon. 
Moreover, it is important to recognise that the ability of politicians, 
propagandists and activists to win the bulk of the population to some kind of 
racist worldview was central in facilitating the development of a racial, 
exclusionary policy. The loyalty of the mass of the population to “the empire”, 
“the white race”, and/or the myth of “British freedom”, was fundamental to 
ruling class strategies of colonisation and social control. Thus the anti-Chinese 
movements served to hegemonise a series of imperial strategies in the minds of 
ordinary people. But the argument that the anti-Chinese movements set the 
agenda regarding legislation or government policy in any more immediate or 
significant sense does not stand up to scrutiny. 
As already demonstrated, the four major colonial governments had long 
resolved to introduce legislation to virtually prohibit Chinese immigration, and 
this resolve was a product of their own concerns, and not public agitation. The 
Chinese Commissioners’ visit, concern about British “appeasement” of China, 
and the various “scares” over the summer of 1887-8, created profound ruling 
class concern over Chinese immigration. From the liberal to the conservative, 
from the populist to the intellectual—the newspaper and magazine press of 
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Australia was overwhelmingly hostile to Chinese immigration, and supportive 
of further restriction, if not complete exclusion. 
When we examine the individual movements against Chinese immigration, we 
find that they had considerable public support, but little direct impact on 
policy. Queensland’s mass movement came first; from September 1886 to 
August 1887, there was a rolling series of mass public meetings, demonstrations 
and petitions against Chinese immigration, starting in Townsville, moving from 
North Queensland southwards, and culminating in an anti-Chinese conference 
in Brisbane in August 1887. The central activist in this movement, John Potts, 
claimed to have visited 29 centres of population and held upwards of 80 anti-
Chinese meetings from September 1886 to October 1887, and he later visited 
Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, as well as other Queensland towns. The 
Intercolonial Trades Union Congress, held in Brisbane in March 1888, also 
focused heavily on the “Chinese question” and featured several hair-raising 
denunciations of the Chinese. Perhaps emboldened by the broader anti-Chinese 
campaign, whites in the north Queensland towns of Croydon (1886 and 1888), 
Etheridge (1888) and Normanton (1888) launched large-scale violent attacks on 
Chinese and Malay people.85 The hysteria created over this period by the 
McIlwraith Conservatives’ election campaign, the newspapers and the anti-
Chinese movement led directly to the anti-Chinese riot in Brisbane on the 
evening of 5 May 1888 (briefly discussed in chapter 8). 
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If we are seeking proof of widespread racism in Australian society, the 
Queensland movement provides it. And certainly, the anti-Chinese issue was 
used to win votes—primarily for the McIlwraith Conservatives at the 1888 
election (as discussed in chapter 8). But there is no evidence that this movement 
shaped government policy. Both the rival parties in Queensland were hostile to 
Chinese immigration and had been for over a decade, and both were willing to 
cooperate with the other colonies to intensify restriction. When it came to 
appointing Queensland’s representative to the Intercolonial Conference in 
Sydney in June 1888, the Liberal Premier was happy to appoint the 
Conservative John Murtagh Macrossan as Queensland’s representative. 
Griffith’s party had been defeated at the elections of May-June 1888, and the 
resumption of the Queensland parliament on 12 June, meant that until a few 
days before, it appeared that Queensland would be unrepresented.86 At the last 
minute, and in consultation with McIlwraith, Griffith appointed Macrossan, 
telling McIlwraith, “Mr Macrossan’s views have always been in the main the 
same as my own on this subject; & I infer…that you would be satisfied with the 
appointment of him alone as the representative of Queensland.”87
If the anti-Chinese movement did not shape Queensland government policy 
before the Intercolonial conference, neither did it mobilise when the McIlwraith 
government’s Bill for the further restriction of Chinese Immigration was 
reserved by the Administrator (Acting Governor), Sir Arthur Palmer, in 
November 1888, to the annoyance of the government. It would be another year 
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before a bill acceptable to London was passed and approved, during which 
time there was no response from the anti-Chinese movement. 
The anti-Chinese movement in Victoria was the next most substantial in this 
period, but according to Andrew Markus, from mid-1887 to mid-1888, it took all 
the movement’s resources and energy to run a series of large and successful 
public meetings on the issue, in Melbourne’s suburbs and various regional 
centres.88 When the Afghan arrived in Melbourne, the Trades Hall Council 
organised a deputation to the Premier, warning that it was “quite possible that 
violent measures would be taken to prevent their landing.”89 Their ultimatum 
was condemned by Gillies and ineffectual anyway; Customs officers had 
already moved to prevent any Chinese people landing, and Gillies rejected the 
other demands of the delegation. To that point, the anti-Chinese movement had 
organised no mass protest action; its plan had been to hold a mass rally at 
Melbourne Town Hall as the culmination of all its local meetings, but by the 
time this final rally was held, all the movement could do was celebrate a victory 
it had had little part in shaping.90 RJ Lewis has argued that the Victorian 
government was resolved to act independently of representations made to it by 
the anti-Chinese movement and the trade unions, and that the legislative action 
the government did take bore little resemblance to the demands of the 
movement.91
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In Sydney, the anti-Chinese movement barely existed as an independent entity 
in 1887-88. Nor was Chinese immigration the dominant political issue. The 
conflict over free trade and protection was the issue that divided the Parkes 
government and the official opposition, led by George Dibbs, in an increasingly 
bitter conflict. Outside parliament mobilisation on the fiscal issue was far more 
sustained and extensive than mobilisation against Chinese immigration, with 
the singular exception of the mass anti-Chinese demonstration of 2 June 1888. 
There were constant public meetings and polemics on the fiscal issue, and a 
series of by-elections in 1887-88 provided both sides with opportunities to 
mobilise their supporters and continue the debate, to the point that it drowned 
out many other issues. On Monday 14 May 1888, for instance, both sides were 
campaigning for the Central Cumberland by-election, with parliamentary 
leaders on both sides supporting their candidates at separate meetings at which 
opponents were also present. On the same evening, the Premier and his 
Minister for Mines spoke at an outdoor meeting of 2000 people for the Balmain 
Free Trade Association, and faced some disruption.92 Just this one day’s 
agitation probably involved as many people (at the three events) as the anti-
Chinese meeting at the Town Hall twelve days earlier. 
One reason the official Sydney anti-Chinese committee was of little 
consequence is that it was a creature of the protectionist movement. At one of 
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its few public meetings, in October 1887, all the speakers were prominent 
protectionist agitators such as William Richardson, John Norton, RC Luscombe 
and Ninian Melville MLA. When Luscombe declared that “freetraders could 
not conscientiously belong to the league”, there was dissension in the audience 
and many people walked out.93 A subsequent organising meeting was small, 
and the chairperson lamented that while “It was not difficult to get patrons”, 
“what the league wanted was a hard-working committee.”94 The gap between 
the so-called anti-Chinese League and the trade union movement can be seen in 
arrangements for the Town Hall meeting in early May 1888. It was called for the 
same evening as an important meeting of the Trades and Labour Council to 
discuss proposed arbitration legislation to be moved by JH Carruthers MLA. 
On the night, the TLC quickly ended its meeting so that everyone could go to 
the anti-Chinese meeting, but their leaders were unable to reach the platform. 
John Norton, the Vice-President of the Anti-Chinese League had to apologise, 
and reassure the unions that the problem had been the crush inside the hall, 
and that “seats were duly reserved for the Trades and Labour Council, the 
Trades Hall Council, the Eight-hour Demonstration Committee, and the 
Building Trades Council”.95  
Nevertheless, the Sydney anti-Chinese movement did hold three major protest 
events: the Town Hall public meeting and march to Parliament House on 3 
May, already discussed, a mass protest against Chinese immigration on 2 June, 
and another anti-Chinese rally four weeks later. The protest on 2 June was the 
largest of these. The march from Circular Quay involved some thousands of 
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people and an estimated fifty thousand assembled in the Domain for speeches. 
However, the very advertising for the protest suggests its limited role and 
significance; people were asked to come along and “support Sir Henry Parkes’ 
restriction bill now before Parliament”.96 In essence, the militantly free trade 
Parkes had the initiative; the protectionist-dominated anti-Chinese League was 
reduced to galvanising popular support for him. They had spectacular success 
on 2 June, but in the days afterwards, there was little apparent effect. Indeed, 
the Sydney Morning Herald ignored the protest in its editorial (as distinct from its 
news) columns, despite its extraordinary and historic size, except to use the 
peaceful nature of the protest to point out how exaggerated the Premier’s 
warnings of imminent social disorder had been.97 Andrew Markus sees the anti-
Chinese movement entering a new phase after the success of its mass rally on 2 
June; “At a meeting on 7 June the league decided to secure a trade union base 
and each union was invited to send one delegate to sit permanently on the 
executive committee.”98 Markus sees this move as an attempt to get the unions 
to pay for the extravagance of the anti-Chinese committee; but it also illustrates 
the distance between the official organisers of the movement, and the trade 
unions. The final mass rally of 30 June was also massive in size, but unlike the 
movement in 1878, the anti-Chinese League failed to raise enough money to 
pay its expenses, and was soon reduced to squabbling.99
Lastly, during the most significant struggle to impose a white Australia policy, 
the months it took the South Australian parliament to debate and pass its bill, 
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there was almost no anti-Chinese agitation of any substance in Adelaide, or 
anywhere else, focused on this bill. 
The long tradition of seeing the anti-Chinese movements of working class 
people as responsible for the passage of exclusionary legislation has tended to 
undermine sensible discussion of them. Apart from hiding the agendas of the 
rich and powerful, this inherently implausible argument has tended to 
exaggerate the strength and significance of these movements, and the 
viciousness and hegemony of working class racism. For those pioneering 
historians who had to struggle even to put racism on the agenda as a central 
feature of Australian society, such an emphasis is understandable.100 However, 
a credible history must deal with the contradictory quality of politics. 
There is mounting evidence that there were varied attitudes towards Chinese 
people amongst working class Australians. There is extensive evidence of the 
pain suffered by Chinese people as a result of both Government discrimination 
and inhumanity and socially-sanctioned racism.101 At the same time, the growth 
of Chinese community history is showing that, alongside occasional mass 
involvement in anti-Chinese petitions, meetings and demonstrations, there was 
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a significant degree of tolerance, and some measure of friendship, in the towns 
and suburbs.102 Introducing a special issue of the Journal of Australian Colonial 
History, Alan Mayne criticised the tendency amongst historians to “emphasis[e] 
unrelenting European intolerance and aggression towards Chinese settlers,” 
arguing that in the process they “have tended to overlook Chinese agency and 
the permeability of racial boundaries.” In his own study of the Lower Turon 
goldfields, he found that, “Most Chinese residents in the Lower Turon were 
part and parcel of the broader goldfields community that was taking root,” and 
that whatever racist comments were made, “by and large frictions [between 
Chinese and European settlers] were not based upon race hatred but upon 
specific differences of opinion between neighbours, miners, buyers and 
sellers.”103 The degree of acceptance of Chinese people can be seen, negatively, 
in the frequency with which anti-Chinese agitators attacked working class 
people (and especially working class women) for patronising Chinese hawkers, 
vegetable growers and furniture makers, suggesting that their violent rhetoric 
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was as much aimed at disciplining the working class as influencing 
governments.104
Most anti-Chinese organisations were extremely short-lived. They would 
typically be formed at a time of hysteria in the newspapers, organise a few 
public meetings and mass demonstrations, and soon find themselves with only 
a tiny cadre of activists. In Townsville, for example, an Anti-Chinese League 
was formed in mid-September 1886, and called a very large public meeting in 
the town hall on 22 September, followed by a mass outdoor rally on 30 October. 
However a follow-up meeting on 21 December had been small. The committee 
had resigned, but been asked to continue; while on 28 December, even 
committee members had failed to attend. There was no money to pay bills, and 
a discrepancy between the amount collected and memberships sold. The 
viciously anti-Chinese North Queensland Telegraph, which promoted the 
movement, blamed the workers of Townsville: 
the hatred of the Chinese does not seem to be so strong as people 
imagine... the working man will always “blow” about anything which he 
fancies will tend to injure him, but when it affects his pocket the wrong 
way he isn't there...so long as he can get his vegetables from John 
cheaper than anywhere else he will patronise him, howling him down all 
the time.105
This story was repeated in many places. John Potts’ account of his anti-Chinese 
crusade is a story of mass meetings and forming new committees, but very little 
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money to sustain the agitation; “People came to the meetings, heartily 
applauded our efforts, and then returned to their homes, without aiding us to 
pay for halls and other expenses.”106 In Cairns, he found the mayor hostile, in 
Cooktown he found support for Chinese people, and in Barcaldine he was 
physically attacked by the wife of a Chinese man. 
The question of whether or not the working class was more accepting of 
Chinese people than has previously been allowed, is also raised by a fascinating 
incident during the middle of the Afghan crisis in Sydney. Two Chinese 
passengers escaped from the Menmuir, and the seriously embarrassed police 
were obliged to report to Premier Parkes. Sergeants McNamara and Maguire 
explained, at length, the difficulties in patrolling the ship, given the multi-ethnic 
crew, and the presence of two coaling vessels next to the Menmuir for much of 
the week. In this incident, workers were portrayed as potential conspirators 
with, not agitators against, Chinese migrants. The police officers reported that: 
the coal lumpers having had the run of the ship from one hatch to the 
other, the hatches being in close proximity to where the Chinese were 
quartered, any Chinaman blacking his face could, with little trouble, in 
the night time have stepped from the ship into one of the Colliers 
without the Police being able to detect the difference between them and 
one of the Coal lumpers; but, even in that respect, the best lookout 
possible was kept under the circumstances, and as it is well known that 
many of the Coal lumpers spend much of their spare time playing fan-
tan with the Chinese they might likely being in sympathy with them, 
have assisted in the escape of the missing men.107
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These are truly remarkable words, given the dominant view of historians, that 
the working class were virtually unanimous in their hostility to Chinese 
immigrants, and they are words that we have every right to expect that most 
historians of the crisis have read, and yet never discussed.108 The fact that the 
police could argue that two Chinese were able to escape because coal lumpers—
amongst the most unionised of the working class—were “likely being in 
sympathy with them”, suggests a very different texture to race relations than 
the one we have been led to believe. This impression is reinforced by Andrew 
Markus, who notes that in Sydney, after some initial fear, Chinese people came 
to feel sufficiently confident in their safety that for the third major anti-Chinese 
rally, on 30 June 1888, Chinese shops remained open and Chinese laundrymen 
and furniture makers went unmolested as they passed the protest.109 This was 
quite unlike the violence Chinese people faced in North Queensland mining 
settlements, and in Brisbane’s Chinatown. Further research on the various 
racial-exclusionist movements before 1901 could prove valuable. 
The colonies decide: The Intercolonial Conference of 1888 
Having created the Afghan crisis, the Victorian and NSW governments were 
then faced with the challenge of consolidating and extending their nascent 
victory in the struggle against Chinese immigration. They had previously 
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discussed the possibility of an intercolonial conference to settle the issue; now, 
on 9 May 1888, the Premier of South Australia made a formal proposal for a 
conference.110 In this he was encouraged by his governor, Sir William Robinson, 
who saw a conference as a means of restraining the wild spirits in NSW and 
Victoria.111 Over the next month there would be angst and acrimony as the 
governments attempted to overcome practical and political obstacles to an 
immediate conference—Queensland’s parliament was due to convene after the 
elections on 12 June, which made any Queensland representation seem 
improbable until Griffith agreed to appoint Macrossan as Queensland’s sole 
delegate; no New South Wales minister could travel because their parliament 
was sitting; and Sir Henry Parkes refused to answer telegrams for several days 
as he waited to see if his own legislation could be quickly forced through the 
Legislative Council. In the end, the conference was scheduled for 12 June 1888 
in Sydney. All Australian colonies were represented, and so would New 
Zealand have been had its representative not missed his boat. 
There were four major issues debated and resolved at the conference—whether 
or not they would refrain from passing their own legislation while Britain 
renegotiated the terms of its treaty with China; and when that was resolved in 
favour of both treaty negotiations and local legislation; whether or not severe 
restrictions would apply to all foreigners, all Asian people or just Chinese; 
whether or not British subjects would be included in the restrictions; and 
whether or not the new legislation would include a poll (or entry) tax. 
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The argument that the colonies should seek renegotiation of the treaties 
between China and Britain had been part of the debate on Chinese immigration 
since the late 1870s. British concern over Australian anti-Chinese laws had been 
partly driven by concern that they would undermine the terms of Britain’s 
treaties with China, which gave British citizens the right to live and trade in 
parts of China. The belief that China had an alliance with Britain against 
Russian expansion gave a compelling strategic logic to arguments that Chinese 
immigration restriction should be negotiated rather than imposed. The treaty 
idea was given a major boost in April 1888, when it was announced that China 
and the US had agreed that Chinese labourers would not enter the United 
States for twenty years. From Victoria’s Chief Secretary, Alfred Deakin, came a 
hint that there was another reason to seek a treaty—it would close the Northern 
Territory to the Chinese without having to convince a majority in the South 
Australian Legislative Council.112  
As part of his effort to contain colonial reactions to Chinese immigration, Sir 
William Robinson asked the Colonial Office to outline various ways it thought 
Chinese immigration might be restricted, so that they could be discussed at the 
Intercolonial Conference. As was so often the case, the British reply galvanised 
colonial opposition. After accusing New South Wales of creating “obstacles to 
present negotiations with China”, Lord Knutsford pointed out that the 
“Chinese Government especially objects to legislation for placing Chinese 
emigrants on different footing to subjects of any other power”. His suggestion, 
therefore, was that the colonies “consider whether laws and regulations equally 
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restricting immigration into Colonies of all foreign labourers”.113 Far from 
providing an alternative agenda for the Intercolonial Conference, Knutsford’s 
telegram was condemned. The Queensland Cabinet “unanimously 
disapprove[d] of his suggestion to place all foreign labourers on the same 
footing with power to relax the regulations in certain cases.”114 Knutsford 
appears to have thought that the issue was labour market competition. But the 
colonial ruling classes wanted some non-British European immigrants, and 
some of them wanted no impediments to the use of indentured labour. These 
attitudes made his suggestion impossible. Both the colonial governments and 
the Sydney Morning Herald saw the problem of endless delay at a time of 
“danger”.115 The appeal of waiting for a treaty to be negotiated would also have 
been undermined by comments made by Knutsford in a personal letter to 
Deakin, which would almost certainly have arrived before the conference: 
In Australia you have not illtreated the Chinese laborers, as way too 
often was the case in the United States; & as the Chinese Commissioners 
who visited you were satisfied with what they saw in Australia as to the 
general treatment of their fellow subjects, there is not the same 
inducement for the Chinese Govt to stop the emigration.116
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The colonial ministers wanted a renegotiated treaty, but only to supplement 
their own severely restrictive legislation and not as a substitute for it. After the 
Intercolonial Conference, there were desultory efforts to work out a basis for 
possible negotiation, but the proposals from London were completely 
unacceptable to the colonies, and the treaty idea eventually died.117
One of the major issues debated at the conference was the status of Chinese 
people who were British citizens, as a result, for instance, of being born in Hong 
Kong or Singapore. South Australian Premier, Tom Playford, told his 
parliament that he argued for the effective exclusion of all Chinese people 
irrespective of their citizenship: 
both because of the difficulty of distinguishing individuals, and because 
the objection is to the race. A Chinaman was not the less a Chinaman 
because he was born under the British flag in Hongkong or Singapore. If 
we allowed British-born Chinese to come in we should be flooded by 
immigrants holding some kind of nationalisation papers.118
Resistance to this position came from Sir Henry Parkes, who “looked on British 
citizenship as something sacred.” But Victorian Premier, Duncan Gillies, 
pointed out that for all of them, the problem with the Chinese was that—
supposedly—they could not be assimilated, “so as to form a homogenous 
whole by-and bye; in fact, he had objected to Chinamen on the score of race.” 
                                                 
117 See proposals in letter from Knutsford to Colonial Governors, 27 July 1888, Queensland State 
Archives, PRV7188-1-1; the outlines of possible treaty provisions as received from China in 
letter from Knutsford to Colonial Governors, 14 September 1888, QSA, PRV7188-1-1; 
Memorandum from Chief Sec Qld (McIlwraith) to Administrator of Queensland, Sir Arthur 
Palmer, 30 October 1888, QSA, PRV8231-1-3. This memorandum was applauded by the other 
colonial governments. 
118 SAPD 1888, col. 202. 
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There was also some debate about whether or not they wanted to exclude “all 
Asiatics”. In a draft despatch written for the conference, Deakin had used this 
phrase, and the conference had struck it out and referred only and specifically 
to Chinese. McIlwraith, too, had objected to all Asiatics being excluded; both 
Queensland and South Australia still wanted to recruit Indian labour for 
tropical agriculture.119
The model legislation agreed to by the conference was somewhat different from 
that which would soon pass in New South Wales. It limited the number of 
Chinese passengers allowed on any boat calling at an Australian port to just one 
per 500 tons of the ship’s tare, and it included passengers not landing at that 
port. The penalty for each Chinese passenger over the limit was to be £500—a 
colossal sum of money. The poll tax, an issue that had irritated the Chinese 
Commissioners, was to be abolished, and Chinese people prevented from 
moving from colony to colony without permission. While the colonial ministers 
came to the conference with somewhat different approaches, they mostly came 
with a common agenda: to prohibit, as far as possible, Chinese immigration to 
all the colonies. Once in private discussion, there was said to be a great deal of 
unanimity, and at a luncheon held on Sydney Harbour in the middle of the 
conference, all the speeches from the ministers referred to their unanimity, and 
the possibility that the conference could be the first step towards real 
federation. Only Philip Fysh, the curmudgeonly Premier of Tasmania, 
dissented; he considered existing restrictions strong enough to protect the 
colonies until a new treaty with China could be finalised. 
                                                 
119 See Playford in SAPD 1888, col. 203. 
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But near unanimity amongst colonial ministers was one thing; getting the new 
Chinese immigration laws passed in the colonial parliaments would be another, 
nowhere more so than in South Australia, where all attempts to restrict Chinese 
immigration into Darwin had been frustrated. The success of the Intercolonial 
Conference would ultimately be decided in Adelaide, not Sydney. 
Closing the open door at Darwin 
When South Australian Premier Tom Playford returned to Adelaide, he wasted 
no time introducing a new Chinese Immigration bill, to give effect to the 
decisions made in Melbourne.120 This was a decisive moment for South 
Australia’s ruling class. They were facing a terrible choice. They had spent a lot 
of money attempting to develop their northern colony, but the growing Chinese 
population had been the most successful people at finding ways to make a 
living there. Now the rest of Australia wanted—demanded even!—that the 
open door at Darwin be closed. South Australia’s rich and her politicians 
mostly wanted federation, but they were being asked to sacrifice the future 
prosperity of their Territory. 
The gravitas of this occasion can be measured by the sheer length of this debate; 
it took 32 parliamentary sitting days during which the bill was debated before it 
                                                 
120 The bill was read a first time on 28 June 1888, two weeks after the end of the conference, 
SAPD 1888, cols. 162-77. 
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was passed, amended.121 The second reading debate in the House of Assembly, 
the lower house, ran over an astonishing ten days, and was carried only 
narrowly, 19 votes to 16 (with eight MPs paired).122 Playford’s speech 
introducing the bill canvassed the long history of the issue in South Australia, 
the debates at the Melbourne Conference, the reasons for the new laws, and 
concluded by asking MPs to look at the bill in terms of the interests of all of 
Australia.123
The first thing to emerge from the intense debate in the House of Assembly was 
the degree to which the politicians were deeply conflicted by the dilemma they 
faced. This is evidenced by the sharp changes of mind on a range of issues. For 
instance, the vote for the second reading of the bill in the House of Assembly 
was passed very narrowly indeed, but this turned into a 33-8 majority for the 
third reading, a massive turnaround with eight MPs reversing their vote.124 In 
the debate in committee on the specific provisions of the bill, there was turmoil 
over the tonnage provisions. The bill proposed that only one Chinese person be 
admitted for each 500 tons of a ship’s tare, in line with the conference decision. 
This was first struck out in committee, 23-18; then a proposal for 200 tons was 
defeated 23-22; then after an impassioned speech from the Premier a proposal 
for 250 tons was carried on the casting vote of the chair. A few days later, on 25 
                                                 
121 The 32 days includes all debate on the bill, including some procedural debate, and does not 
include formalities such as first readings, the reading of messages from the other house, etc. 
Debate on the bill rarely consumed more than a modest portion of parliamentary proceedings 
on any one of these days. 
122 In his speech, early in the debate, Rounsevell suggested that previous bills were let through 
the House of Assembly because it was known they would fail in the Upper House, SAPD 1888, 
col. 245. 
123 SAPD 1888, cols. 194-206. 
124 Handyside, Hopkins, Howe, Bews, Castine, Homburg and Giles all opposed the second 
reading and voted for the third; Ward supported the second reading and opposed the third. 
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September, Playford attempted to get the tonnage clause recommitted—an 
extraordinary procedure. After a bitter debate, this was agreed to 
overwhelmingly, 39-6, and the 500 tons clause was finally carried 23-16.125 In a 
parallel debate, the argument for a poll tax, the position South Australia had 
taken to the Intercolonial Conference, was also finally defeated. These changes 
of mind were not a product of any local anti-Chinese organising—in South 
Australia it was minimal. 
                                                 
125 SAPD 1888, cols. 1029-31; 1107-13. The nineteen who voted for the second reading were 
supplemented by six MPs who hadn’t been present for the first vote—almost evenly divided 
between Downer and Playford supporters. In addition, there were seven MPs who had reversed 
their votes, again roughly evenly divided between government and opposition supporters. The 
vote on the second reading was on 21 August 1888, and the division list can be found at SAPD 
1888, col. 651. The vote on the third reading was on 27 September, and the division list can be 
found at SAPD 1888, col. 1153. I have designated MPs as supporters of Playford (P) or Downer 
(D), with N=not present for the division, based on the division list for the motion of no 
confidence moved by Playford against the Downer government on 7 June 1887, five days after 
the resumption of parliament after the 1887 general election, and voted on on 9 June. Downer 
was defeated 29-16. The one exception to this is Rounsevell, who voted against Downer, but 
who described himself as a supporter of the opposition in the Chinese Immigration Bill debate, 
see SAPD 1888, col 245. There may also be other exceptions, but the patterns I am describing are 
so crude that I do not expect them to be contradicted by more definitive information on the 
allegiances of MPs. Those who turned up for the third reading vote, but who had been absent 
for the second reading vote were Sir ET Smith (D), Holder (P), Hussey (D), Kimber (P), Rees 
(N), and Solomon (D). Those who changed their vote from against the bill on the second 
reading, to for it on the third, were Bews (P), Castine (P), Giles (P), Handyside (D), Homburg 
(P), Hopkins (D) and Howe (D). By contrast, of the sixteen who voted against the second 
reading, seven were not present for the third reading vote—a result which is so extreme as to 
suggest a deliberate absence. This is reinforced by the quality and seriousness of those who 
absented themselves: Horn, Moulden, Gilbert, HE Downer and Sir Lancelot Stirling among 
them. Of the seven who absented themselves, at least five (and probably six) were Downer 
supporters. In other words, they disliked the bill, they were angry about the circumstances of its 
introduction, and the effect it would have, but they would not endanger federation. Perhaps, 
also, they realised that the Legislative Council had to be forced to finally listen to the broad 
ruling class consensus, and being unable to vote for the bill, at least allowed it an overwhelming 
majority. It is equally instructive to look at the hardline eight who held out against the third 
reading of the bill. Not one of them voted for Sir John Downer when he faced the 1887 no-
confidence motion. Downer himself had then been still overseas, returning from the 1887 
Colonial Conference in London; Dashwood, Glynn, Rounsevell and Ward had voted for 
Playford and Burgoyne, Caldwell and EW Hawker were not present for the 1887 vote. 
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The debate itself canvassed a wide range of issues, but at its centre was the 
polarity between “coloured labour” to develop the north, and the desire for 
federation. Before June 1888, South Australia’s ruling class could entertain both 
strategies; now they were forced to choose. At every crucial moment in debate, 
the desire for “Australian unity” was the government’s trump card, and it 
worked because most in the opposition also wanted federation. In his major 
speech, the Attorney-General, CC Kingston argued that he would prefer a 
united Australia rather than holding out for South Australia’s formula for 
restriction, a poll-tax. He appealed to Sir John Downer, the Leader of the 
Opposition, who had spoken out so eloquently on Australian union to sink 
party differences on the issue: “He would rather that the responsibility of 
breaking up Australian union should rest on other shoulders than his.”126
This did not mean that Kingston was opposed to coloured labour; when 
Caldwell from the Opposition pointed out that there had been net Chinese 
emigration from South Australia proper, and net Indian immigration, Kingston 
interjected, “We prefer the Indian immigrants.”127 As in Queensland, politicians 
distinguished between the advantages and dangers posed by labourers from 
India, China and other states. Moreover, the government was prepared to agree 
that coloured labour may be needed. When JCF Johnson, the Minister for 
Education and the Northern Territory was accused of telling a delegation that 
the rigour of the regulations could be softened, he replied, “That was perfectly 
true, and that was the idea of the Government. If it could be shown to be 
                                                 
126 SAPD 1888, cols. 423-4. 
127 SAPD 1888, col. 338. 
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necessary that Chinese should be introduced the rigor of the Bill could be 
softened.”128
Amongst those opposed to the bill there was a variety of positions. Most 
however would have agreed with Rounsevell when he argued that, “With our 
varied climate and conditions we must have discriminative legislation suited to 
different districts.”129 Indeed, it is probable that a majority on the government 
side would have supported this. Division on the Opposition side was centred 
on the restriction of specifically Chinese immigration. For his part, Rounsevell 
thought that Chinese immigration should be allowed, but restricted: 
He was not an advocate for the introduction of Chinese into South 
Australia proper; indeed he would help to take every means to prevent 
the Chinese coming here at all. Our laborers had a perfect right to say 
that their tasks were heavy enough, and their burdens were hard to be 
borne, and we would all resist anything like their being brought into 
competition with an increased number of Chinese. But there were places 
in Australia where the European could not profitably labor.130
However, he insisted, “the Chinese should not be allowed to come to the 
Australian shores in unrestricted numbers”; on that “there could not be two 
opinions”.131
By contrast, Horn specifically supported Chinese immigration, along with better 
regulation of the Chinese who came.132 Gilbert agreed: “if we intended to 
                                                 
128 SAPD 1888, cols. 575-6. 
129 SAPD 1888, col. 249. 
130 SAPD 1888, col. 249. 
131 SAPD 1888, col. 250. 
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develop that distant possession we must have Chinese labor.” He was against 
letting them “overrun the Northern Territory”, but also thought that “they were 
so constituted that under proper conditions they would make excellent 
citizens.”133 Ward, too, was against the bill. Like Rounsevell, he had voted for 
Playford against Downer in the 1887 no-confidence debate, but he was against 
excluding the Chinese labourer. There was probably nowhere richer on the 
continent, but it couldn’t be developed with European labour, and he thought 
the Aboriginal population was not industrious.134 He was in favour of some 
restriction and, on this basis, voted for the second reading.  
it was…necessary, because of the climatic condition of the Northern 
Territory, as applied to Europeans and not to Asiatics, to keep a medical 
man in order to carry on the works at all. They must expect to have a 
portion of the men down with fever. We wanted to get across the 
unhealthy part of the country, and we could only do that by the 
introduction of Asiatic labor. Europeans would always be subject to 
illnesses which Asiatics were not, and that was one of the reasons why 
this Bill and the resolution arrived at by the Sydney Conference was 
against the development of this great continent.135
Parliament was not divided on the issue of the importance of “coloured labour” 
for the Northern Territory—MacDonald was the only MP to argue that white 
men could work in the north, a sharp contrast to opinions in the Queensland 
parliament. The divisions were over whether or not Chinese people were 
acceptable labourers, and whether or not the unity of Australia was more 
                                                                                                                                               
132 SAPD 1888, col 207. 
133 SAPD 1888, col 577. 
134 SAPD 1888, col 649. 
135 SAPD 1888, col. 650. 
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important than the admission of Chinese labourers. Bagster, for instance, was 
one who supported the bill. The Chinese had done “evil” on the Northern 
Territory goldfields, and he worried that when the railway was finished, the 
Chinese labourers would head for the goldfields “to the ruin of the fields and of 
the white population”. It was, he thought, a pity the Indian Coolie bill had not 
been brought into force; “He believed the importation of the Indian coolie into 
the Northern Territory would be a great benefit to that place.”136 He also argued 
that if they had not had the Chinese in the Northern Territory, there would 
have been no development there: 
There would have been nothing at Port Darwin except perhaps the 
telegraph station guarded by a few police. The country would not have 
been developed and the goldfields would not have been opened up. Still, 
it would be very dangerous to that part of South Australia to allow the 
Chinese to come there in large numbers.137
For their part, the Liberals linked the necessity for the legislation to the refusal 
of the Legislative Council to pass the reasonable bills of 1886 and 1887. Grayson 
talked of the “extreme feeling of annoyance which was known to exist, [in 
Queensland and New South Wales] at the ease with which huge bodies of 
Chinamen could gain access to our Northern Territory and become a menace to 
their borders.” Further: 
They had…a right to treat it [this issue] from the standpoint of 
Australasian nationality, and not for South Australia only. Our action in 
connection with the matter was peculiarly responsible, seeing that in 
consequence of the large influx of Chinese into the Northern Territory 
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the New South Wales Cabinet considered it incumbent on them to 
institute legislation. This was distinctly stated by the Hon. J Salomans in 
introducing the Chinese Bill to the Legislative Council of that colony.138
The desire to hang on to a “coloured labour” strategy for the north, against the 
tide of feeling in the rest of Australia, was also expressed in bitterness from the 
Opposition that the Legislative Council had not passed the Chinese 
Immigration Bill of 1887. Sir John Downer thought the restrictions in force 
elsewhere in Australia, and similar to the legislation he had attempted to pass 
in 1886 and Playford in 1887, had been sufficient; “the whole difficulty of the 
case had arisen through the unfortunate action of the other branch of the 
Legislature in not extending to the Northern Territory similar laws to those 
prevailing in the southern portion of the province.”139 But he could not resist 
sharing the blame with a previous Liberal administration, for letting a railway 
contract that “required” Chinese labour.140 Rounsevell and Gilbert, both 
Downer supporters, also blamed the upper house: “if another branch of the 
Legislature had passed the Bill which the Assembly carried last session there 
would have been no necessity for the present legislation.”141
While many MPs were prepared to countenance the restriction of Chinese 
immigration, there was also a desire to do it their way—with a poll tax, rather 
than the 500 ton restriction passed by the Intercolonial Conference. It is difficult 
to understand the intensity of their attachment to the poll tax, but it seems to 
                                                 
138 SAPD 1888, col. 281; see also MacDonald, col. 286. 
139 SAPD 1888, col. 437. 
140 SAPD 1888, col. 438. 
141 Gilbert, SAPD 1888, col. 576. 
Page 524   Chapter 10: The making of White Australia 
have been sincere.142 As a result, there was bitterness towards Sir Henry Parkes 
in particular from members of the opposition, in both speeches and interjections 
through the debate. This was presumably because of Parkes’ support for a 
tonnage restriction rather than a poll tax. Downer attacked the “subservience” 
of the South Australian delegation to Parkes, arguing that this would not assist 
Australian union.143 Playford replied that it was Queensland—likewise now 
ruled by a Conservative administration—that had moved for the 500 ton limit at 
the conference, despite going to the conference with a pro-poll tax position.144 
The sense of dilemma facing the opposition was well expressed by Sir Lancelot 
Stirling: “He recognised that as we possess in the Territory a front door by 
                                                 
142 In a telegram to Playford at the Intercolonial Conference, the Chief Secretary, Ramsay, had 
reiterated what his Premier no doubt already knew: “Very strong feeling here in favor of the 
imposition of a poll tax on Chinese not exceeding thirty pounds - Hope you will be able 
influence conference in that direction.” Telegram from Chief Secretary SA to Treasurer, 14 June 
1888, State Records SA, GRG 24/4, vol 65 (1888). As the debate developed, Playford asked his 
Agent-General in London to approach the Colonial Office for a statement on the undesirability 
of the poll tax, and asked Victorian Premier Gillies to do likewise, which he did. The result was 
an informal reassurance from Graham Berry in London that “Her Majesty's Government sees no 
reason why decision of conference should be departed from”, and a formal statement from the 
Colonial Office that “H.M. Govt hope no further restrictions will be placed than those settled by 
conference.” Letter from Premier SA (Playford) to Premier Vic, 10 August 1888, State Records 
SA, GRG 24/28, vol. 7 (1888); letter from Chief Sec Vic to Chief Sec SA, 11 August 1888, State 
Records SA, letter no. 1888/1277, GRG 24/6, box 400; letter from Premier Vic (Gillies) to 
Premier SA (Playford), 14 August 1888, State Records SA, letter no. 1888/0733, GRG 24/6, box 
398; letter from Governor SA to Governor Qld, 17 August 1888, QSA, PRV7188-1-1. On 19 
August 1888, the SA Governor wrote to London: “I am requested by Ministers to ask whether 
Her Majesty’s Government would prefer five hundred tons limitation as proposed section five 
Bill, accompanied by power of relaxation as contemplated in section two without any poll tax or 
a twenty or thirty pounds poll tax and hundred ton limitation without any powers relaxation as 
contemplated subdivision three section two. Debate adjourned to Tuesday. Ministers anxious to 
hear your views with a view to informing Parliament if no objection.” State Records SA, GRG 
2/6, vol 16 (1886-9). From London came the reply: “Referring to your Telegram of 20 August 
Her Majesty’s Government prefer abolition of poll tax and 500 tons limitation with powers of 
relaxation.” State Records SA, GRG 24/28, vol. 7 (1888). These telegrams were made available to 
parliament. Letter from Premier SA (Playford) to Premier Vic, 22 August 1888, State Records 
SA, GRG 24/28, vol. 7 (1888). 
143 SAPD 1888, cols. 439-40. 
144 SAPD 1888, col. 1114. 
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which the Chinese may enter Australia we should bow to the wishes of the 
other colonies and endeavour to place some restriction on their influx.” But for 
him, that restriction was a poll tax.145
From the Conservatives who jumped ship to push this extreme anti-Chinese bill 
through the House of Assembly, it is perhaps Sir ET Smith who gave the most 
explicit explanation. Speaking during the committee debate on a poll tax, he 
said that he 
at one time favored a poll tax, but believing that they should work in 
harmony with the other colonies he would support the policy adopted 
by the Government… they ought to be consistent in their opinions as to 
federal union, and from that point of view he regretted the action of Sir 
John Downer.146
In the Legislative Council, the debate was equally prolonged, but more 
polarised, with the language correspondingly extreme. The Chief Secretary, 
Ramsay, introduced the bill expounding on the dangers and corruption 
represented by Chinese immigration; in reply H Scott described the 
Intercolonial Conference as meeting “for the breaking of the laws of the land 
and doing an injustice to one of the greatest nations of the world”. Even worse, 
it intended to deprive them of Chinese labour, and “The Chinese are the only 
Asiatics who are able and willing to undertake hard labour.” He excoriated: 
the Darwin merchants, who found that a large part of their business was 
being transferred to the hands of the Chinese storekeepers, and also that 
                                                 
145 SAPD 1888, col. 584. 
146 SAPD 1888, cols. 1113-4. 
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the Chinese were not nearly such profitable customers as the Europeans, 
and [who] accordingly determined if possible to get rid of them.147
Scott attacked the government for whipping up the groundless scare about the 
Chinese in February, and for the contempt they had shown for the Legislative 
Council, before turning the “awakening China” argument against the 
exclusionists: “Any European country would hesitate before going to war with 
China, and the colonies themselves will be unable to cope with China, as far as 
fighting power is concerned, for the next 20 years.” Hence it was important for 
the colonies to stay on good terms with China.148
It is interesting that there was virtually no debate over the proposed legislation 
for South Australia proper—the Northern Territory was the only issue. It is also 
amusing to see how many of these statesmen had suddenly discovered that 
some form of restriction on Chinese immigration into the Northern Territory 
was now desirable.149 When the Conservative leader in the council tried to 
amend the bill to not apply to the Northern Territory, he was defeated nine 
votes to two (with two sets of pairs), a radical shift from previous votes. 
Conservative resistance to the exclusion of Chinese immigrants would now take 
a new form—the attempt to impose a lesser restriction on immigration into the 
Territory. This, the decisive battle, would take place in committee. In the 
meantime, the principles of the bill were thrashed out over five days of debate. 
                                                 
147 SAPD 1888, cols. 1304-6. 
148 SAPD 1888, cols. 1306-7. He was reading from an interview given by Rev G Hargreaves, a 
missionary from Canton. 
149 For example, speeches by O’Loghlin SAPD 1888, col. 1443 and Magarey, col. 1444. 
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JH Angas supported Scott, declaring himself one of those who now believed 
that some moderate restriction was necessary, but the proposed legislation 
“should be called the Northern Territory Destruction Bill”.150 Addison thought 
the Northern Territory “a second India”. He supported the bill, but agreed that 
exclusion could “in the future involve England in war” with China.151 
Alexander Hay was outraged at the actions of Sir Henry Parkes, but he was for 
closing Darwin to unrestricted immigration—it wouldn’t be fair to let Chinese 
people in there and have them go to the other colonies. But the climate meant 
they would need some Chinese to come.152 Campbell was another climatic 
determinist; white labour was impossible in the north, and it was unreasonable 
for the southern colonies to legislate for the north. After federation, the tropical 
colonies should separate and then there would be no further aggravation over 
the labour question.153 This was music to the ears of Richard Chaffey Baker: 
It followed logically from Dr. Campbell’s remarks that the northern parts 
of Australia ought to be formed into Crown colonies, because if these 
countries were to be colonised the bulk of the people must be of a servile 
race with a dominant population of Europeans, such as was the case in 
India and Java… He would like to see the Territory peopled by a large 
Asiatic population—he did not say necessarily Chinese—ruled over by 
Europeans.154
Ramsay, the Chief Secretary, attempted to appeal to this dominant sentiment, 
by emphasising the possibilities under clause three of the bill: “There was no 
                                                 
150 SAPD 1888, cols. 1307-9 ; interjection col. 1436. 
151 SAPD 1888, col. 1309. 
152 SAPD 1888, cols. 1333-4. 
153 SAPD 1888, col. 1335. 
154 SAPD 1888, cols. 1335-6. 
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doubt that under it the Government would allow persons in want of Asiatic 
labor to import them.”155 This impressed Hay—so long as relaxation of the 
restrictions was in the hands of the Executive, he didn’t care about the extent of 
restriction and was happy to appease the Assembly.156 But this concession was 
ridiculed by the hard-line element in the Council; the reactionary Samuel 
Tomkinson asking: 
Even supposing that the white people there [in the Northern Territory] 
come to their senses and asked for the relaxation of the regulations, 
would the working men in Adelaide allow them to be relaxed? Certainly 
not. Would the Attorney-General’s constituents in West Adelaide allow 
the regulations to be relaxed? Certainly not.157
The South Australian parliament was the last major bastion of “black labour” 
politics in Australia. Where the debate in the New South Wales upper house 
was saturated with concern for the racial homogeneity of the people, the 
fabulously wealthy John Darling stood out as one of the few in the South 
Australian upper house who wanted them to turn their backs on a strategy of 
racial oppression as a means to profit. He claimed the backing of history: 
that wherever whites and colored people mingled the weaker race was 
debased and enslaved. He did not wish the history of Australia to be 
similar to that of America…and he feared that the result of the 
introduction of large numbers of Chinese into this colony would result in 
the degradation of the European colonists by their attempts to debase 
and enslave the Chinese.158
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Others pursued either an Australian, or imperial, view of the question. For 
West-Erskine: 
They had to remember that in the old country there were thousands of 
their fellow people who would, in the course of a few years, be 
compelled to seek a home in other lands… They should, therefore, be 
just before they were generous, and not allow the Chinese to monopolise 
the land that they were in duty bound to conserve for their own 
people.159
Gordon thought they could not avoid supporting the rest of the Australian 
ruling class: 
If it was true that they could not develop the Northern Territory without 
the Chinese they must consider the question of abandoning the Territory 
or else introduce Chinese. But if in introducing Celestials into that 
distant province there was a danger of their finding their way south in 
large numbers, then he thought the better plan would be to cut the 
Northern Territory off altogether.160
It was, however, when the bill moved into committee that the real struggle 
began. The Council had rejected Baker’s motion to confine the bill to South 
Australia proper, but when Scott moved that the tonnage restrictions only 
apply south of the 26th parallel, his amendment was passed 11-8; the Council 
voting for a tonnage restriction of 100 tons for the north. This move now 
precipitated a crisis, into which at least two other colonial governments 
intervened. On 25 October, two days after the vote to reduce the tonnage 
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restriction for the Northern Territory, came the following telegram from 
Queensland’s Conservative Secretary for Public Works and Mines, John 
Murtagh Macrossan: 
We regret that your Legislative Council have refused to agree to the five 
hundred limit in the Chinese Restriction Bill and hope for the sake of 
Australia’s unity that you will endeavour to reserve the decision of the 
Legislative Council. The bill as it left our Assembly was made more 
stringent by majority of three to one imposing a penalty of fifty (50) 
pounds on any Chinese entering Queensland without permission. The 
feeling here is very strong as our only danger now will be from the 
Northern Territory if your Council persists in its amendment.161
And from Victorian Premier, Duncan Gilles, on 30 October 1888: 
There appears to be some difference of opinion in your Parliament about 
some parts of the Chinese bill especially portion limiting the number to 
be carried to one for every five hundred tons of the ship especially as 
applicable to your Northern Territory. I think it of great importance that 
for the sake of unity in Australia we should all adhere to the provision in 
the conference bill.162
That afternoon, 30 October, the South Australian government went back to the 
Legislative Council and asked it to reconsider the tonnage restriction for the 
Northern Territory, and carried the vote 13-9. Motions to remove clauses 
                                                 
161 Telegram from Macrossan (Qld) to Playford, 25 October 1888; SA State Records, letter 
88/1702, GRG 24/6, box 402. There is no reflection of this “feeling” in the Brisbane Courier of the 
time, which did not editorialise on the various positions taken in the South Australian upper 
house, merely reporting them via telegrams from Adelaide. 
162 Telegram from Gillies to Playford, 30 October 1888, SA State Records, letter 88/1725, GRG 
24/6, box 402. 
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providing for different restrictions for the Northern Territory, and the 100 ton 
limit for the Territory, were then removed without division.163
With the Queensland government having earlier repealed its Indian labour 
laws, and banned the Pacific Island labour trade from the end of 1890, this was 
the moment at which the Anglo-Australian ruling class finally got its first White 
Australia policy. 
The turnaround from five days earlier came as a result of four MLCs changing 
their mind: Darling, Hay, Martin and Simms. The proceedings in the house give 
us a hint of the campaign by other colonial governments. JH Angas wondered 
“why the Chief Secretary should attempt to coerce the Council into passing the 
clause because the other colonies had acted differently.” Martin, one of those 
who had changed his mind, then attempted to justify himself. He had first 
“thought that he would prefer to see the restriction reduced from 500 to 250 
                                                 
163 SAPD 1888, cols. 1529-30. On the telegram from Gillies, Playford then minuted: “Our L.C. 
have reconsidered question and reinstated in Chinese bill the five hundred ton limit.” It is 
interesting to look for the sources in the radical change in voting. Playford had reassured his 
colleagues in other colonies that the April 1888 elections for the Legislative Council had solved 
the problem, and certainly five MLCs who voted against the 1887 bill were no longer in the 
Council. Of the eight legislative councillors elected at the general poll in May 1888, Ramsay and 
Ayres were the only ones re-elected; Ayres did not vote in the division on the anti-Chinese bill, 
while Ramsay was Chief Secretary, and in favour of it. Of the six new councillors, five were for 
the anti-Chinese bill, and one was against. Of the old group, four were against and two were 
for. In other words, the “against” group had lost three and the “for” group gained three—a six 
vote turnaround. A further member of the Legislative Council elected after the general poll due 
to a resignation, was against, but he replaced a member who was also against, so that involved 
no change. In addition, while one member previously supportive of anti-Chinese laws 
(Simpson) voted against the 1888 bill, three who were previously against—Bright, Salom and 
Simms—were now for. These were big shifts in a house of 24. In other words, there had been 
three votes gained as a result of the election, three as a result of the debate and one lost: seven 
members out of 24 had shifted, enough to turn a five vote deficit into a five vote majority. There 
were also three “against” MLCs not in the House for the vote—Scott (who was militant on the 
issue), Murray, and Ayres. 
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tons, but as he had since been assured that the other colonies would pass the 
higher limit he had decided to alter his vote on the question.” Martin was 
immediately challenged by Copley: “Who gave you the assurance?” In reply, 
Martin said that he 
did not think that he had to give the source of all the information that he 
had obtained, and it was sufficient that the assurance he received 
satisfied his judgment. He hoped that the Council would consider the 
Bill in the light of the effect it would have upon the federation of the 
colonies.164
Had he been shown the telegram from Queensland? Had the telegram from 
Melbourne arrived in time to influence the debate? Whatever had been 
specifically done, Richard Chaffey Baker was angry about it; “it seemed to him 
that the decisions of the Council were influenced by buttonholing in a most 
improper manner.” For its part, the populist Lantern, Adelaide’s equivalent to 
Figaro, was in no doubt that the motive was federation: 
despite all Sam Tomki’s hysterics, the Chinese Immigration Restriction 
Bill was passed. Although we do not agree with everything in it, this was 
perhaps the best thing that could happen in the interests of Australian 
federation.165
But if the Legislative Council had backed down in the interests of federation, it 
now put a sting in the tail of the bill, passing a clause providing that the bill 
would cease to apply on 1 January 1890 unless a proclamation was made by the 
                                                 
164 SAPD 1888, cols.1529-30. 
165 Lantern (Adelaide), 17 November 1888, p. 15. The reference is to Samuel Tomkinson MLC, 
well-known as an extreme conservative. 
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Governor that two additional colonies had passed Acts substantially the 
same.166 The Playford government had finally to agree to this clause, which 
caused a great deal of aggravation before it was quietly removed two years 
later. 
On 8 December 1888, the Governor, Sir William Robinson, signed the bill, 
bringing it into force. The open door at Darwin was now closed. Lord 
Carrington had long ago signed the New South Wales law into force; Victoria’s 
Governor, Lord Loch, followed suit on 22 December. Only Queensland held 
out. The Governor, Sir Anthony Musgrave, had died on 9 October, and the 
cranky Sir Arthur Palmer, Lieutenant Governor, reserved Queensland’s Chinese 
Immigration Restriction Bill on 6 November 1888 for London to decide,167 which 
it eventually did on 28 November 1889. Coincidentally, no doubt, the West 
Australian Governor assented to the anti-Chinese bill passed that year in his 
tiny colony. The Western Australian Act followed its larger compatriots in its 
own way by introducing the 500 ton restriction and abolishing its entry tax, but 
exempting British citizens and returning Chinese residents, unlike the model 
conference bill. This did not stop Chinese immigration into Western Australia. 
In December 1891, assent was given to amendments to South Australia’s Chinese 
Immigration Restriction Act of 1888 which continued it indefinitely, and amended 
it so that it did not apply to Chinese people naturalised in South Australia 
before 1 October 1891, or in any other Australasian colony. 
                                                 
166 SAPD 1888, cols. 1530-31, 1549-51, 1604, 1624-5. 
167 Letter from Administrator of Qld Govt (AH Palmer) to Sec State for Colonies, 6 November 
1888, QSA, PRV7188-1-1. 
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The passing of South Australia’s Chinese Immigration Restriction Bill of 1888 
devastated the Northern Territory economy.168 For the next twenty years, South 
Australian politicians would attempt to organise Indian labour, and discuss 
abandoning the Territory. Before long, they came to see federation as the 
opportunity to unload it onto the proposed new commonwealth, an operation 
completed in 1911. 
Conclusion 
In 1888, Australia was given its first white Australia policy by the combined 
action of its colonial parliaments, parliaments peopled and controlled by 
businessmen, lawyers, pastoralists, and the occasional journalist—by members 
of the ruling class, representing the interests of their ruling classes. 
A series of factors came together to drive Australia’s politicians to pass extreme 
legislation—the perception of China as a rising military power, their growing 
distrust of Britain as protector of their interests, the refusal of the South 
Australian parliament to restrict the immigration of Chinese people into the 
Northern Territory, the visit of the Chinese Commissioners, which aroused 
profound concern in the colonies that China had plans to colonise part of the 
continent, British support for the complaints of the Chinese government; and 
                                                 
168 PF Donovan, A land full of possibilities: A history of South Australia’s Northern Territory, 
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Qld), 1981, p. 179; “Memorandum by the Governor to 
Ministers on Northern Territory Affairs”, SA V&P, 1891, vol. IV, p. 4. 
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finally a series of scares in the summer of 1887-8 that large scale Chinese 
immigration was being actively organised. 
Behind these specific factors was the enormous dilemma that the Anglo-
Australian ruling class had in dealing with the 40 per cent of the land mass that 
is tropical: they did not want an indentured labour colony on the continent, but 
they could not see how white labour could develop the north. In the end, they 
chose to destroy the economy of the Northern Territory rather than allow 
Chinese people to develop it. The “emptiness” of the north made the presence 
of any Asian power, however weak in reality, seem a potential threat. As the 
Sydney Morning Herald argued in June 1888, in the wake of the Intercolonial 
Conference: “This sudden aggression on the part of our Government came, not 
from any special inroad of Chinese upon New South Wales, but rather from 
largely-increased immigration in the northern part of the colony of South 
Australia.”169
South Australia, Victoria and then New South Wales all took arbitrary 
administrative action to force a crisis on the issue of Chinese immigration. The 
Afghan crisis created the conditions for them to ram through radically more 
restrictive anti-Chinese legislation, and finally, in October 1888, to force the 
South Australian Legislative Council to choose between a thriving, Asian-
dominated Northern Territory, and federation with the eastern colonies in the 
interest of closer economic integration with its prosperous neighbours and 
wider strategic security. 
                                                 
169 SMH 18 June 1888, p. 7, col. 2. 
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Conclusion 
MOST HISTORIANS are agreed that by 1901, all classes supported the White 
Australia policy, that Australian nationalism was structured around white 
racism, and that dissentients were a small minority. Yet almost all histories 
have focused on the motives and actions of the working class. This thesis was 
grounded in the conviction that the colonial working class was nowhere strong 
enough to impose such a fundamental policy on any colonial government, and 
the empirical observation that in some places, Chinese immigration was 
restricted with minimal or no working class mobilisation. As a result of the 
research undertaken for this thesis it was also found that while racism was 
fundamental to the adoption and justification of the policy of racial exclusion, it 
fails as an explanation for it. 
This research project tested the suggestion that White Australia was a ruling 
class policy. In doing so, it explored more that just the reasons given by ruling 
class politicians and strategists for their opposition to either Chinese 
immigration or indentured “coloured labour” and looked as well for 
sufficiently profound, structural ruling class agendas that would have led them 
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to oppose capitalists who supported “non-white” immigration, and to 
themselves embrace various forms of racial exclusion. 
I concluded that the majority of the Anglo-Australian ruling class had three 
such agendas. The first and most fundamental was a determination that 
colonisation of the Australian continent would be dominated by British 
settlement, and that Chinese immigration (and any other large scale Asian 
immigration) would threaten this strategic control. While capitalist politicians 
frequently disagreed over whether or not Australia was “threatened” by some 
particular influx of Chinese people, there was minimal disagreement within the 
ruling class that this “danger” existed, and that restriction may well be needed 
at some point. Thus, the arrival of 17,000 Chinese people as part of the Palmer 
River gold rush galvanised ruling class opinion in Queensland behind 
restrictive legislation in 1877. 
The second ruling class agenda was a determination to build a modern 
capitalist economy, and a concern that this would be threatened by any large-
scale system of production based on indentured labour. This was the agenda 
that most thoroughly divided ruling class opinion in colonial Australia. Nearly 
forty per cent of the Australian land mass is in the tropics, and most leading 
colonial figures believed that white people could not do hard physical labour in 
the tropics. They therefore faced a terrible dilemma: would the north be left 
undeveloped, or would agriculture be based on the large scale use of dangerous 
“coloured labour”? This dilemma was deepened by the successful development 
of Queensland’s sugar industry on the basis of Pacific Islander labour. Would 
the immense profits being made, and the even greater profits promised in the 
future, be sacrificed? Would Australia risk a repeat of the catastrophic 
American experience of a civil war over “slavery”? As urban and industrial 
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capital grew in Queensland, the ruling class came to embrace a policy of 
tolerating, but severely containing, the use of “coloured” indentured labour. 
The profits of the sugar industry would be protected, but no new indentured 
labour industries would be allowed, and when the appalling recruitment 
scandals of 1884-5 erupted, the Liberal government moved to terminate 
Islander indenture altogether. When the sugar capitalists responded with a 
campaign to separate North Queensland from Brisbane’s control, they were 
rebuffed, and their movement contained. It was, perhaps surprisingly, in South 
Australia that capitalists were most attached to the prospect of using 
indentured “coloured labour” to develop their tropical colony, the Northern 
Territory. The determination of the rest of the colonial ruling class to prevent 
the development of a “coloured” north can be seen in the pressure they applied 
to South Australia in 1887 and 1888 to stop Chinese immigration into Darwin, 
and to do it in line with the decisions of the 1888 Intercolonial Conference. 
The final ruling class agenda was that of building a culturally homogeneous 
population. I suggest that this agenda was legitimised by the theories of John 
Stuart Mill, and his argument that “free institutions” required homogeneity and 
fellow feeling amongst citizens. I located the source of Mill’s theory of 
homogeneity in the views of the anti-enlightenment Coleridgians, who gave 
Mill the outlines for a theory of social control in the new circumstances of a 
developing industrial capitalist society. The significance of the agenda of 
homogeneity was that the Australian ruling class was actively engaged in a 
massive social engineering project, as it recruited a working class population for 
the future. Assisted British migration and the exclusion of Chinese (and 
ultimately all non-white) people were two sides of this strategy for 
homogeneity; other elements included the limitation on the assisted 
immigration of Catholic Irish settlers, and the failed attempt to assimilate 
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Catholics through systems of free, compulsory, non-denominational education. 
Thus the White Australia policy was also a (mostly) Protestant White Australia 
policy, at least until the late 1940s. 
The decisive moment in the adoption of the first White Australia policy came in 
1888, when the British government responded to a complaint from China by 
demanding that the colonies explain and justify their anti-Chinese laws. This 
brought to a head a growing anxiety within the ruling class over Britain’s 
“indifference” to their fundamental interests. At the same time, the South 
Australian Legislative Council had allowed significant Chinese immigration 
into the Northern Territory, and had refused to pass even mild restrictions. 
Backed by the vast majority of the mainstream press, colonial politicians 
asserted control of immigration policy and agreed amongst themselves to 
virtually prohibit Chinese immigration, imposing the policy on both London 
and the recalcitrants in Adelaide, who were confronted with the unpleasant 
prospect that the price of federation with the prosperous eastern capitalist 
colonies would be the probable crippling of economic development in their 
Northern Territory. 
Both the broad agendas involved in the construction of the first White Australia 
policy of 1888, and the means by which that policy was adopted and imposed, 
are themselves illustrations of the dominance of the colonial elite in Australia. 
When the labour movement was challenged and decisively defeated in the great 
strikes of the early 1890s, there was no move to dismantle the structure of racial 
exclusion agreed to in the late 1880s. The singular exception was the 
reinstatement of Pacific Islander indenture in 1892 for the sugar industry alone, 
and on a basis which threatened none of the three ruling class agendas. This in 
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turn was ruthlessly terminated by the Protectionist government of Edmund 
Barton in its 1901 legislation. 
There is, therefore, irony in the fact that many in the ruling class were initially 
reluctant to “own” their policy of racial exclusion. Whatever working class 
Australia believed about itself, many in the ruling class saw the anti-Chinese 
laws of 1888 as driven by labour movement mobilisation. In part they were 
clearly ashamed of their abandonment of some of the fundamental tenets of 
liberalism, such as the liberty of the individual and their right to free 
movement. Many were angry at Parkes’ strident speech in May 1888, or  
worried by the implications of asserting a distinctly Australian “national” right, 
reflecting local bourgeois priorities, above the needs of the empire as a whole, 
especially in a climate affected by Irish resistance to British rule. There was also 
anger and disbelief at the idea that Australia would abandon capitalist 
development in the north. But this did not imply any real sympathy for Chinese 
people, or any openness to large-scale Chinese immigration. The typical speech 
or letter from an unreconciled ruling class figure of the period attacked the 
mob, the anti-Chinese agitators, the inflated fears of the time, and sometimes Sir 
Henry Parkes, while averring a hostility to any large-scale Chinese 
immigration. The following extracts from two letters by Sir Samuel Way, Chief 
Justice of South Australia, are representative. To Sir Alfred Stephen, he wrote: 
I share your views on the Chinese question. The recent agitation is a 
most disgraceful chapter in our history… The storekeepers lighted the 
flame at Port Darwin which the labour leaders—the most cruel tyrants of 
our time—have kept alive in the South.1
                                                 
1 Letter to Sir Alfred Stephen 9 July 1888,  in Papers of Sir Samuel Way, State Library of South 
Australia, PRG 30/8 
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And to Sir Henry Parkes: 
I believe the Chinese have work to do for us especially in tropical 
Australia—but I do not yield to you in the wish to make extra tropical 
Australia the home of an Anglo Saxon race free from any admixture of 
Mongolian blood.2
British and Chinese acceptance of the 1888 decision, and the passage of time, 
saw this discontent abate. Once the consensus was firmly established, debates 
about the particular issues involved also dissipated, and the decisions taken 
were more often explained in purely racial terms. White Australia became a 
phrase that encompassed all three agendas, as did Sir Henry Parkes’ famous 
evocation of “the crimson thread of kinship”, or the Bulletin’s “Australia for the 
white man”. The dominant form of Australian nationalism, from the 1890s to 
the early 1970s, was thus, not just a product of the radical nationalist literati, but 
an expression of fundamental ruling class strategy, and was expressed in a form 
that could win the allegiance of the bulk of the plebeian social layers and the 
working class. 
In chapter 2, I discussed a possible Marxist theory of racism, built on the 
methodology of base and superstructure, and drawn from the writings of key 
Marxist thinkers. To what extent do these theses encapsulate the development 
of White Australia as argued here? Certainly economic competition opened up 
Australian workers to accepting racist ideas (Thesis 1), and “White Australia” 
gave workers an identity with the illusion of power (Thesis 2). Most analyses of 
White Australia see this racism as having benefited the “white” working class; I 
                                                 
2 Letter from Sir Samuel Way to Sir Henry Parkes, 31 May 1888, Parkes corresp, Mitchell, A913 
p. 334. 
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offered a challenge to this (Thesis 3), and showed a mainstream media 
consciously promoting racism (Thesis 4). Certainly White Australia involved 
the real oppression of Indigenous, Chinese and other “coloured” people in a 
colonial context (Thesis 5). Theses 6-8 addressed strategic issues for the working 
class movement, and were not addressed in this project. The deliberate 
construction, both demographically and ideologically, of an “homogeneous” 
people, White Australia, was aimed at creating an hegemony that would 
facilitate social control; of all my tentative theses, the ninth is the one reinforced 
most strongly. 
But there is a gap in the Marxist theory of racism I suggested in chapter 2. The 
strongest driver of White Australia racism was the strategic concern for British-
Australian control and colonisation of the continent. This was not primarily a 
question of justifying oppression, although the dispossession of Australia’s 
Indigenous people, and the exclusion and vilification of the Chinese were 
profoundly oppressive. White Australia was not just a statement about the 
communities in which Anglo-Australian people actually lived, but about vast 
areas of the earth’s surface where most Australians did not live, and did not 
want to live. It was a statement that a southern and eastern-based ruling class 
would control the vast “empty north”. The north was important as a massive 
strategic asset. For the southern ruling class, it was a strategic buffer and source 
of raw materials; and for whatever empire Australia was part of, a safe place for 
military installations and a large part of the earth’s surface denied to its rivals. 
But this strategic asset was permanently vulnerable, in the minds of Australia’s 
rulers, to encroachment from Asia. There were, supposedly, rivals for 
possession of the north; not just states, but peoples. Those people had a number 
of serious advantages in the struggle for the north—their numbers, their 
proximity, their supposed climatic suitability, and their supposed ability to 
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withstand hardship, the common experience of colonisation. The assertion that 
Australia feared Chinese and Japanese people for their strengths was not an 
attempt to make Asian people feel less debased; it was a reflection of this sense 
of strategic vulnerability. White Australia was a reflection of that constant sense 
of rivalry, however unstated. Over the past century those rivals have been 
Japan, China, and Indonesia, and dark fears of northern invasion have haunted 
politicians and ruling class thinkers to this day.3
In Australia, racism was mobilised to serve a ruling class strategic objective, to 
galvanise popular support for the state as it promoted British immigration and 
excluded people whom it thought could threaten its control. The use of racism 
in situations of imperialist rivalry is well known; during the First World War, 
the German people, led by the cousin of the British King, were vilified as “the 
hun”. The use of racism in Australia was particularly suitable because the 
strategic fear was as much focused on people, as on a rival state. Australia may 
well be an extreme example of this dimension to racism; but it is no less valid 
for that. 
 
                                                 
3 A survey of “elite” opinion in 1975 found a surprising proportion who believed that the most 
important problem the country would face in the year 2000 would be the threat of invasion 
from Asia as a result of Australia’s underpopulation. John Higley, Desley Deacon and Don 
Smart, Elites in Australia, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Boston 1979, pp. 270-75. In an interview in 
2000, former Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, raised the spectre of Australia’s north being 
“vulnerable” if the recent chaos in Indonesia had not been resolved, with possibly “hundreds of 
thousands of people landing on our shores…this is a very, very, real possibility. We have got a 
very large coastline out there; it is very hard to stop people once the flow gets going. Australia 
could be faced with a crisis here…it would be a stupid government, and a stupid people, who 
didn’t have it in their minds as a possibility.” From David Love, Straw polls, paper money, Viking, 
Ringwood (Vic), 2001, p. 256. See also the interview with an unnamed Australian “military 
commander”, in the chapter, “The potential for invasion by unarmed civilians”, pp. 340-54. 
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This understanding allows us to see that the racism unleashed by the Howard 
government against Muslims and people from the Middle East, and especially 
against refugees, has its roots in the same agendas that led to the White 
Australia policy. The government’s determination to prevent the uncontrolled 
arrival of people from Indonesia, and its attempt to impose a new form of 
“homogeneity” on Australians, have shaped its cruel vilification of Muslims. In 
the 1980s, journalist, Paul Kelly, found John Howard, then Opposition Leader, 
wrestling with the same dilemma faced by John Stuart Mill 150 years earlier. As 
Labor governments furiously deregulated and privatised, the Liberals were in 
disarray; they had nothing to offer the mass of the population beyond the same, 
increasingly disliked, agenda of neoliberalism. According to Kelly, Howard 
turned to xenophobia and conservative moralism as vehicles for some kind of 
“social cohesion”: 
Howard was attempting to address the central challenge for modern 
liberalism: how to reconcile free market economics with a system of 
social values that preserved community life… The issue can be stated 
simply—free markets have the potential to destroy the status quo. They 
can uproot communities, transfer capital and labour from one location to 
another and demolish long-established social ties and employment 
habits… Howard was the first Liberal to grasp that free market 
economics required a moral dimension and that the power of free market 
economics must be offset by an equally powerful theory of social order.4
It will take more than a PhD thesis to challenge that, but I hope that an 
understanding of our ruling class and its past can illuminate the challenges we 
face in the present. 
                                                 
4 Paul Kelly, The end of certainty: Power, politics & business in Australia, revised edition, Allen & 
Unwin, St Leonards (NSW), 1994, p. 418. 
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